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security(llc): scope the goal ancestry walk, and stop it defaulting off (#15930) - #15944
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…ff (#15930) `GET /goals/{goal_id}/ancestors` authorised the leaf and then walked its parent chain with `company_id` omitted. The defence existed, was correct, and was not switched on -- and #13704's own docstring names the shape: "Scoping only the leaf is not enough -- a cross-company parent edge makes the chain itself the leak." `llc_goals.parent_goal_id` is a self-referential FK with no company constraint, so the database permits the edge; only the service `create` guard stops new ones, and by #13704's account such edges were creatable before it. THE DEFAULT IS THE DEFECT, so the default changed. `get_ancestors` now derives the scope from the STARTING goal when the caller omits it, rather than walking unscoped. That is not a weaker check -- the leaf is the goal the caller was authorised for, so its company IS the caller's -- and it means the next caller is scoped without having to know. The route passes `ctx.org_id` explicitly as well, at the authorisation boundary where it belongs. `get_goal_ancestry_for_work_item`'s own ENTRY check ("is this goal the caller's?") stays an argument: deriving it from the goal would make it a tautology. `kb/context_builder.py` now passes the work item's company, which is the second call site the sweep found omitting it. AC3, revoke_key: classified and then fixed rather than documented. `heartbeat_scheduler._revoke_run_key` was a sanctioned unscoped call -- `api_key.py` says the scope is optional "so internal callers whose scope is already established stay unchanged" (#13771), and the agent and key both come from `_issue_ephemeral_key` a few lines up. But the scheduler holds the company in `agent_config`, so it passes it: an optional tenant scope that is never omitted cannot be omitted by accident. SIX TESTS PINNED THE UNSCOPED SIGNATURE and had to change -- one in `test_heartbeat_context.py`, five in `test_heartbeat_scheduler.py`. They asserted `assert_called_once_with(session, goal_id)`, which encoded the omission rather than guarding anything. They now assert the scoped call. Worth naming: a test that pins a call signature pins whatever the call currently is, including its defects. Verified by mutation (baseline 6 passed): restore the unscoped default (pre-fix state) 1 failed walk continues past a foreign ancestor 3 failed entry check dropped from ancestry_for_wi 1 failed One test asserts the walk STOPS at a foreign ancestor rather than filtering it out: continuing past it would return the caller's own grandparent, reachable only THROUGH another company's row, which is the traversal rather than the disclosure of one title. Two contrast cases keep the feature working -- an own-company chain returns in full, and an own goal's ancestry is inclusive. Fixtures seed the cross-company edge DIRECTLY rather than through `create`, because `create`'s guard correctly refuses it. That reproduces the pre-#13704 state an existing installation may hold, which is the reason the walk needs its own check at all. No regression: the LLC suite fails the same 9 on this branch and on untouched base -- sets diffed, not counted. Both grandfathered files back to exactly their ceilings (`heartbeat_scheduler.py` 1076, `test_heartbeat_scheduler.py` 1085).
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 6 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change applies company scoping to goal ancestry retrieval and ephemeral heartbeat API-key revocation. It adds regression coverage for cross-company goal chains, work-item ancestry, route authorisation, and heartbeat dispatch outcomes. ChangesTenant scope enforcement
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Goal ancestry now remains within the starting goal’s company while preserving authorized platform-admin access, and heartbeat cleanup revokes keys within the run’s company scope. The covered behavior has no remaining merge-blocking risk. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The PR implements tenant-scoped ancestry traversal, foreign-ancestor stopping, scheduler company scoping, and regression tests. It does not enumerate all optional tenant-scope parameters and call sites, and it does not record the repository-wide decision on whether tenant scope should remain optional. [ Resolution Enumerate every tenant-scoped method with an optional company scope, classify each call site as scoped or deliberately unscoped, and record whether the repository will keep tenant scope optional or make it required. Also document the intentional use of the starting goal's company for platform-admin requests. ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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Inline comments:
In `@autobot-backend/llc/api/goals.py`:
- Line 268: Update the goal ancestry flow to retain the authorised goal returned
by _get_authorized_goal and pass its company_id to _svc().get_ancestors instead
of ctx.org_id. Preserve the caller-company behavior for ordinary tenant requests
while allowing authorised platform administrators to traverse goals belonging to
another company.
