update master #1

frank-w · 2017-12-12T16:31:27Z

Merge actual kernel-repo

Remove circular dependency deadlock in a scenario where hotplug of CPU is being done while there is updation in cgroup and cpuset triggered from userspace. Process A => kthreadd => Process B => Process C => Process A Process A cpu_subsys_offline(); cpu_down(); _cpu_down(); percpu_down_write(&cpu_hotplug_lock); //held cpuhp_invoke_callback(); workqueue_offline_cpu(); queue_work_on(); // unbind_work on system_highpri_wq __queue_work(); insert_work(); wake_up_worker(); flush_work(); wait_for_completion(); worker_thread(); manage_workers(); create_worker(); kthread_create_on_node(); wake_up_process(kthreadd_task); kthreadd kthreadd(); kernel_thread(); do_fork(); copy_process(); percpu_down_read(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); __rwsem_down_read_failed_common(); //waiting Process B kernfs_fop_write(); cgroup_file_write(); cgroup_procs_write(); percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); //held cgroup_attach_task(); cgroup_migrate(); cgroup_migrate_execute(); cpuset_can_attach(); mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex); //waiting Process C kernfs_fop_write(); cgroup_file_write(); cpuset_write_resmask(); mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex); //held update_cpumask(); update_cpumasks_hier(); rebuild_sched_domains_locked(); get_online_cpus(); percpu_down_read(&cpu_hotplug_lock); //waiting Eliminating deadlock by reversing the locking order for cpuset_mutex and cpu_hotplug_lock. Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood <prsood@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Convert cpuset_hotplug_workfn() into synchronous call for cpu hotplug path. For memory hotplug path it still gets queued as a work item. Since cpuset_hotplug_workfn() can be made synchronous for cpu hotplug path, it is not required to wait for cpuset hotplug while thawing processes. Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood <prsood@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

…rly() This is needed in order to allow the unbound workqueue to take housekeeping cpus into accounty Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <tal.shorer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Initialize wq_unbound_cpumask to exclude cpus that were isolated by the cmdline's isolcpus parameter. Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <tal.shorer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Albert Pool <albertpool@solcon.nl> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

This macro `task_css_set` verifies that the caller is inside proper critical section if the kernel set CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y. Signed-off-by: Wang Long <wanglong19@meituan.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Here, The function pdc_hardware_init always return zero. So it is not necessary to check its return value. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Make these pdc2027x_*_timing structures const as it is never modified. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Commit 438a506 ("percpu: don't forget to free the temporary struct pcpu_alloc_info") uncovered a problem on the CRIS architecture where the bootmem allocator is initialized with virtual addresses. Given it has: #define __va(x) ((void *)((unsigned long)(x) | 0x80000000)) then things just work out because the end result is the same whether you give this a physical or a virtual address. Untill you call memblock_free_early(__pa(address)) that is, because values from __pa() don't match with the virtual addresses stuffed in the bootmem allocator anymore. Avoid freeing the temporary pcpu_alloc_info memory on that architecture until they fix things up to let the kernel boot like it did before. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Fixes: 438a506 ("percpu: don't forget to free the temporary struct pcpu_alloc_info")

Lockdep complains that the stats update is trying to register a non-static key. This is because u64_stats are using a seqlock on 32bit arches, which needs to be initialized before usage. Fixes: 041cd64 (cgroup: Implement cgroup2 basic CPU usage accounting) Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'. This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type "asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER). KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196 CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328 rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106 x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141 x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 196: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 5a7de97 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the AEAD interface for AF_ALG, the reference to the "null skcipher" held by each tfm was being dropped in the wrong place -- when each af_alg_ctx was freed instead of when the aead_tfm was freed. As discovered by syzkaller, a specially crafted program could use this to cause the null skcipher to be freed while it is still in use. Fix it by dropping the reference in the right place. Fixes: 72548b0 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

af_alg_free_areq_sgls() If allocating the ->tsgl member of 'struct af_alg_async_req' failed, during cleanup we dereferenced the NULL ->tsgl pointer in af_alg_free_areq_sgls(), because ->tsgl_entries was nonzero. Fix it by only freeing the ->tsgl list if it is non-NULL. This affected both algif_skcipher and algif_aead. Fixes: e870456 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Fixes: d887c52 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86 implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)', because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized. The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided. The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization" and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do. Reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int algfd, reqfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "skcipher", .salg_name = "salsa20", }; char key[16] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key)); } Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: eb6f13e ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

These PP2C and PP3C registers control the configuration of the PHY control OOB timing for the COMINIT/COMWAKE parameters respectively for sata port. Overwrite default values with calculated ones to get better OOB timing. Signed-off-by: Tang Yuantian <andy.tang@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

The driver name "ahci" is already used by the ahci platform driver. This leads to the following error: Error: Driver 'ahci' is already registered, aborting... Change the name to ahci-mtk to fix this. Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <mbrugger@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

…sstatus speed During hotplug, it is possible for 6Gbps link speed to be limited all the way down to 1.5 Gbps which may lead to a slower link speed when drive is re-connected. This behavior has been seen on a Intel Lewisburg SATA controller (8086:a1d2) with HGST HUH728080ALE600 drive where SATA link speed was limited to 1.5 Gbps and when re-connected the link came up 3.0 Gbps. This patch was retested on above configuration and showed the hotplugged link to come back online at max speed (6Gbps). I did not see the downgrade when testing on Intel C600/X79, but retested patched linux-4.14-rc5 kernel and didn't see any side effects from this change. Also, successfully retested hotplug on port multiplier 3Gbps link. tj: Minor comment updates. Signed-off-by: David Milburn <dmilburn@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

This reverts commit 1599a18. This and the previous commit led to another circular locking scenario and the scenario which is fixed by this commit no longer exists after e8b3f8d ("workqueue/hotplug: simplify workqueue_offline_cpu()") which removes work item flushing from hotplug path. Revert it for now. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Since the recent cpu/hotplug refactoring, workqueue_offline_cpu() is guaranteed to run on the local cpu which is going offline. This also fixes the following deadlock by removing work item scheduling and flushing from CPU hotplug path. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1504764252-29091-1-git-send-email-prsood@codeaurora.org tj: Description update. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Since the cpu/hotplug refactoring, DOWN_FAILED is never called without preceding DOWN_PREPARE making the workaround unnecessary. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

This reverts commit aa24163. This and the following commit led to another circular locking scenario and the scenario which is fixed by this commit no longer exists after e8b3f8d ("workqueue/hotplug: simplify workqueue_offline_cpu()") which removes work item flushing from hotplug path. Revert it for now. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

We haven't yet figured out what to do with RT threads on cgroup2. Document the limitation. v2: Included the warning about system management software behavior as suggested by Michael. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>

System may crash after unloading ipmi_si.ko module because a timer may remain and fire after the module cleaned up resources. cleanup_one_si() contains the following processing. /* * Make sure that interrupts, the timer and the thread are * stopped and will not run again. */ if (to_clean->irq_cleanup) to_clean->irq_cleanup(to_clean); wait_for_timer_and_thread(to_clean); /* * Timeouts are stopped, now make sure the interrupts are off * in the BMC. Note that timers and CPU interrupts are off, * so no need for locks. */ while (to_clean->curr_msg || (to_clean->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) { poll(to_clean); schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1); } si_state changes as following in the while loop calling poll(to_clean). SI_GETTING_MESSAGES => SI_CHECKING_ENABLES => SI_SETTING_ENABLES => SI_GETTING_EVENTS => SI_NORMAL As written in the code comments above, timers are expected to stop before the polling loop and not to run again. But the timer is set again in the following process when si_state becomes SI_SETTING_ENABLES. => poll => smi_event_handler => handle_transaction_done // smi_info->si_state == SI_SETTING_ENABLES => start_getting_events => start_new_msg => smi_mod_timer => mod_timer As a result, before the timer set in start_new_msg() expires, the polling loop may see si_state becoming SI_NORMAL and the module clean-up finishes. For example, hard LOCKUP and panic occurred as following. smi_timeout was called after smi_event_handler, kcs_event and hangs at port_inb() trying to access I/O port after release. [exception RIP: port_inb+19] RIP: ffffffffc0473053 RSP: ffff88069fdc3d80 RFLAGS: 00000006 RAX: ffff8806800f8e00 RBX: ffff880682bd9400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000ca3 RSI: 0000000000000ca3 RDI: ffff8806800f8e40 RBP: ffff88069fdc3d80 R8: ffffffff81d86dfc R9: ffffffff81e36426 R10: 00000000000509f0 R11: 0000000000100000 R12: 0000000000]:000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: ffff8806800f8e00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 --- <NMI exception stack> --- To fix the problem I defined a flag, timer_can_start, as member of struct smi_info. The flag is enabled immediately after initializing the timer and disabled immediately before waiting for timer deletion. Fixes: 0cfec91 ("ipmi: Start the timer and thread on internal msgs") Signed-off-by: Yamazaki Masamitsu <m-yamazaki@ah.jp.nec.com> [Adjusted for recent changes in the driver.] Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>

