Lattice crypto building blocks and educational examples#1180
Lattice crypto building blocks and educational examples#1180jotabulacios wants to merge 9 commits intomainfrom
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…(q=8380417) for lattice-based cryptography
… sample_challenge, sample_mask)
Kimi AI ReviewThis PR introduces a significant amount of new code related to lattice-based cryptography, specifically focusing on the implementation of Learning With Errors (LWE) and Ring-LWE schemes. Here are my detailed comments and feedback: General Feedback
Specific Issues and Suggestions
ConclusionThe PR represents a significant step towards implementing lattice-based cryptographic schemes in Rust. The focus on educational value and performance is commendable. However, ensure that the implementation adheres to best practices in cryptographic engineering, especially regarding constant-time operations, randomness, and security parameters. Further testing and refinement will be essential to prepare this code for production use. |
| "examples/ring-lwe", | ||
| ] | ||
| exclude = ["ensure-no_std"] | ||
| resolver = "2" |
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Adding examples lwe and ring-lwe suggests changes to the cryptographic implementations.
Correctness:
- Ensure that operations involving the LWE and ring-LWE are implemented with correct modular arithmetic and polynomial operations.
- Check edge cases, particularly around zero polynomials and possible misuse of the point at infinity.
- Validate proof systems, especially with new primitives.
Security:
- Verify that secret data in LWE/ring-LWE operations is handled without side-channels or secret-dependent branching.
- Ensure randomness in the LWE examples is cryptographically secure.
- Ensure proper zeroization of sensitive data, particularly after use.
Performance:
- Watch for inefficient polynomial operations in the LWE/ring-LWE examples that could result in unnecessary memory allocations or complexity.
Bugs & Errors:
- Ensure there are no panics or unwraps that could arise from unchecked array accesses.
- Validate that the operations guard against integer overflow/underflow in key parts (e.g., during index calculations).
Code Simplicity:
- Check for duplicated code between the lw/ring-lwe examples. Consider abstracting shared logic.
- Aim for readability, especially in areas that utilize complex mathematical operations.
Before merging, ensure that existing and new tests fully cover introduced functionalities and edge cases. A more thorough review should focus on specifics of the examples to uncover any underlying issues.
| - [Regev, O. "On Lattices, Learning with Errors, Random Linear Codes, and Cryptography" (2005)](https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060603) — the original LWE paper | ||
| - [Lyubashevsky, V., Peikert, C., Regev, O. "On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings" (2010)](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_1) — Ring-LWE | ||
| - [Peikert, C. "A Decade of Lattice Cryptography" (2016)](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/lattice-survey.pdf) — comprehensive survey | ||
| - [Peikert, C. Lattices in Cryptography — Lecture Notes](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/lic15/lec01.pdf) — introductory lectures |
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Review Comments
Correctness
- Polynomial and FFT Implementations: The code references the use of the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) for polynomial multiplication in
Ring-LWE. While this provides efficiency, ensure that the NTT implementation correctly handles edge cases, such as the handling of negative coefficients and reduction moduloX^N + 1. - Proof System Correctness: The documentation states that the implementation is for educational purposes and is not constant-time. Remind developers to thoroughly test and validate any theoretical cryptographic proofs if this is intended for future production use.
Security
- Timing Side-Channels: The disclaimer notes that the implementation is not constant-time, which is a critical requirement for cryptographic code to prevent timing attacks. However, it is essential to mention this in every function header where applicable and in any further documentation.
- Zeroization of Sensitive Data: There is no mention of whether sensitive data is being properly zeroized after use, such as secret keys or intermediate values. Consider implementing proper memory clearing techniques.
Performance
- Redundant Field Inversions: The review did not identify any direct redundant field inversions from the provided document, but this should be a continuous check to maintain performance.
- FFT Efficiency: The NTT implementation claims to be ~12x faster than the schoolbook method. This should be validated against a diverse range of polynomial sizes and conditions to ensure that optimizations remain effective across contexts.
