docs(comments): retire the present-tense platform-admin elevation gate at the sites #13903 scoped

packages/core/src/security/platform-admin.ts

@@ -114,11 +114,14 @@ export interface PlatformAdminEmailConfig {
    *
    * It exists so that no consumer ever has a reason to split {@link raw} a
    * second time. Two readers need the as-typed form and neither may re-parse
-   * to get it: the elevation gate's by-email `sys_user` lookup queries the
-   * verbatim spelling alongside the normalized one (an imported/legacy row may
-   * not be stored lowercased, and a driver `where` is an exact match), and the
-   * walled boot diagnostic quotes the addresses back to the operator, who
-   * should see what they wrote.
+   * to get it: the platform-admin STANDING surface's by-email `sys_user`
+   * lookup queries the verbatim spelling alongside the normalized one (an
+   * imported/legacy row may not be stored lowercased, and a driver `where` is
+   * an exact match) — that lookup is `resolvePlatformAdminStanding` in
+   * plugin-security's `platform-admin-service.ts`, which inherited the
+   * two-spelling discipline from the elevation gate the #11663 re-anchor
+   * (leg L4) retired — and the walled boot diagnostic quotes the addresses
+   * back to the operator, who should see what they wrote.
    */
   readonly declaredSpellings: readonly string[];
   /** What the operator actually typed, when the variable was set to anything. */
@@ -284,9 +287,16 @@ export function matchesConfiguredPlatformAdmin(
  * and exported, because the row-and-verified predicate above is not the shape
  * every reader of `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL` needs:
  *
- *  - the elevation gate (`plugin-security/bootstrap-platform-admin.ts`) must
- *    keep the two halves SEPARATE — its `walled_owner_not_registered` and
- *    `walled_owner_not_verified` diagnostics are different answers;
+ *  - the walled platform-admin STANDING surface must keep the two halves
+ *    SEPARATE — `resolvePlatformAdminStanding`
+ *    (`plugin-security/platform-admin-service.ts`, reported at boot by
+ *    `bootstrap-platform-admin.ts`) answers `registered` and `verified` as two
+ *    independent per-entry fields, so the operator's log can tell "not
+ *    registered yet" apart from "registered, NOT verified". ⚠️ That reason
+ *    predates the #11663 re-anchor and survives it: the pair used to be the
+ *    retired elevation gate's `walled_owner_not_registered` /
+ *    `walled_owner_not_verified` reasons — the mechanism moved, the need to
+ *    keep the halves apart did not;
  *  - the creation-time operator stamp (`plugin-auth`) is handed an email
  *    STRING by better-auth, before any row exists to read;
  *  - the Layer 0 wall bypass takes a fast negative on the session's

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/last-admin-guard.test.ts

@@ -1609,9 +1609,20 @@ describe('[#5978] reverse verification: without the guard, the third path locks
 // "Who is a platform admin" is resolved BY NAME: `resolveAdminUserIds` looks
 // the permission set up as `where: { name: 'admin_full_access' }` and only then
 // reads the grants pointing at its id. So the row named `admin_full_access` is
-// itself part of the administrator evidence, and deleting it — or calling it
-// something else — un-makes every platform admin in one write while `sys_user`,
-// `sys_member` and `sys_user_permission_set` all stay exactly as they were.
+// itself part of the GRANT-anchored administrator evidence, and deleting it —
+// or calling it something else — un-makes every grant-anchored platform admin
+// in one write while `sys_user`, `sys_member` and `sys_user_permission_set` all
+// stay exactly as they were.
+//
+// ⚠️ Not "every platform admin": since the #11663 re-anchor (L2) standing has a
+// SECOND anchor this write cannot reach — a config-anchored administrator (a
+// declared `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL` address on a VERIFIED `sys_user` row) is
+// derived at `resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config without reading this row at
+// all, and `resolveAdminUserIds` counts it through the resolver's own
+// predicate. Where one stands these refusals are re-priced away and the write
+// is PERMITTED (pinned in `last-admin-guard.re-pricing.test.ts`). This file
+// declares no owner emails, so the grant anchor is the whole population here
+// and the refusals below are the live price.
 //
 // The block pins the same five things each earlier path did, plus the one this
 // path adds: the guard must NOT go quiet on every other path afterwards.