When the IPMI PCI code was split out, some code was consolidated for setting the io_setup field in the io structure. The PCI code needed this set before registration to probe register spacing, though, so restore the old code for that function. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197999 Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>

This patch fixes ipmi crash on parisc introduced in the kernel 4.15-rc. The pointer io.io_setup is not initialized and thus it causes crash in try_smi_init when attempting to call new_smi->io.io_setup. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>

The filw was converted from print_symbol() to %pf some time ago (044c782 "workqueue: fix checkpatch issues"). kallsyms does not seem to be needed anymore. Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

…/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This push fixes the following issues: - buffer overread in RSA - potential use after free in algif_aead. - error path null pointer dereference in af_alg - forbid combinations such as hmac(hmac(sha3)) which may crash - crash in salsa20 due to incorrect API usage" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed crypto: af_alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in crypto: algif_aead - fix reference counting of null skcipher crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes

Pull IPMI fixes from Corey Minyard. * tag 'for-linus-4.15-2' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi: ipmi_si: fix crash on parisc ipmi_si: Fix oops with PCI devices ipmi: Stop timers before cleaning up the module

…ernel/git/tj/libata Pull libata fixes from Tejun Heo: "Nothing too interesting. David Milburn improved a corner case misbehavior during hotplug. Other than that, minor driver-specific fixes" * 'for-4.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/libata: libata: sata_down_spd_limit should return if driver has not recorded sstatus speed ahci: mtk: Change driver name to ahci-mtk ahci: qoriq: refine port register configuration pata_pdc2027x : make pdc2027x_*_timing structures const pata_pdc2027x: Remove unnecessary error check ata: mediatek: Fix typo in module description

