chore(deps): update module github.com/opencontainers/runc to v1.2.8 [security] #1098
Conversation
|
Important Review skippedReview was skipped due to path filters ⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (5)
CodeRabbit blocks several paths by default. You can override this behavior by explicitly including those paths in the path filters. For example, including You can disable this status message by setting the ✨ Finishing touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #1098 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 82.00% 81.98% -0.03%
==========================================
Files 186 186
Lines 8942 8942
==========================================
- Hits 7333 7331 -2
- Misses 1187 1188 +1
- Partials 422 423 +1 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
|
NumaryBot
deleted the
renovate/go-github.com-opencontainers-runc-vulnerability
branch
This PR contains the following updates:
v1.2.3->v1.2.8GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-31133
Impact
The OCI runtime specification has a
maskedPathsfeature that allows for files or directories to be "masked" by placing a mount on top of them to conceal their contents. This is primarily intended to protect against privileged users in non-user-namespaced from being able to write to files or access directories that would either provide sensitive information about the host to containers or allow containers to perform destructive or other privileged operations on the host (examples include/proc/kcore,/proc/timer_list,/proc/acpi, and/proc/keys).maskedPathscan be used to either mask a directory or a file -- directories are masked using a new read-onlytmpfsinstance that is mounted on top of the masked path, while files are masked by bind-mounting the container's/dev/nullon top of the masked path.In all known versions of runc, when using the container's
/dev/nullto mask files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's/dev/null) was actually a real/dev/nullinode. While/dev/nullis usually created by runc when doing container creation, it is possible for an attacker to create a/dev/nullor modify the/dev/nullinode created by runc through race conditions with other containers sharing mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile withdocker buildx buildas that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured).This could lead to two separate issues:
Attack 1: Arbitrary Mount Gadget (leading to Host Information Disclosure, Host Denial of Service, or Container Escape)
By replacing
/dev/nullwith a symlink to an attacker-controlled path, an attacker could cause runc to bind-mount an arbitrary source path to a path inside the container. This could lead to:/proc/sysrq-trigger, the attacker can gain access to a read-write version of files which can be destructive to write to (/proc/sysrq-triggerwould allow an attacker to trigger a kernel panic, shutting down the machine, or causing the machine to freeze without rebooting)./proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern, the attacker can reconfigure a coredump helper -- as kernel upcalls are not namespaced, the configured binary (which could be a container binary or a host binary with a malicious command-line) will run with full privileges on the host system. Thus, the attacker can simply trigger a coredump and gain complete root privileges over the host.Note that while
config.jsonallows users to bind-mount arbitrary paths (and thus an attacker that can modifyconfig.jsonarbitrarily could gain the same access as this exploit), becausemaskedPathsis applied by almost all higher-level container runtimes (and thus provides a guaranteed mount source) this flaw effectively allows any attacker that can spawn containers (with some degree of control over what kinds of containers are being spawned) to achieve the above goals.Attack 2: Bypassing
maskedPathsWhile investigating Attack 1, runc discovered that the runc validation mechanism when bind-mounting
/dev/nullformaskedPathswould ignoreENOENTerrors -- meaning that if an attacker deleted/dev/nullbefore runc did the bind-mount, runc would silently skip applyingmaskedPathsfor the container. (The original purpose of thisENOENT-ignore behaviour was to permit configurations wheremaskedPathsreferences non-existent files, but runc did not consider that the source path could also not exist in this kind of race-attack scenario.)With
maskedPathsrendered inoperative, an attacker would be able to access sensitive host information from files in/procthat would usually be masked (such as/proc/kcore). However, note that/proc/sysand/proc/sysrq-triggerare mounted read-only rather than being masked with files, so this attack variant will not allow the same breakout or host denial of service attacks as in Attack 1.Patches
This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories:
The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory:
runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/v1.4.0-rc.2/RELEASES.md
Mitigations
Use containers with user namespaces (with the host root user not mapped into the container's user namespace). This will block most of the most serious aspects of these attacks, as the
procfsfiles used for the container breakout use Unix DAC permissions and user namespaced users will not have access to the relevant files.runc would also like to take this opportunity to re-iterate that runc strongly recommend all users use user namespaced containers. They have proven to be one of the best security hardening mechanisms against container breakouts, and the kernel applies additional restrictions to user namespaced containers above and beyond the user remapping functionality provided. With the advent of id-mapped mounts (Linux 5.12), there is very little reason to not use user namespaces for most applications. Note that using user namespaces to configure your container does not mean you have to enable unprivileged user namespace creation inside the container -- most container runtimes apply a seccomp-bpf profile which blocks
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)inside containers regardless of whether the container itself uses user namespaces.Rootless containers can provide even more protection if your configuration can use them -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc.
