security(memory): /verbatim-memory/search and session delete are scoped to the caller (#16701) by mrveiss · Pull Request #16732 · mrveiss/AutoBot-AI

mrveiss · 2026-09-14T09:21:47Z

Single-issue rationale

Scoped to one issue's route/store/delete-ownership fix; #16707/#16708 (queued next) touch different files under a separate sequencing constraint (mcp/autobot_server.py frozen at 948 lines, knowledge_search_aggregator.py waiting on #16691), so keeping this apart avoids entangling unrelated collision windows.

Thinking Path

/verbatim-memory/search (api/verbatim_memory.py) checked only that the caller was signed in. VerbatimStore.search filtered by session_id when supplied, never by user, so any signed-in user could search the autobot_verbatim ChromaDB collection and get back every user's verbatim conversation chunks. VerbatimStore.search_symbolic (the Redis inverted-term-index path -- currently unwired to any caller, but the same class, same file, same bug) had the identical gap.

Reading the file for the fix also turned up DELETE /verbatim-memory/session/{session_id}'s docstring claiming "in production the middleware additionally enforces that users can only delete their own sessions" -- nothing in this file, or anywhere grep could find, enforced that. Any signed-in user could delete any other user's verbatim session data. Same file, same root cause (missing per-caller scoping), fixed in scope alongside the search issue.

The MCP path (mcp/autobot_server.py's memory.verbatim_search tool) turned out to be a genuinely different problem, not just unverified auth: this stdio/JSON-RPC transport authenticates by scope token only ("kb"/"memory"/"agents" prefixes via _check_scope) -- there is no per-user identity anywhere in its request handling to scope by. Same shape as _kb_search/_kb_get_document in the same file, already TRACKED_GAP #16666. Filed #16727 as its own sub-issue of #16654 rather than force a fix onto a transport that structurally can't support it.

What Changed

memory/verbatim_store.py: search and search_symbolic both take user_id as a required argument (no default) -- applied in the ChromaDB where clause (composed with session_filter via $and when both are present, mirroring memory/trajectory_store.py's existing pattern) for search, and in the post-fetch candidate filter for search_symbolic (the term index has no per-user structure). Required rather than optional specifically so a future caller can't silently get every user's chunks by omitting an argument. The one legitimate unscoped caller (the MCP tool) must pass the new, explicit UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS sentinel and the code says why (#16727).

api/verbatim_memory.py:

verbatim_search now extracts the caller's user_id (via the established extract_user_context_from_request helper) and always passes it to store.search. No admin bypass on this route -- an admin-wide search would need its own explicit admin API, which doesn't exist today.
delete_session_verbatim now runs Depends(validate_session_ownership), the same dependency api/chat_sessions.py uses throughout for identical session-ownership enforcement, replacing the docstring's unsubstantiated claim.

mcp/autobot_server.py: memory.verbatim_search passes UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS explicitly. Net-zero line-count change to this file -- it's frozen at 948 lines with #16730 and #16731 also touching it (per coordinator sequencing), so this leaves the full shared ceiling for those.

Existing tests updated for the new required user_id param: memory/verbatim_store_test.py, memory/verbatim_symbolic_test.py, memory/verbatim_recency_test.py (all pass UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS, preserving their original unscoped intent -- verified the shared test-collection mock's where-handling stays behaviourally identical for the sentinel case, so no other assertion in those files needed to change).

Verification

Cross-user isolation proven with a real VerbatimStore over a mocked ChromaDB collection, not a mock asserting call args -- proves the actual filtering logic works, not just that an argument was passed:
- memory/verbatim_store_test.py: test_search_never_returns_another_users_chunks, test_search_is_symmetric_for_the_other_user, test_search_combines_user_and_session_scope
- memory/verbatim_symbolic_test.py: test_search_symbolic_never_returns_another_users_chunks
- api/verbatim_memory_16701_test.py (route layer): test_search_never_returns_another_users_chunks, test_search_is_symmetric_for_the_other_user, test_search_requires_authentication
Delete-ownership wiring proven through a real FastAPI TestClient with validate_session_ownership overridden as a real async function (not a bare mock -- FastAPI's dependency override signature inspection needs one): test_delete_session_refuses_a_caller_who_does_not_own_it, test_delete_session_allows_the_owner.