commit 344b7ef upstream. Many filesystems such as NFS and Ceph do not implement the `invalidate_cache` method. On those filesystems, if writing to the cache (`NETFS_WRITE_TO_CACHE`) fails for some reason, the kernel crashes like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3380 Comm: kworker/u193:11 Not tainted 6.13.3-cm4all1-hp #437 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_write_collection_worker RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffff9b86e2ca7dc0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 7fffffffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff89259d576a18 RDI: ffff89259d576900 RBP: ffff89259d5769b0 R08: ffff9b86e2ca7d28 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff89258ceaca80 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffff893d158b9338 R14: ffff89259d576900 R15: ffff89259d5769b0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893c9fa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000054442e003 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x460 ? try_to_wake_up+0x2d2/0x530 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 netfs_write_collection_worker+0xe9f/0x12b0 ? xs_poll_check_readable+0x3f/0x80 ? xs_stream_data_receive_workfn+0x8d/0x110 process_one_work+0x134/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x299/0x3a0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xba/0xe0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000000 This patch adds the missing `NULL` check. Fixes: 0e0f2df ("netfs: Dispatch write requests to process a writeback slice") Fixes: 288ace2 ("netfs: New writeback implementation") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250314164201.1993231-3-dhowells@redhat.com Acked-by: "Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat)" <pc@manguebit.com> cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 654b33a upstream. Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation. The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used. use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding pde->proc_ops->... dereference. rmmod lookup sys_delete_module proc_lookup_de pde_get(de); proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de); mod->exit() proc_remove remove_proc_subtree proc_entry_rundown(de); free_module(mod); if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter) --> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0 RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158 RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20 R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0 R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0 __lookup_slow+0x188/0x350 walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0 path_lookupat+0x120/0x660 filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560 vfs_statx+0xac/0x150 __do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3d25ded0-1739-447e-812b-e34da7990dcf@p183 Fixes: 778f3dd ("Fix procfs compat_ioctl regression") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4676741 upstream. This fixes the following crash: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888136335380 by task kworker/6:0/140241 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 140241 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc6+ #1 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: LENOVO 30FNA1V7CW/1057, BIOS S0EKT54A 07/01/2024 Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card [rtsx_usb_ms] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x320 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx_rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x10/0x10 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 ? kick_pool+0x3b/0x270 process_one_work+0x357/0x660 worker_thread+0x390/0x4c0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x190/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 161446: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x470 memstick_alloc_host+0x1f/0xe0 [memstick] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_probe+0x47/0x320 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_probe+0x60/0xe0 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 bus_probe_device+0xbd/0xd0 device_add+0x4a5/0x760 platform_device_add+0x189/0x370 mfd_add_device+0x587/0x5e0 mfd_add_devices+0xb1/0x130 rtsx_usb_probe+0x28e/0x2e0 [rtsx_usb] usb_probe_interface+0x15c/0x460 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 rebind_marked_interfaces.isra.0+0xcc/0x110 usb_reset_device+0x352/0x410 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xe5c/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 161506: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x36/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x50 kfree+0x1fd/0x3b0 device_release+0x56/0xf0 kobject_cleanup+0x73/0x1c0 rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x13d/0x220 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_remove+0x2f/0x50 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 bus_remove_device+0x124/0x1d0 device_del+0x239/0x530 platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x40 mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x167/0x170 device_for_each_child_reverse+0xc9/0x130 mfd_remove_devices+0x6e/0xa0 rtsx_usb_disconnect+0x2e/0xd0 [rtsx_usb] usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x3f0 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 proc_disconnect_claim+0x13d/0x220 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xb5e/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888136335000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 896 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888136335000, ffff888136335800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x136330 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea0004d8cc01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888136335280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888136335380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888136335400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 6827ca5 ("memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: Support runtime power management") Signed-off-by: Luo Qiu <luoqiu@kylinsec.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4B7BC3E6E291E6F2+20250317101438.25650-1-luoqiu@kylinsec.com.cn Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…ate_pagetables' [ Upstream commit fddc450 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang@amd.com> Cc: Yunxiang Li <Yunxiang.Li@amd.com> Cc: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com> Cc: Alex Sierra <alex.sierra@amd.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 42d9d7b ] ctx->dmub_srv will de NULL if the ASIC does not support DMUB, which is tested in dm_dmub_sw_init. However, it will be dereferenced in dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd if should_use_dmub_lock returns true. This has been the case since dmub support has been added for PSR1. Fix this by checking for dmub_srv in should_use_dmub_lock. [ 37.440832] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 [ 37.447808] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 37.452959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 37.458112] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 37.460662] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 37.465553] CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 1745 Comm: DrmThread Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-00003-gd62e938120f0 #23 99720e1cb1e0fc4773b8513150932a07de3c6e88 [ 37.478324] Hardware name: Google Morphius/Morphius, BIOS Google_Morphius.13434.858.0 10/26/2023 [ 37.487103] RIP: 0010:dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.492074] Code: 44 24 0e 00 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 45 00 00 0c 40 88 74 24 0d 0f b6 02 88 44 24 0c 8b 01 89 44 24 08 85 f6 75 05 c6 44 24 0e 01 <48> 8b 7f 58 48 89 e6 ba 01 00 00 00 e8 08 3c 2a 00 65 48 8b 04 5 [ 37.510822] RSP: 0018:ffff969442853300 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 37.516052] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92db03000000 RCX: ffff969442853358 [ 37.523185] RDX: ffff969442853368 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 37.530322] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000004a7 R09: 00000000000004a5 [ 37.537453] R10: 0000000000000476 R11: 0000000000000062 R12: ffff92db0ade8000 [ 37.544589] R13: ffff92da01180ae0 R14: ffff92da011802a8 R15: ffff92db03000000 [ 37.551725] FS: 0000784a9cdfc6c0(0000) GS:ffff92db2af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.559814] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.565562] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000112b1c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 37.572697] Call Trace: [ 37.575152] <TASK> [ 37.577258] ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0 [ 37.580756] ? page_fault_oops+0x3e7/0x4a0 [ 37.584861] ? exc_page_fault+0x3e/0xe0 [ 37.588706] ? exc_page_fault+0x5c/0xe0 [ 37.592550] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 37.596742] ? dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.601107] dcn10_cursor_lock+0x1e1/0x240 [ 37.605211] program_cursor_attributes+0x81/0x190 [ 37.609923] commit_planes_for_stream+0x998/0x1ef0 [ 37.614722] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x41e/0x5c0 [ 37.619703] dc_update_planes_and_stream+0x78/0x140 [ 37.624588] amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x4362/0x49f0 [ 37.629832] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.633847] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xd0 [ 37.637774] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [ 37.642135] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.646148] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x95/0x150 [ 37.650510] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.654522] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2f/0x50 [ 37.658883] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.662897] ? wait_for_common+0x186/0x1c0 [ 37.666998] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.671009] ? drm_crtc_next_vblank_start+0xc3/0x170 [ 37.675983] commit_tail+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 37.679478] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x2a2/0x2b0 [ 37.684186] drm_atomic_commit+0xd6/0x100 [ 37.688199] ? __cfi___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 [ 37.692911] drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xe5/0x130 [ 37.698054] drm_mode_cursor_common+0x501/0x670 [ 37.702600] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 37.707572] drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x48/0x70 [ 37.711851] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xf2/0x150 [ 37.715781] drm_ioctl+0x363/0x590 [ 37.719189] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 37.724165] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x41/0x80 [ 37.728013] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 [ 37.731685] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x100 [ 37.735355] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.739024] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.743041] ? find_held_lock+0x47/0xf0 [ 37.746884] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.750552] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.754565] ? lock_release+0x1c4/0x2e0 [ 37.758406] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.762079] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0xe0 [ 37.765921] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.769938] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x95/0x150 [ 37.774303] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.778317] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0xe0 [ 37.782163] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 37.787218] RIP: 0033:0x784aa5ec3059 [ 37.790803] Code: 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 48 8d 45 10 c7 45 b0 10 00 00 00 48 89 45 b8 48 8d 45 d0 48 89 45 c0 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1d 48 8b 45 c8 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 0 [ 37.809553] RSP: 002b:0000784a9cdf90e0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 37.817121] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000784a9cdf917c RCX: 0000784aa5ec3059 [ 37.824256] RDX: 0000784a9cdf917c RSI: 00000000c01c64a3 RDI: 0000000000000020 [ 37.831391] RBP: 0000784a9cdf9130 R08: 0000000000000100 R09: 0000000000ff0000 [ 37.838525] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000025c01606ed0 [ 37.845657] R13: 0000025c00030200 R14: 00000000c01c64a3 R15: 0000000000000020 [ 37.852799] </TASK> [ 37.854992] Modules linked in: [ 37.864546] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 [ 37.868656] CR2: 0000000000000058 [ 37.871979] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 37.880976] RIP: 0010:dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.885954] Code: 44 24 0e 00 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 45 00 00 0c 40 88 74 24 0d 0f b6 02 88 44 24 0c 8b 01 89 44 24 08 85 f6 75 05 c6 44 24 0e 01 <48> 8b 7f 58 48 89 e6 ba 01 00 00 00 e8 08 3c 2a 00 65 48 8b 04 5 [ 37.904703] RSP: 0018:ffff969442853300 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 37.909933] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92db03000000 RCX: ffff969442853358 [ 37.917068] RDX: ffff969442853368 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 37.924201] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000004a7 R09: 00000000000004a5 [ 37.931336] R10: 0000000000000476 R11: 0000000000000062 R12: ffff92db0ade8000 [ 37.938469] R13: ffff92da01180ae0 R14: ffff92da011802a8 R15: ffff92db03000000 [ 37.945602] FS: 0000784a9cdfc6c0(0000) GS:ffff92db2af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.953689] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.959435] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000112b1c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 37.966570] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 37.971901] Kernel Offset: 0x30200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 37.982840] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x02 Fixes: b5c764d ("drm/amd/display: Use HW lock mgr for PSR1") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Cc: Sun peng Li <sunpeng.li@amd.com> Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung@amd.com> Cc: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <siqueira@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Leo Li <sunpeng.li@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit efdde3d ] There is case as below could trigger kernel dump: Use U-Boot to start remote processor(rproc) with resource table published to a fixed address by rproc. After Kernel boots up, stop the rproc, load a new firmware which doesn't have resource table ,and start rproc. When starting rproc with a firmware not have resource table, `memcpy(loaded_table, rproc->cached_table, rproc->table_sz)` will trigger dump, because rproc->cache_table is set to NULL during the last stop operation, but rproc->table_sz is still valid. This issue is found on i.MX8MP and i.MX9. Dump as below: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000010af63000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1060 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-next-20250317-dirty #38 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x110/0x22c lr : rproc_start+0x88/0x1e0 Call trace: __pi_memcpy_generic+0x110/0x22c (P) rproc_boot+0x198/0x57c state_store+0x40/0x104 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x7c/0x94 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1cc vfs_write+0x240/0x378 ksys_write+0x70/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xcc el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Clear rproc->table_sz to address the issue. Fixes: 9dc9507 ("remoteproc: Properly deal with the resource table when detaching") Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319100106.3622619-1-peng.fan@oss.nxp.com Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d19d734 ] With UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I'm hitting the below panic due to dereferencing `ctx->clk_data.hws` before setting `ctx->clk_data.num = nr_clks`. Move that up to fix the crash. UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP <snip> Call trace: samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P) samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L) samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0 exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64 __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60 ... Fixes: e620a1e ("drivers/clk: convert VL struct to struct_size") Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250212183253.509771-1-willmcvicker@google.com Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a1ecb30 ] Commit 467f432 ("RDMA/core: Split port and device counter sysfs attributes") accidentally almost exposed hw counters to non-init net namespaces. It didn't expose them fully, as an attempt to read any of those counters leads to a crash like this one: [42021.807566] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [42021.814463] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [42021.819549] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [42021.824636] PGD 0 P4D 0 [42021.827145] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [42021.830598] CPU: 82 PID: 2843922 Comm: switchto-defaul Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W I XXX [42021.841697] Hardware name: XXX [42021.849619] RIP: 0010:hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core] [42021.855362] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 d0 4c 8b 5e 20 48 8b 8f b8 04 00 00 48 81 c7 f0 fa ff ff <48> 8b 41 28 48 29 ce 48 83 c6 d0 48 c1 ee 04 69 d6 ab aa aa aa 48 [42021.873931] RSP: 0018:ffff97fe90f03da0 EFLAGS: 00010287 [42021.879108] RAX: ffff9406988a8c60 RBX: ffff940e1072d438 RCX: 0000000000000000 [42021.886169] RDX: ffff94085f1aa000 RSI: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 RDI: ffff940c7517aef0 [42021.893230] RBP: ffff97fe90f03e70 R08: ffff94085f1aa000 R09: 0000000000000000 [42021.900294] R10: ffff94085f1aa000 R11: ffffffffc0775680 R12: ffffffff87ca2530 [42021.907355] R13: ffff940651602840 R14: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 R15: ffff94085f1aa000 [42021.914418] FS: 00007fda1a3b9700(0000) GS:ffff94453fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [42021.922423] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [42021.928130] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000042dcfb8003 CR4: 00000000003726f0 [42021.935194] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [42021.942257] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [42021.949324] Call Trace: [42021.951756] <TASK> [42021.953842] [<ffffffff86c58674>] ? show_regs+0x64/0x70 [42021.959030] [<ffffffff86c58468>] ? __die+0x78/0xc0 [42021.963874] [<ffffffff86c9ef75>] ? page_fault_oops+0x2b5/0x3b0 [42021.969749] [<ffffffff87674b92>] ? exc_page_fault+0x1a2/0x3c0 [42021.975549] [<ffffffff87801326>] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [42021.981517] [<ffffffffc0775680>] ? __pfx_show_hw_stats+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] [42021.988482] [<ffffffffc077564e>] ? hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core] [42021.995438] [<ffffffff86ac7f8e>] dev_attr_show+0x1e/0x50 [42022.000803] [<ffffffff86a3eeb1>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x81/0xe0 [42022.006508] [<ffffffff86a11134>] seq_read_iter+0xf4/0x410 [42022.011954] [<ffffffff869f4b2e>] vfs_read+0x16e/0x2f0 [42022.017058] [<ffffffff869f50ee>] ksys_read+0x6e/0xe0 [42022.022073] [<ffffffff8766f1ca>] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xa0 [42022.027441] [<ffffffff8780013b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 The problem can be reproduced using the following steps: ip netns add foo ip netns exec foo bash cat /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters/* The panic occurs because of casting the device pointer into an ib_device pointer using container_of() in hw_stat_device_show() is wrong and leads to a memory corruption. However the real problem is that hw counters should never been exposed outside of the non-init net namespace. Fix this by saving the index of the corresponding attribute group (it might be 1 or 2 depending on the presence of driver-specific attributes) and zeroing the pointer to hw_counters group for compat devices during the initialization. With this fix applied hw_counters are not available in a non-init net namespace: find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/1/hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/2/hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters ip netns add foo ip netns exec foo bash find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters Fixes: 467f432 ("RDMA/core: Split port and device counter sysfs attributes") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com> Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250227165420.3430301-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5ed3b0c ] When cur_qp isn't NULL, in order to avoid fetching the QP from the radix tree again we check if the next cqe QP is identical to the one we already have. The bug however is that we are checking if the QP is identical by checking the QP number inside the CQE against the QP number inside the mlx5_ib_qp, but that's wrong since the QP number from the CQE is from FW so it should be matched against mlx5_core_qp which is our FW QP number. Otherwise we could use the wrong QP when handling a CQE which could cause the kernel trace below. This issue is mainly noticeable over QPs 0 & 1, since for now they are the only QPs in our driver whereas the QP number inside mlx5_ib_qp doesn't match the QP number inside mlx5_core_qp. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7927 Comm: kworker/u62:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3+ #189 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ib-comp-unb-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c7/0xd90 [mlx5_ib] Code: 03 00 00 8d 58 ff 21 cb 66 39 d3 74 39 48 c7 c7 3c 89 6e a0 0f b7 db e8 b7 d2 b3 e0 49 8b 86 60 03 00 00 48 c7 c7 4a 89 6e a0 <0f> b7 5c 98 02 e8 9f d2 b3 e0 41 0f b7 86 78 03 00 00 83 e8 01 21 RSP: 0018:ffff88810511bd60 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88885fa1b3c0 RDI: ffffffffa06e894a RBP: 00000000000000b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810511bc10 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88810d593000 R13: ffff88810e579108 R14: ffff888105146000 R15: 00000000000000b0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 00000001077e6001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c7/0xd90 [mlx5_ib] __ib_process_cq+0x5a/0x150 [ib_core] ib_cq_poll_work+0x31/0x90 [ib_core] process_one_work+0x169/0x320 worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0 ? work_busy+0xb0/0xb0 kthread+0xd7/0x1f0 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fixes: e126ba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Edward Srouji <edwards@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4ada09d41f1e36db62c44a9b25c209ea5f054316.1741875692.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ee735aa ] The array contains only 5 elements, but the index calculated by veml6075_read_int_time_index can range from 0 to 7, which could lead to out-of-bounds access. The check prevents this issue. Coverity Issue CID 1574309: (#1 of 1): Out-of-bounds read (OVERRUN) overrun-local: Overrunning array veml6075_it_ms of 5 4-byte elements at element index 7 (byte offset 31) using index int_index (which evaluates to 7) This is hardening against potentially broken hardware. Good to have but not necessary to backport. Fixes: 3b82f43 ("iio: light: add VEML6075 UVA and UVB light sensor driver") Signed-off-by: Karan Sanghavi <karansanghvi98@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/Z7dnrEpKQdRZ2qFU@Emma Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 23f0080 ] Commit 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node GUIDs: # echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs # ip link show dev ib0 RTNETLINK answers: Message too long Cannot send link get request: Message too long Kernel warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8 RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00 R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x230 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? report_bug+0x22d/0x240 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290 netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0 ? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0 ? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0 ? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10 ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 ? __down_read_trylock+0x150/0x270 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x404/0x8e0 ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 __sys_sendmsg+0xd5/0x150 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __up_read+0x192/0x480 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f63a5b13367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007fff8c726bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000067b687c2 RCX: 00007f63a5b13367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff8c726c30 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fff8c726cb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034 R10: 00007fff8c726c7c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff8c726cd0 R15: 00007fff8c726cd0 </TASK> irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Thus, when calculating ifinfo message size, take VF GUIDs sizes into account when supported. Fixes: 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250325090226.749730-1-mbloch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 8c1624b ] nvme_tcp_poll() may race with the send path error handler because it may complete the request while it is actively being polled for completion, resulting in a UAF panic [1]: We should make sure to stop polling when we see an error when trying to read from the socket. Hence make sure to propagate the error so that the block layer breaks the polling cycle. [1]: -- [35665.692310] nvme nvme2: failed to send request -13 [35665.702265] nvme nvme2: unsupported pdu type (3) [35665.702272] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [35665.702542] nvme nvme2: queue 1 receive failed: -22 [35665.703209] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [35665.703213] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [35665.703214] PGD 8000003801cce067 P4D 8000003801cce067 PUD 37e6f79067 PMD 0 [35665.703220] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [35665.703658] nvme nvme2: starting error recovery [35665.705809] Hardware name: Inspur aaabbb/YZMB-00882-104, BIOS 4.1.26 09/22/2022 [35665.705812] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work [35665.709172] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.715788] Call Trace: [35665.716201] <TASK> [35665.716613] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717049] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717457] ? blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.717950] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [35665.718361] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140 [35665.718749] ? blk_mq_start_request+0x30/0xf0 [35665.719144] ? nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0xc7/0x170 [nvme_tcp] [35665.719547] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x130 [35665.719938] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [35665.720333] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.720723] blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.721101] blk_mq_requeue_work+0xa5/0x180 [35665.721451] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390 [35665.721809] worker_thread+0x53/0x3d0 [35665.722159] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [35665.722501] kthread+0x124/0x150 [35665.722849] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [35665.723182] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Reported-by: Zhang Guanghui <zhang.guanghui@cestc.cn> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…cal section [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1020630 ] We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start() or risk a crash as syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181 sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930 proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553 proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601 iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158 splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227 do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] Fixes: 046c052 ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks") Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250331091532.224982-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1b755d8 ] When handling multiple NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE attributes, the parsing logic should place every geneve_opt structure one by one compactly. Hence, when deciding the next geneve_opt position, the pointer addition should be in units of char *. However, the current implementation erroneously does type conversion before the addition, which will lead to heap out-of-bounds write. [ 6.989857] ================================================================== [ 6.990293] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.990725] Write of size 124 at addr ffff888005f18974 by task poc/178 [ 6.991162] [ 6.991259] CPU: 0 PID: 178 Comm: poc-oob-write Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 6.991655] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 6.992281] Call Trace: [ 6.992423] <TASK> [ 6.992586] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 6.992801] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 6.993790] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 6.994252] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 6.994486] memcpy+0x38/0x60 [ 6.994692] nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.995677] nft_obj_init+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 6.995891] nf_tables_newobj+0x585/0x950 [ 6.996922] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xdf9/0x1020 [ 6.998997] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1df/0x220 [ 6.999537] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 7.000771] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 7.001462] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 7.001707] ____sys_sendmsg+0x409/0x450 [ 7.002391] ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x170 [ 7.003145] __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x170 [ 7.004359] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 7.005817] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 7.006127] RIP: 0033:0x7ec756d4e407 [ 7.006339] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 7.007364] RSP: 002b:00007ffed5d46760 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 7.007827] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ec756cc4740 RCX: 00007ec756d4e407 [ 7.008223] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed5d467f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 7.008620] RBP: 00007ffed5d468a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009039] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009429] R13: 00007ffed5d478b0 R14: 00007ec756ee5000 R15: 00005cbd4e655cb8 Fix this bug with correct pointer addition and conversion in parse and dump code. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b27055a ] struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes. However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic, further achieve heap out-of-bounds read. One example crash log is like below: [ 3.905425] ================================================================== [ 3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177 [ 3.906646] [ 3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3.907784] Call Trace: [ 3.907925] <TASK> [ 3.908048] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 3.908258] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 3.909151] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 3.909539] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 3.909794] memcpy+0x1f/0x60 [ 3.909968] nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.910147] tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0 [ 3.911536] tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340 [ 3.912436] tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180 [ 3.912689] tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0 [ 3.912905] fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0 [ 3.913483] tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460 [ 3.914778] tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180 [ 3.915208] tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0 [ 3.918615] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560 [ 3.919118] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200 [ 3.919787] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 3.921032] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 3.921987] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 3.922220] __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240 [ 3.922682] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90 [ 3.922906] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 3.923814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407 [ 3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407 [ 3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c [ 3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0 [ 3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8 Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related policies. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Fixes: 4ece477 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve") Fixes: 0ed5269 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key") Fixes: 0a6e777 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402165632.6958-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 8977752 upstream. Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2. Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are enabled on the system. Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced, and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have device-exclusive PTEs. The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM. Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out (proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about failed migration of a page that should be movable. # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # ./hmm-swap & ... wait until everything is device-exclusive # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state [ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a [ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000 [ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate| dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure [ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774 [ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0 [ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280 [ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740 [ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540 [ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340 [ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0 [ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0 [ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0 ... This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send out separately once this landed and I get to it. I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed. With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day. I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW, so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected. <program> #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> #define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd) struct hmm_dmirror_cmd { __u64 addr; __u64 ptr; __u64 npages; __u64 cpages; __u64 faults; }; const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul; const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul; int main(void) { struct hmm_dmirror_cmd cmd; size_t cur_size; int fd, ret; char *addr, *mirror; fd = open("/dev/hmm_dmirror1", O_RDWR, 0); if (fd < 0) { perror("open failed\n"); exit(1); } addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap failed\n"); exit(1); } madvise(addr, size, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE); memset(addr, 1, size); mirror = malloc(chunk_size); for (cur_size = 0; cur_size < size; cur_size += chunk_size) { cmd.addr = (uintptr_t)addr + cur_size; cmd.ptr = (uintptr_t)mirror; cmd.npages = chunk_size / getpagesize(); ret = ioctl(fd, HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE, &cmd); if (ret) { perror("ioctl failed\n"); exit(1); } } pause(); return 0; } </program> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/25e02685-4f1d-47fa-be5b-01ff85bb0ce2@redhat.com This patch (of 17): We only have two FOLL_SPLIT_PMD users. While uprobe refuses hugetlb early, make_device_exclusive_range() can end up getting called on hugetlb VMAs. Right now, this means that with a PMD-sized hugetlb page, we can end up calling split_huge_pmd(), because pmd_trans_huge() also succeeds with hugetlb PMDs. For example, using a modified hmm-test selftest one can trigger: [ 207.017134][T14945] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 207.018614][T14945] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:87! [ 207.019716][T14945] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 207.021072][T14945] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: ... [ 207.023036][T14945] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 [ 207.024834][T14945] RIP: 0010:page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.026128][T14945] Code: ... [ 207.029965][T14945] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cb8f348 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 207.031139][T14945] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff8249a0cd [ 207.032649][T14945] RDX: ffff88811e883c80 RSI: ffffffff8249a357 RDI: ffff88811e883c80 [ 207.034183][T14945] RBP: ffff888105c0a050 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 207.035688][T14945] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 207.037203][T14945] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 207.038711][T14945] FS: 00007f2783275740(0000) GS:ffff8881f4980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 207.040407][T14945] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 207.041660][T14945] CR2: 00007f2782c00000 CR3: 0000000132356000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 207.043196][T14945] PKRU: 55555554 [ 207.043880][T14945] Call Trace: [ 207.044506][T14945] <TASK> [ 207.045086][T14945] ? __die+0x51/0x92 [ 207.045864][T14945] ? die+0x29/0x50 [ 207.046596][T14945] ? do_trap+0x250/0x320 [ 207.047430][T14945] ? do_error_trap+0xe7/0x220 [ 207.048346][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.049535][T14945] ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 [ 207.050494][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.051681][T14945] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2e/0x50 [ 207.052589][T14945] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 207.053596][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x1fd/0x510 [ 207.054790][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.055993][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.057195][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.058384][T14945] __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x34b/0x5a0 [ 207.059524][T14945] ? __pfx___page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x10/0x10 [ 207.060775][T14945] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 207.061940][T14945] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 207.062967][T14945] pmdp_huge_clear_flush+0x279/0x360 [ 207.064024][T14945] split_huge_pmd_locked+0x82b/0x3750 ... Before commit 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code"), we would have ignored the flag; instead, let's simply refuse the combination completely in check_vma_flags(): the caller is likely not prepared to handle any hugetlb folios. We'll teach make_device_exclusive_range() separately to ignore any hugetlb folios as a future-proof safety net. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Cc: Lyude <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Yanteng Si <si.yanteng@linux.dev> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c28f31d upstream. do_alignment_t32_to_handler() only fixes up alignment faults for specific instructions; it returns NULL otherwise (e.g. LDREX). When that's the case, signal to the caller that it needs to proceed with the regular alignment fault handling (i.e. SIGBUS). Without this patch, the kernel panics: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000006 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800164aa000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800081fdbd22003, p4d=0800081fdbd22003, pud=08000815d51c6003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill xt_nat xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter veth nvme_fa> libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid0 multipath linear dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod xhci_pci nvme xhci_hcd nvme_core t10_pi usbcore igb crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_ce crct10dif_common usb_common i2c_algo_bit i2c> CPU: 2 PID: 3932954 Comm: WPEWebProcess Not tainted 6.1.0-31-arm64 #1 Debian 6.1.128-1 Hardware name: GIGABYTE MP32-AR1-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021 pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : do_compat_alignment_fixup+0xd8/0x3dc sp : ffff80000f973dd0 x29: ffff80000f973dd0 x28: ffff081b42526180 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 00000000e8551f00 x19: ffff80000f973eb0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffaebc949bc488 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000400000 x4 : 0000fffffffffffe x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000f973eb0 x1 : 00000000e8551f00 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: 0x0 do_alignment_fault+0x40/0x50 do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa0 el0_da+0x48/0xf0 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x110/0x140 el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <angelos@igalia.com> Fixes: 3fc24ef ("arm64: compat: Implement misalignment fixups for multiword loads") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.1.x Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250401085150.148313-1-angelos@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit adc3fd2 upstream. Address a kernel panic caused by a null pointer dereference in the `mt792x_rx_get_wcid` function. The issue arises because the `deflink` structure is not properly initialized with the `sta` context. This patch ensures that the `deflink` structure is correctly linked to the `sta` context, preventing the null pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000400 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 470 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Not tainted 6.12.13-gentoo-dist #1 Hardware name: /AMD HUDSON-M1, BIOS 4.6.4 11/15/2011 RIP: 0010:mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] RSP: 0018:ffffa147c055fd98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e9ecb652000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e9ecb652000 RBP: 0000000000000685 R08: ffff8e9ec6570000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8e9ecd2ca000 R11: ffff8e9f22a217c0 R12: 0000000038010119 R13: 0000000080843801 R14: ffff8e9ec6570000 R15: ffff8e9ecb652000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9f22a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000400 CR3: 000000000d2ea000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] mt7921_queue_rx_skb+0x1c6/0xaa0 [mt7921_common] mt76u_alloc_queues+0x784/0x810 [mt76_usb] ? __pfx___mt76_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [mt76] __mt76_worker_fn+0x4f/0x80 [mt76] kthread+0xd2/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Reported-by: Nick Morrow <usbwifi2024@gmail.com> Closes: morrownr/USB-WiFi#577 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 90c1028 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: Update mt792x_rx_get_wcid for per-link STA") Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Salah Coronya <salah.coronya@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218033343.1999648-1-mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d5e2067 upstream. Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later on, when the corrupted directory is removed). ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.' and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry() and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the same data block. If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer which results in out-of-bounds mem access. Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero). Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is really an OOB read. This issue was found by syzkaller tool. Call Trace: [ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375 [ 38.595158] [ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1 [ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 38.595304] Call Trace: [ 38.595308] <TASK> [ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0 [ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0 [ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250 [ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90 [ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 [ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990 [ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10 [ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0 [ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140 [ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140 [ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670 [ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190 [ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0 [ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0 [ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 [ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: ac27a0e ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c11bcbc upstream. Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226185625.2672936-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev> Reported-by: syzbot+1a517ccfcbc6a7ab0f82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67bcea51.050a0220.bbfd1.0096.GAE@google.com/ Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below). The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor" conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock. To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and return -EBUSY when it fails. Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user space. syzbot report: syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline] ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline] rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline] ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015 ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558 init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910 do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257 do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568 kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline] wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64 notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452 param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588 module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924 sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline] vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679 ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(param_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(param_lock); lock(system_transition_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: syzbot+ace60642828c074eb913@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913 Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250224013139.3994500-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com [ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

