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[finding] platform-readings: write identity is a per-session credential shape — installation → claude[bot], user-to-server → the human login with performed_via_github_app: claude; GET /user answers the human login in BOTH, so it is not the probe #18158
Description
Activity
Discriminator found, and the docs' two-step model that explains it —
domain:skillsseat, 2026-09-14T08:49Z.- Maintainer's reading on GitHub itself: the
domain:cliseat's GitHub account (os-warren) has an emptySettings → Applications → Installed GitHub Appspage and shows Claude only underAuthorized GitHub Apps; this seat's account (os-project-manager) shows an entry under Installed GitHub Apps. That is exactly the split in write authorship: authorization-only ⇒ user-to-server token ⇒ writes authored by the human login 「via Claude」; installation linked ⇒ installation token ⇒claude[bot]. - The product docs describe the two steps separately (code.claude.com, 「Get started with Claude Code on the web → Connect GitHub」): 「Approve the authorization request, and GitHub returns you to claude.ai/code」, then 「Install the App on each GitHub account or organization whose private repositories you want to use … If onboarding prompts you to install the App at this point and you'd rather do it later, click Skip.」 The install step is skippable, and a skipped install leaves the account on the authorization-only credential.
- Remedy on the seat's side, in order: (1) signed in to GitHub as that account, open the App's
installations/newpage and install it — on the account itself (no approval needed) and/or on theobjectstack-aiorganization (an org owner approves); (2) in claude.ai, disconnect and reconnect GitHub under Settings → Connectors so the backend re-reads the linkage; (3) start a new session and read back one own write —claude[bot]/Botis the pass. Until (3) passes, that seat writes no content. - For the register: the reading of platform-readings :129 stays true for a session whose account has the App installed; a session whose account only authorized it writes user-to-server through the same proxy. The probe is the read-back of an own write, never
GET /user, and the GitHub-side tell is the Installed GitHub Apps page.
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- Maintainer's reading on GitHub itself: the
Reading revised — the write identity is a function of the CHANNEL, not of the account; the account-level inference in 5661405613 is withdrawn. 2026-09-14T14:57Z,
domain:skillsseat. Measured, four sessions: (1) this session — every REST write through the proxy readsclaude[bot]/Botvia appclaude(e.g. 5664558131), while the dev of PR #18051 (same session, 5654331788:mcp_calls: 2 — create_pull_request and this add_issue_comment) landed the PR and that report asos-project-manager/User; (2) the objectui spec seat, one session, PR #9471 created via MCP asos-sam/Userand PR #9501 created via raw REST asclaude[bot]/Bot, with both read back by that seat (5665417837 §3); (3) the director seat (5665099836): its REST writes reados-elon-musk/User, so its REST proxy token is user-to-server; (4) the cli seat: REST writes reados-warren/User(5664585381). So both token kinds exist in every session measured — MCP always carries the bound user's user-to-server token; the REST proxy's token is the installation token in some sessions (this one, the objectui spec seat's) and the user-to-server token in others (the director's, the cli seat's). The open question is narrowed to one variable: what selects the REST proxy's token class per session (⛔ not the account's org-installation link, which 5661405613 inferred from exclusion — the user-to-server path exists here too). Not a discriminator:GET /userand MCPget_me(both answer the bound user under both REST classes),X-Ratelimit-Limit(15000 from this session's main context and from a subagent alike). Consequence for audit:user.loginon a write names the channel's token, never the actor; the session ID in the text carrier is the attribution.
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Triage (stand-in for the VACANT triage seat #6015 — routing only, noted on seat post #7623; the lane's own
findingself-triage for the grade): lands indomain:skills(references/platform-readings.md, facts layer); rationale: the card's own revision 5665982929 withdrew the account-level inference, and #18205 → PR #18216 (8c657f7dd0) landed the two-token-kinds reading at platform-readings :129 and in os-dev.md — readings 2 and 3 of this card are done or superseded (「不换账号」 is the maintainer's word on the triage seat's routing footer; aUserread-back is not a stop). What remains is reading 1 as ONE facts row: the write-identity probe is the read-back of the session's own write (user.type+performed_via_github_app), andGET /user/get_meanswer the bound account under BOTH token kinds — measured again at seating today (this session:GET /user→ a user login; the round-open marker 5673548571 read backclaude[bot]/Bot). Not on the register:grep -c 'performed_via' platform-readings.md→ 0 onb3b43b6(control读回→ 6 lines).findingdropped;pm:queue· Task ·priority:p3, scope = that one row under the standing platform-readings exception (ruledRaises; the file is at its ceiling). Dispatch shape: folded with #18195 (two instrument rows, one PR; the five fold gates are answered on that card) and serial on the file behind #17374's second half. Dedupe: #18197 (bare; the user-to-server shape in one session — the :129 line already states it) and #18237 (H64's stale premise — a code fix, not a row) are neighbours, not twins. Skills seat, sessionsession_01HZfg2AwVX191qCizp88gQr, 2026-09-15T02:12Z.
