This is an opinionated single-file OpenVPN TLS certificate manager and OpenVPN configuration generator. It has no dependencies on any other external tool such as openssl. It is a replacement for and an enhancement to easy-rsa (typically bundled with OpenVPN).
- v0.9.x is a breaking change from the previous version:
pki/
code is moved to its own repository- boltdb code refactored (e.g., use AEAD for storing DB key)
- If you are using v0.8.x, please export the database and import it. See the section on importing below.
- Uses a single boltdb instance to store the certificates and keys.
- All data stored in the database is encrypted with keys derived from a user supplied CA passphrase.
- To support automation, the master password can be supplied via a
user defined environment variable. All commands support
--env-password=E
option to support this feature. - Support for arbitrary chain of intermediate CAs
- The certificates and keys are opinionated:
- Secp521r1 used for CA certificates
- Secp256k1 EC certificate private keys
- "SSL-Server" attribute set on server certificates (nsCertType)
- "SSL-Client" attribute set on client certificates (nsCertType)
- ECDSA with SHA512 is used as the signature algorithm
- The generated OpenVPN configuration for client or server uses inline
certificates, keys and runs with an opinionated set of defaults:
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384:TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256
for TLS control channelAES-256-GCM
for data encryption- TLS 1.2 is the minimum version negotiation
- Client verifies the X509 Common-Name of the server
- Uses "tun" mode
- Server pushes its tunnel address as the default gateway for all client traffic
- Server pushes its tunnel address as the DNS server so that all
DNS lookups on the client can be handled inside the tunnel. The
server will need additional software such as
unbound
to provide DNS server/cache functionality. - The Client and Server configurations uses the
tls-crypt
option to ensure that the server is protected with an additional layer of encryption to thwart DoS attacks.
- Ability to export DB contents as a JSON file; ability to import JSON from a previous export.
You will need a fairly recent golang toolchain (>1.10):
$ git clone https://github.com/opencoff/ovpn-tool
$ cd ovpn-tool
$ ./build -s
The build script puts the binary in a platform specific directory:
- macOS:
bin/darwin-amd64
- Linux:
bin/linux-amd64
- OpenBSD:
bin/openbsd-amd64
And so on. The build script can generate a fully standalone
statically-linked binary on platforms that support it. To build
statically linked binaries, use build -s
.
You can also do cross-platform builds for any supported OS, Arch combination supported by the golang toolchain. e.g., on macOS, to build a statically linked binary for linux-amd64 architecture:
$ ./build -s --arch linux-amd64
The common pattern for invoking ovpn-tool is:
ovpn-tool DB CMD [options] [arguments]
Where:
-
DB is the name of the certificate store (database). This is a boltdb instance.
-
CMD is a command - one of
init
,server
,client
,export
,list
,delete
,crl
,passwd
.
The tool writes the certificates, keys into an encrypted boltdb instance.
The tool comes with builtin help:
$ ./bin/openbsd-amd64/ovpn-tool --help
Every subcommand comes with its own help; but, requires you to at least supply a database name as the first argument. e.g.,
$ ./bin/openbsd-amd64/ovpn-tool foo.db server --help
In what follows, we will assume that you have built ovpn-tool and
installed somewhere in your $PATH
.
Before any certificates are generated, one must first create a CA and initialize the certificate DB:
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db init my-CA
You can see the generated CA certificate via two ways:
- Using
-v
for the ovpn-tool's global options - Using the
list
command with the--ca
option.
In general, using the -v
global option when generating the CA, server
or client certificates will print the certificate to stdout at the end.
The CA can be initialized with additional data such as Organization Name,
Organization Unit Name etc. See init --help
for additional details.
The default lifetime of the CA is 5 years; you can change this via
the -V
(--validity
) option to "init".
One can also use a user defined environment variable to provide the database master password:
$ abcdef=myDBPassword45879 ovpn-tool -v foo.db init -E abcdef my-CA
The example invocation above uses the DB password from the
environment variable abcdef
to find the passphrase
myDBPassword45879
.
If you are using any version of ovpn-tool prior to v0.9.x, you must first export the DB into a JSON file using the v0.8.x version of the tool. Assuming the DB dump is in db.json, then you can initialize a new CA instance like so:
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db init --from-json db.json
You will be prompted for the DB passphrase; this passphrase is for the new database (and NOT the old database).
Often, it's useful to have an intermediate CA for issuing server or client certificates. These intermediate CAs can be arbitrarily chained.
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db inter client-ca
Once created, this intermediate CA can be used to issue new leaf certificates:
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db user -s client-ca user@example.com
An OpenVPN server needs a few things:
- A server common name - so client can either address it by DNS Name.
- An IP Address - so that the server config can use it to listen on an IP:Port.
- The IP Address has the additional benefit (or drawback) of not requiring the client to do a DNS lookup.
Creating a new server certificate/key pair:
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db server -i IP.ADDR.ES server.domain.name
Of course, you should use the appropriate values for IP.ADDR.ES
and server.domain.name
for your setup.
The IP Address and Server FQDN show up in the certificate as Certificate.IPAddress and Certificate.Subject.CommonName. Additionally, the server FQDN also shows up in Certificate.DNSNames.
You can also set a custom OpenVPN port for this server via the -p
flag. You can request the server certificate to have a different
validity via the V
(--validity
) option; this option takes the
value in units of years.
You can of course create as many server certificates as needed. But, when you export a client configuration, you must select the correct server name this client will connect to. See example below.
An OpenVPN client certificate is quite simple - it just needs a common name. For convenience, you may use the email address as the common Name.
