┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ VERIFIED CONTAINER PROTOCOL │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │
│ │ PRODUCER │ │ CONSUMER │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ Build system │ ── OCI Image ────► │ Container │ │
│ │ that creates │ ── Attestation ──► │ runtime that │ │
│ │ verified │ ── Trust Store ──► │ verifies │ │
│ │ images │ │ before exec │ │
│ └────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ Examples: Examples: │
│ • Cerro Torre • Svalinn/Vordr │
│ • Wolfi • Cosign-aware runtimes │
│ • Any SLSA L3+ builder • Policy engines │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘| Spec | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
Format for packaging in-toto attestations with log proofs |
Draft |
|
Schema for distributing and managing public keys |
Draft |
|
Procedure for verifying images before execution |
Draft |
|
Requirements for federated transparency logs |
Draft |
|
JSON Schema for trust store validation |
Draft |
Everything is identified by cryptographic hash. No mutable references cross the protocol boundary.
No single point of trust. Threshold signatures and multiple log operators required.
-
Cerro Torre — Ada/SPARK supply-chain-verified Linux distribution
-
Svalinn/Vordr — Rust/SPARK container runtime with formal verification
Proposals for spec changes should be submitted as pull requests with:
-
Rationale for the change
-
Backwards compatibility analysis
-
Security impact assessment