Verify the libarchive payload #181
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The libarchive that is used to make a swiftly release for Linux is downloaded directly from the libarchive project on GitHub from a release artifact. In theory, this release could become tampered in the future. Typically package managers get around this problem by both getting a specific version of the package, and also keep a hash/git commit to verify the contents. Add a content check using an expected SHA-256 sum of the release source tarball of libarchive to help protect against any tampering of the release in the future.
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@swift-ci test macOS |
justice-adams-apple
approved these changes
Nov 4, 2024
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LGTM |
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The libarchive that is used to make a swiftly release for Linux is downloaded directly from the libarchive project on GitHub from a release artifact. In theory, this release could become tampered in the future.
Typically package managers get around this problem by both getting a specific version of the package, and also keep a hash/git commit to verify the contents.
Add a content check using an expected SHA-256 sum of the release source tarball of libarchive to help protect against any tampering of the release in the future.