Pre-push pytest run (scoped to the changed files) passed locally:

[pre-push] running pytest on:
    autobot-backend/api/verbatim_memory_16701_test.py
    autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server_test.py
    autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_recency_test.py
    autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_store_test.py
    autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_symbolic_test.py
[pre-push OK] pytest: all relevant tests pass

CI: pending at push time.

Model Used

Claude Sonnet 5

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Summary by CodeRabbit

Bug Fixes
- Verbatim memory searches are now restricted to the authenticated user, preventing access to other users’ stored content.
- Session deletion now verifies ownership and rejects unauthorised or forbidden requests before processing.
- Search and session filters now work together to provide more accurate results.
Tests
- Added coverage for authentication, ownership checks, user isolation, and cross-user search protection.

…ed to the caller (#16701, #16654) /verbatim-memory/search (api/verbatim_memory.py) checked only that the caller was signed in -- VerbatimStore.search filtered by session_id when supplied, never by user, so any signed-in user could search the autobot_verbatim ChromaDB collection and get back every user's verbatim conversation chunks. VerbatimStore.search_symbolic (the Redis inverted-term-index path, currently unwired to any caller but the same class, same file) had the identical gap. Fixed by making user_id a required argument on both methods (no default), applied in the ChromaDB where clause / post-fetch filter -- the same grant memory/transparency.py's _list_verbatim already applies. Required, not optional, so a future caller can't silently get every user's chunks by omitting an argument. The route always passes the authenticated caller's own user_id (via the established extract_user_context_from_request helper); there is no admin bypass on this route today -- an admin-wide search would need its own explicit admin API, which doesn't exist yet. Also fixed, found while reading the file: DELETE /verbatim-memory/session/ {session_id}'s docstring claimed "in production the middleware additionally enforces that users can only delete their own sessions", but nothing in this file (or anywhere findable) enforced that -- any signed-in user could delete any other user's verbatim session data. Now runs Depends(validate_session_ownership), the same dependency api/chat_sessions.py uses throughout for the identical purpose. MCP path (mcp/autobot_server.py's memory.verbatim_search): this stdio/ JSON-RPC transport authenticates by scope token only ("kb"/"memory"/ "agents" prefixes) -- there is no per-user identity anywhere in its request handling to scope by, the same shape as _kb_search/_kb_get_document in the same file (already TRACKED_GAP #16666). Filed #16727 as its own sub-issue of #16654 rather than force a fix the transport can't support; this call site passes the new, explicit UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS sentinel and says why, so the gap is visible and can't spread to a future caller forgetting to pass user_id. Net-zero line-count change to this frozen (948-line, #16730/#16701/#16731 all touch it) file: the identity-threading comment was cut in favor of the constant's own docstring, to leave every inch of the shared ceiling for the two PRs still to land. Tested in both directions with a real VerbatimStore over a mocked ChromaDB collection (not mock-asserts-call-args): search_never_returns_another_users_ chunks / is_symmetric_for_the_other_user, at both the VerbatimStore layer (memory/verbatim_store_test.py, memory/verbatim_symbolic_test.py) and the route layer (api/verbatim_memory_16701_test.py). Delete's ownership dependency is proven wired through a real FastAPI TestClient, not a direct function call, so a refusal is proven to happen before the handler body runs. Refs #16654, #16666, #16727.

coderabbitai · 2026-09-14T09:21:56Z

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The change scopes verbatim searches by user ID, adds an explicit unrestricted scope for approved callers, and enforces session ownership during deletion. Tests cover user isolation, authentication, ownership checks, combined filters, and updated search signatures.

Changes

Verbatim access scoping

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Storage search scope `autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_store.py`, `autobot-backend/memory/*test.py`, `autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server.py`	`VerbatimStore.search()` and `search_symbolic()` now require `user_id`. Scoped searches filter chunks by user. `UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS` provides explicit unrestricted access for the MCP path and related tests.
API authentication and ownership enforcement `autobot-backend/api/verbatim_memory.py`, `autobot-backend/api/verbatim_memory_16701_test.py`	The search endpoint passes the authenticated user ID to storage. Session deletion uses `validate_session_ownership` as a dependency. Tests cover authentication, user isolation, ownership refusal, and successful deletion.

