Update electron #994
Update electron #994
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Caution Review failedThe pull request is closed. WalkthroughThe pull request modifies the Changes
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Codecov ReportAll modified and coverable lines are covered by tests ✅
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #994 +/- ##
=======================================
Coverage 72.11% 72.12%
=======================================
Files 107 107
Lines 11334 11338 +4
Branches 2165 2167 +2
=======================================
+ Hits 8174 8178 +4
Misses 3142 3142
Partials 18 18 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
src/background/window/security.ts (1)
11-15: Consider consistent error handling across security validationsThe new null handling introduces an inconsistency in error handling patterns. Other security validation functions (
validateHTTPRequestMethod,validateHTTPRequestURL) throw errors, while this silently returns on null frames. This could lead to security assumptions being violated if callers expect errors to be thrown.Consider either:
- Throwing an error for null frames to maintain consistency
- Documenting why this specific case warrants different handling
- Adding a boolean return value to explicitly indicate validation result
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
[warning] 13-15: src/background/window/security.ts#L13-L15
Added lines #L13 - L15 were not covered by tests
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
package-lock.jsonis excluded by!**/package-lock.json
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
src/background/window/security.ts(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
src/background/window/security.ts
[warning] 13-15: src/background/window/security.ts#L13-L15
Added lines #L13 - L15 were not covered by tests
🔇 Additional comments (1)
src/background/window/security.ts (1)
11-11: Verify security implications of null frame handling
The signature change to accept null frames aligns with Electron's updates. However, since this is a security-critical function, we should verify that null frames can only occur in safe contexts (navigation/destruction).
Let's analyze the usage patterns:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the comprehensive analysis of the codebase, I can now provide a final response:
Null frame handling is properly implemented with appropriate security measures
The implementation shows that:
- The null check is performed immediately with early return and error logging
- The function is only used in IPC handlers where the frame is directly from Electron's event
- Test coverage confirms the validation of allowed/disallowed origins
- The null handling aligns with Electron's security best practices for IPC validation
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Analyze IPC message handling to ensure null frames are handled safely
# Find all IPC-related code that might use this validator
rg -l "validateIPCSender|ipcMain.on|ipcMain.handle" --type ts
# Look for any direct WebFrameMain access patterns
ast-grep --pattern 'frame.$_'
Length of output: 380
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's analyze the implementation and test coverage
# Check the full implementation of validateIPCSender
cat src/background/window/security.ts
# Check how it's used in IPC handlers
cat src/background/window/ipc.ts
# Check test coverage
cat src/tests/background/window/security.spec.ts
Length of output: 32325
src/background/window/security.ts
Outdated
| if (!frame) { | ||
| getAppLogger().error("WebFrameMain is already null"); | ||
| return; | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Enhance error handling and add test coverage
While the null check is appropriate, consider these improvements:
- The error message could be more descriptive (e.g., include context about when/why the frame is null)
- The error message should use the i18n system like other messages in this file
- The new code path lacks test coverage
Consider this enhancement:
if (!frame) {
- getAppLogger().error("WebFrameMain is already null");
+ getAppLogger().error(t.webFrameMainNull("during navigation or frame destruction"));
return;
}Would you like me to help create unit tests for this new code path?
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
[warning] 13-15: src/background/window/security.ts#L13-L15
Added lines #L13 - L15 were not covered by tests
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Actionable comments posted: 1
📜 Review details
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Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
src/background/window/security.ts(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
src/background/window/security.ts
[warning] 17-19: src/background/window/security.ts#L17-L19
Added lines #L17 - L19 were not covered by tests
🔇 Additional comments (2)
src/background/window/security.ts (2)
11-19: Security Review: Assess null frame handling implications
The current implementation bypasses all security checks when frame is null. This could potentially create a security vulnerability if malicious code can intentionally trigger null frame conditions.
Consider these security aspects:
- Can the null frame state be artificially triggered?
- Should we maintain a security audit trail for null frame occurrences?
- Should we implement rate limiting for null frame events?
