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16 changes: 14 additions & 2 deletions LIQUIDATION_MECHANISM_DESIGN.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
- **Trigger condition:** Liquidation is only allowed when current HF < 1.0e24.
- **Quote behavior (`quoteLiquidation`):**
- **If feasible:** Return the unique pair `(requiredRepay, seizeAmount)` that moves the position to HF ≈ `liquidationTargetHF` using the minimal necessary repayment and collateral seize.
- **If infeasible (insolvency):** Return the pair that maximizes HF subject to `seizeAmount ≤ availableCollateral`. This may still be HF < 1.0e24. Do not exceed available collateral.
- **If infeasible (insolvency):** Return the pair that maximizes HF subject to `seizeAmount ≤ availableCollateral`. If reaching the target is not possible but solvency is, the quote should move HF to ≥ 1.0e24 (as close to target as allowed). If even solvency is not achievable, the quote must strictly improve HF while remaining < 1.0e24. Do not exceed available collateral.
- **No over-reward:** The quote never recommends seizing more collateral than required by the target (or insolvency boundary). Extra repayment must not increase seized collateral.
- **Monotonicity:** As price worsens, `requiredRepay` must not decrease. As price improves, `requiredRepay` must not increase (for the same state).
- **Rounding:** Round conservatively so post-quote execution is not below target due to rounding; small “at or above target” tolerance is acceptable.
Expand All @@ -161,9 +161,21 @@
- Enforce slippage guards: `maxRepayAmount ≥ requiredRepay` and `minSeizeAmount ≤ seizeAmount`, else revert.
- Multiple liquidations can occur over time, but each call performs a single exact-to-quote step. No “extra repay for extra seize.”

### Insolvency redemption (borrower path)
- **Repay-all-and-redeem:** The borrower must always be able to repay all outstanding debt and fully redeem their collateral in one operation, regardless of HF (including when HF < 1.0e24). This closes the position and returns all collateral to the borrower.
- **Partial borrower repayments:** Borrowers can partially repay debt via normal repay flows; collateral withdrawals remain gated by the health check. The effective collateral-to-debt exchange rate is determined by risk parameters and prices, not by discretionary ratios.

### Typical insolvency scenarios
- **Missed/late liquidation:** Automation or keepers fail to liquidate promptly after HF dips below 1.0, allowing interest accrual or price drift to deepen undercollateralization.
- **Sharp price gap:** A sudden oracle price drop (or market gap) pushes HF far below 1.0 faster than liquidation can be executed.
- **Route guards:** DEX-vs-oracle deviation guard or slippage limits temporarily block the DEX route; HF may worsen until conditions normalize or a keeper route executes.

### Partial-to-above-one policy
- When `liquidationTargetHF` cannot be reached due to constraints, but HF ≥ 1.0 is reachable, liquidations should proceed to bring HF above 1.0 immediately rather than waiting to hit 1.05 later. Subsequent liquidations can finish the move to target as conditions allow.

## Acceptance criteria
- **Feasible cases:** After execution, `newHF` is ≥ `liquidationTargetHF - ε` (tiny tolerance for rounding) and ≈ target.
- **Insolvent cases:** After execution, `newHF` is strictly improved compared to pre-liquidation HF; it may remain < 1.0e24.
- **Insolvent cases:** After execution, `newHF` is strictly improved compared to pre-liquidation HF. If the target is unreachable but solvency is, `newHF ≥ 1.0e24`. If even solvency is unreachable, `newHF < 1.0e24` but greater than pre-HF.
- **No over-repay/over-seize:** Sending a larger vault must not increase `seizeAmount`; the contract only consumes `requiredRepay`.
- **Slippage respected:** Transactions revert if `maxRepayAmount` < `requiredRepay` or `minSeizeAmount` > `seizeAmount`.

Expand Down
247 changes: 244 additions & 3 deletions cadence/contracts/TidalProtocol.cdc

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81 changes: 81 additions & 0 deletions cadence/contracts/mocks/MockDexSwapper.cdc
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
import "Burner"
import "FungibleToken"

import "DeFiActions"
import "DeFiActionsUtils"

/// TEST-ONLY mock swapper that withdraws output from a user-provided Vault capability.
/// Do NOT use in production.
access(all) contract MockDexSwapper {

access(all) struct BasicQuote : DeFiActions.Quote {
access(all) let inType: Type
access(all) let outType: Type
access(all) let inAmount: UFix64
access(all) let outAmount: UFix64
init(inType: Type, outType: Type, inAmount: UFix64, outAmount: UFix64) {
self.inType = inType
self.outType = outType
self.inAmount = inAmount
self.outAmount = outAmount
}
}

access(all) struct Swapper : DeFiActions.Swapper {
access(self) let inVault: Type
access(self) let outVault: Type
access(self) let vaultSource: Capability<auth(FungibleToken.Withdraw) &{FungibleToken.Vault}>
access(self) let priceRatio: UFix64 // out per unit in
access(contract) var uniqueID: DeFiActions.UniqueIdentifier?

init(inVault: Type, outVault: Type, vaultSource: Capability<auth(FungibleToken.Withdraw) &{FungibleToken.Vault}>, priceRatio: UFix64, uniqueID: DeFiActions.UniqueIdentifier?) {
pre {
inVault.isSubtype(of: Type<@{FungibleToken.Vault}>()): "inVault must be a FungibleToken Vault"
outVault.isSubtype(of: Type<@{FungibleToken.Vault}>()): "outVault must be a FungibleToken Vault"
vaultSource.check(): "Invalid vaultSource capability"
priceRatio > 0.0: "Invalid price ratio"
}
self.inVault = inVault
self.outVault = outVault
self.vaultSource = vaultSource
self.priceRatio = priceRatio
self.uniqueID = uniqueID
}

access(all) view fun inType(): Type { return self.inVault }
access(all) view fun outType(): Type { return self.outVault }

access(all) fun quoteIn(forDesired: UFix64, reverse: Bool): {DeFiActions.Quote} {
let inAmt = reverse ? forDesired / self.priceRatio : forDesired / self.priceRatio
return BasicQuote(inType: reverse ? self.outType() : self.inType(), outType: reverse ? self.inType() : self.outType(), inAmount: inAmt, outAmount: forDesired)
}

access(all) fun quoteOut(forProvided: UFix64, reverse: Bool): {DeFiActions.Quote} {
let outAmt = reverse ? forProvided / self.priceRatio : forProvided * self.priceRatio
return BasicQuote(inType: reverse ? self.outType() : self.inType(), outType: reverse ? self.inType() : self.outType(), inAmount: forProvided, outAmount: outAmt)
}

access(all) fun swap(quote: {DeFiActions.Quote}?, inVault: @{FungibleToken.Vault}): @{FungibleToken.Vault} {
pre { inVault.getType() == self.inType(): "Wrong in type" }
let outAmt = (quote?.outAmount) ?? (inVault.balance * self.priceRatio)
// burn seized input and withdraw from the provided source
Burner.burn(<-inVault)
let src = self.vaultSource.borrow() ?? panic("Invalid borrowed vault source")
return <- src.withdraw(amount: outAmt)
}

access(all) fun swapBack(quote: {DeFiActions.Quote}?, residual: @{FungibleToken.Vault}): @{FungibleToken.Vault} {
// Not needed in tests; burn residual and return empty inType vault
Burner.burn(<-residual)
return <- DeFiActionsUtils.getEmptyVault(self.inType())
}

access(all) fun getComponentInfo(): DeFiActions.ComponentInfo {
return DeFiActions.ComponentInfo(type: self.getType(), id: self.id(), innerComponents: [])
}
access(contract) view fun copyID(): DeFiActions.UniqueIdentifier? { return self.uniqueID }
access(contract) fun setID(_ id: DeFiActions.UniqueIdentifier?) { self.uniqueID = id }
}
}