Priority: ⬆️ High

Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes

Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: High

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Client
  participant verbatim_search
  participant AuthMiddleware
  participant VerbatimStore
  participant ChromaDB
  Client->>verbatim_search: Search request
  verbatim_search->>AuthMiddleware: Get authenticated user
  AuthMiddleware-->>verbatim_search: Return user_id
  verbatim_search->>VerbatimStore: Search with user_id
  VerbatimStore->>ChromaDB: Query user-scoped chunks
  ChromaDB-->>Client: Return scoped results

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 7c5da

Authenticated MCP callers with memory access can retrieve other users' verbatim-memory chunks. Add an admin restriction or user scoping before merge.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 3

❌ Failed checks (3 warnings)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Linked Issues check	⚠️ Warning	The HTTP search path and `VerbatimStore.search`/`search_symbolic` meet the user-scoping requirement in `#16701`. They require `user_id`, apply the user condition in the ChromaDB query or candidate filte…	Gate `memory.verbatim_search` when the MCP transport has no user identity, or provide a verified per-user identity and pass it to `VerbatimStore.search`. If unscoped access is required, expose it only through an explicit admin API with an a…
Out of Scope Changes check	⚠️ Warning	The change to `delete_session_verbatim` adds `validate_session_ownership` and related tests. Issue `#16701` defines coding requirements for verbatim search isolation, search callers, MCP search, and cro…	Remove the session deletion ownership changes from this pull request, or link that work to a separate issue and submit it separately.
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 28.57% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 42 functions across 7 files.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (2 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and concisely describes the main security changes: caller-scoped verbatim search and ownership-checked session deletion.

Full details: Linked Issues check

Explanation

The HTTP search path and VerbatimStore.search/search_symbolic meet the user-scoping requirement in #16701. They require user_id, apply the user condition in the ChromaDB query or candidate filtering, and tests cover cross-user isolation, session combinations, authentication, and the sentinel collision. The MCP path still passes UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS. Its shared MCP authentication does not provide per-user identity or an explicit admin API. Therefore, MCP can still perform an unscoped search, so the requirement that broader searches use an explicit admin API and that MCP search is scoped or gated remains unmet.

Resolution

Gate memory.verbatim_search when the MCP transport has no user identity, or provide a verified per-user identity and pass it to VerbatimStore.search. If unscoped access is required, expose it only through an explicit admin API with an admin authorisation check. Add a test for the selected MCP behaviour.

Full details: Out of Scope Changes check

Explanation

The change to delete_session_verbatim adds validate_session_ownership and related tests. Issue #16701 defines coding requirements for verbatim search isolation, search callers, MCP search, and cross-user search tests. It does not require session deletion ownership enforcement. The deletion change therefore has no demonstrated connection to the linked issue's scope.

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github-actions · 2026-09-14T09:34:34Z

Notice: 29 open PRs — past the runaway threshold (25)

There is no PR queue limit, and this is not a request to defer this PR. Work proceeds one issue at a time without a cap on open PRs; review capacity is the constraint.

This notice only means the count is high enough to be worth a glance for a runaway — something opening PRs in a loop, or a merge pipeline that has stalled so nothing is draining.

Currently open:

