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Security: martinsbrezauckis/shellx

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security disclosures to martins.brezauckis@gmail.com with the subject line [shellX security]. Please do not file a public GitHub issue for security bugs — coordinated disclosure first.

You can alternatively use GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Do not include exploit details in a public issue.

I aim to acknowledge within 72 hours and patch critical issues within 14 days. If you receive no response within 7 days, it is fine to escalate by opening a public issue saying "security report not acknowledged" (without details).

Supported versions

The latest stable ShellX release receives security fixes. A fix may be backported to the immediately preceding release when the updater path or impact makes that necessary, but older versions should be upgraded before reporting a compatibility-only issue. Pre-release builds are supported only long enough to qualify the next stable release.

Scope

In scope:

  • The shellX desktop app (Tauri 2, Rust backend, React frontend).
  • The bundled ShellX host MCP server (shellx-host-http Streamable HTTP on 127.0.0.1:<bound-mcp-port> and the legacy grok-shell-host stdio/tool-name compatibility surface).
  • The shellXagent HTTP+WS API on 127.0.0.1:<bound-debug-port>.
  • The encrypted vault (chacha20poly1305 + keyring-rs).
  • ShellX Browser runtime and protocol code under shellx-browser/, src/browser/, and the Browser Rust modules.
  • The vendored shared Vault client/broker under vendor/shellx-vault/.
  • Anything under src-tauri/ or src/ in this repo.

Out of scope:

  • Third-party MCP servers installed through the marketplace.
  • grok-build itself (xAI's client) — report those to xAI.
  • Upstream operating-system or browser-engine bugs (WebView2, WKWebView).

Trust model

shellX assumes that any local OS-session attacker can read files in the user's home directory, including the bearer tokens at ~/.shellx/shellxagent.token and ~/.shellx/mcp.token. The defenses we ship raise the cost for an agent or remote process that does NOT have local read access; they do not protect against malware running as the same user. This is the same threat model as ~/.aws/credentials or a pass store. Hardening notes live in docs/public/ARCHITECTURE.md under "Four trust boundaries".

ShellX's normal agent workflow is Full Auto. Provider sessions and Build work can run with provider-native bypass permission flags. Report issues where the UI or docs hide that mode, where Full Auto reaches a broader filesystem/environment than the selected project, or where secrets are logged while auto tools are running.

Last reviewed: 2026-08-01. Review this policy with each stable release and whenever the Browser, Vault, updater, or host-MCP trust boundary changes.

There aren't any published security advisories