CVE-2007-4559 Patch

[TrellixVulnTeam]

Patching CVE-2007-4559

Hi, we are security researchers from the Advanced Research Center at Trellix. We have began a campaign to patch a widespread bug named CVE-2007-4559. CVE-2007-4559 is a 15 year old bug in the Python tarfile package. By using extract() or extractall() on a tarfile object without sanitizing input, a maliciously crafted .tar file could perform a directory path traversal attack. We found at least one unsantized extractall() in your codebase and are providing a patch for you via pull request. The patch essentially checks to see if all tarfile members will be extracted safely and throws an exception otherwise. We encourage you to use this patch or your own solution to secure against CVE-2007-4559. Further technical information about the vulnerability can be found in this blog.

If you have further questions you may contact us through this projects lead researcher Kasimir Schulz.

[openshift-ci]

Hi @TrellixVulnTeam. Thanks for your PR.

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[openshift-ci]

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This pull-request has been approved by: TrellixVulnTeam
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[osherdp]

Hi @TrellixVulnTeam!
First and foremost, thank you for looking out for this issue across lots of existing GitHub projects that are infected by it!

I wanted to let you know of a couple of comments I have for this process:

• First, I'm not sure if it's possible to tag Kasimir Schulz in GitHub. For opensource projects it's more common to reach via GitHub discussion rather than continuing discussions via email (which has the tendency of creating a "split-brain": discussions in each media can lead to different conclusions)
• We usually prefer a different style of code, and most importantly reducing code duplication. That's why I'm going to open a new PR (assuming you folks are too busy to respond reviews) which is a bit different. I understand you folks tried making it Python 2+3 compatible and also are not familiar with each open-source conventions for where to put utility functions etc., it's well understood and accepted
• Because of the previous point, I think it will be better to introduce a new third-party library that does this check before running extract / extractall. Patched projects won't be bothered by code style, it's abstracted from them :)
• Better yet, I don't understand why new cpython versions don't come with a new method safe_extract or something alike. Users of the old functions can have the same functionality as they had before, but anyone can move to the new variant based on the use-case
• Lastly, I think you haven't caught all relevant uses. Please take a look at the PR I've created: sanitize tar archives due to CVE #1900