Commit b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem. Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c Call trace: try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P) try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L) rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8 rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58 try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90 unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8 do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568 offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670 memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374 memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78 device_offline+0xa4/0xd0 state_store+0x8c/0xf0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-4-mawupeng1@huawei.com Fixes: b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined") Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Address an Oops issues when performing test of loading XE GPU driver module after applying the GPU SVM and Xe SVM patch series[1] and the Dept patch series[2]. The issue occurs when loading the xe driver via modprobe [3], which adds a struct page for device memory via devm_memremap_pages(). When a process leads the addition of a struct page to vmemmap (e.g. hot-plug), the page table update for the newly added vmemmap-based virtual address is updated first in init_mm's page table and then synchronized later. If the vmemmap-based virtual address is accessed through the process's page table before this sync, a page fault will occur. This patch translates vmemmap-based virtual address to direct-mapped virtual address and use it, if the current top-level page table is not init_mm's page table when accessing a vmemmap-based virtual address before this sync. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20250213021112.1228481-1-matthew.brost@intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240508094726.35754-1-byungchul@sk.com/ [3] [ 49.103630] xe 0000:00:04.0: [drm] Available VRAM: 0x0000000800000000, 0x00000002fb800000 [ 49.116710] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb3ff1200000 [ 49.117175] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 49.117511] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 49.117835] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 49.118015] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 49.118366] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 302 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.13.0-drm-tip-test+ #62 [ 49.118976] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 49.119179] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 49.119710] RIP: 0010:vmemmap_set_pmd+0xff/0x230 [ 49.120011] Code: 77 22 02 a9 ff ff 1f 00 74 58 48 8b 3d 62 77 22 02 48 85 ff 0f 85 9a 00 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 48 89 e9 31 c0 48 89 ea 48 83 e7 f8 <48> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 48 29 f9 48 c7 45 48 00 00 00 00 83 c1 50 [ 49.121158] RSP: 0018:ffffc900016d37a8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 49.121502] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888164000000 RCX: ffffeb3ff1200000 [ 49.121966] RDX: ffffeb3ff1200000 RSI: 80000000000001e3 RDI: ffffeb3ff1200008 [ 49.122499] RBP: ffffeb3ff1200000 R08: ffffeb3ff1280000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 49.123032] R10: ffff88817b94dc48 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffeb3ff1280000 [ 49.123566] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88817b94dc48 R15: 8000000163e001e3 [ 49.124096] FS: 00007f53ae71d740(0000) GS:ffff88843fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 49.124698] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 49.125129] CR2: ffffeb3ff1200000 CR3: 000000017c7d2000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 49.125662] PKRU: 55555554 [ 49.125880] Call Trace: [ 49.126078] <TASK> [ 49.126252] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 [ 49.126509] ? page_fault_oops+0xa2/0x240 [ 49.126736] ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0 [ 49.126968] ? search_module_extables+0x4a/0x80 [ 49.127224] ? exc_page_fault+0x206/0x230 [ 49.127454] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 49.127691] ? vmemmap_set_pmd+0xff/0x230 [ 49.127919] vmemmap_populate_hugepages+0x176/0x180 [ 49.128194] vmemmap_populate+0x34/0x80 [ 49.128416] __populate_section_memmap+0x41/0x90 [ 49.128676] sparse_add_section+0x121/0x3e0 [ 49.128914] __add_pages+0xba/0x150 [ 49.129116] add_pages+0x1d/0x70 [ 49.129305] memremap_pages+0x3dc/0x810 [ 49.129529] devm_memremap_pages+0x1c/0x60 [ 49.129762] xe_devm_add+0x8b/0x100 [xe] [ 49.130072] xe_tile_init_noalloc+0x6a/0x70 [xe] [ 49.130408] xe_device_probe+0x48c/0x740 [xe] [ 49.130714] ? __pfx___drmm_mutex_release+0x10/0x10 [ 49.130982] ? __drmm_add_action+0x85/0xd0 [ 49.131208] ? __pfx___drmm_mutex_release+0x10/0x10 [ 49.131478] xe_pci_probe+0x7ef/0xd90 [xe] [ 49.131777] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x66/0x90 [ 49.132049] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xba/0x140 [ 49.132290] pci_device_probe+0x99/0x110 [ 49.132510] really_probe+0xdb/0x340 [ 49.132710] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x50/0x90 [ 49.132941] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 49.133190] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 49.133433] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 49.133661] __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 [ 49.133874] bus_for_each_dev+0x7a/0xd0 [ 49.134089] bus_add_driver+0x114/0x200 [ 49.134302] driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 [ 49.134515] xe_init+0x1e/0x50 [xe] [ 49.134827] ? __pfx_xe_init+0x10/0x10 [xe] [ 49.134926] xe 0000:00:04.0: [drm:process_one_work] GT1: GuC CT safe-mode canceled [ 49.135112] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x2b0 [ 49.135734] ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40 [ 49.135995] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x231/0x310 [ 49.136315] do_init_module+0x60/0x210 [ 49.136572] init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 [ 49.136863] idempotent_init_module+0x12b/0x340 [ 49.137156] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x61/0xc0 [ 49.137437] do_syscall_64+0x69/0x140 [ 49.137681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 49.137953] RIP: 0033:0x7f53ae1261fd [ 49.138153] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 fa 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 49.139117] RSP: 002b:00007ffd0e9021e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 49.139525] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c02951ee50 RCX: 00007f53ae1261fd [ 49.139905] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055bfff125478 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 49.140282] RBP: 000055bfff125478 R08: 00007f53ae1f6b20 R09: 00007ffd0e902230 [ 49.140663] R10: 000055c029522000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 [ 49.141040] R13: 000055c02951ef80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055c029521fc0 [ 49.141424] </TASK> [ 49.141552] Modules linked in: xe(+) drm_ttm_helper gpu_sched drm_suballoc_helper drm_gpuvm drm_exec drm_gpusvm i2c_algo_bit drm_buddy video wmi ttm drm_display_helper drm_kms_helper crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul i2c_piix4 e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_smbus fuse [ 49.142824] CR2: ffffeb3ff1200000 [ 49.143010] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 49.143268] RIP: 0010:vmemmap_set_pmd+0xff/0x230 [ 49.143523] Code: 77 22 02 a9 ff ff 1f 00 74 58 48 8b 3d 62 77 22 02 48 85 ff 0f 85 9a 00 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 48 89 e9 31 c0 48 89 ea 48 83 e7 f8 <48> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 48 29 f9 48 c7 45 48 00 00 00 00 83 c1 50 [ 49.144489] RSP: 0018:ffffc900016d37a8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 49.144775] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888164000000 RCX: ffffeb3ff1200000 [ 49.145154] RDX: ffffeb3ff1200000 RSI: 80000000000001e3 RDI: ffffeb3ff1200008 [ 49.145536] RBP: ffffeb3ff1200000 R08: ffffeb3ff1280000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 49.145914] R10: ffff88817b94dc48 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffeb3ff1280000 [ 49.146292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88817b94dc48 R15: 8000000163e001e3 [ 49.146671] FS: 00007f53ae71d740(0000) GS:ffff88843fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 49.147097] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 49.147407] CR2: ffffeb3ff1200000 CR3: 000000017c7d2000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 49.147786] PKRU: 55555554 [ 49.147941] note: modprobe[302] exited with irqs disabled When a process leads the addition of a struct page to vmemmap (e.g. hot-plug), the page table update for the newly added vmemmap-based virtual address is updated first in init_mm's page table and then synchronized later. If the vmemmap-based virtual address is accessed through the process's page table before this sync, a page fault will occur. This translates vmemmap-based virtual address to direct-mapped virtual address and use it, if the current top-level page table is not init_mm's page table when accessing a vmemmap-based virtual address before this sync. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217114133.400063-2-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com Fixes: faf1c00 ("x86/vmemmap: optimize for consecutive sections in partial populated PMDs") Signed-off-by: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul@sk.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Add a NULL check on the return value of swp_swap_info in __swap_duplicate to prevent crashes caused by NULL pointer dereference. The reason why swp_swap_info() returns NULL is unclear; it may be due to CPU cache issues or DDR bit flips. The probability of this issue is very small - it has been observed to occur approximately 1 in 500,000 times per week. The stack info we encountered is as follows: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [RB/E]rb_sreason_str_set: sreason_str set null_pointer Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008a80e5000 [0000000000000058] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 ... pc : swap_duplicate+0x44/0x164 lr : copy_page_range+0x508/0x1e78 sp : ffffffc0f2a699e0 x29: ffffffc0f2a699e0 x28: ffffff8a5b28d388 x27: ffffff8b06603388 x26: ffffffdf7291fe70 x25: 0000000000000006 x24: 0000000000100073 x23: 00000000002d2d2f x22: 0000000000000008 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 00000000002d2d2f x19: 18000000002d2d2f x18: ffffffdf726faec0 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0010000000000001 x15: 0040000000000001 x14: 0400000000000001 x13: ff7ffffffffffb7f x12: ffeffffffffffbff x11: ffffff8a5c7e1898 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : 0000000000000006 x8 : 1800000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff8057c01f10 x5 : 000000000000a318 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000006daf200000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 18000000002d2d2f Call trace: swap_duplicate+0x44/0x164 copy_page_range+0x508/0x1e78 copy_process+0x1278/0x21cc kernel_clone+0x90/0x438 __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c invoke_syscall+0x58/0x110 do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xe0 el0_svc+0x38/0x9c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x44/0xec el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac Code: 9139c35a 71006f3f 54000568 f8797b55 (f9402ea8) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs The patch seems to only provide a workaround, but there are no more effective software solutions to handle the bit flips problem. This path will change the issue from a system crash to a process exception, thereby reducing the impact on the entire machine. Signed-off-by: gao xu <gaoxu2@honor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e223b0e6ba2f4924984b1917cc717bd5@honor.com Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