For non-user namespaced containers, configure all containers you spawn to not permit processes to run with root privileges. In most cases this would require configuring the container to use a non-root user and enabling
noNewPrivilegesto disable any setuid or set-capability binaries. (Note that this is runc's general recommendation for a secure container setup -- it is very difficult, if not impossible, to run an untrusted program with root privileges safely.) If you need to usepingin your containers, there is anet.ipv4.ping_group_rangesysctl that can be used to allow unprivileged users to ping without requiring setuid or set-capability binaries.Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources.
Depending on the configuration of
maskedPaths, an AppArmor profile (such as the default one applied by higher level runtimes including Docker and Podman) can block write attempts to most of/procand/sys. This means that even with a procfs file maliciously bind-mounted to amaskedPathstarget, all of the targets ofmaskedPathsin the default configuration of runtimes such as Docker or Podman will still not permit write access to said files. However, if a container is configured with amaskedPathsthat is not protected by AppArmor then the same attack can be carried out. Please note that CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM labels, and so this mitigation is not that helpful when considered in combination with CVE-2025-52881.Based on runc's analysis, SELinux policies have a limited effect when trying to protect against this attack. The reason is that the
/dev/nullbind-mount gets implicitly relabelled withcontext=...set to the container's SELinux context, and thus the container process will have access to the source of the bind-mount even if they otherwise wouldn't.GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Other Runtimes
As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability. Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a coordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to also be vulnerable in some aspects, but their security stance is (understandably) that non-user-namespaced containers are fundamentally insecure by design.
https://linuxcontainers.org/lxc/security/
Credits
Thanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) for finding and reporting the original vulnerability (Attack 1), and Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering another attack vector (Attack 2) based on @ssst0n3's initial findings.
CVE-2025-52565
Impact
This attack is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it attacks a similar vulnerability in a different target (namely, the bind-mount of
/dev/pts/$nto/dev/consoleas configured for all containers that allocate a console).In runc version 1.0.0-rc3 and later, due to insufficient checks when bind-mounting
/dev/pts/$nto/dev/consoleinside the container, an attacker can trick runc into bind-mounting paths which would normally be made read-only or be masked onto a path that the attacker can write to. This happens afterpivot_root(2), so this cannot be used to write to host files directly -- however, as with CVE-2025-31133, this can load to denial of service of the host or a container breakout by providing the attacker with a writable copy of/proc/sysrq-triggeror/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern(respectively).The reason that the attacker can gain write access to these files is because the
/dev/consolebind-mount happens beforemaskedPathsandreadonlyPathsare applied.Additional Findings
While investigating this issue, runc discovered some other theoretical issues that may or may not be exploitable, as well as taking the opportunity to fix some fairly well-known issues related to consoles.