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autobot-backend/llc/api/goals.pyautobot-backend/llc/kb/context_builder.pyautobot-backend/llc/scheduler/heartbeat_scheduler.pyautobot-backend/llc/services/goal.pyautobot-backend/llc/tests/test_goal_ancestry_scope_15930.pyautobot-backend/llc/tests/test_heartbeat_context.pyautobot-backend/llc/tests/test_heartbeat_scheduler.py
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Review — the coderabbit Major is correct, and the fix is smaller than its diffFirst human pass. Adjudicating the bot's Major was the job, so I traced it end to The Major is real. The chain, at
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Addendum: the argument I'm asking you to delete is #15930's fix, and that's why the comment matters more than the deletionProvenance I didn't have when I wrote the above, and it strengthens the
The fix had two available shapes — pass the scope at the call site, or make the So the parameter's meaning inverted inside one PR
That inversion is the real hazard here, and it is not in the code — it is in what Which makes the comment change the substantive part of this fixDeleting the argument is one line. The comment at
True for a tenant, false for a platform admin, and the sentence gives a reader no The comment at Safety check, restated against the provenanceThe tenant case is unchanged, and this is the part worth being explicit about #13704's stop-at-the-first-foreign-ancestor property is preserved throughout, So: no tenant loses isolation, one admin case starts working, and one line goes. |
…chain (#15930) The first form of this fix had `goals.py` pass `company_id=str(ctx.org_id)` to `get_ancestors`, overriding the derived default the same PR added. `_get_authorized_goal:119` exempts platform admins (`and not ctx.is_platform_admin`), so an admin legitimately holds a goal whose company is not their org. Passing `ctx.org_id` then stopped the walk at step one and returned an empty chain -- "no ancestors" where the truth is a chain. Fails closed, so not a tenant leak, but a wrong answer. THE PARAMETER'S MEANING INVERTED INSIDE THIS PR. Before the derived default existed, OMITTING `company_id` was the bug: the walk ran unscoped, which is #15930. After it exists, SUPPLYING it is. Anyone following that line to #15930 would read the argument as load-bearing tenant isolation and refuse to touch it, so the argument is deleted and the service comment now says the derived company is the STARTING GOAL's, cites #15930, and states the inversion outright. Deleting is safe for tenants: `_get_authorized_goal` has already established the caller is authorised for the starting goal, so for a normal caller the derived and passed scopes are the same value. Only the admin case moves. #13704's stop-at-the-first-foreign-ancestor is preserved either way -- the walk still stops, just against the right company. Two route-level tests added, which is where the defect was: the six existing ones call the service directly and all pass either way. One asserts an admin gets the chain; the contrast asserts a non-admin from another org still 404s before the walk runs, which is why deleting the argument costs nothing. restore company_id=str(ctx.org_id) 1 failed of 8 Ceilings rc=0 measured after black and isort. LLC suite fails the same 9 as untouched base, sets diffed.
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Thinking Path
GET /goals/{goal_id}/ancestorsauthorised the starting goal and then walked its parent chain withcompany_idomitted:The defence existed, was correct, and was not switched on. #13704's own docstring names this exact shape:
llc_goals.parent_goal_idis a self-referential FK with no company constraint, so the database permits the edge. Only the servicecreateguard stops new ones, and by #13704's account such edges were creatable before it — so any installation with goals predating that change may hold one._get_authorized_goalreturns the caller's own goal, so the request looks entirely legitimate at the boundary.The default is the defect, so the default changed.
get_ancestorsderives the scope from the starting goal when the caller omits it. That is not a weaker check — the leaf is the goal the caller was authorised for, so its company is the caller's — and it means the next caller is scoped without having to know. The route also passesctx.org_idexplicitly, at the authorisation boundary where it belongs.Fixing only the route would have left the trap for the next caller. An optional tenant scope is off by default, and every call site written before the parameter keeps the old behaviour with no diff showing it.
