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chore(deps): update dependency kubeshark/kubeshark to v52.1.63 #3326

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merged 1 commit into from
Feb 29, 2024

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Update Change
kubeshark/kubeshark patch v52.1.50 -> v52.1.63

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.


Release Notes

kubeshark/kubeshark (kubeshark/kubeshark)

v52.1.63

Compare Source

Kubeshark release v52.1.63

Kubeshark CHANGELOG is now part of Kubeshark wiki

Download Kubeshark for your platform

Mac (x86-64/Intel)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.63/kubeshark_darwin_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Mac (AArch64/Apple M1 silicon)

rm -f kubeshark && curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.63/kubeshark_darwin_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (x86-64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.63/kubeshark_linux_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (AArch64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.63/kubeshark_linux_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Windows (x86-64)

curl -LO https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.63/kubeshark.exe
Checksums

SHA256 checksums available for compiled binaries.
Run shasum -a 256 -c kubeshark_OS_ARCH.sha256 to verify.

v52.1.62

Compare Source

Kubeshark release v52.1.62

Kubeshark CHANGELOG is now part of Kubeshark wiki

Download Kubeshark for your platform

Mac (x86-64/Intel)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.62/kubeshark_darwin_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Mac (AArch64/Apple M1 silicon)

rm -f kubeshark && curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.62/kubeshark_darwin_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (x86-64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.62/kubeshark_linux_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (AArch64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.62/kubeshark_linux_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Windows (x86-64)

curl -LO https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.62/kubeshark.exe
Checksums

SHA256 checksums available for compiled binaries.
Run shasum -a 256 -c kubeshark_OS_ARCH.sha256 to verify.

v52.1.61

Compare Source

v52.1.61 (2024-02-28)

Release Highlights

Keywords: Custom TLS, eBPF, Homebrew

In this release, we have enhanced the Homebrew installation process and addressed several bugs. We have broadened our eBPF TLS interception capabilities to include support for Golang sockets and custom TLS configurations. Additionally, we have undertaken significant refactoring in the Worker to boost performance and conducted comprehensive bug fixes.

Bug Fixes
  • The installation script is now hosted in the Kubeshark main repository.
  • Enhanced the Homebrew user experience (https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/issues/1488).
  • Resolved a Homebrew-related issue (https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/issues/1345).
  • Improved support for Minikube and other Linux kernels by removing the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capability, which can still be manually added if necessary (kubeshark/kubeshark@8fe0544).
  • Refactored significant portions of the Worker's dissection-reassemble-display process for increased reliability (shifted from dynamic API call representation to a static approach to avoid marshaling and unmarshaling).
  • Addressed numerous bugs in the Worker.
  • Added API call METADATA to each API call information pane, encompassing all relevant API call details.
  • Enabled TLS capture from Golang sockets.
  • Introduced support for custom TLS eBPF probes.

Download Kubeshark for your platform

Mac (x86-64/Intel)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.61/kubeshark_darwin_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Mac (AArch64/Apple M1 silicon)

rm -f kubeshark && curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.61/kubeshark_darwin_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (x86-64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.61/kubeshark_linux_amd64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Linux (AArch64)

curl -Lo kubeshark https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.61/kubeshark_linux_arm64 && chmod 755 kubeshark

Windows (x86-64)

curl -LO https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/download/v52.1.61/kubeshark.exe
Checksums

SHA256 checksums available for compiled binaries.
Run shasum -a 256 -c kubeshark_OS_ARCH.sha256 to verify.


Configuration

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Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

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Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.

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🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/kubeshark:v52.1.63

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/kubeshark:v52.1.63
digestsha256:5c2f0e8ca6c6c9b0d3355c7c38654b8c5d06dfe128530abd28cd81c6e8420a48
vulnerabilitiescritical: 0 high: 2 medium: 7 low: 0 unspecified: 4
platformlinux/amd64
size17 MB
packages148
critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 1 low: 0 unspecified: 1google.golang.org/grpc 1.54.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/google.golang.org/grpc@1.54.0

high 7.5: GHSA--m425--mq94--257g

Affected range<1.56.3
Fixed version1.56.3
CVSS Score7.5
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

Impact

In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.

Patches

This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.

Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.

Workarounds

None.

References

#6703

medium 5.3: CVE--2023--44487 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Affected range<1.56.3
Fixed version1.56.3
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Description

HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack

The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.

Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.

The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.

The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.

In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.

Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the swift-nio-http2 repo advisory and their original conent follows.

swift-nio-http2 specific advisory

swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an EventLoop and prevent it from making forward progress.

swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.

unspecified : GMS--2023--3788 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Affected range<1.56.3
Fixed version1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3
Description

Impact

In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit.

Patches

This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0.

Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection.

Workarounds

None.

References

#6703

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 1 low: 0 helm.sh/helm/v3 3.12.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/helm.sh/helm/v3@3.12.0

high 7.5: CVE--2024--26147 Use of Uninitialized Variable

Affected range<3.14.2
Fixed version3.14.2
CVSS Score7.5
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

A Helm contributor discovered uninitialized variable vulnerability when Helm parses index and plugin yaml files missing expected content.

Impact

When either an index.yaml file or a plugins plugin.yaml file were missing all metadata a panic would occur in Helm.

In the Helm SDK this is found when using the LoadIndexFile or DownloadIndexFile functions in the repo package or the LoadDir function in the plugin package. For the Helm client this impacts functions around adding a repository and all Helm functions if a malicious plugin is added as Helm inspects all known plugins on each invocation.

Patches

This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.14.2.

Workarounds

If a malicious plugin has been added which is causing all Helm client commands to panic, the malicious plugin can be manually removed from the filesystem.

If using Helm SDK versions prior to 3.14.2, calls to affected functions can use recover to catch the panic.

For more information

Helm's security policy is spelled out in detail in our SECURITY document.

Credits

Disclosed by Jakub Ciolek at AlphaSense.

medium 6.4: CVE--2024--25620 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Affected range<=3.14.0
Fixed version3.14.1
CVSS Score6.4
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Description

A Helm contributor discovered a path traversal vulnerability when Helm saves a chart including at download time.

Impact

When either the Helm client or SDK is used to save a chart whose name within the Chart.yaml file includes a relative path change, the chart would be saved outside its expected directory based on the changes in the relative path. The validation and linting did not detect the path changes in the name.

Patches

This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.14.1.

Workarounds

Check all charts used by Helm for path changes in their name as found in the Chart.yaml file. This includes dependencies.

Credits

Disclosed by Dominykas Blyžė at Nearform Ltd.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 unspecified: 1github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin 0.2.3 (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@0.2.3

medium : GHSA--6xv5--86q9--7xr8

Affected range<0.2.4
Fixed version0.2.4
Description

Impact

For Windows users of github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin, until v0.2.4 it was possible for certain rootfs and path combinations (in particular, where a malicious Unix-style /-separated unsafe path was used with a Windows-style rootfs path) to result in generated paths that were outside of the provided rootfs.

It is unclear to what extent this has a practical impact on real users, but given the possible severity of the issue we have released an emergency patch release that resolves this issue.

Thanks to @pjbgf for discovering, debugging, and fixing this issue (as well as writing some tests for it).

Patches

c121231e1276e11049547bee5ce68d5a2cfe2d9b is the patch fixing this issue. v0.2.4 contains the fix.

Workarounds

Users could use filepath.FromSlash() on all unsafe paths before passing them to filepath-securejoin.

References

See #9.

unspecified : GMS--2023--2229 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Affected range
Fixed versionv0.2.4
Description

Impact

For Windows users of github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin, until v0.2.4 it was possible for certain rootfs and path combinations (in particular, where a malicious Unix-style /-separated unsafe path was used with a Windows-style rootfs path) to result in generated paths that were outside of the provided rootfs.

It is unclear to what extent this has a practical impact on real users, but given the possible severity of the issue we have released an emergency patch release that resolves this issue.

Thanks to @pjbgf for discovering, debugging, and fixing this issue (as well as writing some tests for it).

Patches

c121231e1276e11049547bee5ce68d5a2cfe2d9b is the patch fixing this issue. v0.2.4 contains the fix.

Workarounds

Users could use filepath.FromSlash() on all unsafe paths before passing them to filepath-securejoin.

References

See #9.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 unspecified: 1github.com/docker/docker 20.10.24+incompatible (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/docker/docker@20.10.24+incompatible

medium : GHSA--jq35--85cj--fj4p

Affected range<20.10.27
Fixed version24.0.7
Description

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.

By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.

Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios:

  • Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system
  • sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments running directly on affected hardware. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.

References

unspecified : GMS--2023--3981 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Affected range<20.10.27
Fixed versionv24.0.7
Description

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 unspecified: 1github.com/containerd/containerd 1.7.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/containerd/containerd@1.7.0

medium : GHSA--7ww5--4wqc--m92c

Affected range>=1.7.0
<=1.7.10
Fixed version1.7.11
Description

/sys/devices/virtual/powercap accessible by default to containers

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.

By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.

Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios:

  • Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system
  • sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.

References

unspecified : GMS--2023--6564 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Affected range>=1.7.0
<=1.7.10
Fixed version1.6.26, 1.7.11
Description

/sys/devices/virtual/powercap accessible by default to containers

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.

By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.

Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios:

  • Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system
  • sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.

References

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 golang.org/x/crypto 0.14.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.14.0

medium 5.9: CVE--2023--48795 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affected range<0.17.0
Fixed version0.17.0
CVSS Score5.9
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Description

Summary

Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it.

Mitigations

To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes.

Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.

As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.

Details

The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.

The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.

In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.

For more details see https://terrapin-attack.com.

Impact

This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 k8s.io/apiserver 0.27.1 (golang)

pkg:golang/k8s.io/apiserver@0.27.1

medium 4.3: CVE--2020--8552 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Affected range<1.15.10
Fixed version1.15.10, 1.16.7, 1.17.3
CVSS Score4.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Description

The Kubernetes API server component has been found to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack via successful API requests.

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Attempting automerge. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/8089586079.

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PR is clean and can be merged. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/8089586079.

@github-actions github-actions bot merged commit 4bc1b2a into main Feb 29, 2024
9 of 10 checks passed
@github-actions github-actions bot deleted the renovate/kubeshark-kubeshark-52.1.x branch February 29, 2024 01:24
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