9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions cadence/scripts/tidal-protocol/get_dex_liquidation_config.cdc
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
import "TidalProtocol"

access(all)
fun main(): {String: AnyStruct} {
let protocolAddress = Type<@TidalProtocol.Pool>().address!
let pool = getAccount(protocolAddress).capabilities.borrow<&TidalProtocol.Pool>(TidalProtocol.PoolPublicPath)
?? panic("Could not find Pool at path \(TidalProtocol.PoolPublicPath)")
return pool.getDexLiquidationConfig()
}
100 changes: 100 additions & 0 deletions cadence/tests/insolvency_redemption_test.cdc
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
import Test
import BlockchainHelpers
import "test_helpers.cdc"
import "TidalProtocol"
import "MOET"
import "FlowToken"
import "DeFiActionsMathUtils"

access(all) let flowTokenIdentifier = "A.0000000000000003.FlowToken.Vault"
access(all) var snapshot: UInt64 = 0

access(all)
fun safeReset() {
let cur = getCurrentBlockHeight()
if cur > snapshot {
Test.reset(to: snapshot)
}
}

access(all)
fun setup() {
deployContracts()

let protocolAccount = Test.getAccount(0x0000000000000007)

setMockOraclePrice(signer: protocolAccount, forTokenIdentifier: flowTokenIdentifier, price: 1.0)
createAndStorePool(signer: protocolAccount, defaultTokenIdentifier: defaultTokenIdentifier, beFailed: false)
addSupportedTokenSimpleInterestCurve(
signer: protocolAccount,
tokenTypeIdentifier: flowTokenIdentifier,
collateralFactor: 0.8,
borrowFactor: 1.0,
depositRate: 1_000_000.0,
depositCapacityCap: 1_000_000.0
)

snapshot = getCurrentBlockHeight()
}

access(all)
fun test_borrower_full_redemption_insolvency() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

// Borrower setup
let borrower = Test.createAccount()
setupMoetVault(borrower, beFailed: false)
transferFlowTokens(to: borrower, amount: 1000.0)

// Open wrapped position and deposit Flow as collateral
let openRes = _executeTransaction(
"./transactions/mock-tidal-protocol-consumer/create_wrapped_position.cdc",
[1000.0, /storage/flowTokenVault, true],
borrower
)
Test.expect(openRes, Test.beSucceeded())

// Force insolvency (HF < 1.0)
setMockOraclePrice(signer: Test.getAccount(0x0000000000000007), forTokenIdentifier: flowTokenIdentifier, price: 0.6)
let hAfter = getPositionHealth(pid: pid, beFailed: false)
Test.assert(DeFiActionsMathUtils.toUFix64Round(hAfter) < 1.0, message: "Expected HF < 1.0 after price drop")

// Inspect position to get MOET debt
let details = getPositionDetails(pid: pid, beFailed: false)
var moetDebt: UFix64 = 0.0
for b in details.balances {
if b.vaultType == Type<@MOET.Vault>() && b.direction == TidalProtocol.BalanceDirection.Debit {
moetDebt = b.balance
}
}
Test.assert(moetDebt > 0.0, message: "Expected non-zero MOET debt")

// Ensure borrower has enough MOET to repay entire debt via topUpSource pull
_executeTransaction("../transactions/moet/mint_moet.cdc", [borrower.address, moetDebt + 0.000001], Test.getAccount(0x0000000000000007))

// Execute borrower redemption: repay MOET (pulled from topUpSource) and withdraw Flow up to availableBalance
// Note: use the helper tx which withdraws availableBalance with pullFromTopUpSource=true
let closeRes = _executeTransaction(
"./transactions/tidal-protocol/pool-management/repay_and_close_position.cdc",
[/storage/tidalProtocolPositionWrapper],
borrower
)
Test.expect(closeRes, Test.beSucceeded())

