Please do NOT report security vulnerabilities via public GitHub issues.

Instead, use one of the following:

• GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (preferred): https://github.com/michelbr84/GarraRUST/security/advisories/new
• Email: security@garraia.org

• A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
• Steps to reproduce the issue
• Any relevant logs, config, or code snippets (redact any real credentials)

• Acknowledgement: within 48 hours
• Initial assessment: within 5 business days
• Patch timeline: within 14 days for critical, 30 days for others
• Credit: reporters credited in release notes unless they prefer anonymity

GarraIA is built with security as a core requirement:

• AES-256-GCM encrypted credential vault (never plaintext on disk)
• Argon2id (RFC 9106, m=64 MiB, t=3, p=4) for new credentials; PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 lazy upgrade path for legacy hashes (transactional under FOR NO KEY UPDATE)
• JWT HS256 access tokens with explicit algorithm-confusion guards; opaque refresh tokens fingerprinted with a separate HMAC-SHA256 secret
• Multi-tenant isolation in garraia-workspace: 22 tables under FORCE RLS, plus dedicated garraia_login / garraia_signup Postgres roles fronted by typed LoginPool / SignupPool newtypes (raw PgPool access forbidden in auth paths)
• Authentication required by default on the WebSocket gateway and the REST /v1/* surface
• Per-channel user allowlists with pairing codes
• Prompt injection detection and input sanitization
• WASM sandboxing for optional plugins
• Localhost-only binding by default (127.0.0.1, not 0.0.0.0)
• SHA-256 verified self-updates
• GitHub secret-scanning push protection enabled on this repository

In scope:

• garraia-security crate (credential vault, allowlists, pairing)
• garraia-auth crate (RBAC role/permission table, JWT, password hashing, refresh tokens)
• garraia-gateway crate (WebSocket, HTTP API, REST /v1/*, auth, tus upload endpoints)
• garraia-workspace crate (multi-tenant Postgres + pgvector schema, FORCE RLS, BYPASSRLS roles)
• garraia-storage crate (object storage trait, LocalFs / S3-compatible backends, tus 1.0)
• garraia-cli crate migrate workspace flow (SQLite → Postgres user/identity hash reassembly)
• install.sh and the self-update mechanism
• Prompt injection or sandbox escape in the agent runtime
• Credential leakage in any channel (Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, iMessage)
• Plugin/WASM sandbox escapes
• Cross-tenant data exposure (RLS bypass, broken Principal extractor, missing WITH CHECK enforcement on writes)

Out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report upstream, then notify us)
• Issues requiring physical access to the host machine
• Denial of service requiring high traffic volume

We follow responsible disclosure. Please:

1. Give us reasonable time to patch before public disclosure
2. Do not access or modify other users data
3. Do not degrade service availability during testing

We will not pursue legal action against researchers acting in good faith.