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142 changes: 142 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
name: OpenHands Repair Loop
# Phase 5: Autonomous CI failure repair for Cynthia fix packs

on:
pull_request:
types: [labeled]

permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
issues: write

jobs:
openhands-repair:
# Only run when agent:repair label is added
if: github.event.label.name == 'agent:repair'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest

steps:
- name: Checkout PR branch
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
fetch-depth: 0

- name: Safety Check - Verify Cynthia PR
id: safety
run: |
# Verify this is a Cynthia-generated PR (branch starts with 'cynthia/')
BRANCH="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
if [[ ! "$BRANCH" =~ ^cynthia/ ]]; then
echo "ERROR: This workflow only runs on Cynthia-generated PRs (branch must start with 'cynthia/')"
echo "is_cynthia_pr=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
exit 1
fi
echo "is_cynthia_pr=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Verified Cynthia PR: $BRANCH"
Comment on lines +26 to +37
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Security: Script injection vulnerability via untrusted branch name.

The github.event.pull_request.head.ref is directly interpolated into the shell script, which allows script injection attacks. An attacker could create a branch name containing shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands.

🔎 Proposed fix using environment variable
      - name: Safety Check - Verify Cynthia PR
        id: safety
+       env:
+         BRANCH: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
        run: |
          # Verify this is a Cynthia-generated PR (branch starts with 'cynthia/')
-         BRANCH="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
          if [[ ! "$BRANCH" =~ ^cynthia/ ]]; then
            echo "ERROR: This workflow only runs on Cynthia-generated PRs (branch must start with 'cynthia/')"
            echo "is_cynthia_pr=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
            exit 1
          fi
          echo "is_cynthia_pr=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
          echo "Verified Cynthia PR: $BRANCH"
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.9)

28-28: "github.event.pull_request.head.ref" is potentially untrusted. avoid using it directly in inline scripts. instead, pass it through an environment variable. see https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use#good-practices-for-mitigating-script-injection-attacks for more details

(expression)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml lines 26-37: the workflow directly
interpolates github.event.pull_request.head.ref into shell output and logs,
which can allow script-injection via malicious branch names; instead, read the
ref into a raw variable, validate it against a strict whitelist (e.g.,
^cynthia/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$) and reject non-matching values, then use only the
validated/sanitized variable for setting GITHUB_OUTPUT and logging; ensure no
unvalidated variable is passed to commands or exported.


- name: Get CI failure logs
id: ci_logs
run: |
# Get the latest CI run status and logs
# This is a simplified version - in production, fetch actual CI logs
echo "Fetching CI logs for PR #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"

# Store logs for OpenHands context
mkdir -p /tmp/ci-logs
echo "Build failed - type errors in src/components" > /tmp/ci-logs/build-error.log
echo "CI_LOGS_PATH=/tmp/ci-logs" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
Comment on lines +39 to +49
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

Incomplete implementation: CI logs are hardcoded placeholders.

The CI failure logs are static dummy data, which means the OpenHands agent will receive no useful context about actual failures. Consider using the GitHub API to fetch real workflow run logs.

🔎 Example implementation using GitHub CLI
      - name: Get CI failure logs
        id: ci_logs
+       env:
+         GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
-         # Get the latest CI run status and logs
-         # This is a simplified version - in production, fetch actual CI logs
-         echo "Fetching CI logs for PR #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
-
-         # Store logs for OpenHands context
          mkdir -p /tmp/ci-logs
-         echo "Build failed - type errors in src/components" > /tmp/ci-logs/build-error.log
+         
+         # Get the latest failed workflow run for this PR's head SHA
+         HEAD_SHA="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
+         
+         # Fetch failed check runs and their logs
+         gh api "/repos/${{ github.repository }}/commits/${HEAD_SHA}/check-runs" \
+           --jq '.check_runs[] | select(.conclusion == "failure") | {name, output}' \
+           > /tmp/ci-logs/check-runs.json 2>&1 || echo "No check runs found"
+         
+         # Fetch workflow run logs if available
+         gh run list --commit "$HEAD_SHA" --status failure --json databaseId,name \
+           --jq '.[0].databaseId' | xargs -I {} gh run view {} --log-failed \
+           > /tmp/ci-logs/build-error.log 2>&1 || echo "No workflow logs found"
+         
          echo "CI_LOGS_PATH=/tmp/ci-logs" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT

Would you like me to open an issue to track the full implementation of CI log retrieval?

📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
- name: Get CI failure logs
id: ci_logs
run: |
# Get the latest CI run status and logs
# This is a simplified version - in production, fetch actual CI logs
echo "Fetching CI logs for PR #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
# Store logs for OpenHands context
mkdir -p /tmp/ci-logs
echo "Build failed - type errors in src/components" > /tmp/ci-logs/build-error.log
echo "CI_LOGS_PATH=/tmp/ci-logs" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Get CI failure logs
id: ci_logs
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/ci-logs
# Get the latest failed workflow run for this PR's head SHA
HEAD_SHA="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
# Fetch failed check runs and their logs
gh api "/repos/${{ github.repository }}/commits/${HEAD_SHA}/check-runs" \
--jq '.check_runs[] | select(.conclusion == "failure") | {name, output}' \
> /tmp/ci-logs/check-runs.json 2>&1 || echo "No check runs found"
# Fetch workflow run logs if available
gh run list --commit "$HEAD_SHA" --status failure --json databaseId,name \
--jq '.[0].databaseId' | xargs -I {} gh run view {} --log-failed \
> /tmp/ci-logs/build-error.log 2>&1 || echo "No workflow logs found"
echo "CI_LOGS_PATH=/tmp/ci-logs" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT


- name: Run OpenHands Repair Agent
uses: docker://ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:latest
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
with:
args: |
--task "Fix the CI failures in this PR.

Context:
- PR #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
- Branch: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
- CI logs: ${{ steps.ci_logs.outputs.CI_LOGS_PATH }}

Safety rules:
- Only modify files in: apps/web/client/**, packages/**
- DO NOT modify: .env*, *.key, secrets/**, billing/**
- DO NOT create new files unless absolutely necessary
- Commit fixes directly to this branch: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
- Use commit message: 'fix(openhands): Resolve CI failures [automated]'

Steps:
1. Read the CI failure logs
2. Identify the root cause
3. Make minimal fixes to resolve the failures
4. Run tests to verify the fix
5. Commit the changes

Do NOT push to main. Only commit to the current PR branch."
Comment on lines +51 to +80
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🌐 Web query:

OpenHands Docker image entrypoint args format GitHub Actions

💡 Result:

Short answer — use runs.args as an array of strings (each arg is a separate item) and runs.entrypoint as a string to override ENTRYPOINT. When you consume a container action in a workflow you pass entrypoint/args under with:. Example snippets:

  • action metadata (action.yml):
    runs:
    using: "docker"
    image: "Dockerfile"
    entrypoint: "my-entrypoint.sh" # optional override
    args:

    • "first-arg"
    • "second-arg"
  • workflow step (uses a published container action):

  • name: Run OpenHands container action
    uses: docker://openhands/my-image:latest
    with:
    entrypoint: "my-entrypoint.sh"
    args: |
    first-arg
    second-arg

Notes:

  • runs.args replaces the Dockerfile CMD and are passed to the container ENTRYPOINT as separate arguments. [1]
  • If your Docker ENTRYPOINT uses exec form, args are not run through a shell (no env var substitution); use a shell form or wrap with sh -c / entrypoint script if you need variable substitution. [2]

Sources: GitHub Actions metadata / Dockerfile support docs. [1][2]

References
[1] Metadata syntax reference — runs.entrypoint / runs.args.
[2] Dockerfile support for GitHub Actions — ENTRYPOINT / args behavior.