userfaultfd_move() checks whether the PTE entry is present or a swap entry. - If the PTE entry is present, move_present_pte() handles folio migration by setting: src_folio->index = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr); - If the PTE entry is a swap entry, move_swap_pte() simply copies the PTE to the new dst_addr. This approach is incorrect because, even if the PTE is a swap entry, it can still reference a folio that remains in the swap cache. This creates a race window between steps 2 and 4. 1. add_to_swap: The folio is added to the swapcache. 2. try_to_unmap: PTEs are converted to swap entries. 3. pageout: The folio is written back. 4. Swapcache is cleared. If userfaultfd_move() occurs in the window between steps 2 and 4, after the swap PTE has been moved to the destination, accessing the destination triggers do_swap_page(), which may locate the folio in the swapcache. However, since the folio's index has not been updated to match the destination VMA, do_swap_page() will detect a mismatch. This can result in two critical issues depending on the system configuration. If KSM is disabled, both small and large folios can trigger a BUG during the add_rmap operation due to: page_pgoff(folio, page) != linear_page_index(vma, address) [ 13.336953] page: refcount:6 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000f43db19c index:0xffffaf150 pfn:0x4667c [ 13.337520] head: order:2 mapcount:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:1 pincount:0 [ 13.337716] memcg:ffff00000405f000 [ 13.337849] anon flags: 0x3fffc0000020459(locked|uptodate|dirty|owner_priv_1|head|swapbacked|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) [ 13.338630] raw: 03fffc0000020459 ffff80008507b538 ffff80008507b538 ffff000006260361 [ 13.338831] raw: 0000000ffffaf150 0000000000004000 0000000600000000 ffff00000405f000 [ 13.339031] head: 03fffc0000020459 ffff80008507b538 ffff80008507b538 ffff000006260361 [ 13.339204] head: 0000000ffffaf150 0000000000004000 0000000600000000 ffff00000405f000 [ 13.339375] head: 03fffc0000000202 fffffdffc0199f01 ffffffff00000000 0000000000000001 [ 13.339546] head: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 13.339736] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_pgoff(folio, page) != linear_page_index(vma, address)) [ 13.340190] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 13.340316] kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1380! [ 13.340683] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 13.340969] Modules linked in: [ 13.341257] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 107 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-gcf42737e247a-dirty #299 [ 13.341470] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 13.341671] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 13.341815] pc : __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 [ 13.341920] lr : __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 [ 13.342018] sp : ffff80008752bb20 [ 13.342093] x29: ffff80008752bb20 x28: fffffdffc0199f00 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 13.342404] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 13.342575] x23: 0000ffffaf0d0000 x22: 0000ffffaf0d0000 x21: fffffdffc0199f00 [ 13.342731] x20: fffffdffc0199f00 x19: ffff000006210700 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 13.342881] x17: 6c203d2120296567 x16: 6170202c6f696c6f x15: 662866666f67705f [ 13.343033] x14: 6567617028454741 x13: 2929737365726464 x12: ffff800083728ab0 [ 13.343183] x11: ffff800082996bf8 x10: 0000000000000fd7 x9 : ffff80008011bc40 [ 13.343351] x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : 00000000fffff000 x6 : ffff8000829eebf8 [ 13.343498] x5 : c0000000fffff000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 13.343645] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000062db980 x0 : 000000000000005f [ 13.343876] Call trace: [ 13.344045] __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 (P) [ 13.344234] folio_add_anon_rmap_ptes+0x22c/0x320 [ 13.344333] do_swap_page+0x1060/0x1400 [ 13.344417] __handle_mm_fault+0x61c/0xbc8 [ 13.344504] handle_mm_fault+0xd8/0x2e8 [ 13.344586] do_page_fault+0x20c/0x770 [ 13.344673] do_translation_fault+0xb4/0xf0 [ 13.344759] do_mem_abort+0x48/0xa0 [ 13.344842] el0_da+0x58/0x130 [ 13.344914] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc4/0x138 [ 13.345002] el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 [ 13.345208] Code: aa1503e0 f000f801 910f6021 97ff5779 (d4210000) [ 13.345504] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 13.345715] note: a.out[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 13.345954] note: a.out[107] exited with preempt_count 2 If KSM is enabled, Peter Xu also discovered that do_swap_page() may trigger an unexpected CoW operation for small folios because ksm_might_need_to_copy() allocates a new folio when the folio index does not match linear_page_index(vma, addr). This patch also checks the swapcache when handling swap entries. If a match is found in the swapcache, it processes it similarly to a present PTE. However, there are some differences. For example, the folio is no longer exclusive because folio_try_share_anon_rmap_pte() is performed during unmapping. Furthermore, in the case of swapcache, the folio has already been unmapped, eliminating the risk of concurrent rmap walks and removing the need to acquire src_folio's anon_vma or lock. Note that for large folios, in the swapcache handling path, we directly return -EBUSY since split_folio() will return -EBUSY regardless if the folio is under writeback or unmapped. This is not an urgent issue, so a follow-up patch may address it separately. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226001400.9129-1-21cnbao@gmail.com Fixes: adef440 ("userfaultfd: UFFDIO_MOVE uABI") Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Cc: Tangquan Zheng <zhengtangquan@oppo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