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/walled-owner-operator-stamp.test.ts

@@ -8,21 +8,33 @@
  *
  *  1. **The pure decision matrix** (`shouldStampOwnerVerifiedAtCreation`) —
  *     every bound of the contract as a direct call: walled family only,
- *     declared-owner match only (compared the way the elevation gate
- *     compares), operator-provisioned creation only (operator class, or the
- *     bootstrap carve-out; provider and non-bootstrap self-serve NEVER).
+ *     declared-owner match only (compared the way the platform-admin
+ *     derivation compares), operator-provisioned creation only (operator
+ *     class, or the bootstrap carve-out; provider and non-bootstrap
+ *     self-serve NEVER).
  *  2. **The store probe** (`probeWalledOwnerAccountState`) over a REAL
- *     `ObjectQL` engine — the same backend the elevation gate reads, so the
+ *     `ObjectQL` engine — the same backend the derivation reads, so the
  *     probe's answers are measured against real driver representations, not
  *     a fake's.
  *  3. **The wiring, end to end** — real better-auth pipeline over the real
  *     engine (the `audience-bootstrap-seam` harness shape): the declared
  *     owner's operator-provisioned row is BORN `email_verified`, and every
  *     "never" cell of the matrix stays unverified through the same pipeline.
  *     The verified read-back uses the shared [#11343] allow-list
- *     (`isEmailVerifiedUserRow`) — the predicate the elevation gate itself
- *     refuses on — so a green here IS "the elevation gate would accept this
- *     row", without booting plugin-security.
+ *     (`isEmailVerifiedUserRow`) — the predicate the derivation itself
+ *     refuses on — so a green here IS "`resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config
+ *     would resolve PLATFORM_ADMIN for this row", without booting
+ *     plugin-security.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ The mechanism this file's prose used to name — the walled platform-admin
+ * ELEVATION GATE — is RETIRED (#11663 leg L4): `bootstrapPlatformAdmin` writes
+ * no grant row under a walled posture and elevates nobody, it reports.
+ * Standing is derived PER REQUEST instead, and the implementation this file
+ * covers says the same ([#11973] note in `walled-owner-operator-stamp.ts`:
+ * "the invariant is enforced at the derivation site … rather than by an
+ * elevation write; the stamp's value is unchanged"). One `it()` title below
+ * still names the gate; correcting a title is an executable change, not a
+ * comment fix, so it is left for the card that can price it.
  */
 
 import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
@@ -88,8 +100,9 @@ const walledWithOwner = (owner = OWNER, posture = 'isolated') => {
  * `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL` takes one address OR a list (#11663 Choice 2B).
  * Before this card the stamp compared a candidate against the operator's WHOLE
  * raw value as one address, so under a list no member was ever stamped — the
- * account was born unverified and the elevation gate then refused it
- * (`walled_owner_not_verified`), silently.
+ * account was born unverified, so the per-request derivation
+ * (`resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config) resolved it non-admin and the walled
+ * boot log reported it "registered, NOT verified", silently.
  */
 const SECOND_OWNER = 'ops@corp.example';
 const OWNER_LIST = `${OWNER}, ${SECOND_OWNER}`;
@@ -392,8 +405,8 @@ describe('#12751 — probeWalledOwnerAccountState over a real ObjectQL engine',
     expect((await signUp(manager, SECOND_OWNER)).status).toBe(200);
     expect(await probeWalledOwnerAccountState(engine as never)).toBe('owner-unverified');
 
