fix(security): correct typo in trusted extensions registry URL#113
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lightningpixel merged 4 commits intoApr 27, 2026
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Summary
The trusted-extensions registry URL in
electron/main/ipc-handlers.tspoints at an unregistered GitHub username due to a typo:The intended account
lightningpixel/modly-official-extensionexists and serves the correctregistry.json. The misspelledliightnig125does not appear to be controlled by anyone today.Why this matters (security impact)
Anyone can register the
liightnig125GitHub username and start serving aregistry.jsonof their choice. That JSON populatestrustedReposinfetchTrustedRepos(), which feeds thetrustedflag returned byparseExtensionManifest. Thetrustedflag is rendered as a badge inExtensionCard.tsx.So while it's not direct RCE, it's a phishing/social-engineering primitive: a squatter could mark arbitrary attacker-controlled extension repos as "trusted" in the UI right at the moment a user is deciding whether to paste a GitHub URL into the install box. The install step itself runs
setup.pyandnpm installfrom the chosen repo, so misplaced trust there is high-cost.Every existing v0.3.3 install is currently fetching from this typo'd URL, so the window is open until users update.
Test plan
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lightningpixel/modly-official-extension/main/registry.jsonreturns the expectedtrusted_reposlist:{ "trusted_repos": [ "https://github.com/lightningpixel/modly-hunyuan3d-mini-extension", "https://github.com/lightningpixel/modly-triposg-extension", "https://github.com/lightningpixel/modly-trellis2-extension" ] }Suggested follow-ups (out of scope for this PR)
liightnig125username to prevent future squattingregistry.jsonto a commit SHA or signing it, so a future repo compromise can't silently flip the trusted set