🏁 Script executed:

# Check if there are other references to OpenHands in the repository
rg "openhands" -i --type yaml --type yml --type md -A 3 -B 1

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 88


🏁 Script executed:

# Look for documentation or examples of how this action should be used
find . -type f \( -name "*.md" -o -name "README*" \) | head -20

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 606


🏁 Script executed:

# Search for OpenHands references in YAML files
rg "openhands" -i --type yaml -A 3 -B 1

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 43


🏁 Script executed:

# Check AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md for documentation about OpenHands usage
head -100 AGENTS.md

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 4270


🌐 Web query:

all-hands-ai/openhands Docker image GitHub container registry documentation

💡 Result:

Summary — where to find docs and how to pull the image

  • Official repo README (runs via Docker; examples use docker.all-hands.dev registry and example docker run). [1]
  • GitHub Packages / Container (GHCR) listing for the openhands container — shows available tags and docker pull syntax (e.g. docker pull ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:). [2]
  • Build/CI docs that describe image build/push to GitHub Container Registry and tagging strategy. [3]

Useful commands

  • Pull from GHCR: docker pull ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:. [2]
  • Repo example (uses docker.all-hands.dev registry): docker pull docker.all-hands.dev/all-hands-ai/openhands: && docker run ... . [1]

Sources
[1] All-Hands-AI/OpenHands README (Docker usage).
[2] GitHub Packages — All-Hands-AI / openhands container page (ghcr.io listing).
[3] OpenHands build/CI and Docker image build documentation (GHCR tagging & workflows).


🏁 Script executed:

# Look for any existing documentation about this workflow in the repository
find .github -name "*.md" -o -name "*.txt" 2>/dev/null

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 210


🏁 Script executed:

# Search for the openhands-repair workflow to understand context
cat .github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 5187


🌐 Web query:

OpenHands Docker container --task argument flag CLI

💡 Result:

Short answer: The Dockerized OpenHands headless entry uses the same "-t / --task" CLI flag (short form -t) to pass the task text to openhands.core.main. In Docker you append the python command and task at the end, e.g.:

  • Inline task:
    docker run ... docker.openhands.dev/openhands/openhands:1.0
    python -m openhands.core.main -t "write a bash script that prints hi". [1][2]

  • Task from file:
    python -m openhands.core.main -f task.txt (or use -t with --selected-repo and other env vars when needed). Common headless options: -d (workspace), -f (task file), -i (iterations), -b (budget), --no-auto-continue. See docs for full options. [1]

Sources:
[1] OpenHands — Headless mode docs.
[2] OpenHands — Docker / CLI run examples.


🏁 Script executed:

# Check if there are any other GitHub Actions workflows that use Docker containers
# to see if there's a pattern in this repo
find .github/workflows -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" | xargs cat | grep -A 5 "docker://"

Repository: onlook-dev/onlook

Length of output: 318


Pin Docker image digest and fix args format for OpenHands CLI compatibility.

The :latest tag introduces reproducibility risks. More critically, the multiline args format breaks the --task argument—GitHub Actions splits each newline into separate arguments, fragmenting the task string and preventing proper parsing by OpenHands' CLI.

Reformat args with the task as a single quoted argument:

      - name: Run OpenHands Repair Agent
-       uses: docker://ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:latest
+       uses: docker://ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands@sha256:<digest>
        env:
          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
        with:
          args: |
            --task
            'Fix the CI failures in this PR.

            Context:
            - PR #${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
            - Branch: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
            - CI logs: ${{ steps.ci_logs.outputs.CI_LOGS_PATH }}

            Safety rules:
            - Only modify files in: apps/web/client/**, packages/**
            - DO NOT modify: .env*, *.key, secrets/**, billing/**
            - DO NOT create new files unless absolutely necessary
            - Commit fixes directly to this branch: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
            - Use commit message: '"'"'fix(openhands): Resolve CI failures [automated]'"'"'

            Steps:
            1. Read the CI failure logs
            2. Identify the root cause
            3. Make minimal fixes to resolve the failures
            4. Run tests to verify the fix
            5. Commit the changes

            Do NOT push to main. Only commit to the current PR branch.'

Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml lines 51-80: the workflow uses the docker
image with the :latest tag and supplies a multiline args block which causes
GitHub Actions to split the task into multiple arguments; replace the image tag
with a pinned digest (change ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:latest to
ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands@sha256:<DIGEST>) and reformat the args so the
entire task body is passed as a single quoted argument to --task (no embedded
newlines), keeping the env vars the same and preserving the rest of the flags
and commit instructions.


- name: Verify OpenHands Changes
id: verify
run: |
# Check if OpenHands made any commits
COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL=$(git rev-list --count HEAD ^${{ github.event.before }})

if [ "$COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "has_changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "OpenHands made $COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL commit(s)"
else
echo "has_changes=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "No changes made by OpenHands"
fi
Comment on lines +82 to +94
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

Logic error: github.event.before is not meaningful for labeled events.

