Prevent next_url abuse
#106
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tomako
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ThiefMaster
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Feb 6, 2025
tomako
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They make no sense, and fail on the werkzeug level when used in a redirect. By failing the validation we avoid an ugly exception.
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This PR is about to prevent werkzeug exception if
nextURL parameter has newline characters.We have been receiving such suspicious requests more often recently, mostly trying to inject some malicious code.
For example
https://indico.un.org/login/?next=/event/1010969/%0D%0Dor something similar but on thelogoutendpoint.This PR is just applying the same checking werkzeug does.