security(kb): the MCP knowledge tools return non-private facts only (#16666) #16730 security(kb): the MCP knowledge tools return non-private facts only (security(kb): the raw ChromaDB explorer and the MCP knowledge tools bypass fact visibility #16666)
fix(hooks,tests): pre-push runs changed test_*.py, and a services/ test no longer swaps the real package over the conftest stub (#16711, #16722) #16728 fix(hooks,tests): pre-push runs changed test_*.py, and a services/ test no longer swaps the real package over the conftest stub (ci(pre-push): a changed test file named test_*.py never runs in the pre-push hook #16711, sys.modules leak guard: reconciler_status_restart_delta_14465_test.py leaks 'services' into a later autobot-slm-backend/tests file #16722)
test(settings): an anonymous caller gets 401 through the real gate (#16278) #16725 test(settings): an anonymous caller gets 401 through the real gate (security(settings): the core /api/settings routes read and write system config with no authentication #16278)
security(kb): backfill ownerless ingested documents as SYSTEM, frozen to the facts present at deploy (#16693) #16723 security(kb): backfill ownerless ingested documents as SYSTEM, frozen to the facts present at deploy (security(kb): backfill facts with no owner or visibility as SYSTEM before chat grounding is scoped #16693)
fix(ansible): venvs create with python -m venv, chdir their relative editables, single-source two venvs #16721 fix(ansible): venvs create with python -m venv, chdir their relative editables, single-source two venvs
fix(kb): six callers and a doc pass get_fact(query=...) to a synchronous get_fact(fact_id) (#16710) #16719 fix(kb): six callers and a doc pass get_fact(query=...) to a synchronous get_fact(fact_id) (bug(kb): six callers and a doc pass get_fact(query=...) to a synchronous get_fact(fact_id) #16710)
security(kb): ai-stack and RAG search routes filter results by the caller's access (#16665, PR 3/3 partial) #16716 security(kb): ai-stack and RAG search routes filter results by the caller's access (security(kb): the knowledge search and RAG routes filter results by the caller's access #16665, PR 3/3 partial)
security(kb): scope knowledge-CRUD category counts and confirm admin-gated routes carry no T3 gap (#16665, PR 2/3) #16706 security(kb): scope knowledge-CRUD category counts and confirm admin-gated routes carry no T3 gap (security(kb): the knowledge search and RAG routes filter results by the caller's access #16665, PR 2/3)
fix(kb): ID lists read back as lists, explicit read APIs pass the admin input, MCP add refuses non-admin platform-wide reach, and fact store/delete survive a missing ownership manager (#16662, #16663, #16685) #16705 fix(kb): ID lists read back as lists, explicit read APIs pass the admin input, MCP add refuses non-admin platform-wide reach, and fact store/delete survive a missing ownership manager (security(kb): the ownership helpers fail open and misread shared and group facts #16662, security(kb): only admins may make a fact platform-wide, and visibility writes keep the indexes current #16663, bug(kb): hasattr(self, "ownership_manager") is always true, so a missing ownership manager crashes fact store and delete #16685)
test(kb): the read guard ratchets against detected reads and sees raw ChromaDB reads on KB content (#16667, #16666 part 3) #16703 test(kb): the read guard ratchets against detected reads and sees raw ChromaDB reads on KB content (test(kb): a shrink-only guard over every knowledge-base read entry point #16667, security(kb): the raw ChromaDB explorer and the MCP knowledge tools bypass fact visibility #16666 part 3)
batch(2d): combine 14 reviewed members into one vehicle #16702 batch(2d): combine 14 reviewed members into one vehicle
security(redis): every Ansible-rendered client pairs its Redis password with a username; deploy scripts drop the hardcoded password (#16678, #16686) #16700 security(redis): every Ansible-rendered client pairs its Redis password with a username; deploy scripts drop the hardcoded password (security(redis): the ai-stack env and deploy playbooks send a Redis password without a username #16678, security(redis): deploy-hybrid.sh and deploy-native.sh write a hardcoded Redis password into the generated env file #16686)
fix(knowledge-ui): move Watch Folders under Knowledge → Manage and fix its form styling (#16695) #16696 fix(knowledge-ui): move Watch Folders under Knowledge → Manage and fix its form styling (fix(knowledge-ui): watch folders belongs under Knowledge → Manage; the Add watch folder form styling is broken #16695)
security(kb): the canonical search and multi-source routes filter results by the caller's access (#16665) [1/3] #16691 security(kb): the canonical search and multi-source routes filter results by the caller's access (security(kb): the knowledge search and RAG routes filter results by the caller's access #16665) [1/3]
security(kb): the raw ChromaDB explorer is admin-only (#16666, part 1) #16689 security(kb): the raw ChromaDB explorer is admin-only (security(kb): the raw ChromaDB explorer and the MCP knowledge tools bypass fact visibility #16666, part 1)
chore(deps): bump the all-dependencies group across 1 directory with 6 updates #16645 chore(deps): bump the all-dependencies group across 1 directory with 6 updates
feat(knowledge): import Claude Code auto-memory into knowledge_facts (#16642) #16643 feat(knowledge): import Claude Code auto-memory into knowledge_facts (feat(memory): import Claude Code auto-memory into AutoBot knowledge base #16642)
chore(deps): bump the all-dependencies group across 1 directory with 12 updates #16611 chore(deps): bump the all-dependencies group across 1 directory with 12 updates
chore(deps): bump the uv group across 1 directory with 2 updates #16597 chore(deps): bump the uv group across 1 directory with 2 updates
chore(deps): dependabot train — 10 members onto current main [no-merge] #16591 chore(deps): dependabot train — 10 members onto current main [no-merge]
feat(llm): wire extractive prompt compression and enforce per-provider concurrency cap (#16526, #16527) #16546 feat(llm): wire extractive prompt compression and enforce per-provider concurrency cap (Wire the existing extractive prompt compressor into the live LLM completion path #16526, Enforce the existing per-provider LLM concurrency cap #16527)
fix(infra): consolidate the last 3 private TLS-cert-generation copies (#16020) #16522 fix(infra): consolidate the last 3 private TLS-cert-generation copies (nginx cannot start on a node with no TLS cert: five roles consume the shared keypair, four provision it #16020)
fix(frontend): retire four dead settings API paths, stop a fifth calling admin-gated settings from non-admin surfaces (#16481) #16484 fix(frontend): retire four dead settings API paths, stop a fifth calling admin-gated settings from non-admin surfaces (retire useSettingsApi/SystemRepository/services-api.ts/CacheService.ts dead settings paths #16481)
feat(llm): cross-worker quota headroom store, persist real 429 headroom #16483 feat(llm): cross-worker quota headroom store, persist real 429 headroom
chore(deps): bump the npm_and_yarn group across 4 directories with 2 updates #16474 chore(deps): bump the npm_and_yarn group across 4 directories with 2 updates
feat(collaboration): surface pending invitations in the collaboration panel (#16470) #16472 feat(collaboration): surface pending invitations in the collaboration panel (impl gap: surface pending collaboration invitations in a UI #16470)
feat(collaboration): persist activity/notification history, add invitation list+respond endpoints (#16460) #16471 feat(collaboration): persist activity/notification history, add invitation list+respond endpoints (feat(collaboration): persist activity/notification history and add invitation list+respond endpoints #16460)
feat(collaboration): wire the collaboration UI onto the real backend (#16443) #16462 feat(collaboration): wire the collaboration UI onto the real backend (impl gap: wire in the real-time collaborative-session UI (#608 phases 5-7 / #874) — 6 components + useSessionCollaboration, zero callers #16443)
feat(mcp): admin-configured external MCP server bridge #16458 feat(mcp): admin-configured external MCP server bridge