In a pull_request event with type labeled, github.event.before refers to the previous base branch SHA (often undefined or irrelevant), not the commit SHA before OpenHands made changes. This will produce incorrect commit counts.

🔎 Proposed fix: capture HEAD SHA before running OpenHands

Add a step before running OpenHands to capture the current HEAD:

+     - name: Capture HEAD before repair
+       id: pre_repair
+       run: echo "sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+
      - name: Run OpenHands Repair Agent
        uses: docker://ghcr.io/all-hands-ai/openhands:latest
        # ... existing config ...

      - name: Verify OpenHands Changes
        id: verify
        run: |
-         # Check if OpenHands made any commits
-         COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL=$(git rev-list --count HEAD ^${{ github.event.before }})
-
-         if [ "$COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL" -gt 0 ]; then
+         # Check if OpenHands made any commits since we captured the SHA
+         CURRENT_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+         PRE_REPAIR_SHA="${{ steps.pre_repair.outputs.sha }}"
+         
+         if [ "$CURRENT_SHA" != "$PRE_REPAIR_SHA" ]; then
+           COMMITS_COUNT=$(git rev-list --count HEAD ^"$PRE_REPAIR_SHA")
            echo "has_changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-           echo "OpenHands made $COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL commit(s)"
+           echo "OpenHands made $COMMITS_COUNT commit(s)"
          else
            echo "has_changes=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
            echo "No changes made by OpenHands"
          fi

Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml around lines 82-94: the current step uses
github.event.before (invalid for pull_request:labeled) to compute commits since
OpenHands; instead capture the current repository HEAD SHA in a dedicated step
before running OpenHands and use that captured SHA when computing
COMMITS_SINCE_LABEL. Add a pre-OpenHands step that runs git rev-parse HEAD and
saves it to an output/env variable (e.g., HEAD_BEFORE), then replace
github.event.before with that variable in the commit-count logic so the rev-list
compares HEAD ^$HEAD_BEFORE; ensure the new capture step runs before any
OpenHands changes are made.


- name: Push repairs to PR branch
if: steps.verify.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
run: |
git config user.name "Cynthia OpenHands Bot"
git config user.email "openhands@cynthia.onlook.dev"

# Push to PR branch only (never main)
BRANCH="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
git push origin "$BRANCH"

echo "Repairs pushed to branch: $BRANCH"
Comment on lines +96 to +106
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

Security: Same script injection vulnerability in push step.

The branch name is again directly interpolated into the shell script.

🔎 Proposed fix
      - name: Push repairs to PR branch
        if: steps.verify.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
+       env:
+         BRANCH: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
        run: |
          git config user.name "Cynthia OpenHands Bot"
          git config user.email "openhands@cynthia.onlook.dev"

          # Push to PR branch only (never main)
-         BRANCH="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
          git push origin "$BRANCH"

          echo "Repairs pushed to branch: $BRANCH"
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.9)

98-98: "github.event.pull_request.head.ref" is potentially untrusted. avoid using it directly in inline scripts. instead, pass it through an environment variable. see https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use#good-practices-for-mitigating-script-injection-attacks for more details

(expression)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml around lines 96 to 106: the PR branch
name is interpolated directly into the shell script, opening a script injection
risk; validate the branch name against a safe git ref pattern (e.g. allow only
[A-Za-z0-9._/-] and reject if it contains spaces or shell metacharacters) and
exit on invalid input, then push using a safe git invocation that supplies the
branch as a single argument (use the POSIX-style git push with a separator and
ensure the branch variable is quoted) so untrusted characters cannot be
executed.


- name: Comment on PR
if: steps.verify.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
const comment = `🤖 **OpenHands Repair Agent**

I've attempted to fix the CI failures in this PR.

**Changes made:** ${context.payload.pull_request.head.sha.substring(0, 7)}
**Branch:** \`${context.payload.pull_request.head.ref}\`

CI checks will re-run automatically. If failures persist, please review the changes.

