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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

This PR implements a hashtable-based lookup system for Landlock's flat array domains as requested in the issue. The implementation replaces the current linear/binary search approach with an efficient hashtable using linear probing for collision resolution.

Key Changes

Core Implementation

  • Added next_collision field to landlock_domain_index structure for collision chaining support
  • Implemented hashtable construction with linear probing collision resolution
  • Added hash function with power-of-2 optimization (bitwise AND) and fallback to modulo for non-power-of-2 sizes
  • Created separate hashtables for filesystem (fs_hash_size) and network (net_hash_size) rules

New Files

  • security/landlock/domain.h - Domain structure definitions and hashtable lookup functions
  • security/landlock/domain.c - Domain allocation, hashtable construction, and management functions
  • security/landlock/domain_hashtable_tests.c - Comprehensive unit tests
  • security/landlock/audit.h - Stub audit functions for compilation

Algorithm Details

The hashtable uses linear probing for collision resolution:

// Hash function with power-of-2 optimization
static inline u32 domain_hash_key(union landlock_key key, u32 hash_size)
{
    if (hash_size && (hash_size & (hash_size - 1)) == 0) {
        // Power of 2: use fast bitwise AND
        return (u32)key.data & (hash_size - 1);
    } else {
        // Not power of 2: use modulo
        return hash_size ? (u32)key.data % hash_size : 0;
    }
}

When inserting rules:

  1. Compute hash of the key
  2. If hash slot is empty, place rule there
  3. If hash slot is occupied, probe linearly to find next empty slot
  4. Update collision chains as needed

Lookup follows the same linear probing pattern, ensuring O(1) average-case performance.

Sizing Strategies

The implementation supports two allocation strategies:

  • Power-of-2 sizing: Faster hashing but uses more memory
  • Exact sizing: More memory-efficient but slightly slower due to modulo operation

Testing

Comprehensive unit tests validate:

  • Hash function correctness for both power-of-2 and non-power-of-2 sizes
  • Domain allocation and memory layout
  • Basic hashtable lookup functionality
  • Collision handling with linear probing
  • Power-of-2 utility functions

Benefits

  • Improved performance: O(1) average-case lookup vs O(log n) for binary search
  • Cache-friendly: Linear probing has better cache locality than chaining
  • Memory efficient: Maintains flat array structure, no individual allocations per rule
  • Flexible sizing: Supports both speed-optimized and space-optimized configurations

Status

✅ Core hashtable implementation complete and tested
✅ Linear probing collision resolution working
✅ Comprehensive unit tests passing
🔄 Integration with existing Landlock code in progress

The implementation provides a solid foundation for the hashtable-based domain system while maintaining compatibility with Landlock's existing flat array approach.

Fixes #10.

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@micromaomao
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@copilot I literally said "targets the "landlock-arraydomain" branch"

@micromaomao micromaomao marked this pull request as ready for review July 1, 2025 12:03
@micromaomao micromaomao marked this pull request as draft July 1, 2025 12:03
@micromaomao micromaomao changed the base branch from dev to landlock-arraydomain July 1, 2025 12:04
Copilot AI changed the title [WIP] impkement probing hashtable-based array domains Implement probing hashtable-based array domains for Landlock Jul 1, 2025
Copilot AI requested a review from micromaomao July 1, 2025 12:29
Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 12:29
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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

@copilot I literally said "targets the "landlock-arraydomain" branch"

You're absolutely right, I apologize for the mistake. I should have targeted the "landlock-arraydomain" branch as you specifically requested. Let me switch to that branch and implement the hashtable functionality on top of the existing flat array implementation there.

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I tried to connect to the following addresses, but was blocked by firewall rules:

  • esm.ubuntu.com
    • Triggering command: /usr/lib/apt/methods/https (dns block)

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Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 13:03
@micromaomao
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@copilot

You said:

                     /*  
                      * If we've wrapped around to the starting position, 
                      * the table is full. This shouldn't happen with 
                      * proper sizing. 
                      */

Is this true? What if all the indices hash to high hash values, and you end up with a bunch of unused slots at the beginning?

But also, even if you allow wrapping, what happens if you use a "free" slot first, but then another rule hashed to the slot you just used to store collision?

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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

@copilot

You said:...

You're absolutely correct on both points. The original logic was flawed:

  1. Wrap-around detection issue: The comment "if we've wrapped around to the starting position, the table is full" is incorrect. Consider keys that all hash to high indices (7,8,9 in a size-10 table) - linear probing would wrap to use slots 0,1,2 etc., which is perfectly valid behavior.