Issue 1: Problematic Usage of
os.CreateGo provides an
os.Createfunction for creating files, which older code in runc (dating back to the originallibcontainerfrom the early 2010s) had a tendency to use fairly liberally.os.CreateimpliesO_CREAT|O_TRUNCbut by design it does not applyO_NOFOLLOWnorO_EXCL, meaning if the target is swapped with a malicious symlink runc can be tricked into truncating host files (which can lead to denial of service attacks, among other concerns).Runc conducted an audit of all
os.Createusages in runc and found some suspicious usages related to device inodes, but based on runc's testing these were not exploitable in practice. Runc now has custom code lints to block anyos.Createusage in runc, and plan to do a further audit of any other plainos.*operation usage throughout runc after this advisory becomes public.CVE-2024-45310 was a similar attack but without the
O_TRUNCcomponent (which resulted in a "Low" severity) -- a similar attack being exploitable would've been much more severe.Issue 2: Malicious
/dev/pts/$nInode Attacks (TIOCGPTPEER)The (very) classic API for constructing consoles involves first opening
/dev/ptmxfor reading and writing. This allocates a new pseudo-terminal and the returned file descriptor is the "master" end (which is used by higher-level runtimes to do I/O with the container).Traditionally, in order to get the "slave" end, you do
ioctl(ptm, TIOCGPTN)to get the pseudo-terminal number and then open the file in/dev/pts/with the corresponding base-10 decimal number of the number returned byTIOCGPTN. The naive way of doing this is vulnerable to very basic race attacks where/dev/pts/$nis replaced with a different pseudo-terminal or other malicious file.In order to provide a mechanism to mitigate this risk, Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) implemented
TIOCGPTPEERback in 2017 to provide a race-free way of doing the lastTIOCGPTNstep by opening the peer end of the pseudo-terminal directly. However, at the time it was believed to be too impractical to implement this protection in runc due to its no-monitor-process architecture (unlike runtimes like LXC which made use ofTIOCGPTPEERalmost immediately). While working on this advisory, runc found a way to makeTIOCGPTNusage on pre-4.13 kernels still safe against race attacks and so have implemented bothTIOCGPTPEERsupport as well as safeTIOCGPTNsupport as a fallback.Another possible target of attack would be replacing
/dev/ptmxor/dev/pts/ptmxwith a different inode and tricking runc into trying to operate on it. This is very similar to the core issue in CVE-2025-31133 and had a similar solution.Runc's analysis was that while this attack appears to be potentially problematic in theory, it seems unlikely to actually be exploitable due to how consoles are treated (runc tries to do several pseudo-terminal-specific
ioctls and will error out if they fail -- which happens for most other file types). In principle you could imagine a DoS attack using a disconnected NFS handle but it seems impractical to exploit. However, runc felt it prudent to include a solution (and this also provides a safe mechanism to get the source mount for the/dev/consolebind-mount issue at the beginning of this advisory).Patches
This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories:
The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory:
runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched.
Mitigations
procfsfiles used for the container breakout use Unix DAC permissions and user namespaced users will not have access to the relevant files.An attacker would still be able to bind-mount host paths into the container but if the host uids and gids mapped into the container do not overlap with ordinary users on the host (which is the generally recommended configuration) then the attacker would likely not be able to read or write to most sensitive host files (depending on the Unix DAC permissions of the host files). Note that this is still technically more privilege than an unprivileged user on the host -- because the bind-mount is done by a privileged process, the attacker would be able to get access to directories whose parents may have denied search access (i.e., they may be able to access paths inside a
chmod 700directory that would normally block them from resolving subpaths).Runc would also like to take this opportunity to re-iterate that runc strongly recommend all users use user namespaced containers. They have proven to be one of the best security hardening mechanisms against container breakouts, and the kernel applies additional restrictions to user namespaced containers above and beyond the user remapping functionality provided. With the advent of id-mapped mounts (Linux 5.12), there is very little reason to not use user namespaces for most applications. Note that using user namespaces to configure your container does not mean you have to enable unprivileged user namespace creation inside the container -- most container runtimes apply a seccomp-bpf profile which blocks
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)inside containers regardless of whether the container itself uses user namespaces.Rootless containers can provide even more protection if your configuration can use them -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc.
For non-user namespaced containers, configure all containers you spawn to not permit processes to run with root privileges. In most cases this would require configuring the container to use a non-root user and enabling
noNewPrivilegesto disable any setuid or set-capability binaries. (Note that this is runc's general recommendation for a secure container setup -- it is very difficult, if not impossible, to run an untrusted program with root privileges safely.) If you need to usepingin your containers, there is anet.ipv4.ping_group_rangesysctl that can be used to allow unprivileged users to ping without requiring setuid or set-capability binaries.Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources.
The default
containers-selinuxSELinux policy mitigates this issue, as (unlike CVE-2025-31133) the/dev/consolebind-mount does not get relabeled and so the container process cannot write to the bind-mounted procfs file by default.Please note that CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM labels, and so this mitigation is not that helpful when considered in combination with CVE-2025-52881.
The default AppArmor policy used by Docker and Podman does not mitigate this issue (as access to
/dev/console) is usually permitted. Users could create a custom profile that blocks access to/dev/console, but such a profile might break regular containers.Please note that CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM labels, and so the mitigation provided with a custom profile is not that helpful when considered in combination with CVE-2025-52881.
