Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/…

…jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:

 - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:

     * several bug fixes and cleanups

     * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
       on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
       securityfs symlinks

     * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
       carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
       converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
       base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
       will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
       a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.

     * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
       features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
       Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
       of this.

 - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
   permission. From Paul:

      "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
       the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.

       Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
       Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
       labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
       capabilities on policy load"

   There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
   lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.

 - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
   cap_capable call in privilege check.

 - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.

 - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
   LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.

 - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
   the boot command line.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
  apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
  seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
  seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
  seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
  IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
  ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
  ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
  integrity: Small code improvements
  ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
  ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
  ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
  ima: use memdup_user_nul
  ima: fix up #endif comments
  IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
  ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
  ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
  ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
  ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
  ...

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ Description:
 			fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
 			uid:= decimal value
 			euid:= decimal value
-			fowner:=decimal value
+			fowner:= decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
+			pcr:= decimal value
 
 		default policy:
 			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
@@ -96,3 +97,8 @@ Description:
 
 		Smack:
 			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+
+		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs:
+
+			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
+			measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1501,12 +1501,21 @@
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
 	ima_policy=	[IMA]
-			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
-			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
-			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
-			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
-			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
-			Format: "tcb"
+			The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
+			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot"
+
+			The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
+			mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
+			mode bit set by either the effective uid (euid=0) or
+			uid=0.
+
+			The "appraise_tcb" policy appraises the integrity of
+			all files owned by root. (This is the equivalent
+			of ima_appraise_tcb.)
+
+			The "secure_boot" policy appraises the integrity
+			of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules,
+			firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
 
 	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int st33zp24_i2c_acpi_request_resources(struct i2c_client *client)
 	struct device *dev = &client->dev;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(dev), acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
+	ret = devm_acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(dev, acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ static int st33zp24_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	acpi_dev_remove_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(&client->dev));
 	return 0;
 }
 

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/spi.c

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int st33zp24_spi_acpi_request_resources(struct spi_device *spi_dev)
 	struct device *dev = &spi_dev->dev;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(dev), acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
+	ret = devm_acpi_dev_add_driver_gpios(dev, acpi_st33zp24_gpios);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -402,7 +402,6 @@ static int st33zp24_spi_remove(struct spi_device *dev)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	acpi_dev_remove_driver_gpios(ACPI_COMPANION(&dev->dev));
 	return 0;
 }
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c

@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
 	/* Store the decision as chip->locality will be changed. */
 	need_locality = chip->locality == -1;
 
-	if (need_locality && chip->ops->request_locality)  {
+	if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW) &&
+	    need_locality && chip->ops->request_locality)  {
 		rc = chip->ops->request_locality(chip, 0);
 		if (rc < 0)
 			goto out_no_locality;
@@ -429,8 +430,9 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
 
 	rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev,
-			"tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %d\n", rc);
+		if (rc != -EPIPE)
+			dev_err(&chip->dev,
+				"%s: tpm_send: error %d\n", __func__, rc);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -536,59 +538,62 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
 
 	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_transmit_cmd);
 
 #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
 #define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
 #define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
-#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
-#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM cpu_to_be32(70)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP 101
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM 70
 
 static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(22),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_GET_CAP)
 };
 
 ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
 		   const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length)
 {
-	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	int rc;
 
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_CAP);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 ||
 	    subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
-		/*subcap field not necessary */
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0);
-		tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32));
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, subcap_id);
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
 	} else {
 		if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
 		    subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
-			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap =
-				cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_FLAG);
+			tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM_CAP_FLAG);
 		else
-			tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap =
-				cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_PROP);
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
+			tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM_CAP_PROP);
+
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 4);
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, subcap_id);
 	}
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
 			      min_cap_length, 0, desc);
 	if (!rc)
-		*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
+		*cap = *(cap_t *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4];
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_getcap);
 
-#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP cpu_to_be32(153)
+#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP 153
 #define TPM_ST_CLEAR cpu_to_be16(1)
 #define TPM_ST_STATE cpu_to_be16(2)
 #define TPM_ST_DEACTIVATED cpu_to_be16(3)
 static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_startup_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(12),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_STARTUP
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_STARTUP)
 };
 
 static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
@@ -737,7 +742,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
 #define CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE 10
 
 static const struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
 	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST),
 };
@@ -760,13 +765,13 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
+#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD 21
 #define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
 #define READ_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE 20
 static const struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD)
 };
 
 int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
@@ -838,15 +843,34 @@ int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
 
-#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
+#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND 20
 #define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
 #define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE 20
 static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND)
 };
 
+static int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
+			   char *log_msg)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+			      EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0, log_msg);
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
  * @chip_num:	tpm idx # or AN&
@@ -859,7 +883,6 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
  */
 int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
 {
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
 	int rc;
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 	struct tpm2_digest digest_list[ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)];
@@ -885,13 +908,8 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
 		return rc;
 	}
 
-	cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
-	cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
-	memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
-			      EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
-			      "attempting extend a PCR value");
-
+	rc = tpm1_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, hash,
+			     "attempting extend a PCR value");
 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1060,13 +1078,13 @@ int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
 
-#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
+#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE 152
 #define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
 
 static const struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE)
 };
 
 /*
@@ -1090,15 +1108,9 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 	}
 
 	/* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
-	if (tpm_suspend_pcr) {
-		cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
-		cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
-		memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
-		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
-				      EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
-				      "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
-	}
+	if (tpm_suspend_pcr)
+		rc = tpm1_pcr_extend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr, dummy_hash,
+				     "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
 
 	/* now do the actual savestate */
 	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
@@ -1149,9 +1161,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
 
 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE	18
 static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM)
 };
 
 /**

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c

@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@
 
 #define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
 #define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE (28 + 256)
-#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
+#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK 124
 static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
-	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
-	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
+	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_READPUBEK)
 };
 static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			  char *buf)