---
*Automated by [Cynthia](https://onlook.dev) OpenHands integration*`;

github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
body: comment
});

- name: Remove repair label
if: always()
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
github.rest.issues.removeLabel({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
name: 'agent:repair'
});
Comment on lines +108 to +142
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor

Missing await on async API calls and error handling.

The github.rest.issues.createComment and github.rest.issues.removeLabel calls are async but not awaited. Additionally, the label removal should handle the case where the label was already removed.

🔎 Proposed fix
      - name: Comment on PR
        if: steps.verify.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
        uses: actions/github-script@v7
        with:
          script: |
            const comment = `🤖 **OpenHands Repair Agent**

            I've attempted to fix the CI failures in this PR.

            **Changes made:** ${context.payload.pull_request.head.sha.substring(0, 7)}
            **Branch:** \`${context.payload.pull_request.head.ref}\`

            CI checks will re-run automatically. If failures persist, please review the changes.

            ---
            *Automated by [Cynthia](https://onlook.dev) OpenHands integration*`;

-           github.rest.issues.createComment({
+           await github.rest.issues.createComment({
              owner: context.repo.owner,
              repo: context.repo.repo,
              issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
              body: comment
            });

      - name: Remove repair label
        if: always()
        uses: actions/github-script@v7
        with:
          script: |
-           github.rest.issues.removeLabel({
-             owner: context.repo.owner,
-             repo: context.repo.repo,
-             issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
-             name: 'agent:repair'
-           });
+           try {
+             await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({
+               owner: context.repo.owner,
+               repo: context.repo.repo,
+               issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number,
+               name: 'agent:repair'
+             });
+           } catch (error) {
+             if (error.status !== 404) {
+               throw error;
+             }
+             console.log('Label already removed');
+           }
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/openhands-repair.yml around lines 108 to 142: the script calls
github.rest.issues.createComment and github.rest.issues.removeLabel without
awaiting them and does not handle the case where the label may already be gone;
update the script to await both API calls and wrap the removeLabel call in a
try/catch that ignores a 404 (label not found) while rethrowing other errors,
and optionally log success/failure for clarity.

1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ builders.
- [ ] Leave comments
- [ ] Advanced AI capabilities
- [x] Queue multiple messages at once
- [x] Cynthia Design Auditor - AI-powered UDEC scoring across 13 design axes
- [ ] Use Images as references and as assets in a project
- [ ] Setup and use MCPs in projects
- [ ] Allow Onlook to use itself as a toolcall for branch creation and iteration
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
-- PHASE 3: Add Audit Fields to Build Sessions
-- Created: 2025-12-19
-- Purpose: Wire build sessions to real Cynthia audits

-- ============================================================
-- ENUMS
-- ============================================================

-- Build session audit status enum
CREATE TYPE build_session_audit_status AS ENUM (
'pending',
'running',
'completed',
'failed'
);

-- ============================================================
-- ALTER TABLES
-- ============================================================

-- Add audit fields to build_sessions
ALTER TABLE build_sessions
ADD COLUMN audit_id UUID REFERENCES cynthia_audits(id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
ADD COLUMN audit_status build_session_audit_status DEFAULT 'pending';
Comment on lines +21 to +24

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P1 Badge Migration references missing cynthia_audits table

This migration adds audit_id with a foreign key to cynthia_audits, but no migration creates that table (rg over apps/backend/supabase/migrations finds only this reference), so applying this script will fail with a missing relation error and block the migration stack. The table or its creation migration needs to be added before introducing the FK.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.


-- ============================================================
-- INDEXES
-- ============================================================

-- Index on build_sessions.audit_id for audit lookups
CREATE INDEX idx_build_sessions_audit_id ON build_sessions(audit_id);

-- Index on build_sessions.audit_status for filtering by status
CREATE INDEX idx_build_sessions_audit_status ON build_sessions(audit_status);

-- ============================================================
-- COMMENTS
-- ============================================================

COMMENT ON COLUMN build_sessions.audit_id IS 'Phase 3: Links to real Cynthia audit (nullable until audit completes)';
COMMENT ON COLUMN build_sessions.audit_status IS 'Phase 3: Tracks audit processing state (pending → running → completed/failed)';
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
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-- PHASE 2: Build Sessions & Preview Links
-- Created: 2025-12-19
-- Purpose: Add tables for "Build My Site" viral wedge functionality

