Backport of Fix for arbitrary file reads vulnerabilities into release/1.22.x#23261
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Backport
This PR is auto-generated from #23249 to be assessed for backporting due to the inclusion of the label backport/1.22.
The below text is copied from the body of the original PR.
Description
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the Vault CA provider's authentication methods (Kubernetes, JWT, and AppRole) that allowed arbitrary file reads through path traversal attacks.
Root Cause:
The auth providers used os.ReadFile() directly on user-supplied file paths without proper validation, allowing attackers to read any file on the system by manipulating configuration parameters:
Solution
Implemented OS-level path traversal protection using Go's os.OpenRoot() function, which creates a chroot-like restriction preventing access outside designated directories.
Security Measures:
Whitelist Validation: Only allow file reads from pre-defined standard directories
OS-Level Enforcement: Use os.OpenRoot() to prevent path traversal and symlink escapes at the kernel level
Defense in Depth: Multiple layers of validation ensure security even if one layer has bugs
Allowed Directories:
Kubernetes Auth
JWT Auth
AppRole Auth:
Testing:
Tests use symbolic links from allowed directories to temporary test directories, respecting the security boundaries while enabling test execution.
Overview of commits