feat: multiple evm calls in single tx #603
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughA per-transaction fee mechanism is introduced for cross-chain actions in EVM gateways. The first action in a transaction is free; subsequent actions incur a configurable fee transferred to the TSS address. Multiple deposit and depositAndCall function overloads are added to support amount-based ETH and ERC20 transfers with integrated fee validation. Interface definitions are updated with new events and custom errors, and the EVM version is upgraded to cancun. Changes
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
actor User
participant Gateway as GatewayEVM
participant Storage as Transient Storage
participant TSS as TSS Address
rect rgb(240, 248, 255)
Note over User,TSS: Multi-Action Transaction
end
rect rgb(200, 220, 240)
Note over Gateway,Storage: Action 1 (First Action - Free)
User->>Gateway: deposit/call (action 1)
Gateway->>Storage: _getNextActionIndex() → index=0
Storage-->>Gateway: return 0, increment to 1
Gateway->>Gateway: _processFee() → first action free
end
rect rgb(220, 240, 200)
Note over Gateway,Storage: Action 2+ (Subsequent Actions - Fee Required)
User->>Gateway: deposit/call (action 2, with ETH fee)
Gateway->>Storage: _getNextActionIndex() → index=1
Storage-->>Gateway: return 1, increment to 2
Gateway->>Gateway: _processFee() checks:<br/>- additionalActionFeeWei > 0?<br/>- msg.value >= fee?
Gateway->>Gateway: _validate...Fee() verifies amount
Gateway->>TSS: transfer(additionalActionFeeWei)
TSS-->>Gateway: ✓ fee received
end
rect rgb(255, 230, 200)
Note over Gateway: Disabled Fee Scenario
Gateway->>Gateway: if additionalActionFeeWei == 0<br/>→ revert AdditionalActionDisabled()
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~45 minutes The changes involve multiple interconnected components: transient storage usage for action tracking, per-transaction fee state management, multiple fee validation and transfer paths for ETH and ERC20 assets, and numerous overloaded function signatures requiring careful review of parameter handling and backwards compatibility. The logic is distributed across core implementation, interfaces, and comprehensive test coverage, requiring separate reasoning for ETH vs. ERC20 flows and fee edge cases. Pre-merge checks and finishing touches✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Nitpick comments (13)
contracts/zevm/interfaces/UniversalContract.sol (1)
4-7: Remove unused imports (or reference them) to avoid warnings.IWZETA and IZRC20 are imported but unused here. Drop them unless needed.
-import "../interfaces/IWZETA.sol"; -import "../interfaces/IZRC20.sol";test/GatewayEVM.t.sol (1)
457-508: Strong coverage; add two small scenarios to close gaps.
- Add “transaction boundary” test: perform second action with fee, then start a new tx and ensure index resets (first action free again).
- Add “third action” test: perform three actions in one tx and assert fees charged exactly twice (actions 2 and 3).
I can draft both tests if helpful.
Also applies to: 611-661, 762-819, 851-996, 997-1034, 1036-1169, 1171-1190, 1192-1250, 1252-1273
test/utils/upgrades/GatewayEVMUpgradeTest.sol (2)
59-63: Use a namespaced bytes32 key for transient storage to avoid future collisions.A literal 0x01 can collide across upgrades/merges. Prefer a hashed, self‑documented slot.
-uint256 private constant _TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY = 0x01; +bytes32 private constant _TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY = + keccak256("zeta.gatewayEVM.txActionCount.v1"); ... function _getNextActionIndex() internal returns (uint256 currentIndex) { assembly { - // Load current count from transient storage - currentIndex := tload(_TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY) - // Increment and store back to transient storage - tstore(_TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY, add(currentIndex, 1)) + currentIndex := tload(_TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY) + tstore(_TRANSACTION_ACTION_COUNT_KEY, add(currentIndex, 1)) } }Also applies to: 633-644
579-611: Optional: validate before fee transfer for clearer CEI flow.Semantics are correct (reverts unwind), but moving validations ahead of the transfer clarifies intent.
- // Subsequent actions require fee payment - feeCharged = additionalActionFeeWei; - if (msg.value < feeCharged) { - revert InsufficientFee(feeCharged, msg.value); - } - - // Transfer fee to TSS address + // Subsequent actions require exact/adequate fee + feeCharged = additionalActionFeeWei; + if (msg.value < feeCharged) revert InsufficientFee(feeCharged, msg.value); + // Transfer fee to TSS address (bool success,) = tssAddress.call{ value: feeCharged }(""); if (!success) { revert FeeTransferFailed(); }Also applies to: 615-631
contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol (6)
116-137: Error set looks good; minor doc/naming nits only.The new custom errors cover all fee/ETH-mismatch paths. Consider clarifying in NatSpec that AdditionalActionDisabled is triggered when fee is 0 and actionIndex > 0, and that ExcessETHProvided/IncorrectValueProvided are used in ERC20 and ETH-with-amount contexts respectively.