I found a NULL pointer dereference as followed: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 5964 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-dirty #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1. RIP: 0010:has_unmovable_pages+0x184/0x360 ... Call Trace: <TASK> set_migratetype_isolate+0xd1/0x180 start_isolate_page_range+0xd2/0x170 alloc_contig_range_noprof+0x101/0x660 alloc_contig_pages_noprof+0x238/0x290 alloc_gigantic_folio.isra.0+0xb6/0x1f0 only_alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0xf/0x60 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x80/0xf0 set_max_huge_pages+0x211/0x490 __nr_hugepages_store_common+0x5f/0xe0 nr_hugepages_store+0x77/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x200 vfs_write+0x23c/0x3f0 ksys_write+0x62/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e As has_unmovable_pages() call folio_hstate() without hugetlb_lock, there is a race to free the HugeTLB page between PageHuge() and folio_hstate(). There is no need to add hugetlb_lock here as the HugeTLB page can be freed in lot of places. So it's enough to unfold folio_hstate() and add a check to avoid NULL pointer dereference for hugepage_migration_supported(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250122061151.578768-1-liushixin2@huawei.com Fixes: 464c7ff ("mm/hugetlb: filter out hugetlb pages if HUGEPAGE migration is not supported.") Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shuemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2. Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are enabled on the system. Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced, and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have device-exclusive PTEs. The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM. Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out (proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about failed migration of a page that should be movable. # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # ./hmm-swap & ... wait until everything is device-exclusive # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state [ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a [ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000 [ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate| dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure [ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774 [ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0 [ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280 [ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740 [ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540 [ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340 [ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0 [ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0 [ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0 ... This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send out separately once this landed and I get to it. I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed. With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day. I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW, so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected. <program> #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> #define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd) struct hmm_dmirror_cmd { __u64 addr; __u64 ptr; __u64 npages; __u64 cpages; __u64 faults; }; const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul; const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul; int main(void) { struct hmm_dmirror_cmd cmd; size_t cur_size; int fd, ret; char *addr, *mirror; fd = open("/dev/hmm_dmirror1", O_RDWR, 0); if (fd < 0) { perror("open failed\n"); exit(1); } addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap failed\n"); exit(1); } madvise(addr, size, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE); memset(addr, 1, size); mirror = malloc(chunk_size); for (cur_size = 0; cur_size < size; cur_size += chunk_size) { cmd.addr = (uintptr_t)addr + cur_size; cmd.ptr = (uintptr_t)mirror; cmd.npages = chunk_size / getpagesize(); ret = ioctl(fd, HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE, &cmd); if (ret) { perror("ioctl failed\n"); exit(1); } } pause(); return 0; } </program> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/25e02685-4f1d-47fa-be5b-01ff85bb0ce2@redhat.com This patch (of 17): We only have two FOLL_SPLIT_PMD users. While uprobe refuses hugetlb early, make_device_exclusive_range() can end up getting called on hugetlb VMAs. Right now, this means that with a PMD-sized hugetlb page, we can end up calling split_huge_pmd(), because pmd_trans_huge() also succeeds with hugetlb PMDs. For example, using a modified hmm-test selftest one can trigger: [ 207.017134][T14945] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 207.018614][T14945] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:87! [ 207.019716][T14945] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 207.021072][T14945] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: ... [ 207.023036][T14945] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 [ 207.024834][T14945] RIP: 0010:page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.026128][T14945] Code: ... [ 207.029965][T14945] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cb8f348 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 207.031139][T14945] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff8249a0cd [ 207.032649][T14945] RDX: ffff88811e883c80 RSI: ffffffff8249a357 RDI: ffff88811e883c80 [ 207.034183][T14945] RBP: ffff888105c0a050 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 207.035688][T14945] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 207.037203][T14945] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 207.038711][T14945] FS: 00007f2783275740(0000) GS:ffff8881f4980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 207.040407][T14945] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 207.041660][T14945] CR2: 00007f2782c00000 CR3: 0000000132356000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 207.043196][T14945] PKRU: 55555554 [ 207.043880][T14945] Call Trace: [ 207.044506][T14945] <TASK> [ 207.045086][T14945] ? __die+0x51/0x92 [ 207.045864][T14945] ? die+0x29/0x50 [ 207.046596][T14945] ? do_trap+0x250/0x320 [ 207.047430][T14945] ? do_error_trap+0xe7/0x220 [ 207.048346][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.049535][T14945] ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 [ 207.050494][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.051681][T14945] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2e/0x50 [ 207.052589][T14945] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 207.053596][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x1fd/0x510 [ 207.054790][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.055993][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.057195][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.058384][T14945] __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x34b/0x5a0 [ 207.059524][T14945] ? __pfx___page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x10/0x10 [ 207.060775][T14945] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 207.061940][T14945] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 207.062967][T14945] pmdp_huge_clear_flush+0x279/0x360 [ 207.064024][T14945] split_huge_pmd_locked+0x82b/0x3750 ... Before commit 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code"), we would have ignored the flag; instead, let's simply refuse the combination completely in check_vma_flags(): the caller is likely not prepared to handle any hugetlb folios. We'll teach make_device_exclusive_range() separately to ignore any hugetlb folios as a future-proof safety net. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Cc: Lyude <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Yanteng Si <si.yanteng@linux.dev> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