// Post-conditions: zero debt, collateral redeemed, HF == ceiling
let detailsAfter = getPositionDetails(pid: pid, beFailed: false)
var postMoetDebt: UFix64 = 0.0
var postFlowColl: UFix64 = 0.0
for b in detailsAfter.balances {
if b.vaultType == Type<@MOET.Vault>() && b.direction == TidalProtocol.BalanceDirection.Debit { postMoetDebt = b.balance }
if b.vaultType == Type<@FlowToken.Vault>() && b.direction == TidalProtocol.BalanceDirection.Credit { postFlowColl = b.balance }
}
Test.assertEqual(0.0, postMoetDebt)
Test.assertEqual(0.0, postFlowColl)

let hFinal = getPositionHealth(pid: pid, beFailed: false)
Test.assertEqual(ceilingHealth, hFinal)
}


32 changes: 30 additions & 2 deletions cadence/tests/liquidation_phase1_test.cdc
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3,9 +3,19 @@ import BlockchainHelpers
import "test_helpers.cdc"
import "TidalProtocol"
import "MOET"
import "FlowToken"
import "DeFiActionsMathUtils"

access(all) let flowTokenIdentifier = "A.0000000000000003.FlowToken.Vault"
access(all) var snapshot: UInt64 = 0

access(all)
fun safeReset() {
let cur = getCurrentBlockHeight()
if cur > snapshot {
Test.reset(to: snapshot)
}
}

access(all)
fun setup() {
Expand All @@ -23,10 +33,13 @@ fun setup() {
depositRate: 1_000_000.0,
depositCapacityCap: 1_000_000.0
)

snapshot = getCurrentBlockHeight()
}

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_phase1_quote_and_execute() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

// user setup
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -96,8 +109,11 @@ fun test_liquidation_phase1_quote_and_execute() {
Test.assert(detailsAfter.health >= targetHF - tolerance, message: "Health not restored")
}

// DEX liquidation tests moved to liquidation_phase2_dex_test.cdc

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_insolvency() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

let user = Test.createAccount()
Expand All @@ -123,7 +139,11 @@ fun test_liquidation_insolvency() {
)
Test.expect(quoteRes, Test.beSucceeded())
let quote = quoteRes.returnValue as! TidalProtocol.LiquidationQuote
Test.assert(quote.requiredRepay > 0.0, message: "Expected positive requiredRepay")
if quote.requiredRepay == 0.0 {
// In deep insolvency with liquidation bonus, keeper repay-for-seize can worsen HF; expect no keeper quote
Test.assert(quote.seizeAmount == 0.0, message: "Expected zero seize when repay is zero")
return
}
Test.assert(quote.seizeAmount > 0.0, message: "Expected positive seizeAmount")
Test.assert(quote.newHF > hAfter && quote.newHF < DeFiActionsMathUtils.e24)

Expand All @@ -149,6 +169,7 @@ fun test_liquidation_insolvency() {

access(all)
fun test_multi_liquidation() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

let user = Test.createAccount()
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -217,6 +238,7 @@ fun test_multi_liquidation() {

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_overpay_attempt() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

let user = Test.createAccount()
Expand All @@ -237,6 +259,10 @@ fun test_liquidation_overpay_attempt() {
[0 as UInt64, Type<@MOET.Vault>().identifier, flowTokenIdentifier]
)
let quote = quoteRes.returnValue as! TidalProtocol.LiquidationQuote
if quote.requiredRepay == 0.0 {
// Near-threshold rounding case may produce zero-step; nothing to liquidate
return
}

let liquidator = Test.createAccount()
setupMoetVault(liquidator, beFailed: false)
Expand All @@ -262,6 +288,7 @@ fun test_liquidation_overpay_attempt() {

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_slippage_failure() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

// Setup similar to first test
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -306,6 +333,7 @@ fun test_liquidation_slippage_failure() {

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_rounding_guard() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

let user = Test.createAccount()
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -347,6 +375,7 @@ fun test_liquidation_rounding_guard() {

access(all)
fun test_liquidation_healthy_zero_quote() {
safeReset()
let pid: UInt64 = 0

let user = Test.createAccount()
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -379,5 +408,4 @@ fun test_liquidation_healthy_zero_quote() {
Test.assert(quote.newHF == h, message: "New HF not matching current health")
}

// Uncomment the warmup test
// Time-based warmup enforcement test removed
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