205-210: Document msg.value semantics for ETH-with-amount deposit.Add a NatSpec note: “msg.value must equal amount for the first action; for subsequent actions it must equal amount + additionalActionFeeWei.”
Please confirm the implementation in GatewayEVM.deposit(receiver, amount, revertOptions) enforces this invariant (it currently does via _processFee + _validateChargedFeeForETHWithAmount).
222-224: Clarify payable usage for ERC20 deposit.Add a NatSpec note: “For first action, msg.value must be 0; for subsequent actions, msg.value must equal additionalActionFeeWei (fee only).”
237-250: Clarify msg.value rules for ETH depositAndCall with amount.Same as deposit with amount: “msg.value == amount on first action; == amount + fee on subsequent.”
264-266: Clarify payable usage for ERC20 depositAndCall.Document that msg.value is fee-only (0 for first action, fee for subsequent).
271-278: call(...) now payable: document zero-ETH first action rule.Add NatSpec: “No asset transfer. msg.value must be 0 on the first action; equals fee on subsequent.”
contracts/evm/GatewayEVM.sol (3)
55-59: Cancun/EIP‑1153 dependency and transient slot hygiene.
- Using tload/tstore ties this to Cancun-enabled chains. Confirm deployment networks have EIP‑1153 active in toolchain/runtime.
- Slot 0x01 works but is fragile for future transient usage. Consider a unique slot like bytes32(uint256(keccak256("zeta.gateway.tx.action.count"))) to avoid accidental collisions in future refactors.
Also applies to: 639-649
585-616: Fee processing logic is clear; consider pulling fee-to-TSS into a small internal “_transferETHToTSS” helper.Improves reuse and makes applying a reentrancy guard decision obvious in one place. Optional.
618-626: Doc/code mismatch: enforce equality for ERC20 fee payment.NatSpec says msg.value equals required fee, but code only rejects the “greater than” case (underpayment is caught in _processFee). Make the invariant explicit for maintainability.
Apply this diff:
function _validateChargedFeeForERC20(uint256 feeCharged) internal view { - // For ERC20 operations, msg.value must equal the required fee - if (msg.value > feeCharged) { - revert ExcessETHProvided(feeCharged, msg.value); - } + // For ERC20 operations, msg.value must equal the required fee (0 on first action) + if (msg.value != feeCharged) { + if (msg.value > feeCharged) revert ExcessETHProvided(feeCharged, msg.value); + revert IncorrectValueProvided(feeCharged, msg.value); + } }
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contracts/Revert.sol(1 hunks)contracts/evm/GatewayEVM.sol(10 hunks)contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol(6 hunks)contracts/zevm/interfaces/UniversalContract.sol(1 hunks)foundry.toml(1 hunks)hardhat.config.ts(1 hunks)test/GatewayEVM.t.sol(5 hunks)test/utils/TestUniversalContract.sol(1 hunks)test/utils/upgrades/GatewayEVMUpgradeTest.sol(10 hunks)
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contracts/zevm/interfaces/UniversalContract.solcontracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.solcontracts/Revert.solcontracts/evm/GatewayEVM.sol
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🔇 Additional comments (8)
foundry.toml (1)
26-26: Good alignment with transient storage.Foundry set to evm_version="cancun" matches contract/tests using TSTORE/TLOAD.
test/utils/upgrades/GatewayEVMUpgradeTest.sol (1)
121-130: Event + access control LGTM.Admin‑only fee update with event emission is sound; tests cover role constraints.
contracts/Revert.sol (1)
57-58: ****The interface change to non-payable
onRevert()is correct. Call sites in bothGatewayEVMandGatewayZEVMfollow the proper pattern: transfer value/tokens first, then invokeonRevert()without forwarding ETH. No refactoring needed.test/utils/TestUniversalContract.sol (1)
53-55: Verification confirms signature is consistent across all implementations.All
onRevertimplementations matching theRevertableinterface are non-payable:
TestUniversalContract.sol:53usesexternal override(correct)ReceiverEVM.sol:72usesexternal(correct)- Interface definition in
Revert.sol:57is non-payable- All call sites use non-payable calls (no value forwarding)
The legacy
ZetaConnectorvariants implement a different interface with different parameters, so they are not relevant to this change.contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol (1)
74-75: Event addition aligns with admin control of fee.UpdatedAdditionalActionFee is appropriate and matches GatewayEVM.updateAdditionalActionFee emission. No issues.
contracts/evm/GatewayEVM.sol (3)
112-122: Admin setter is fine; emits event.Implementation looks good. Consider emitting the event before updating state only if you prefer old/new in logs before mutation; current pattern (emit after assign with cached oldFee) is correct.