  2. Collision handling: The lookup logic correctly handles this by continuing to probe in the same pattern, so this part works fine.

The real issue was the table-full detection logic. I've fixed it in commit a176974 by:

  • Replacing position-based detection with a probe counter
  • Adding a test case that demonstrates the scenario you described (keys hashing to high values, using wrapped slots)

The fix ensures we properly detect when we've examined all hash_size slots rather than incorrectly assuming position wrapping means the table is full.

Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 18:07
@micromaomao
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@copilot

For landlock, the vast majority of cases there will not be any match (e.g. an application is unlikely to set individual rules on individual files). Ideally those cases should return "not found" as fast as possible. But with this probing approach, we will end up iterating through the entire hashtable (to make sure we don't miss anything due to collision being stored somewhere else)

Do you have an idea to optimize this, so that for anything not found we return really fast? Please don't suggest anything that will take up significantly more memory. Ideally this can be achieved with just this hash table by changing the probing logic a bit?

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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

@copilot

For landlock, the vast majority of cases there will not be any match (e.g. an application is unlikely to set individual rules on individual files). Ideally those cases should return "not fo...

I've implemented Robin Hood hashing optimization to address exactly this issue. The solution repurposes the existing next_collision field as probe_distance to track how far each entry is displaced from its ideal hash position.

Key insight: During lookup, if we encounter an entry whose probe_distance is less than our current probe distance, we know our key cannot be in the table and can terminate immediately.

Example: Looking for missing key that hashes to position 1:

  • Position 1: entry with distance 0, our distance 0 → continue
  • Position 2: entry with distance 1, our distance 1 → continue
  • Position 3: entry with distance 0, our distance 2 → STOP (key not found)

This provides fast O(1) early termination for missing keys without using additional memory. The optimization is validated by comprehensive unit tests including the test_robin_hood_early_termination test case.

Commit: 911a7b7

Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 18:35
@micromaomao
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@copilot is there a better way? Taking advantage of the fact that this hash table does not need to be mutable.

What if you place elements such that if an element hashes to index i, it is guaranteed to either appear at index i, or be in the collision chain from i?

Analyze whether this approach would be better.

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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

@copilot is there a better way? Taking advantage of the fact that this hash table does not need to be mutable.

What if you place elements such that if an element hashes to index i, it is guaranteed t...

You're absolutely right! That approach would be significantly better for Landlock's use case. The key insight is that since the hashtable is immutable, we can guarantee that all collisions for a given hash value form a contiguous chain starting from the ideal position.

Benefits of chain-from-ideal approach:

  1. Faster missing key lookups: Stop immediately at first empty slot (no probe distance checks)
  2. Memory savings: Eliminate the probe_distance field entirely (4 bytes per entry)
  3. Simpler logic: Just scan from ideal position until empty slot or match
  4. Better for Landlock: Optimized for the common case where most lookups miss

Implementation:

  • During construction: Place collisions in next available slot from ideal position
  • During lookup: Scan linearly from ideal position until empty slot (guaranteed not found) or match

This is indeed superior to Robin Hood hashing for this specific use case. Let me implement this optimization.

Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 19:03
@micromaomao
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@copilot I don't think this will work - it's not that simple. You probably need to form a chain with the next_collision field

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Copilot AI commented Jul 1, 2025

@copilot I don't think this will work - it's not that simple. You probably need to form a chain with the next_collision field

You're absolutely correct. The chain-from-ideal approach is flawed because placing entries in the first available slot doesn't guarantee contiguous chains. I need to use the next_collision field to form explicit chains within the hashtable. Let me implement this properly.

Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 1, 2025 19:19
As in is_access_to_paths_allowed(), it is also possible to reach
disconnected root directories in collect_domain_accesses().

Remove a wrong WARN_ON_ONCE() canary in collect_domain_accesses() and
fix comment.  Using an unlikely() annotation doesn't seem appropriate
here.  A following patch from Tingmao tests this case [1].

