Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2024-06-17-11-43' of git://git.kernel.o…

…rg/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "Mainly MM singleton fixes. And a couple of ocfs2 regression fixes"

* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2024-06-17-11-43' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
  kcov: don't lose track of remote references during softirqs
  mm: shmem: fix getting incorrect lruvec when replacing a shmem folio
  mm/debug_vm_pgtable: drop RANDOM_ORVALUE trick
  mm: fix possible OOB in numa_rebuild_large_mapping()
  mm/migrate: fix kernel BUG at mm/compaction.c:2761!
  selftests: mm: make map_fixed_noreplace test names stable
  mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
  mm: mmap: allow for the maximum number of bits for randomizing mmap_base by default
  gcov: add support for GCC 14
  zap_pid_ns_processes: clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING
  mm: huge_memory: fix misused mapping_large_folio_support() for anon folios
  lib/alloc_tag: fix RCU imbalance in pgalloc_tag_get()
  lib/alloc_tag: do not register sysctl interface when CONFIG_SYSCTL=n
  MAINTAINERS: remove Lorenzo as vmalloc reviewer
  Revert "mm: init_mlocked_on_free_v3"
  mm/page_table_check: fix crash on ZONE_DEVICE
  gcc: disable '-Warray-bounds' for gcc-9
  ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_abort_trigger()
  ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_journal_dirty()

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2192,12 +2192,6 @@
 			Format: 0 | 1
 			Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
 
-	init_mlocked_on_free=	[MM] Fill freed userspace memory with zeroes if
-				it was mlock'ed and not explicitly munlock'ed
-				afterwards.
-				Format: 0 | 1
-				Default set by CONFIG_INIT_MLOCKED_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
-
 	init_pkru=	[X86] Specify the default memory protection keys rights
 			register contents for all processes.  0x55555554 by
 			default (disallow access to all but pkey 0).  Can

Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Security-related interfaces
    seccomp_filter
    landlock
    lsm
+   mfd_noexec
    spec_ctrl
    tee
 

Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==================================
+Introduction of non-executable mfd
+==================================
+:Author:
+    Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
+    Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
+
+:Contributor:
+	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+
+Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfds have always had their
+execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting
+it differently.
+
+However, in a secure-by-default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
+executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by verified
+boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass
+and enables “confused deputy attack”.  E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
+process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
+however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code
+and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP of this kind.
+
+On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use: runc uses memfd’s
+seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
+execute them. For such a system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
+use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
+
+To address those above:
+ - Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
+ - Let memfd be sealed for modifying X bit when NX is set.
+ - Add a new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to help applications in
+   migrating and enforcing non-executable MFD.
+
+User API
+========
+``int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)``
+
+``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL``
+	When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created
+	with NX. F_SEAL_EXEC is set and the memfd can't be modified to
+	add X later. MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is also implied.
+	This is the most common case for the application to use memfd.
+
+``MFD_EXEC``
+	When MFD_EXEC bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created with X.
+
+Note:
+	``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`` implies ``MFD_ALLOW_SEALING``. In case that
+	an app doesn't want sealing, it can add F_SEAL_SEAL after creation.
+
+
+Sysctl:
+========
+``pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec``
+
+The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values:
+
+ - 0: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC
+	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
+	MFD_EXEC was set.
+
+ - 1: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL
+	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
+	MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
+
+ - 2: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED
+	memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
+
+The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old software that
+doesn't set the executable bit; for example, a container with
+vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old software will create non-executable memfd
+by default while new software can create executable memfd by setting
+MFD_EXEC.
+
+The value of vm.memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation
+time. In addition, the setting is hierarchical, i.e. during memfd_create,
+we will search from current ns to root ns and use the most restrictive
+setting.
+
+[1] https://crbug.com/1305267
+
+[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20memfd%20escalation&can=1
+
+[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/

MAINTAINERS

@@ -23974,7 +23974,6 @@ VMALLOC
 M:	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
 R:	Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
 R:	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
-R:	Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
 L:	linux-mm@kvack.org
 S:	Maintained
 W:	http://www.linux-mm.org

arch/Kconfig

@@ -1046,10 +1046,21 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
 	int
 
+config FORCE_MAX_MMAP_RND_BITS
+	bool "Force maximum number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address"
+	default y if !64BIT
+	help
+	  ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS and ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS represent the number
+	  of bits to use for ASLR and if no custom value is assigned (EXPERT)
+	  then the architecture's lower bound (minimum) value is assumed.
+	  This toggle changes that default assumption to assume the arch upper
+	  bound (maximum) value instead.
+
 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX if FORCE_MAX_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	help
@@ -1084,6 +1095,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
 	int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
 	range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
+	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX if FORCE_MAX_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
 	help