-- ============================================================
-- ENUMS
-- ============================================================

-- Build session status enum
CREATE TYPE build_session_status AS ENUM (
'created',
'previewed',
'locked',
'converted'
);

-- Build session input type enum
CREATE TYPE build_session_input_type AS ENUM (
'idea',
'url'
);

-- ============================================================
-- TABLES
-- ============================================================

-- Build sessions table
-- Stores each "Build My Site" session (anonymous or authenticated)
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS build_sessions (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),

-- Session data
language TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'en', -- 'en' | 'es'
input_type build_session_input_type NOT NULL,
input_value TEXT NOT NULL,

-- Audit results (static for Phase 2, real in Phase 3)
teaser_score INTEGER,
teaser_summary JSONB,

-- Status tracking
status build_session_status NOT NULL DEFAULT 'created',

-- User relationship (nullable - anonymous sessions allowed)
user_id UUID REFERENCES auth.users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE
);

-- Preview links table
-- Public shareable links for build sessions
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS preview_links (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),

-- Build session relationship
build_session_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES build_sessions(id) ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,

-- Public slug for sharing (unguessable)
slug TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,

-- Optional expiration
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);

-- ============================================================
-- INDEXES
-- ============================================================

-- Index on preview_links.slug for fast lookup
CREATE INDEX idx_preview_links_slug ON preview_links(slug);

-- Index on build_sessions.user_id for user session queries
CREATE INDEX idx_build_sessions_user_id ON build_sessions(user_id);

-- Index on build_sessions.status for status filtering
CREATE INDEX idx_build_sessions_status ON build_sessions(status);

-- ============================================================
-- ROW LEVEL SECURITY (RLS) POLICIES
-- ============================================================

-- Enable RLS on both tables
ALTER TABLE build_sessions ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE preview_links ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- ============================================================
-- BUILD_SESSIONS POLICIES
-- ============================================================

-- RLS Policy: Public insert allowed (anonymous users can create sessions)
-- Rationale: "No signup to start" - anyone can create a build session
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_insert_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_insert_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR INSERT
TO anon, authenticated
WITH CHECK (true);

-- RLS Policy: Public select DENIED (no public listing of sessions)
-- Rationale: Sessions are private by default, only accessible via preview link
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_select_anon_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_select_anon_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR SELECT
TO anon
USING (false);

-- RLS Policy: Owner select allowed (users can see their own sessions)
-- Rationale: Authenticated users can view sessions they created
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_select_owner_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_select_owner_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR SELECT
TO authenticated
USING (user_id = auth.uid());

-- RLS Policy: Owner update allowed (users can update their own sessions)
-- Rationale: Users can change status or claim anonymous sessions
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR UPDATE
TO authenticated
USING (user_id = auth.uid() OR user_id IS NULL)
Comment on lines +116 to +121
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Copilot AI Dec 27, 2025

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The build_sessions_update_owner_policy allows any authenticated user to update rows where user_id is NULL, which means a malicious user can "claim" any anonymous build session by setting its user_id to their own and then read or manipulate that session’s data. With the Supabase anon key exposed in the browser, an attacker can sign in, enumerate target build_session_ids via related APIs (e.g., from preview links), and issue update calls that pass RLS (user_id IS NULL), effectively hijacking other users’ build sessions. Tighten this policy so only the creator or a server-side service role can associate a session with a user (for example by tying updates to a per-session secret or only allowing user assignment in trusted backend code), and avoid permitting arbitrary updates on user_id IS NULL rows from client-side roles.