Other Runtimes
As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug,runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability.
Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to also be vulnerable in some aspects, but their security stance is (understandably) that non-user-namespaced containers are fundamentally insecure by design.
Credits
Thanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) and Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering and reporting the main
/dev/consolebind-mount vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for discovering Issues 1 and 2 and the original research into these classes of issues several years ago.CVE-2025-52881
Impact
This attack is primarily a more sophisticated version of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw which allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy
tmpfsfile and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation runc applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when runc writes LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files.Rather than using a fake
tmpfsfile for/proc/self/attr/<label>, an attacker could instead (through various means) make/proc/self/attr/<label>reference a realprocfsfile, but one that would still be a no-op (such as/proc/self/sched). This would have the same effect but would clear the "is a procfs file" check. Runc is aware that this kind of attack would be possible (even going so far as to discuss this publicly as "future work" at conferences), and runc is working on a far more comprehensive mitigation of this attack, but this security issue was disclosed before runc could complete this work.In all known versions of runc, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to
/procto other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile withdocker buildx buildas that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in atmpfsor theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts.Note that while
/proc/self/attr/<label>was the example used above (which is LSM-specific), this issue affect all writes to/procin runc and thus also affects sysctls (written to/proc/sys/...) and some other APIs.Additional Impacts
While investigating this issue, runc discovered that another risk with these redirected writes is that they could be redirected to dangerous files such as
/proc/sysrq-triggerrather than just no-op files like/proc/self/sched. For instance, the default AppArmor profile name in Docker isdocker-default, which when written to/proc/sysrq-triggerwould cause the host system to crash.When this was discovered, runc conducted an audit of other write operations within runc and found several possible areas where runc could be used as a semi-arbitrary write gadget when combined with the above race attacks. The most concerning attack scenario was the configuration of sysctls. Because the contents of the sysctl are free-form text, an attacker could use a misdirected write to write to
/proc/sys/kernel/core_patternand break out of the container (as described in CVE-2025-31133, kernel upcalls are not namespaced and so coredump helpers will run with complete root privileges on the host). Even if the attacker cannot configure custom sysctls, a valid sysctl string (when redirected to/proc/sysrq-trigger) can easily cause the machine to hang.Note that the fact that this attack allows you to disable LSM labels makes it a very useful attack to combine with CVE-2025-31133 (as one of the only mitigations available to most users for that issue is AppArmor, and this attack would let you bypass that). However, the misdirected write issue above means that you could also achieve most of the same goals without needing to chain together attacks.
Patches
This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories:
The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory:
Please note that this patch includes a private patch for
github.com/opencontainers/selinuxthat could not be made public through a public pull request (as it would necessarily disclose this embargoed security issue).The patch includes a complete copy of the forked code and a
replacedirective (as well asgo mod vendorapplied), which should still work with downstream build systems. If you cannot apply this patch, you can safely drop it -- some of the other patches in this series should block these kinds of racing mount attacks entirely.See https://github.com/opencontainers/selinux/pull/237 for the upstream patch.
runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched.
Mitigations
Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources.
For the basic no-op attack, this attack allows a container process to run with the same LSM labels as
runc. For most AppArmor deployments this means it will beunconfined, and for SELinux it will likely becontainer_runtime_t. Runc has not conducted in-depth testing of the impact on SELinux -- it is possible that it provides some reasonable protection but it seems likely that an attacker could cause harm to systems even with such an SELinux setup.For the more involved redirect and write gadget attacks, unfortunately most LSM profiles (including the standard container-selinux profiles) provide the container runtime access to sysctl files (including
/proc/sysrq-trigger) and so LSMs likely do not provide much protection against these attacks.Using rootless containers provides some protection against these kinds of bugs (privileged writes in runc being redirected) -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc. For this particular bug, the privilege escalation caused by the inadvertent write issue is entirely mitigated with rootless containers because the unprivileged user that the
runcprocess is executing as cannot write to the aforementioned procfs files (even intentionally).Other Runtimes
As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability.
Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to use the host's
/procfor all procfs operations, and so is likely not vulnerable to this issue (this is a trade-off -- runc uses the container's procfs to avoid CVE-2016-9962-style attacks).Credits
Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering this vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.