-    // One verified member is all the elevation gate needs, so it is all the
-    // probe reports — the gate's own three outcomes, mirrored.
+    // One verified member is all the derivation needs, so it is all the probe
+    // reports — the standing surface's own outcomes, mirrored.
     const row = await userRow(engine, SECOND_OWNER);
     await engine.update(
       'sys_user',
@@ -440,8 +453,8 @@ describe('#12751 — the stamp lands through the REAL creation pipeline', () =>
     expect(res.status, `owner bootstrap sign-up refused: ${await res.clone().text()}`).toBe(200);
 
     const row = await userRow(engine, OWNER);
-    // Read back through the elevation gate's own predicate: a `true` here is
-    // "bootstrapPlatformAdmin would elevate this row", representation
+    // Read back through the derivation's own predicate: a `true` here is
+    // "§6b-config would resolve PLATFORM_ADMIN for this row", representation
     // included.
     expect(
       isEmailVerifiedUserRow(row),

packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/platform-owner-wall-bypass.ts

@@ -34,9 +34,14 @@
  * (`normalizePlatformAdminEmail`: trim, then lowercase) — identical in effect to
  * the `String(email).trim().toLowerCase()` this used to spell inline.
  *
- * `walled-owner-operator-stamp.ts` (plugin-auth) and the elevation gate ask the
- * same parser for the same reason. The sites MUST agree — an account the stamp
- * verifies is one the gate must elevate and the wall must recognise.
+ * `walled-owner-operator-stamp.ts` (plugin-auth) and the platform-admin
+ * DERIVATION (`resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config, through
+ * `matchesConfiguredPlatformAdmin`) ask the same parser for the same reason.
+ * The sites MUST agree — an account the stamp verifies is one the derivation
+ * must resolve `PLATFORM_ADMIN` for and the wall must recognise. Before the
+ * #11663 re-anchor the third site was the elevation gate, which conferred that
+ * standing by a WRITE; the agreement requirement is unchanged by its
+ * retirement.
  *
  * Fail-closed by construction, both directions the ruling pins:
  *  - no declared owner (env unset/blank, or a list REFUSED for an unparseable

packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts

@@ -5819,8 +5819,11 @@ export class SecurityPlugin implements Plugin {
    *  4. The authoritative answer is the `sys_user` ROW (system-context by-id
    *     read, memoized per request-context like `__rlsMembershipStaged` /
    *     `__preImage`): {@link isVerifiedPlatformOwnerRow} = the canonical
-   *     declared-owner email match (the elevation gate's twin,
-   *     `platform-owner-wall-bypass.ts`) AND the #11343 verified-email
+   *     declared-owner email match (`platform-owner-wall-bypass.ts`, shared
+   *     with the platform-admin standing surface — it was extracted as the
+   *     elevation gate's twin, and since the #11663 re-anchor retired that
+   *     gate its opposite number is the per-request derivation at
+   *     `resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config) AND the #11343 verified-email
    *     allow-list (`isEmailVerifiedUserRow` — absent-means-unverified).
    *     Missing row / unreadable store ⇒ `false`.
    *

packages/types/src/env.ts

@@ -165,9 +165,16 @@ export function resolveTenancyPosture(): TenancyPosture {
  * The env variable naming the deployment's PLATFORM OWNER account
  * (#11184, the framework leg of cloud#1509).
  *
- * Exported as a constant so every message that refuses over it (the walled
- * boot guard in plugin-auth, the elevation refusal in plugin-security's
- * `bootstrapPlatformAdmin`) names exactly one spelling.
+ * Exported as a constant so every message that names it quotes exactly one
+ * spelling: the walled boot guard in plugin-auth, and plugin-security's
+ * `bootstrapPlatformAdmin` — its fail-closed backstop for an undeclared or
+ * refused config, and the config-derived standing it logs beside it.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ That second site is no longer an ELEVATION refusal. Since the #11663
+ * platform-admin re-anchor (leg L4) the walled `bootstrapPlatformAdmin` writes
+ * no grant row and elevates nobody — it reports. Standing is derived PER
+ * REQUEST at `resolve-authz-context.ts` §6b-config, from a declared address
+ * held on a VERIFIED `sys_user` row.
  */
 export const PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL_ENV = 'OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL';