Never rollback initial ledger secrets #3169
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eddyashton
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no_rollback_initial_ledger_secrets@36086 aka 20211105.23 vs main ewma over 20 builds from 35549 to 36072 Click to see table
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achamayou
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achamayou
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achamayou
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Nov 5, 2021
…fre/CCF into no_rollback_initial_ledger_secrets
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When a backup node joins a service, it is given the entire history of ledger secrets so far (part of the
/node/joinresponse). If an election is triggered when the node is catching up, the node will rollback its store, which will cause the ledger secrets to be rolled back too. This is incorrect since the backup will need the ledger secrets to decrypt further entries, once the catch up phase is complete.For example, if a new node joined without a snapshot and received the ledger secrets at seqnos
{1, 10}, caught up till5at which point an election was triggered (new joiner's store is rolled back at5, ledger secrets at now{1}), it wouldn't have been able to deserialise entries from10onwards.We now protect the initial ledger secrets received in the
/node/joinresponse so that they cannot be rolled back.