627-637: ETH-with-amount validation looks solid.Exact equality check prevents dust retention and overpayment. LGTM.
41-45: Verify storage layout compatibility before deployment using forge inspect.This is a new storage variable added to an upgradeable contract. While the placement appears correct (appended after existing state variables
custody,tssAddress,zetaConnector, andzetaToken, before constants), you must verify the actual storage slot layout to ensure:
- No conflicts with any previously deployed versions
- No unintended overwrites of inherited storage gaps from OpenZeppelin base contracts
- Compatibility with the upgrade path
Follow the review comment's recommendation: run
forge inspect contracts/evm/GatewayEVM.sol:GatewayEVM storage-layoutand compare against the currently deployed implementation's layout.
…calls # Conflicts: # docs/index.md
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contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol (2)
219-226: Document the fee payment requirement for ERC20 deposits.Making the ERC20
depositfunctionpayableis a significant behavioral change. Users will need to send ETH (viamsg.value) to cover potential additional action fees, even when depositing ERC20 tokens. This could be confusing without clear documentation.Consider enhancing the function documentation:
/// @notice Deposits ERC20 tokens to the custody or connector contract. + /// @dev If this is not the first action in the transaction, msg.value must include the additional action fee. /// @param receiver Address of the receiver. /// @param amount Amount of tokens to deposit. /// @param asset Address of the ERC20 token. /// @param revertOptions Revert options. function deposit(
260-268: Document the fee payment requirement for ERC20 depositAndCall.Similar to the
depositfunction, this ERC20depositAndCallis nowpayableto support fee payments. Consider adding documentation to clarify when ETH must be sent alongside ERC20 token approvals.Apply similar documentation enhancement:
/// @notice Deposits ERC20 tokens to the custody or connector contract and calls an omnichain smart contract. + /// @dev If this is not the first action in the transaction, msg.value must include the additional action fee. /// @param receiver Address of the receiver. /// @param amount Amount of tokens to deposit. /// @param asset Address of the ERC20 token. /// @param payload Calldata to pass to the call. /// @param revertOptions Revert options.
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol (2)
74-77: Add explanatory documentation for the additional action fee mechanism.The past review comment requested additional documentation here. Consider expanding the NatSpec to explain what "additional action" means in this context (e.g., "subsequent actions after the first free action in a transaction").
Apply this diff to enhance the documentation:
- /// @notice Emitted when additional action fee is updated. - /// @param oldFeeWei old fee value. - /// @param newFeeWei new fee value. + /// @notice Emitted when the additional action fee is updated. + /// @dev The first action in a transaction is free; subsequent actions incur this fee. + /// @param oldFeeWei Old fee value in wei. + /// @param newFeeWei New fee value in wei. event UpdatedAdditionalActionFee(uint256 oldFeeWei, uint256 newFeeWei);
274-280: Document the fee payment requirement for the call function.The
callfunction is nowpayable, likely to support the additional action fee mechanism. Consider documenting whenmsg.valuemust be provided.Enhance the documentation:
/// @notice Calls an omnichain smart contract without asset transfer. + /// @dev If this is not the first action in the transaction, msg.value must include the additional action fee. /// @param receiver Address of the receiver. /// @param payload Calldata to pass to the call. /// @param revertOptions Revert options.
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contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol(6 hunks)foundry.toml(1 hunks)
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🔇 Additional comments (3)
contracts/evm/interfaces/IGatewayEVM.sol (3)
119-139: LGTM! Comprehensive error definitions.The new custom errors are well-documented and provide detailed context with parameters for debugging fee-related issues. This follows Solidity best practices for gas-efficient error handling.
240-252: LGTM! Consistent with the new deposit pattern.This overload follows the same pattern as the new
depositfunction with explicit amount. The documentation is clear and the signature is well-formatted.
208-212: Implementation correctly validates msg.value relationship.The
deposit(address receiver, uint256 amount, RevertOptions)function at lines 284-311 properly validates thatmsg.valueequalsamount + feeCharged. The validation function_validateChargedFeeForETHWithAmount(lines 631-635) enforces this with the checkif (msg.value != expectedValue) revert IncorrectValueProvided(expectedValue, msg.value), providing clear error messages that show both expected and provided values. The documentation accurately reflects this requirement.
Original PR: feat: multiple evm calls in single tx #569
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