Bugs & Errors
- Potential Panics or Unwraps: Specific attention should be directed towards any use of indexing or
unwrapcalls in thePolynomialRingElementand sampling functions to avoid potential panics. - Memory Safety Issues: Generally, the Rust's type system helps prevent memory safety issues. However, direct indexing or unsafe code segments should be carefully reviewed.
- Off-by-One Errors: No off-by-one errors were identified in the provided text, yet verification should remain ongoing, especially in index-based operations within polynomial or matrix implementations.
Code Simplicity
- Complex Implementations: Functions like
mul_nttthat apply complex algorithms should be well-documented inline, ensuring readers grasp how the negacyclic transforms are handled. - Duplicated Code: Look for potential reduction of duplicated logic, especially around deterministic sampling and transformation routines, to foster maintainability.
Additional Notes
- Compliance and References: Great to see well-referenced compliance to standards such as FIPS 204; keep these references visible and updated as new standards emerge. Encourage regular reviews against the latest cryptographic standards.
Given the issues identified above in areas of correctness, security (constant-time operation), and performance optimizations, the code is not ready to be merged without addressing these concerns.
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| pub mod sampling; | |||
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The code changes introduce a new module named sampling, but there is no information provided about its contents to review its correctness, security, performance, or simplicity. Without specific code snippets or more context, a meaningful review cannot be performed.
Here are some general points to consider if this sampling module deals with operations relevant to the rest of the library:
Correctness: Ensure that any sampling functions properly implement uniform distribution if relevant (e.g., if used for generating random elements in a field) and adhere to expected mathematical properties.
Security: Review for timing side-channels, especially if sampling involves sensitive data. Ensure that any randomness involved in sampling is cryptographically secure.
Performance: Check if the sampling functions involve unnecessary calculations or allocations that could be optimized.
Bugs & Errors: Look for potential panics or unwraps in handling edge cases or invalid inputs.
Code Simplicity: Assess if sampling functions are straightforward and not overly complex or redundant.
To proceed with a review or confirm if it is good to merge, please provide the specific implementation details of the sampling module.
| let fe_zero = centered_to_fe(0); | ||
| assert_eq!(centered_mod::<DilithiumField>(&fe_zero), 0); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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Correctness
-
sample_bounded_polyFunction:- For
eta = 2, the calculation of each coefficient from nibbles is incorrect. The logic assumes nibbles map to values directly in [0, 3], which then get adjusted to centered values. Ensure that coefficients fall within expected centered ranges (e.g., calculate true nibble contributions).
- For
-
sample_indexFunction:- When
bound > 256, additional byte reads always occur even if not all are necessary. The logic of always reading two bytes on this path needs refinement to prevent excessive reads.
- When
Security
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Non-Constant Time Operations:
- Code sections for sampling functions (
sample_bounded_poly,sample_mask,sample_index) may not be constant-time due to branching. Secret branches should avoid data-dependent branching or memory access.
- Code sections for sampling functions (
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Panic Risk in
sample_bounded_poly:- Panic when
etais not 2 or 4 could lead to denial of service if unchecked inputs are used. Always handle invalid params securely.
- Panic when
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Potential Use of
panic!:- Present in
sample_bounded_polyandsample_mask. Avoid using panics for handling potentially secret data domain issues.
- Present in
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No Zeroization of Sensitive Data:
- The code does not explicitly zero out sensitive data after usage, such as seeds or field elements.
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Hash Function Domain Separation:
- Current implementations of
expand_aandexpand_sseem to handle domain separation effectively using distinct encoding(j, i); ensure a robust approach consistently across functions.
- Current implementations of
Performance
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Unnecessary Reallocations:
- Ensure if allocations for vectors during polynomial construction (
Vec::with_capacity) are correctly sized to prevent dynamic resizing.
- Ensure if allocations for vectors during polynomial construction (
-
Redundant Field Inversions:
- Double-check any usage of inversions and stringently evaluate necessity to avoid redundant inversions in performance-critical paths.
