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base repository: ulid/javascript
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compare: 11c2067
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  • 4 commits
  • 3 files changed
  • 3 contributors

Commits on Jun 8, 2025

  1. Add prepublish script

    perry-mitchell committed Jun 8, 2025
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Commits on Nov 21, 2025

  1. [LOW][Security] Fix biased random number generation

    The random number generation logic results in a bias leading to some
    characters being more frequent than others, due to incorrect processing
    of random bytes.
    
    This can result in more easily guessable IDs, enabling some enumeration
    of resources.
    
    The crux of the vulnerability is that the RNG (as defined in
    `detectPRNG`), generates a float by generating a random byte and
    dividing by 255 (0xff). So, if the random byte is 0x00, it returns 0. If
    the byte is 0x01, it returns ~0.0039, and so on, until if the random
    byte is 0xff, it returns 1.
    
    Thus, the float returned could be [0, 1], rather than [0, 1) (as some
    comments expect).
    
    For reference, The whole list of possible outputs of the rng function
    returned by `detectPRNG` can be obtained by the following snippet:
    
    ```
    const rngValues = Array.from(new Array(256), (_, idx) => (idx)/0xff);
    > [0, 0.0039, …, 1]
    ```
    
    As a result, the `randomChar` function (as used by `encodeRandom`) will
    generate a bias, as it wraps around if the value is 1.
    
    All possible randomPosition values are thus (where 32 is from
    `ENCODING_LEN`):
    
    ```
    const randomPositions = rngValues.map((v) => Math.floor(v * 32) % 32)
    > [0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  1,  1,  1,  1, …, 31, 0]
    ```
    
    If you take a look at the values of this array, you’ll notice that the
    distribution isn’t equal:
    
    ```
    randomPositions.reduce((acc, v) => {
      if (!acc.has(v)) { acc.set(v, 0); }
      acc.set(v, acc.get(v)+1);
      return acc;
    }, new Map());
    > { 0 => 9, 1 => 8, 2 => 8, …, 30 => 8, 31 => 7 }
    ```
    
    Therefore, it’s more likely to generate a ‘0’ character, than a ‘Z’
    character, and thus will lead to bias, thus a lower entropy than
    expected.
    pnappa committed Nov 21, 2025
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Commits on Nov 22, 2025

  1. Configuration menu
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Commits on Nov 30, 2025

  1. Release 3.0.2

    perry-mitchell committed Nov 30, 2025
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