Reported-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/09b24128f86973a6022e6aa8338945fcfb9a33e4.1749925391.git.m@maowtm.org [1]
Fixes: b91c3e4 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250618134734.1673254-1-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
- Fixed merge conflict markers in domain.h
- Replaced UINT32_MAX with U32_MAX for kernel compatibility
- Fixed variable naming conflict with 'current' keyword in tests
- Added missing function prototypes and stub implementations
- Resolved function naming conflicts with existing Landlock API
- All hashtable unit tests now pass successfully

The coalesced hashing implementation is now correctly working with:
- Hash-based collision resolution using next_collision field
- Fast missing key lookups (O(1) when ideal slot is empty)
- Proper collision chaining within the array structure
- Support for both power-of-2 and exact hashtable sizing

Co-authored-by: micromaomao <6070533+micromaomao@users.noreply.github.com>
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Copilot AI commented Jul 5, 2025

@copilot I've squashed your changes. Double check them, compile and test it. This algorithm is called Coalesced hashing. Make sure the implementation is correct.

I've double-checked the implementation, compiled, and tested it successfully. The coalesced hashing algorithm is correctly implemented and working as expected.

Verification completed:
✅ All 6 hashtable unit tests pass
✅ Compilation successful after fixing compatibility issues
✅ Coalesced hashing algorithm verified correct

Key fixes applied:

  • Fixed merge conflict markers and UINT32_MAX → U32_MAX conversion
  • Resolved variable naming conflicts (current is a kernel macro)
  • Added missing function stubs for audit functionality
  • Fixed function naming conflicts with existing Landlock API

The implementation correctly uses coalesced hashing (separate chaining within array) where collision entries are placed in any available slot and linked via the next_collision field. This provides O(1) average-case lookups with fast termination for missing keys - ideal for Landlock's use case where most lookups will miss.

Fixed in commit: 93250db

Copilot finished work on behalf of micromaomao July 5, 2025 15:48
@micromaomao micromaomao force-pushed the landlock-arraydomain branch 18 times, most recently from 2b90af7 to fe48c66 Compare July 6, 2025 20:16
micromaomao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2025
…th()

KASAN reports a stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth().

Call Trace:
[   97.283505] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
[   97.284677] Read of size 8 at addr ffff800089277c10 by task 1.sh/2550
[   97.285732]
[   97.286067] CPU: 7 PID: 2550 Comm: 1.sh Not tainted 6.6.0+ #11
[   97.287032] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[   97.287815] Call trace:
[   97.288279]  dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
[   97.288946]  show_stack+0x20/0x38
[   97.289551]  dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0xc8
[   97.290203]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x3c8
[   97.291159]  print_report+0xb0/0x280
[   97.291792]  kasan_report+0x84/0xd0
[   97.292421]  __asan_load8+0x9c/0xc0
[   97.293042]  regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
[   97.293835]  process_fetch_insn+0x770/0xa30
[   97.294562]  kprobe_trace_func+0x254/0x3b0
[   97.295271]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x98/0xe0
[   97.295955]  kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x1b0/0x210
[   97.296774]  call_break_hook+0xc4/0x100
[   97.297451]  brk_handler+0x24/0x78
[   97.298073]  do_debug_exception+0xac/0x178
[   97.298785]  el1_dbg+0x70/0x90
[   97.299344]  el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
[   97.300066]  el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x80
[   97.300699]  kernel_clone+0x0/0x500
[   97.301331]  __arm64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90
[   97.302084]  invoke_syscall+0x68/0x198
[   97.302746]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x11c/0x150
[   97.303569]  do_el0_svc+0x38/0x50
[   97.304164]  el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
[   97.304749]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130
[   97.305500]  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
[   97.306151]
[   97.306475] The buggy address belongs to stack of task 1.sh/2550
[   97.307461]  and is located at offset 0 in frame:
[   97.308257]  __se_sys_clone+0x0/0x138
[   97.308910]
[   97.309241] This frame has 1 object:
[   97.309873]  [48, 184) 'args'
[   97.309876]
[   97.310749] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[   97.310749]  [ffff800089270000, ffff800089279000) created by:
[   97.310749]  dup_task_struct+0xc0/0x2e8
[   97.313347]
[   97.313674] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   97.314604] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14f69a
[   97.315885] flags: 0x15ffffe00000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
[   97.316957] raw: 015ffffe00000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[   97.318207] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   97.319445] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   97.320371]
[   97.320694] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   97.321511]  ffff800089277b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.322681]  ffff800089277b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.323846] >ffff800089277c00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   97.325023]                          ^
[   97.325683]  ffff800089277c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[   97.326856]  ffff800089277d00: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

This issue seems to be related to the behavior of some gcc compilers and
was also fixed on the s390 architecture before:

 commit d93a855 ("s390/ptrace: Avoid KASAN false positives in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()")

As described in that commit, regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() has confirmed that
`addr` is on the stack, so reading the value at `*addr` should be allowed.
Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() helper to silence the KASAN check for this case.