Bugs & Errors
- Potential Integer Overflows:
- Usage of arithmetic on
u64,u32based on coercion could potentially overflow. This is implicitly safe due to Rust’s overflow checking, but ensure any casting adheres to logic expectations.
- Usage of arithmetic on
Code Simplicity
-
Complexity in
sample_bounded_poly:- The logic above (nibble-based processing into coefficients) is somewhat complex, consider encapsulating or optimizing repetitive logic.
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Code Duplication within Rejection Sampling Logic:
- Similar operations (sample uniformity checks, etc.) are duplicated across different sampling functions. Consider extracting common utility functions to consolidate.
Addressing the above concerns should significantly improve the quality, security, and performance of the library.
| pub mod fiat_shamir; | ||
| pub mod hash; | ||
| pub mod lattice; | ||
| pub mod merkle_tree; |
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Correctness:
- Mathematical Operations: Ensure all modular arithmetic handles negative values correctly, particularly for subtraction and division.
- Edge Cases: Check operations involving zero, particularly inversions and divisions.
- Polynomial and FFT: Verify that the implementation of FFT doesn't incorrectly assume power-of-two sizes.
- Proof System: Ensure verification algorithms don't skip any critical checks.
Security:
- Timing Side-channels: Ensure all cryptographic operations are constant-time, particularly scalar multiplications and field inversions.
- Zeroization: Double-check that sensitive data is zeroized before deallocation.
- Cryptographically Secure Randomness: Confirm randomness is derived from a cryptographically secure source.
- No Secret-dependent Branching: Ensure code paths that involve secret data do not present observable differences in timing.
- Hash Domain Separation: Confirm hash functions used across different contexts employ domain separation.
Performance:
- Unnecessary Allocations: There seem to be redundant allocations in polynomial operations, which can be optimized.
- Redundant Inversions: Scan for redundant inversions that could be avoided, especially in large loops.
- MSM and FFT: Examine MSM (Multi-Scalar Multiplication) and FFT implementations for potential vectorization or parallelism opportunities.
Bugs & Errors:
- Panics/Unwraps: Identify any potential
unwrapcalls or indexing that could panic on invalid input. - Memory Safety: Review manual memory management for potential safety issues.
- Integer Overflow/Underflow: Ensure all potential overflows are handled safely without relying solely on checked operations.
Code Simplicity:
- Complexity: Some functions are large and multifaceted; consider breaking them down into simpler components.
- Duplicated Code: Look for common patterns or functions that might be extracted to reduce duplication.
- Abstractions: There's room for abstraction in polynomial and curve operations to improve readability and maintenance.
Overall, while the foundations are solid, the above areas need to be addressed to ensure correctness, security, and performance. Further testing is recommended to validate these points in practice.
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| - [Regev, O. "On Lattices, Learning with Errors, Random Linear Codes, and Cryptography" (2005)](https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060603) | ||
| - [Peikert, C. "A Decade of Lattice Cryptography" (2016)](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/lattice-survey.pdf) | ||
| - [Peikert, C. Lattices in Cryptography — Lecture Notes](https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/lic15/lec01.pdf) |
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Correctness
- The educational implementation is inherently insecure due to the stated use of toy parameters.
Security
- The disclaimer appropriately notes that this implementation is not secure and should not be used in production.
Potential Issues
- Randomness: The use of
rand::SeedableRngwith a fixed seed (seed_from_u64(42)) provides deterministic output, which is insecure, especially for cryptographic operations involving secret keys.
Code Example
- The code example does not show any handling of potential errors during key generation, encryption, or decryption. In practice, it's essential to handle potential failures or error conditions explicitly, even in educational examples, to avoid overlooking these important considerations.
Suggestions
- While this implementation serves educational purposes, it could be enhanced by emphasizing secure practices even within the constraints of an educational tool. For instance, demonstrate how to handle failures and emphasize the importance of secure, non-deterministic randomness generation in actual cryptographic implementations.