looks like current firmware is not compatible with old driver phy-fw-node in mt7988a.dtsi differs old one: phyfw: phy-firmware@f000000 { compatible = "mediatek,2p5gphy-fw"; reg = <0 0x0f000000 0 0x8000>, <0 0x0f100000 0 0x20000>, <0 0x0f0f0000 0 0x200>; }; new one: phyfw: phy-firmware@f000000 { compatible = "mediatek,2p5gphy-fw"; reg = <0 0x0f100000 0 0x20000>, <0 0x0f0f0018 0 0x20>; }; root@bpi-r4-8G:~# modprobe mediatek-2p5ge root@bpi-r4-8G:~# lsmod Module Size Used by mediatek_2p5ge 12288 0 cfg80211 815104 0 fuse 151552 1 ip_tables 24576 0 x_tables 32768 1 ip_tables root@bpi-r4-8G:~# ip a a 192.168.0.19/24 dev eth1 root@bpi-r4-8G:~# ip link set eth1 up [ 75.731776] Unable to handle kernel access to user memory outside uaccess routines at virtual address 0000000000000210 [ 75.742533] Mem abort info: [ 75.745317] ESR = 0x0000000096000005 [ 75.749066] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 75.754387] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 75.757439] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 75.760600] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault [ 75.765471] Data abort info: [ 75.768345] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 75.773835] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 75.778885] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 75.784204] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001021d6000 [ 75.790641] [0000000000000210] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 [ 75.799369] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP [ 75.804932] Modules linked in: mediatek_2p5ge cfg80211 fuse ip_tables x_tables [ 75.812153] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3264 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.23-bpi-r4-main #1 [ 75.819452] Hardware name: Bananapi BPI-R4 2.5GE (DT) [ 75.824491] pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 75.831440] pc : mt7988_2p5ge_phy_config_init+0x50/0x38c [mediatek_2p5ge] [ 75.838221] lr : mt7988_2p5ge_phy_config_init+0x44/0x38c [mediatek_2p5ge] [ 75.844997] sp : ffffffc0823733b0 [ 75.848301] x29: ffffffc0823733d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff80c1fd7080 [ 75.855429] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff80c1fd4000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 75.862556] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffffff80c4b4b440 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 75.869682] x20: ffffff80c174a800 x19: ffffff80c174a800 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 75.876808] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000007fdf4b3e88 [ 75.883933] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 75.891058] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 00000000000840e0 x9 : 0000000000000003 [ 75.898183] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 6d616e2d6e69616d x6 : 1e0e1a00f2ade4ef [ 75.905309] x5 : 6f642d72001a0e1e x4 : 8080808000000000 x3 : 837bbb2b916b2378 [ 75.912435] x2 : 0000000000000073 x1 : 00000000ffffffea x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 75.919563] Call trace: [ 75.921999] mt7988_2p5ge_phy_config_init+0x50/0x38c [mediatek_2p5ge] [ 75.928428] phy_init_hw+0x68/0xac [ 75.931824] phy_attach_direct+0x174/0x37c [ 75.935911] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0xb0/0x130 [ 75.940692] phylink_of_phy_connect+0x1c/0x28 [ 75.945039] mtk_open+0x38/0xb40