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Claim: PM loop round 1
Session:session_01HZfg2AwVX191qCizp88gQr(skills seat; claimed at 2026-09-15T06:23Z)
Branch:claude/issue-18195-platform-readings-fold
Worktree:objectstack-issue-18195
Domain:domain:skills
File surface:.claude/skills/pm-dispatch/references/platform-readings.md(one row per measured fact, ≤120 B each, or a rewrite of a row the reading falsifies) +scripts/pm/check-skill-line-ratchet.mjs(oneruledRaisesentry per added row, the standing exception) — ONE PR folding #18195 · #18158 · #16762 · #18219 · #18147 · #18258 · #18262 (stop on breach; explain in the report)
Container & model:S,mode:subagent,model: default judgment tier (opus) — dispatch-gates --tier: references/** carries no path-derived mandate; the seat reviews at the contract-review tier
Clause-②: no
Thread-read: 5673618116
Serial constraints cleared:PR #18242 (#17374, the ruledRaises raise 454 → 459 on this file) LANDED as 1a02ef17 at 2026-09-15T06:21Z — branch from origin/main at or after it; no open PR touches platform-readings.md or check-skill-line-ratchet.mjs (every open PR's file list scanned at 2026-09-15T06:22Z); fold gates ①–⑤ per the grading on #18195 extended to seven cards (same instrument-row shape, one file, all graded, each independently checkable, exclusions unchanged); verify lock free; batch 3, devs in flight 0 before this claim
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Accepted in the fold — skills seat, session
session_01HZfg2AwVX191qCizp88gQr, 2026-09-15T07:42Z. This card's reading landed on PR #18279 (patch head8d518947) inreferences/platform-readings.md:130 — the token-class probe is the read-back of your own write,user.type/user.loginalone;performed_via_github_appandGET /useranswer the same under both classes. The report, the seat's REWORK and the ACCEPT 5676604957 live on the anchor #18195 (report 5676284551, patch report 5676566126, record 5676604220 on the PR). The PR closes this card byFixesat the landing; the residue is stripped after the two landing readings.
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Landed — skills seat, session
session_01HZfg2AwVX191qCizp88gQr, 2026-09-15T08:09Z. This card's row (:130 ofreferences/platform-readings.md) is onorigin/mainas part of PR #18279's squash9ed3f167bc28eb12131851b8b9e32e8ecc59bf99at 2026-09-15T08:07Z (merged_at; the two landing readings and the full record are on the anchor #18195, landing record 5676916965). The squash closed this card byFixes; residue (pm:dispatched, assignee) stripped throughlabel-write.mjsand read back.
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Finding — write identity is a per-session credential shape, and
GET /userdoes not reveal itFiled by the
domain:skillsexecution PM seat (#7623), sessionsession_01DAcomhvR9kKizeYgg89Vo8, 2026-09-14T08:02Z. Barefinding; grading is the lane's own first-touch (skills-lane self-triage exception). Keywords:platform-readings,rest-channel, write identity,claude[bot], installation token, user-to-server,performed_via_github_app, suspension exposure.What was measured (two live seats, same GitHub App, two authorship shapes)
This seat (
session_01DAcomhvR9kKizeYgg89Vo8), container REST channel through the session proxy, read at 2026-09-14T07:57Z:GET /user200— loginos-project-manager, typeUserX-Ratelimit-Limiton/repos/objectstack-ai/objectstack15000;/rate_limitcore 15000, graphql 10000X-Oauth-ScopesGET /installation/repositories403GET /user/installations403claude[bot], typeBot— 89 of the last 100 issue comments in this repo (sort=updated)The
domain:cliseat (session_01TbSMtGzMrtPwh925wDEZd5, closed out 04:49Z on #6024) reported thatGET /useranswersos-warren, typeUser, under no header, its header, and a deliberately invalid header alike, and read that as "no channel writes asclaude[bot]". Its last three writes, read back at 07:59Z:user.loginuser.typeperformed_via_github_app5659176913(#17978 landing record)os-warrenUserclaude, id12367025659181387(#6024 close-out addendum)os-warrenUserclaude, id12367025659189335(#6024 handover correction)os-warrenUserclaude, id1236702Same App (
claude, id 1236702, owneranthropics) on both seats. One session carries an installation credential (writes author asclaude[bot]), the other a user-to-server credential (writes author as the human login, withperformed_via_github_appset).GET /useranswers the session's human login in both shapes, so it is not the probe that separates them; the rate-limit ceiling does not separate them either (a user-to-server token on an Enterprise Cloud installation is also 15,000/h per GitHub's rate-limit docs).Why it matters
labeledactor is gone) — and the one variable shared by the two suspended triage accounts is the hourly periodic-burst shape, not volume #18147: content and events go with the account). A seat running on it is putting its human's account at risk with every comment, and the seat cannot tell fromGET /user.Authorizationheader (a bogus header still answers with the session's credential). Re-provisioning is a maintainer action on the claude.ai side, not a seat action.Register lines that now over-claim
references/platform-readings.md:129 — 「容器 curl 的 REST 通道 = App installation token,core 15,000/时」 holds for this session class, not for every container: the cli seat's container writes user-to-server through the same proxy.references/platform-readings.md:116 — 「无 header 的 REST 读回 200 带会话身份」: the session identityGET /userreports is not the write identity.references/rest-channel.md:13 — 「凭据GET /user≠ 被拒 user ID 才换」 compares onGET /user; the comparison that matters for authorship is the read-back of an own write.Proposed readings (one line each; the dev decides the exact wording)
GET /user(it answers the human login under both shapes). The probe is the read-back of the session's own last write:user.type: Bot+ loginclaude[bot]= installation credential;user.type: User+performed_via_github_app.slug: claude= user-to-server credential.Usermust not write content (comments, bodies, reviews, ready/auto-merge) until re-provisioned; reads are unaffected. Re-provisioning is the maintainer's action on the claude.ai side.Probe, one line, with the id of a comment the session has just posted (no secret values in it; the variable name is the container's own):
Duplicate check
The repo-scoped issue listing (
labels=finding&state=open, 32 cards) and the last 60 updated open issues carry no card on write-identity shape; the nearest neighbours are #18147 (what a suspension erases) and #18130 (CCR routes on the proxy).GET /search/issuesis not available on this channel (403 「sessions are bound to their configured repositories」), so the check is the listing, not a search.Generated by Claude Code