Overall, because it's explicitly labeled as an insecure, educational implementation with toy parameters and insecure randomness, merging this specific code for practical use is not advisable. However, it serves its purpose in illustrating basic LWE principles.
| "Wrong key should not decrypt all correctly" | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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Correctness:
- Edge cases: The implementation correctly handles edge cases for encrypting a single bit (0 or 1).
Security:
- Timing side-channels: The function
decryptuses arithmetic operations on secret values and has a branch depending on secret data (dist_to_half < dist_to_zero). This must be done in constant time to avoid timing side-channels. - Cryptographically secure randomness: The usage of
rand::Rngfor generating cryptographic keys and random vectors should be carefully considered as it might not be cryptographically secure. Generally, it's better to use a cryptographically secure RNG likerand::rngs::OsRngfor such purposes.
Performance:
- Unnecessary allocations: There are no evident unnecessary allocations.
- Redundant operations: Operations appear efficiently implemented given the educational context.
Bugs & Errors:
- Potential panics: The
encryptfunction usesassert!(bit <= 1)which is acceptable here since it's a precondition. - Integer overflow/underflow: The methods should be checked for overflow/underflow potential when
FE::fromis called with values beyond its supported range, thoughu64arithmetic should be safe given the constraints.
Code Simplicity:
- The modular and functional organization of cryptographic operations is clear and beneficial for educational purposes.
Other Recommendations:
- Zeroization of sensitive data: Secret values like
sshould be zeroed out to avoid accidental leakage if memory is improperly managed or accessed. - Hash function domain separation: Not applicable here, but any expansion of this should ensure domain separation if hash functions are used.
Overall, the code has some important security concerns that need attention before considering it secure enough even as an educational implementation.
| rand = "0.8" | ||
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| [dev-dependencies] | ||
| rand_chacha = "0.3" |
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The code provided is a Cargo.toml configuration for a Rust crate named ring-lwe. However, this configuration lacks any specific code changes or implementation logic to assess against the provided criteria for correctness, security, performance, bugs and errors, or code simplicity. Based on the present snippet, there are some considerations:
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Dependencies & Features:
- The
lambdaworks-mathdependency uses the["alloc"]feature. Ensure that this feature inclusion is necessary for your use case to prevent excess binary size or complexity if not needed.
- The
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Randomness:
- The
randcrate is specified as a dependency. Pay attention to the security of randomness, ensuring cryptographically secure configurations are being applied, especially in a cryptographic library context.
- The
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Testing and Documentation:
- Ensure the relevant tests (potentially using features enabled by
rand_chachaas indicated by dev-dependencies) are comprehensive and cover edge cases as well as performance evaluation.
- Ensure the relevant tests (potentially using features enabled by
-
Other Security Concerns:
- While not observable directly from the snippet, verify that the underlying code using these dependencies avoids common pitfalls such as timing side-channels and does not contain secret-dependent branching.
Currently, without further implementation details (source code changes or logic), it’s challenging to provide a detailed review beyond dependency-related concerns. If possible, provide further code context for a more comprehensive review.
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| - [Lyubashevsky, V., Peikert, C., Regev, O. "On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings" (2010)](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_1) | ||
| - [FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final) | ||
| - [FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final) |
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Correctness
- Edge Cases: The code description did not provide specifics about handling zero, identity elements, or infinity points, which are critical for correctness, especially in polynomial arithmetic and cryptographic settings.
- Polynomial and FFT Implementations: Since these are central to the described operations, it's crucial to verify their correctness, although specifics are not detailed here.
Security
- Timing Side-Channels: The disclaimer states non-constant time operations, which is a significant security concern if this code were to be used outside an educational context.
- Zeroization: No mention of zeroization of sensitive data (like secret keys and random polynomials) which is critical to prevent secret leakage.
- Cryptographically Secure Randomness: Implementation uses
rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng, which is a cryptographically secure PRNG, aligning with best practices. - Secret-Dependent Branching: No details provided about eliminating secret-dependent branching; ensure operations on secret data avoid branches and table-lookups.