What Changed
llc/services/goal.py—get_ancestorsderives the scope from the starting goal when not given onellc/api/goals.py:265— passescompany_id=str(ctx.org_id)llc/kb/context_builder.py:213— passes the work item's company, enablingget_goal_ancestry_for_work_item's entry check (a different question from the walk's, and one that cannot be derived from the goal without becoming a tautology)llc/scheduler/heartbeat_scheduler.py—_revoke_run_keypasses the company (AC3, below)llc/tests/test_goal_ancestry_scope_15930.py— new, 6 testsllc/tests/test_heartbeat_context.py,llc/tests/test_heartbeat_scheduler.py— six assertions updated, see belowAC3 —
revoke_key, classified and then fixed rather than documentedheartbeat_scheduler._revoke_run_keywas a sanctioned unscoped call:api_key.pysays the scope is optional "so internal callers whose scope is already established stay unchanged" (#13771), and the agent and key both come from_issue_ephemeral_keya few lines above — not from a request.The issue allowed either "state that it is intended" or "pass the company". It passes: the scheduler holds the company in
agent_config, and an optional tenant scope that is never omitted cannot be omitted by accident.Six tests pinned the unscoped signature
assert_called_once_with(session, goal_id)— one intest_heartbeat_context.py, five intest_heartbeat_scheduler.py. They encoded the omission rather than guarding anything, so the fix broke them. They now assert the scoped call.Worth naming as a class: a test that pins a call signature pins whatever the call currently is, including its defects. These looked like regression guards and were the opposite.
Verification
Mutation, baseline 6 passed:
get_goal_ancestry_for_work_itemtest_the_walk_stops_at_the_edge_rather_than_skipping_itasserts the walk stops rather than filtering: continuing past a foreign ancestor would return the caller's own grandparent, reachable only through another company's row. That is the traversal the issue is about, rather than the disclosure of one title.Two contrast cases keep the feature working — an own-company chain returns in full, and an own goal's ancestry is inclusive of itself. Without them, a walk returning nothing satisfies every security assertion.
Fixtures seed the cross-company edge directly rather than through
create, becausecreate's guard correctly refuses it. That reproduces the pre-#13704 state an existing installation may hold, which is the reason the walk needs its own check at all.No regression: the LLC suite fails the same 9 on this branch and on untouched base — sets diffed, not counted, all
llc.scheduler.baserequiring Python 3.11+ locally.Risks
_revoke_run_keynow scopes. If any deployment has an ephemeral key whosecompany_iddoes not match its agent's, the revoke will no longer find it and the key will outlive its run. The call is already best-effort and wrapped intry/except, so this logs rather than fails — but it is a real change and I have not established whether such rows exist.heartbeat_scheduler.pyback to exactly 1076,test_heartbeat_scheduler.pyto 1085. The reasoning lives in this body and the commit instead.AC5 is framed, not decided
That is a repository-wide convention question, not a fix. Making every tenant scope required changes every such signature and all their call sites; the evidence for it is in this PR and in #15931 (where the same mechanism disabled a business rule) and #15924, and the decision belongs to the owner. I have deliberately not made it from one route's fix — the same call as #15907 and #15912's AC1.
Model Used
Claude Opus 5 (claude-opus-5)
Issue Link
Closes #15930
Single-issue rationale: one traversal, one service method, one route, plus the one other call site of the same method that omitted the scope. #15924 (seven hand-rolled copies of the IDOR helper) and #15931 (an unreachable business rule) share the mechanism but not a seam, and batching on shape rather than on file is the lax reading of the rule.
Changelog fragment
Checklist
CLAUDE.mdcreateDev_new_gui(notmain)Summary by CodeRabbit