Additional thanks go to Tõnis Tiigi for finding some very useful exploit templates for these kinds of race attacks using
docker buildx build.Release Notes
opencontainers/runc (github.com/opencontainers/runc)
v1.2.8: runc v1.2.8 -- "鳥籠の中に囚われた屈辱を"Compare Source
This release contains fixes for three high-severity security
vulnerabilities in runc (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, and
CVE-2025-52881). All three vulnerabilities ultimately allow (through
different methods) for full container breakouts by bypassing runc's
restrictions for writing to arbitrary
/procfiles.Security
CVE-2025-31133 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented in
runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's
/dev/nullinode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace
/dev/nullwith a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the
symlink target read-write. This issue affected all known runc versions.
CVE-2025-52565 is very similar in concept and application to
CVE-2025-31133, except that it exploits a flaw in
/dev/consolebind-mounts. When creating the
/dev/consolebind-mount (to/dev/pts/$n),if an attacker replaces
/dev/pts/$nwith a symlink then runc willbind-mount the symlink target over
/dev/console. This issue affected allversions of runc >= 1.0.0-rc3.
CVE-2025-52881 is a more sophisticated variant of CVE-2019-19921,
which was a flaw that allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM
process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not
apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation we
applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused
runc to verify that when we write LSM labels that those labels are actual
procfs files. This issue affects all known runc versions.
Static Linking Notices
The
runcbinary distributed with this release are statically linked withthe following GNU LGPL-2.1 licensed libraries, with
runcactingas a "work that uses the Library":
The versions of these libraries were not modified from their upstream versions,
but in order to comply with the LGPL-2.1 (§6(a)), we have attached the
complete source code for those libraries which (when combined with the attached
runc source code) may be used to exercise your rights under the LGPL-2.1.
However we strongly suggest that you make use of your distribution's packages
or download them from the authoritative upstream sources, especially since
these libraries are related to the security of your containers.
Thanks to the following contributors for making this release possible:
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com
v1.2.7: runc v1.2.7 -- "さんをつけろよデコ助野郎！"Compare Source
This is the seventh release of the 1.2.z release branch of runc. It
contains some fixes for issues found in runc 1.3.z that were considered
"significant" bugfixes (as per our new release and support policy) and
thus be worth backporting.
Fixed
runc pauseorrunc unpauseas an unprivileged user without--systemd-cgroups. Now the warning is only emitted if an actual permissionerror was encountered. (#4709, #4720)
version 3.14 uses a time namespace for checkpoint/restore, however it was
not joining the time namespace in runc. (#4696, #4714)
default. Instead, the default CPU affinity of container processes will be
the largest set of CPUs permitted by the container's cpuset cgroup and any
other system restrictions (such as isolated CPUs). (#4041, #4815, #4858)
#4728, #4736, #4742)
linux.rootfsPropagationtosharedorunbindablenow functionsproperly. (#1755, #1815, #4724, #4791)
runc updatewill no longer clear intelRdt state information. (#4828,#4834)
Changed
flags. However, the error messages we returned did not provide as much
information to users about what clearing flags were conflicting with locked
mount flags. We now provide more diagnostic information if there is an error
when in the fallback path to handle locked mount flags. (#4734, #4740)
support it. (#4806, #4811)
/proc/net/devis no longer included in the permitted procfs overmountlist. Its inclusion was almost certainly an error, and because
/proc/netis a symlink to
/proc/self/net, overmounting this was almost certainlynever useful (and will be blocked by future kernel versions). (#4817, #4820)
supporting runc's ARM CI up until now. (#4844, #4856, #4867)
prepareCriuRestoreMountslogic for checkpoint-restore.(#4765, #4872)
Static Linking Notices
The
runcbinary distributed with this release are statically linked withthe following GNU LGPL-2.1 licensed libraries, with
runcactingas a "work that uses the Library":
The versions of these libraries were not modified from their upstream versions,
but in order to comply with the LGPL-2.1 (§6(a)), we have attached the
complete source code for those libraries which (when combined with the attached
runc source code) may be used to exercise your rights under the LGPL-2.1.
However we strongly suggest that you make use of your distribution's packages
or download them from the authoritative upstream sources, especially since
these libraries are related to the security of your containers.
Thanks to the following contributors for making this release possible:
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com
v1.2.6: runc v1.2.6 -- "Hasta la victoria, siempre."Compare Source
This is the sixth patch release in the 1.2.z series of runc.
