py-blink_mojo-secure

Chialisp money privacy tool using aggregated Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures for security. It is based on a python3 driver for automatation.

• Runs on testnet10 by default.
• Requires full node.
• Requires updating anonymous wallet and known wallet to your personal addresses. Can be edited into blink_mojo.py file or set at the prompt, as in: anon_wallet = "txch<whateverwalletaddressyoudesire>"

Install

Clone repository, go into it, make and activate a virtualenv, and then install requirements.

$ git clone https://github.com/geraldneale/py-blink_mojo-secure.git
$ cd py-blink_mojo-secure
$ python3 -m venv venv
$ . ./venv/bin/activate
$ pip3 install -r requirements.txt

Run

Start the program in interactive mode and set the wallet variables to your own.

$ python3 -i blink_mojo.py
>> anon_wallet = "txch<whateverwalletaddressyoudesire>"
>> known_wallet = "txch<whateverotherwalletaddressyoudesire>"

Use

Deploys and sends coins from whatever wallet is synced and last utilized on your node.

>> faucet_coin=deploy_smart_coin(FAUCET_CLSP,1000000,1000)
>> needs_privacy_coin=deploy_smart_coin(NEEDS_PRIVACY_CLSP,value_amount)
>> decoy_coin=deploy_smart_coin(DECOY_CLSP,1000000,1000)
>> decoy_value_coin=deploy_smart_coin(DECOY_VALUE_CLSP,value_amount)

Final command

>> blink_mojo(faucet_coin,needs_privacy_coin,decoy_coin,decoy_value_coin)

You should see

"status": "SUCCESS", "success": true

Conclusion

Using this technique one can direct the equivalent value of the needs_privacy_coin intentionally to anon_wallet, but there is no lineage and it leaves any auditor, including the user of blink_mojo, without certainty if the mojos that were once in the needs_privacy_coin ended up in anon_wallet or known_wallet.

Chia-blockchain offers major privacy opportunities in three forms; which are:

1. In Chialisp everything is evaluated at the instant of block formation by nature of it being a functional programming language. Therefore value is moved aribitrarily around a spend bundle to CREATE_COIN outputs in need of value. If there is more than one CREATE_COIN with deficit value in a spend bundle then it introduces doubt of the source->destination relationship of value. This is what I call the "blink" in blink_mojo.
2. Puzzle hashes for smart coins represent arbitrary logic(CREATE_COIN etc). If we request a faucet to send value to a smart coin, instead of our wallet, then we can control Chia blockchain logic anonymously.
3. Due to the magic of BLS aggregated signatures there is no certainty on the blockchain of which coins went into which spend bundle in retrospect. There is just one aggregated signature per block. That signature canNOT be reverse engineered to any single spend bundle's aggregated signature with reliability(NOTE: this is as far as I know. please feel free to disagree, but tell me why). The same feature is used within the blink_mojo spend bundle securing each coin with its own BLS key pair and aggregating the signatures at the end securing the coins in the spend bundle from a subtraction attack, but each of the four public keys in the puzzle_reveals look unassociated in retrospect.

Please try it with in testnet only. If used in mainnet it is at your own risk.

Known issues and todos

1. Need to add fee to the final transaction using the blink_mojo() function to ensure fast completion.
2. Todo: Text based message to user confirming they are in the correct synced wallet fingerprint at the step: needs_privacy_coin=deploy_smart_coin(NEEDS_PRIVACY_CLSP,value_amount)
3. Todo: test with standalone wallet.

Also check out

https://github.com/geraldneale/blink_mojo - the original prove of concept with auditable examples on mainnet.

Twitter @geraldneale

http://mojopuzzler.org - chialisp resources for the capable beginner.

Discord Mojo Puzzler - https://discord.gg/SMFHEE2Z

xch1hv4gj4vvdsyzn9hrhy9tn6hu6jwk82tyrs3t4r33468x642myjws8kh8xl