Skip to content

Commit

Permalink
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Browse files Browse the repository at this point in the history
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts.

Adjacent changes:

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c
  06b4125 ("igc: Add lock to safeguard global Qbv variables")
  d375007 ("igc: Add TransmissionOverrun counter")

drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c
  a7dfeda ("net: mana: Fix MANA VF unload when hardware is unresponsive")
  a9ca9f9 ("page_pool: split types and declarations from page_pool.h")
  92272ec ("eth: add missing xdp.h includes in drivers")

net/mptcp/protocol.h
  511b90e ("mptcp: fix disconnect vs accept race")
  b8dc6d6 ("mptcp: fix rcv buffer auto-tuning")

tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
  c8c101a ("selftests: mptcp: join: fix 'implicit EP' test")
  03668c6 ("selftests: mptcp: join: rework detailed report")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
  • Loading branch information
kuba-moo committed Aug 10, 2023
2 parents 29afcd6 + 25aa0be commit 4d016ae
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Showing 258 changed files with 3,653 additions and 1,511 deletions.
15 changes: 13 additions & 2 deletions Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -82,7 +82,12 @@ Description:
whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
support for the operation.


What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
Expand All @@ -92,7 +97,13 @@ Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Description:
(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
all user data areas of the device.
all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires
the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
support for the operation.


What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
Expand Down
13 changes: 7 additions & 6 deletions Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -513,17 +513,18 @@ Description: information about CPUs heterogeneity.
cpu_capacity: capacity of cpuX.

What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-platform-hidma
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-*/chid
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8061:*/chid
Date: Dec 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains the ID of the channel within the HIDMA instance.
It is used to associate a given HIDMA channel with the
Expand Down
20 changes: 10 additions & 10 deletions Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-platform-hidma-mgmt
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/chanops/chan*/priority
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/chanops/chan*/priority
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains either 0 or 1 and indicates if the DMA channel is a
low priority (0) or high priority (1) channel.
Expand All @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/chanops/chan*/weight
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/chanops/chan*/weight
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains 0..15 and indicates the weight of the channel among
equal priority channels during round robin scheduling.
Expand All @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/chreset_timeout_cycles
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/chreset_timeout_cycles
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains the platform specific cycle value to wait after a
reset command is issued. If the value is chosen too short,
Expand All @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/dma_channels
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/dma_channels
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains the number of dma channels supported by one instance
of HIDMA hardware. The value may change from chip to chip.
Expand All @@ -41,23 +41,23 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/hw_version_major
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/hw_version_major
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Version number major for the hardware.

What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/hw_version_minor
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/hw_version_minor
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Version number minor for the hardware.

What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/max_rd_xactions
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/max_rd_xactions
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains a value between 0 and 31. Maximum number of
read transactions that can be issued back to back.
Expand All @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/max_read_request
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/max_read_request
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Size of each read request. The value needs to be a power
of two and can be between 128 and 1024.
Expand All @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/max_wr_xactions
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/max_wr_xactions
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Contains a value between 0 and 31. Maximum number of
write transactions that can be issued back to back.
Expand All @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/platform/hidma-mgmt*/max_write_request
/sys/devices/platform/QCOM8060:*/max_write_request
Date: Nov 2015
KernelVersion: 4.4
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>"
Contact: "Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>"
Description:
Size of each write request. The value needs to be a power
of two and can be between 128 and 1024.
109 changes: 109 additions & 0 deletions Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
GDS - Gather Data Sampling
==========================

Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.

Problem
-------
When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.

The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
vulnerable.

Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
are possible.

Attack scenarios
----------------
Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
permission boundaries:

Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
Userspace can infer kernel data
Guests can infer data from hosts
Guest can infer guest from other guests
Users can infer data from other users

Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.

The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure
that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
attack, and re-enable it.

Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
bits:

================================ === ============================
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability
and mitigation support.
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation
0 by default.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
Can't be cleared once set.
================================ === ============================

GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.

If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that
does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
support will break.

Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.

GDS System Information
------------------------
The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:

/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

The possible values contained in this file are:

============================== =============================================
Not affected Processor not vulnerable.
Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation.
Mitigation: AVX disabled,
no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect.
Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect and cannot be disabled.
Unknown: Dependent on
hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is
affected but with no way to know if host
processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
============================== =============================================

GDS Default mitigation
----------------------
The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
l1d_flush.rst
processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
cross-thread-rsb.rst
srso
gather_data_sampling.rst
Loading

0 comments on commit 4d016ae

Please sign in to comment.