KAGA-KOKO and others added 30 commits November 27, 2017 08:48

main: kernel_start: move housekeeping_init() before workqueue_init_ea…

7d229c6

…rly() This is needed in order to allow the unbound workqueue to take housekeeping cpus into accounty Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <tal.shorer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

workqueue: respect isolated cpus when queueing an unbound work

c98a980

Initialize wq_unbound_cpumask to exclude cpus that were isolated by the cmdline's isolcpus parameter. Signed-off-by: Tal Shorer <tal.shorer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

ata: mediatek: Fix typo in module description

16a27df

Signed-off-by: Albert Pool <albertpool@solcon.nl> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

debug cgroup: use task_css_set instead of rcu_dereference

ddf7005

This macro `task_css_set` verifies that the caller is inside proper critical section if the kernel set CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y. Signed-off-by: Wang Long <wanglong19@meituan.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

pata_pdc2027x: Remove unnecessary error check

c1da86c

Here, The function pdc_hardware_init always return zero. So it is not necessary to check its return value. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

pata_pdc2027x : make pdc2027x_*_timing structures const

20f9cee

Make these pdc2027x_*_timing structures const as it is never modified. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Merge tag 'for-linus-4.15-2' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi

bfb529e

Pull IPMI fixes from Corey Minyard. * tag 'for-linus-4.15-2' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi: ipmi_si: fix crash on parisc ipmi_si: Fix oops with PCI devices ipmi: Stop timers before cleaning up the module

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frank-w commented Dec 12, 2017