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github-actions · 2026-09-14T09:35:42Z

✅ SSOT Configuration Compliance: Passing

🎉 No new hardcoded values of either class — ssot and other both block.

Known backlog in pipeline-scripts/hardcoded_values_baseline.txt is suppressed and tracked in #14371.

Auto-regenerated (py3.14) to match the backend and/or SLM backend schema so the required verify-generated-types gate(s) pass. Triggered by auto-fix-generated-types.yml.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Inline comments:
In `@autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_store.py`:
- Line 43: Replace the string value of UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS with a private
object() sentinel, then update both search paths and any related
unrestricted-access checks to use identity comparison with is. Preserve
unchanged user_id/username handling while ensuring only trusted internal callers
can pass the sentinel to disable filtering.

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📒 Files selected for processing (7)

autobot-backend/api/verbatim_memory.py
autobot-backend/api/verbatim_memory_16701_test.py
autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server.py
autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_recency_test.py
autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_store.py
autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_store_test.py
autobot-backend/memory/verbatim_symbolic_test.py

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mrveiss · 2026-09-14T15:14:01Z

Review at 51c19d8f4: blocked on one small fix. Everything else checks out.

Severity	Where	Finding	Fix
MEDIUM	`memory/verbatim_store.py`, `UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS = "__unscoped_all_users__"` and its checks in `search()` and `_rank_symbolic_candidates()`	The sentinel is an ordinary string compared against a `user_id` derived from the request. `knowledge/search_filters.py` `extract_user_context_from_request` falls back to `username` when the user dict has no `user_id`, and the JWT path includes `user_id` only when the user has one (`auth_middleware.py:417`, `:600`). Usernames accept `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$` (`autobot_shared/user_management/schemas/user.py:26`), so `__unscoped_all_users__` is a valid username. A user with that name and no `user_id` claim would search every user's verbatim chunks through `/verbatim-memory/search`.	Make the sentinel a value no string can equal, such as a module-level `object()` or a dedicated class compared with `is`, and give it its own type in the `user_id` annotation. The stdio MCP caller keeps passing it explicitly.
LOW	the same checks	A device JWT without a `user_id` claim yields `user_id == ""`, and the `where` then matches chunks stored with an empty `user_id`.	Reject an empty `user_id` in the route with a 401 before searching.