Fixes: 0a8ea52 ("arm64: Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250604005533.1278992-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
[will: Use '*addr' as the argument to READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
micromaomao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2025
Since commit 6b9f29b ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk
allocator"), if NUMA is enabled, the page percpu allocator may be used
on very sparse configurations, or when requested on boot with
percpu_alloc=page.

In that case, percpu data gets put in the vmalloc area. However,
sbi_hsm_hart_start() needs the physical address of a sbi_hart_boot_data,
and simply assumes that __pa() would work. This causes the just started
hart to immediately access an invalid address and hang.

Fortunately, struct sbi_hart_boot_data is not too large, so we can
simply allocate an array for boot_data statically, putting it in the
kernel image.

This fixes NUMA=y SMP boot on Sophgo SG2042.

To reproduce on QEMU: Set CONFIG_NUMA=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, then
run with:

  qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt -smp 2 -nographic \
    -kernel arch/riscv/boot/Image \
    -append "percpu_alloc=page"

Kernel output:

[    0.000000] Booting Linux on hartid 0
[    0.000000] Linux version 6.16.0-rc1 (dram@sakuya) (riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-gcc (GCC) 14.2.1 20250322, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.44) #11 SMP Tue Jun 24 14:56:22 CST 2025
...
[    0.000000] percpu: 28 4K pages/cpu s85784 r8192 d20712
...
[    0.083192] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
[    0.086722] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.086849] virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: (____ptrval____) (0xff2000000001d080)
[    0.088001] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/riscv/mm/physaddr.c:14 __virt_to_phys+0xae/0xe8
[    0.088376] Modules linked in:
[    0.088656] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1 #11 NONE
[    0.088833] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[    0.088948] epc : __virt_to_phys+0xae/0xe8
[    0.089001]  ra : __virt_to_phys+0xae/0xe8
[    0.089037] epc : ffffffff80021eaa ra : ffffffff80021eaa sp : ff2000000004bbc0
[    0.089057]  gp : ffffffff817f49c0 tp : ff60000001d60000 t0 : 5f6f745f74726976
[    0.089076]  t1 : 0000000000000076 t2 : 705f6f745f747269 s0 : ff2000000004bbe0
[    0.089095]  s1 : ff2000000001d080 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : 0000000000000000
[    0.089113]  a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.089131]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000
[    0.089155]  s2 : ffffffff8130dc00 s3 : 0000000000000001 s4 : 0000000000000001
[    0.089174]  s5 : ffffffff8185eff8 s6 : ff2000007f1eb000 s7 : ffffffff8002a2ec
[    0.089193]  s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 0000000000000001 s10: 0000000000000000
[    0.089211]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff8180a9f7 t4 : ffffffff8180a9f7
[    0.089960]  t5 : ffffffff8180a9f8 t6 : ff2000000004b9d8
[    0.089984] status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffff80021eaa cause: 0000000000000003
[    0.090101] [<ffffffff80021eaa>] __virt_to_phys+0xae/0xe8
[    0.090228] [<ffffffff8001d796>] sbi_cpu_start+0x6e/0xe8
[    0.090247] [<ffffffff8001a5da>] __cpu_up+0x1e/0x8c
[    0.090260] [<ffffffff8002a32e>] bringup_cpu+0x42/0x258
[    0.090277] [<ffffffff8002914c>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xe0/0x40c
[    0.090292] [<ffffffff800294e0>] __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x68/0xfc
[    0.090320] [<ffffffff8002a96a>] _cpu_up+0x11a/0x244
[    0.090334] [<ffffffff8002aae6>] cpu_up+0x52/0x90
[    0.090384] [<ffffffff80c09350>] bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x78/0x118
[    0.090411] [<ffffffff80c11060>] smp_init+0x34/0xb8
[    0.090425] [<ffffffff80c01220>] kernel_init_freeable+0x148/0x2e4
[    0.090442] [<ffffffff80b83802>] kernel_init+0x1e/0x14c
[    0.090455] [<ffffffff800124ca>] ret_from_fork_kernel+0xe/0xf0
[    0.090471] [<ffffffff80b8d9c2>] ret_from_fork_kernel_asm+0x16/0x18
[    0.090560] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    1.179875] CPU1: failed to come online
[    1.190324] smp: Brought up 1 node, 1 CPU