It primarily fixes an issue with runc exec vs time namespace,
and a compatibility issue with older kernels.
Fixed
O_CLOEXECwithCloseExecFromfailed (#4647).runcnow properly handles joining time namespaces (such as withrunc exec). Previously we would attempt to set the time offsetswhen joining, which would fail. (#4635, #4649)
EINTRretries correctly for socket-related directgolang.org/x/sys/unixsystem calls. (#4650)F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITEwhen sealing the runc binary, as itturns out this had some unfortunate bugs in older kernel versions and was
never necessary in the first place. (#4651, #4640)
Removed
Fexecvehelper fromlibcontainer/system. Runc 1.2.1 removedrunc-dmz, but we forgot to remove this helper added only for that. (#4646)
Changed
from CI. We need to drop Ubuntu 20.04 from CI because Github Actions
announced it's already deprecated and it will be discontinued soon. (#4648)
Static Linking Notices
The
runcbinary distributed with this release are statically linked withthe following GNU LGPL-2.1 licensed libraries, with
runcactingas a "work that uses the Library":
The versions of these libraries were not modified from their upstream versions,
but in order to comply with the LGPL-2.1 (§6(a)), we have attached the
complete source code for those libraries which (when combined with the attached
runc source code) may be used to exercise your rights under the LGPL-2.1.
However we strongly suggest that you make use of your distribution's packages
or download them from the authoritative upstream sources, especially since
these libraries are related to the security of your containers.
Thanks to the following contributors who made this release possible:
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin kolyshkin@gmail.com
v1.2.5: runc v1.2.5 -- "Мороз и солнце; день чудесный!"Compare Source
This is the fifth patch release in the 1.2.z series of runc. It
primarily fixes an issue caused by an upstream systemd bug.
rule restrictions require a systemctl daemon-reload for our transient
units. This caused issues for workloads using NVIDIA GPUs. Workaround the
upstream regression by re-arranging how the unit properties are defined.
(#4568, #4612, #4615)
to allow projects that vendor runc to bump it as well. (#4608)
Static Linking Notices
The
runcbinary distributed with this release are statically linked withthe following GNU LGPL-2.1 licensed libraries, with
runcactingas a "work that uses the Library":
The versions of these libraries were not modified from their upstream versions,
but in order to comply with the LGPL-2.1 (§6(a)), we have attached the
complete source code for those libraries which (when combined with the attached
runc source code) may be used to exercise your rights under the LGPL-2.1.
However we strongly suggest that you make use of your distribution's packages
or download them from the authoritative upstream sources, especially since
these libraries are related to the security of your containers.
Thanks to the following contributors who made this release possible:
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com
v1.2.4: runc v1.2.4 -- "Христос се роди!"Compare Source
This is the fourth patch release of the 1.2.z release branch of runc. It
includes a fix for a regression introduced in 1.2.0 related to the
default device list.
Re-add tun/tap devices to built-in allowed devices lists.
In runc 1.2.0 we removed these devices from the default allow-list
(which were added seemingly by accident early in Docker's history) as
a precaution in order to try to reduce the attack surface of device
inodes available to most containers (#3468). At the time we thought
that the vast majority of users using tun/tap would already be
specifying what devices they need (such as by using
--devicewithDocker/Podman) as opposed to doing the
mknodmanually, and thusthere would've been no user-visible change.
Unfortunately, it seems that this regressed a noticeable number of
users (and not all higher-level tools provide easy ways to specify
devices to allow) and so this change needed to be reverted. Users
that do not need these devices are recommended to explicitly disable
them by adding deny rules in their container configuration. (#4555,
#4556)
Static Linking Notices
The
runcbinary distributed with this release are statically linked withthe following GNU LGPL-2.1 licensed libraries, with
runcactingas a "work that uses the Library":
The versions of these libraries were not modified from their upstream versions,
but in order to comply with the LGPL-2.1 (§6(a)), we have attached the
complete source code for those libraries which (when combined with the attached
runc source code) may be used to exercise your rights under the LGPL-2.1.
However we strongly suggest that you make use of your distribution's packages
or download them from the authoritative upstream sources, especially since
these libraries are related to the security of your containers.
Thanks to all of the contributors who made this release possible:
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.