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db client user@domain.name
You can ask the client private key to be encrypted with a user
supplied passphrase by using the -p
or --password
option to the
client
command. You can request the client certificate to have
a different validity via the V
(--validity
) option; this option
takes the value in units of years.
Once in a while you will want to delete users and prevent them from connecting to the OpenVPN server. E.g.,
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db delete user@domain.name user2@domain
This only deletes the users from the certificate DB. You still need to generate a new CRL (Certificate Revocation List) and push it to your server. See the next workflow.
Once a user is deleted from the system, you will need to generate a new CRL and push it to the server. The command to generate a new CRL:
$ ovpn-tool -v foo.db crl -o crl.pem
This write the PEM encoded CRL to crl.pem
. You must copy this file
to the OpenVPN server and reload (or restart) it.
You can also just view a full list of revoked users:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db crl --list
To see a list of certificates in the database:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db list
ovpn-tool enables you to revoke intermediate CAs or leaf certificates. To revoke a user/server cerfificate:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db del NAME
where NAME
is the common-name of the certificate you want to
revoke. Note you should generate a new CRL once you revoke any
certificate:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db crl -v 7 -o crl.pem
This generates a CRL with a 7 day validity (you should regenerate the CRLs regularly).
While the tool manages certificates, what we are really after are OpenVPN server & client configurations for the server & client respectively. To export a server configuration:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export server.domain.name
This prints the server configuration to stdout. To save this to a file:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export server.domain.name -o server.conf
Note the configuration uses certain private IP address blocks and such. Please edit the configuration file to suit your environment.
At a minimum you have to edit the user/group information particular to your OS for dropping privilege of the OpenVPN daemon. e.g., on Alpine Linux, the preferred user and group for the daemon is "openvpn". On OpenBSD it is "_openvpn"; on macOS it is "nobody".
The server configuration uses a template baked into ovpn-tool. You have the option of providing your own template. The easiest way is to export the template and edit it. You can then feed the modified template back to the export command:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export --print-server-template > s.template
$ vi s.template
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export -t s.template -o s.conf server.domain.name
Client configuration is typically associated with one OpenVPN server. However, this is optional and you can take an unassociated configuration and make manual changes as needed. A typical invocation is:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export -s server.domain.name -o client.conf user@domain.name
You can export the default client configuration template like so:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db export --print-client-template > c.template
If you desire to change the DB passphrase, you can do so with the
passwd
command:
$ ovpn-tool foo.db passwd
This merely changes the way the encrypted DB key is stored on disk.
This command also supports getting the old and new passphrases via user defined environment variables. e.g.,:
$ oldpw=myDBPassword45879 newpw=newDBPwd112233 ovpn-tool foo.db \
passwd -E oldpw -N newpw
This mode of getting the password from the environment is highly discouraged - as it can leave traces in the user's shell history. Use with care!
The following template parameters are available for use in your custom configuration templates:
.CommonName
- Certificate common name.Date
- Today's date and time (UTC).Tool
- ovpn-tool build information (version, etc.).Cert
- PEM encoded certificate.Key
- PEM encoded private key.Ca
- PEM encoded CA certificate.TlsCrypt
- Base64 encoded OpenVPN "tls-crypt" key.ServerCommonName
- Common name of the server.Host
- Server DNS name from the server certificate.IP
- Server IP address from the server certificate.Port
- OpenVPN server port number provided when server certificate was created
All command support the option to get the password from the environment variable of user's choice. This capability is helpful to automate certain operations - but is NOT recommended from a good security practice perspective.
If you do choose to use this feature, please remember to turn-off shell history otherwise your history will hold a permanent record of your DB password.
If you wish to hack on this, notes here might be useful.
The code is organized as a library & command line frontend for that library.
-
We use go module support; you will need go 1.10+ or later
-
The common PKI creation & storage is in the
pki/
library. This library can be used by external callers. e.g., see https://github.com/opencoff/certik -
The script
build
is a shell script to build the program. It does two very important things:- Puts the binary in an OS+Arch specific directory
- Injects a git version-tag into the final binary ("linker resolved symbol")
Additionally, it makes cross compilation and static builds possible (for supported platforms). Try
./build --help
for more details. -
The OpenVPN server & client configuration templates are in
src/export.go
. It uses golang'stext/template
syntax. -
Database encryption:
-
User passphrase is first expanded to 64 bytes by hashing it via SHA-512.
-
The DB is associated with a random 32-byte encryption key and a random 32-byte salt. This key is protected with a Key-encryption-key (KEK) derived from the expanded passphrase.
-
The salt and expanded passphrase are fed into Argon2i to derive the KEK.
-
The DB encryption key is stored on disk as an AEAD encrypted blob (AES-256-GCM). The salt and KEK is stored in the DB.
-
In pseudo code, the above looks like so:
expanded = SHA512(passphrase) salt = randombytes(32) dbkey = randombytes(32) kek = KDF(expanded, salt) enc_dbkey = AES-256-GCM(kek, salt)
-
Database entries are individually encrypted in AEAD (AES-256-GCM) mode. The AEAD nonce size is 16 bytes (instead of the golang default of 12 bytes).
-
Each AEAD encrypt instance uses a separate salt and key extracted via HKDF.
-
The HKDF salt is used as additional data in the AEAD construction.
-
Database bucket keys are entangled with the expanded passphrase and the DB salt via HMAC-SHA256. We don't use any kind of AEAD here because we need a quick and easy way to map user CN's to actual keys. See how
d.key()
is used in db.go.
-
-
The bulk of the code for PKI management is in go-pki.
-
The ovpn-tool command line code is in the
src/
directory. Each command is in its own file. -
internal/utils
: Misc utilities for asking interactive password