#!/bin/bash
# Search for potential security implications in similar validation patterns
rg -l "WebFrameMain.*null" --type ts | xargs rg "security|validation|check" -C 5
# Look for any existing security measures around frame validation
rg "validateFrame|checkFrame|securityCheck" --type ts🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
[warning] 17-19: src/background/window/security.ts#L17-L19
Added lines #L17 - L19 were not covered by tests
11-11: Verify the necessity of accepting null WebFrameMain
While this change aligns with the Electron update, accepting null in a security validation function requires careful consideration. Let's verify this is the only viable approach.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response as there's sufficient context to verify the concern:
Accepting null for WebFrameMain is necessary and properly handled
The change to accept null in validateIPCSender is justified and properly implemented:
- The code includes a clear comment explaining that frames can be null during navigation or after frame disposal in Electron 33.2.0
- The function handles the null case gracefully by logging an error and returning early
- The function is extensively used across the codebase for IPC security validation (70+ call sites found)
- The implementation maintains security by preventing further processing when frame is null
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for WebFrameMain usage patterns in the codebase to understand the context
rg -A 3 "WebFrameMain" --type ts
# Look for similar patterns in Electron's documentation/examples
gh api repos/electron/electron/contents/docs --jq '.[] | select(.name | contains("web-frame")) | .download_url' | xargs curl -s | grep -A 5 "WebFrameMain.*null"
Length of output: 232
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for WebFrameMain usage patterns in the codebase
rg -A 5 "WebFrameMain" --type ts
# Search for validateIPCSender usage to understand call sites
rg -A 5 "validateIPCSender" --type ts
# Look for IPC-related security validations
rg -A 5 "ipc.*security|security.*ipc" --type ts --ignore-case
Length of output: 30877
src/background/window/security.ts
Outdated
| if (!frame) { | ||
| // TODO: | ||
| // electron 33.0.2 から 33.2.0 へのアップデートで frame が null になる可能性が生じるようになった。 | ||
| // ただし、null になるのはナビゲーション中やフレーム破棄後であるとされ、ここに null が渡されるケースは無いと思われる。 | ||
| // null の場合に例外を投げるようにしても良いが、十分な検証ができるまではエラーログの出力に留める。 | ||
| getAppLogger().error("WebFrameMain is already null"); | ||
| return; | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Critical security and maintainability improvements needed
Several issues need attention in this security-critical section:
- The TODO comments should be in English for better international collaboration
- The error message lacks context about the conditions leading to null frame
- The early return without validation needs security impact assessment
- This critical path lacks test coverage
Consider this enhanced implementation:
if (!frame) {
- // TODO:
- // electron 33.0.2 から 33.2.0 へのアップデートで frame が null になる可能性が生じるようになった。
- // ただし、null になるのはナビゲーション中やフレーム破棄後であるとされ、ここに null が渡されるケースは無いと思われる。
- // null の場合に例外を投げるようにしても良いが、十分な検証ができるまではエラーログの出力に留める。
- getAppLogger().error("WebFrameMain is already null");
+ // TODO: After Electron 33.0.2 update, frame can be null during navigation or after frame destruction.
+ // Consider throwing an exception after thorough validation of security implications.
+ getAppLogger().error(t.webFrameMainNull("Security validation failed: frame is null during navigation or frame destruction"));
return;
}Would you like me to help:
- Create unit tests for this null frame scenario?
- Implement a more robust security validation approach for null frames?
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if (!frame) { | |
| // TODO: | |
| // electron 33.0.2 から 33.2.0 へのアップデートで frame が null になる可能性が生じるようになった。 | |
| // ただし、null になるのはナビゲーション中やフレーム破棄後であるとされ、ここに null が渡されるケースは無いと思われる。 | |
| // null の場合に例外を投げるようにしても良いが、十分な検証ができるまではエラーログの出力に留める。 | |
| getAppLogger().error("WebFrameMain is already null"); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| if (!frame) { | |
| // TODO: After Electron 33.0.2 update, frame can be null during navigation or after frame destruction. | |
| // Consider throwing an exception after thorough validation of security implications. | |
| getAppLogger().error(t.webFrameMainNull("Security validation failed: frame is null during navigation or frame destruction")); | |
| return; | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: codecov/patch
[warning] 17-19: src/background/window/security.ts#L17-L19
Added lines #L17 - L19 were not covered by tests
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説明 / Description
electron v33.0.2 には Linux 版のバイナリにデバッグ情報が入ってしまう問題があるため、 v33.2.0 へアップデートする。
electron のアップデートにより webFrame が
WebFrameMain | nullに変わったので対応する。null になるのは navigation や destroyed なときらしいので、基本的には発生しないと理解している。
チェックリスト / Checklist
npm testpassednpm run lintwas applied without warnings/docs/webappnot included (except release branch)console.lognot included (except script file)Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Refactor
Tests