djb2_hash_u32 truncates path components after 32 bytes can trigger policies in a false positive way

[JackySu]

jailer/bpfjailer-daemon/src/bpf_loader.rs

Lines 810 to 816 in c173fc3

	fn djb2_hash_u32(s: &str) -> u32 {
	let mut hash: u32 = 5381;
	for c in s.bytes().take(32) {
	hash = hash.wrapping_mul(33).wrapping_add(c as u32);
	}
	hash
	}

djb2_hash_u32 (hash = hash * 33 + c) can easily cause collisions, e.g.

• .ssh and 01sh
• .aws and .axR

I would say replacing it with a stronger crypto-safe method like SipHash-1-3, or double-checks with both hashing and string matching (which requires BPF map, linux kernel ver. 5.17+)

love to hear feedback from maintainers : )