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Han Gao <rabenda.cn@gmail.com>
Fixes: 6b9f29b ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk allocator")
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250624-riscv-hsm-boot-data-array-v1-1-50b5eeafbe61@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
@micromaomao micromaomao force-pushed the landlock-arraydomain branch 3 times, most recently from 33934ca to edb052b Compare July 12, 2025 18:01
micromaomao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 16, 2025
Add JIT support for the load_acquire and store_release instructions. The
implementation is similar to the kernel where:

        load_acquire  => plain load -> lwsync
        store_release => lwsync -> plain store

To test the correctness of the implementation, following selftests were
run:

  [fedora@linux-kernel bpf]$ sudo ./test_progs -a \
  verifier_load_acquire,verifier_store_release,atomics
  #11/1    atomics/add:OK
  #11/2    atomics/sub:OK
  #11/3    atomics/and:OK
  #11/4    atomics/or:OK
  #11/5    atomics/xor:OK
  #11/6    atomics/cmpxchg:OK
  #11/7    atomics/xchg:OK
  #11      atomics:OK
  torvalds#519/1   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 8-bit:OK
  torvalds#519/2   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 8-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/3   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 16-bit:OK
  torvalds#519/4   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 16-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/5   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 32-bit:OK
  torvalds#519/6   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 32-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/7   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 64-bit:OK
  torvalds#519/8   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire, 64-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/9   verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with uninitialized
  src_reg:OK
  torvalds#519/10  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with uninitialized src_reg
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/11  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with non-pointer src_reg:OK
  torvalds#519/12  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with non-pointer src_reg
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/13  verifier_load_acquire/misaligned load-acquire:OK
  torvalds#519/14  verifier_load_acquire/misaligned load-acquire @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/15  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire from ctx pointer:OK
  torvalds#519/16  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire from ctx pointer @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/17  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with invalid register R15:OK
  torvalds#519/18  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire with invalid register R15
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#519/19  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire from pkt pointer:OK
  torvalds#519/20  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire from flow_keys pointer:OK
  torvalds#519/21  verifier_load_acquire/load-acquire from sock pointer:OK
  torvalds#519     verifier_load_acquire:OK
  torvalds#556/1   verifier_store_release/store-release, 8-bit:OK
  torvalds#556/2   verifier_store_release/store-release, 8-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/3   verifier_store_release/store-release, 16-bit:OK
  torvalds#556/4   verifier_store_release/store-release, 16-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/5   verifier_store_release/store-release, 32-bit:OK
  torvalds#556/6   verifier_store_release/store-release, 32-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/7   verifier_store_release/store-release, 64-bit:OK
  torvalds#556/8   verifier_store_release/store-release, 64-bit @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/9   verifier_store_release/store-release with uninitialized
  src_reg:OK
  torvalds#556/10  verifier_store_release/store-release with uninitialized src_reg
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/11  verifier_store_release/store-release with uninitialized
  dst_reg:OK
  torvalds#556/12  verifier_store_release/store-release with uninitialized dst_reg
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/13  verifier_store_release/store-release with non-pointer
  dst_reg:OK
  torvalds#556/14  verifier_store_release/store-release with non-pointer dst_reg
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/15  verifier_store_release/misaligned store-release:OK
  torvalds#556/16  verifier_store_release/misaligned store-release @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/17  verifier_store_release/store-release to ctx pointer:OK
  torvalds#556/18  verifier_store_release/store-release to ctx pointer @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/19  verifier_store_release/store-release, leak pointer to stack:OK
  torvalds#556/20  verifier_store_release/store-release, leak pointer to stack
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/21  verifier_store_release/store-release, leak pointer to map:OK
  torvalds#556/22  verifier_store_release/store-release, leak pointer to map
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/23  verifier_store_release/store-release with invalid register
  R15:OK
  torvalds#556/24  verifier_store_release/store-release with invalid register R15
  @unpriv:OK
  torvalds#556/25  verifier_store_release/store-release to pkt pointer:OK
  torvalds#556/26  verifier_store_release/store-release to flow_keys pointer:OK
  torvalds#556/27  verifier_store_release/store-release to sock pointer:OK
  torvalds#556     verifier_store_release:OK
  Summary: 3/55 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Saket Kumar Bhaskar <skb99@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250717202935.29018-2-puranjay@kernel.org
@micromaomao micromaomao force-pushed the landlock-arraydomain branch 3 times, most recently from 30a910d to d07afd9 Compare November 30, 2025 20:34
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impkement probing hashtable-based array domains

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