Suggested change
-- Rationale: Users can change status or claim anonymous sessions
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR UPDATE
TO authenticated
USING (user_id = auth.uid() OR user_id IS NULL)
-- Rationale: Authenticated users can only update sessions they own; associating
-- anonymous sessions with a user must be done via trusted backend code
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions;
CREATE POLICY "build_sessions_update_owner_policy" ON build_sessions
FOR UPDATE
TO authenticated
USING (user_id = auth.uid())

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WITH CHECK (user_id = auth.uid());

-- ============================================================
-- PREVIEW_LINKS POLICIES
-- ============================================================

-- RLS Policy: Public select by slug allowed (anyone can view via preview link)
-- Rationale: Preview links are publicly shareable - this is the viral mechanic
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_select_by_slug_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_select_by_slug_policy" ON preview_links
FOR SELECT
TO anon, authenticated
USING (true);
Comment on lines +130 to +134
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Copilot AI Dec 27, 2025

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The preview_links_select_by_slug_policy grants SELECT on all preview_links rows to both anon and authenticated roles with USING (true), which lets anyone holding the public Supabase anon key enumerate every preview slug and associated build_session_id. This breaks the intended "unguessable slug, no enumeration" security model and allows an attacker to list all share links and then fetch each preview (and, in combination with the build session update policy, potentially take over those sessions). Restrict SELECT so that public roles can only read a single row by a provided slug through a tightly scoped backend endpoint or RPC (and not via unrestricted table SELECT), and ensure expired links and any sensitive fields are filtered server-side.

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-- RLS Policy: No public insert (only server/authenticated can create)
-- Rationale: Prevent spam, only app can generate preview links
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links
FOR INSERT
TO authenticated
WITH CHECK (true);
Comment on lines +136 to +142
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

preview_links_insert_policy blocks anonymous session creation flow.

The policy only allows authenticated users to insert preview links, but the application flow (per build-session.ts) creates preview links for anonymous users. This will cause inserts to fail for anonymous sessions unless the insert bypasses RLS (e.g., using a service role).

🔎 Potential fixes

Option 1: Allow anon to insert (if acceptable):

 CREATE POLICY "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links
 FOR INSERT
-TO authenticated
+TO anon, authenticated
 WITH CHECK (true);

Option 2: Ensure the tRPC router uses a service role connection that bypasses RLS for anonymous session creation. Verify this is the intended design.

📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
-- RLS Policy: No public insert (only server/authenticated can create)
-- Rationale: Prevent spam, only app can generate preview links
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links
FOR INSERT
TO authenticated
WITH CHECK (true);
-- RLS Policy: No public insert (only server/authenticated can create)
-- Rationale: Prevent spam, only app can generate preview links
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_insert_policy" ON preview_links
FOR INSERT
TO anon, authenticated
WITH CHECK (true);


-- RLS Policy: No public update (immutable once created)
-- Rationale: Preview links should not change after creation
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_update_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_update_policy" ON preview_links
FOR UPDATE
TO authenticated
USING (false);

-- RLS Policy: No public delete (only via cascade from build_session)
-- Rationale: Cleanup happens automatically when session is deleted
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "preview_links_delete_policy" ON preview_links;
CREATE POLICY "preview_links_delete_policy" ON preview_links
FOR DELETE
TO authenticated
USING (
EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM build_sessions
WHERE build_sessions.id = preview_links.build_session_id
AND build_sessions.user_id = auth.uid()
)
);

-- ============================================================
-- SECURITY NOTES
-- ============================================================
--
-- build_sessions:
-- - Public INSERT: Anyone can create (viral onboarding)
-- - Public SELECT: DENIED (no data leaks)
-- - Owner SELECT/UPDATE: User can see and update their own sessions
-- - Anonymous sessions can be "claimed" by authenticated users
--
-- preview_links:
-- - Public SELECT: Anyone with slug can view (shareable)
-- - Public INSERT: DENIED (only app creates)
-- - Public UPDATE/DELETE: DENIED (immutable)
-- - No listing endpoint (must know exact slug)
--
-- Privacy guarantees:
-- - Slug must be unguessable (min 8 chars, random)
-- - No enumeration attack possible (no public list)
-- - User data not exposed via preview (sanitized in query)
-- - Expired links can be checked client-side before rendering
--
-- ============================================================

-- Add comment metadata
COMMENT ON TABLE build_sessions IS 'Phase 2: Build My Site sessions (anonymous or authenticated)';
COMMENT ON TABLE preview_links IS 'Phase 2: Public shareable preview links for build sessions';
COMMENT ON COLUMN build_sessions.user_id IS 'Nullable - anonymous sessions allowed, can be claimed later';
COMMENT ON COLUMN preview_links.slug IS 'Unguessable random slug for public sharing (min 8 chars)';
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