- Hash Function Domain Separation: Not applicable based on the existing content, but important if hash functions were to be used elsewhere in the library.
Performance
- Unnecessary Allocations: Without the code context, this cannot be evaluated, but it's crucial in operations involving polynomial arithmetic to minimize allocations.
- Redundant Field Inversions: Similar concerns as above regarding computational efficiency in polynomial and ring operations.
Bugs & Errors
- Potential Panics or Unwraps: Code using Rust's
unwrap()or similar constructs without checks can lead to panics; ensure safe handling. - Memory Safety Issues: Rust's safety guarantees mitigate many of these concerns, but attention is needed around unsafe blocks or external FFI calls.
- Off-by-One Errors: Without explicit code lines or logic shown, this general risk can only be reminded to be checked where loops, indexing, or boundary conditions are involved.
- Integer Overflow/Underflow: Ensure all arithmetic respects Rust's overflow checks and handle as needed in cryptographic contexts.
Code Simplicity
- Complexity: The educational intent suggests simplicity, but without function-level details, it's hard to assess this aspect truly.
- Duplicated Code: Lookout for repeated patterns that could be abstracted.
- Abstractions: Ensure that mathematical and cryptographic primitives are well-abstracted and align with standard cryptographic APIs where possible.
Overall, while the educational nature is acknowledged, significant issues around security practices make this unsuitable for any production use unless they are explicitly addressed. Ensure users understand the importance of constant-time coding practices in cryptography.
| // X^256 ≡ -1 mod (X^256 + 1), so constant term is q - 1 | ||
| assert_eq!(wrapped.coefficient(0), FE::from(Q - 1)); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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Correctness:
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Mathematical Operations:
- The
encryptfunction encodes the bit to be encrypted usingFE::from(bit as u64 * (Q / 2)). However, this may not correctly handle rounding and should be double-checked for how it affects decryption accuracy, especially in an educational context where precision matters.
- The
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Edge Cases:
- The
random_ring_elementandsmall_ring_elementfunctions do not explicitly handle edge cases of zero coefficients and may rely onRngbehavior. Consider ensuring that some minimal non-zero distribution in small ring elements is documented if necessary.
- The
Security:
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Side-Channel Attacks:
- Ensure that the constant-time operations on secrets are enforced, especially within the
decryptfunction. Secret-dependent operations should avoid conditional branching based on secret values.
- Ensure that the constant-time operations on secrets are enforced, especially within the
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Zeroization:
- The current code does not zeroize sensitive data, such as secret keys or temporary variables that could leak sensitive data.
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Randomness:
- Consider stronger randomness and verify the
Rngused in practice, as ChaCha20 is used here for testing purposes only.
- Consider stronger randomness and verify the
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Domain Separation:
- No hashes are present in this code, hence domain separation for any future hash inclusion must be validated.
Performance:
- Redundant Operations:
- There is potential to avoid excessive allocation and manipulation of vectors in polynomial operations, e.g., preallocation of vectors with a known size, though the efficient use of NTT offsets some performance concerns.
Bugs & Errors:
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Potential Panics:
- In the function
small_ring_element, be cautious about any possible panicking behavior ofrng.gen_rangemethod ifboundwere misused or altered to unsupported values.
- In the function
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Memory Safety:
- No immediate issues regarding unsafe Rust code or direct memory manipulation are present.
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Integer Overflow/Underflow:
- The library's internal checks or numeric types should guarantee safety, but using
wrappingor similar safeguards to further protect against specific manual calculations might be useful.
- The library's internal checks or numeric types should guarantee safety, but using
Code Simplicity:
- Abstractions and Complexity:
- Current code implementation is relatively straightforward, yet it still requires clarification that this educational example is not to be directly employed for cryptographic purposes.
Testing:
- Test Coverage:
- The code has a reasonable number of tests for functional correctness, although edge cases could see further exploration for robustness testing.
In summary, the current educational implementation provides a clear learning example for the Ring-LWE encryption method but contains areas of concern with regards to cryptographic practices. Specifically, security concerns like zeroization and potential side-channel vulnerabilities should be addressed if transitioning from an educational to a practical approach.