Verified:

Both production callers are updated: api/verbatim_memory.py:73 and mcp/autobot_server.py:839. Nothing in production calls search_symbolic.
Scoping happens in the ChromaDB where, not as a post-filter.
The delete route still returns 401 for an unauthenticated caller, because validate_ownership calls _get_authenticated_user before any mode check.
Ownership on delete now goes through the standard dependency. Its log-only fallback when feature flags are unavailable is pre-existing platform behaviour, tracked in security(chat): ownership enforcement fails OPEN — an unavailable feature-flag service disables every check platform-wide #14010.

…omparable string (#16701) 37's #16732 review: the sentinel was a plain string ("__unscoped_all_users__") compared with ==/!=. extract_user_context_from_request falls back to the caller's username when a token has no user_id claim, and usernames are validated against ^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$ -- a pattern the old sentinel text satisfies. A user actually named "__unscoped_all_users__" would have equaled the sentinel and searched every other user's verbatim chunks. UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS is now an instance of a dedicated, non-str sentinel type; search()/search_symbolic()/_rank_symbolic_candidates() compare it with `is`, never `==`, so no string a caller supplies can ever match it. Added a test proving a user_id literally equal to the old sentinel text stays scoped to their own chunks.

mrveiss · 2026-09-14T15:21:17Z

Correction to my review above: the LOW finding (empty user_id from a device JWT) was wrong. extract_user_context_from_request computes current_user.get("user_id") or current_user.get("username", ""), so an empty user_id claim falls back to the username (device:<id> for a device token), and "" never reaches the where. No change needed there.

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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)

autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server.py (1)
835-839: 🔒 Security & Privacy | 🛡️ Analyzed with Security Review | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win

Authorization Bypass

Reachability: External
Exploitability: Moderate
CWE: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization

Restrict unscoped verbatim search to an explicitly authorised context. _dispatch_tool grants memory.verbatim_search to any valid token with the memory scope. _memory_verbatim_search then passes UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS, which bypasses the metadata.user_id filter. Require a separate administrative capability for this operation, or pass the authenticated user ID and perform a scoped search.
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In `@autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server.py` around lines 835 - 839, Restrict
_memory_verbatim_search so ordinary memory-scoped tokens cannot search across
all users via UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS. Either require an explicitly authorized
administrative capability in _dispatch_tool, or pass the authenticated user ID
to VerbatimStore.search and retain user-scoped filtering.

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Outside diff comments:
In `@autobot-backend/mcp/autobot_server.py`:
- Around line 835-839: Restrict _memory_verbatim_search so ordinary
memory-scoped tokens cannot search across all users via UNSCOPED_ALL_USERS.
Either require an explicitly authorized administrative capability in
_dispatch_tool, or pass the authenticated user ID to VerbatimStore.search and
retain user-scoped filtering.

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github-actions Bot mentioned this pull request Sep 14, 2026

security(kb): the MCP knowledge tools return non-private facts only (#16666) #16730

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chore(types): regenerate generated API types from OpenAPI schema(s)

51c19d8

Auto-regenerated (py3.14) to match the backend and/or SLM backend schema so the required verify-generated-types gate(s) pass. Triggered by auto-fix-generated-types.yml.

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mrveiss mentioned this pull request Sep 14, 2026

chore(train): vehicle 2f — remaining approved greens (#16738, #16734, #16725, #16719, #16471, #16730, #16454, #16732) #16751

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mrveiss merged commit 990c2aa into main Sep 14, 2026
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mrveiss deleted the issue-16701-verbatim-memory-scope branch September 14, 2026 19:41

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security(memory): /verbatim-memory/search and session delete are scoped to the caller (#16701) - #16732

security(memory): /verbatim-memory/search and session delete are scoped to the caller (#16701)#16732
mrveiss merged 3 commits into
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issue-16701-verbatim-memory-scope

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github-actions Bot commented Sep 14, 2026

Notice: 29 open PRs — past the runaway threshold (25)

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