A CK42X-branded external Flipper Zero app (.fap) that stores, generates, and types passwords from the Flipper after explicit confirmation.
Website: https://ck42x.com
- First launch: set a master PIN. Existing legacy
vault.tsvdata is migrated into encrypted storage after setup. - Later launches: unlock with the master PIN.
+ Add New Password- Enter account name
- Enter username
- Choose
Generate PasswordorEnter Custom - For generated passwords, choose a preset:
- Memorable 16+ mix
- Strict 16+ A/a/0/!
- Long 20+ passphrase
- No special char
- Save entry
- Select saved account to view username/password
- Press
Inject, confirm, and the app HID-types the password only
The app icon is a Flipper-compatible 10x10 monochrome simplification of the CK42X crowned bee mark from ck42x.com. The full source logo reference is preserved in ck42x_website_bee_crown.png for provenance.
The app also includes an About / ck42x.com menu item so users can find CK42X after installing the .fap.
From this directory:
/home/x3y5x/.local/share/venvs/ufbt/bin/ufbtOutput:
dist/ck42x_passvault.fap
From WSL if the Flipper is visible there:
/home/x3y5x/.local/share/venvs/ufbt/bin/ufbt launchFrom Windows HERM when the Flipper is physically connected to HERM:
C:\Users\lordb\.hermes\venvs\ufbt\Scripts\ufbt.exe launch FLIP_PORT=COM9Adjust COM9 if Windows assigns a different Flipper CDC port.
If USB automation is unavailable, copy dist/ck42x_passvault.fap to the Flipper SD card under /ext/apps/Tools/ with qFlipper or another mounted SD path.
Generated passwords use the Flipper RNG and the app checks generated passwords against saved entries before saving, so it will not intentionally create a duplicate generated password already in the vault.
v0.4 stores the active vault in app data as AES-GCM encrypted vault.pv1 and gates vault access behind a master PIN. The key is derived in-app from the PIN and a per-vault random salt using a compact SHA-256 KDF. A fresh random AES-GCM nonce is used on each save.
If a legacy plaintext vault.tsv exists and no encrypted vault exists, first PIN setup imports it once, saves the encrypted vault, and removes the plaintext file after the encrypted save succeeds.
This is still a small Flipper utility, not a hardened audited password manager. Device compromise, weak PINs, shoulder surfing, debug access, or modified firmware can still expose vault contents.
Recommended hardening before stronger trust claims:
- edit/delete entries from the UI
- stronger/passphrase-based unlock UX
- clearer recovery/export story
- continued clear warnings in release notes
- Publish the source in a public GitHub repo, e.g.
ck42x/flipper-ck42x-passvault. - Include screenshots or a short demo GIF/video of add → generate → save → confirm HID type.
- Attach a built
.fapto a GitHub Release so users do not need a build chain. - Post to the Flipper Zero community with clear wording: password tool, PIN-gated encrypted storage, explicit HID typing, and no hardened-manager overclaim.
- After feedback, keep the catalog copy accurate and avoid stronger trust claims until the UX/security model has been reviewed.