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Codeql detects zipslip vulnerability #8209

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merged 1 commit into from
Apr 4, 2023
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Codeql detects zipslip vulnerability #8209

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9 changes: 4 additions & 5 deletions javaagent-tooling/src/main/java/io/opentelemetry/javaagent/tooling/ExtensionClassLoader.java
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -91,11 +91,10 @@ private static void includeEmbeddedExtensionsIfFound(
File tempFile = new File(tempDirectory, name.substring(prefix.length()));
// reject extensions that would be extracted outside of temp directory
// https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability
if (name.indexOf("..") != -1
&& !tempFile
.getCanonicalFile()
.toPath()
.startsWith(tempDirectory.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) {
if (!tempFile
.getCanonicalFile()
.toPath()
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.startsWith(tempDirectory.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) {
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@breedx-splk breedx-splk Apr 4, 2023 •
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Suggested change
.startsWith(tempDirectory.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) {
.startsWith(tempDirectory.getCanonicalPath() + File.separator)) {

It looks like appending the file separator to the end of the expected path is important in order to prevent writing to a neighboring directory. That is, if the actual temp dir is /tmp and the file coming in from the zip somehow crafts ../../../../tmpOther it could possibly write to /tmpOther which should also be prevented.

throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid extension " + name);
}
if (tempFile.createNewFile()) {
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