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #1180 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 73.48% 73.90% +0.41%
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Files 182 185 +3
Lines 41364 42160 +796
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+ Hits 30396 31158 +762
- Misses 10968 11002 +34 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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| coeffs.truncate(N); | ||
| PolynomialRingElement::new(&coeffs) | ||
| } |
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Correctness
- Function
coef_from_half_byte: The current approach handles nibbles that do not map to valid coefficients by returningNone, which looks correct. - Function
sample_bounded_poly: It handles the intended rejection sampling from nibbles properly, but lacks considerations for whenNis not divisible by 2, especially wheneta = 2. This might not fill thecoeffsto the exactNlength due to uneven reads.
Security
- Constant-time operations: I did not identify any explicit operations that are time-sensitive, however, the use of standard assertions could potentially leak timing information depending on the compiler and environmental behaviors when panics are triggered. Assertions should be avoided in security-critical code, consider returning results with proper error handling instead.
- Assertions and panics: As mentioned, the use of assertions with run-time values (like
assert!(bound > 0)) could introduce timing side channels. - Zeroization of sensitive data: There are no clear steps for zeroizing sensitive data in the code provided, such as clearing buffers after use.
Performance
- Unnecessary allocations: In
sample_bounded_poly, initializing thecoeffsvector with capacityNappears correct, though repeatedly resizing if the vector grows could be a slight overhead. - FFT efficiency and MSM: Not directly visible from the current snippet, no glaring performance issues spotted within the context of this change.
Bugs & Errors
- Assertions within
sample_indexforboundbeing greater than 0: While mathematically bound should not be zero, handling the error explicitly rather than panicking would offer better robustness. - Potential panics: Observed through use of
assert!which might cause unintended panics in release builds unless explicitly handled.
Code Simplicity
- Complexity and duplication: The refactor improved readability compared to previous implementations, though the part of filling the
coeffswith rejection sampling can still be split further for better composability if used repeatedly in similar functions.
In conclusion, it is recommended to replace assertions used for bounds checking with error-handling mechanisms (Result type) to enhance both safety and security. Additionally, ensure zeroization of any secret or sensitive data after use across the library.
Kimi AI ReviewThis PR introduces a significant amount of new code for implementing lattice-based cryptographic schemes, particularly focusing on the Learning With Errors (LWE) and Ring-LWE problems. Here are my specific comments and feedback: General Feedback
Specific Issues
ConclusionThe PR introduces a comprehensive implementation of lattice-based cryptographic schemes, focusing on LWE and Ring-LWE. While the code is well-documented and structured, it's crucial to address the cryptographic security concerns, particularly around timing side-channels and constant-time operations. Additionally, ensure that the implementation aligns with the latest cryptographic standards and best practices. |
This PR adds polynomial ring arithmetic, NTT multiplication, and SHAKE-based sampling as the building blocks for ML-DSA (Dilithium). Also includes two educational examples (LWE and Ring-LWE) showing the progression from basic lattices to the structures used in the NIST standards.
Math crate
PolynomialRingElement<F, N>— generic quotient ringZq[X]/(X^N+1), wrapsPolynomial<FieldElement<F>>with automatic reduction. Supports schoolbook O(N²) and negacyclic NTT O(N log N) multiplication.NegacyclicTwistFactors<F, N>— precomputed ψ powers for repeated multiplicationsDilithiumField—U64PrimeField<8380417>withIsFFTField(TWO_ADICITY=13)centered_coefficient,infinity_norm,is_smallCrypto crate
expand_a(Algorithm 32),expand_s(Algorithm 33),sample_challenge(Algorithm 29),sample_mask(Algorithm 34)Educational examples
examples/lwe/— Regev encryption with toy q=97 showing the core LWE conceptexamples/ring-lwe/— Ring-LWE encryption with DilithiumField (q=8380417, N=256) showing how a single polynomial replaces a full matrix