Complete fix of a privilege escalation exploit in the sudo configuration of Knockd (followup to #3472) #3476
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As @jasperchess said in the original pull request, sudo access to knockd can be used for privilege escalation within the container. He has submitted a hotfix that was intended for the time until I patched the image in its entirety. My branch splits the runtime of the server to two users, one is for the Minecraft JAR (user
minecraft
) and the second one is for the tasks that use knockd to operate (namely Autopause and Autostop, usernameservice-account
). Service account has the same privileges as the minecraft account had before.