Merge tag 'loongarch-kvm-6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…

…kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson into HEAD

LoongArch KVM changes for v6.10

1. Add ParaVirt IPI support.
2. Add software breakpoint support.
3. Add mmio trace events support.

.mailmap

@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> <ast@fb.com>
 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> <ast@plumgrid.com>
 Alexey Makhalov <alexey.amakhalov@broadcom.com> <amakhalov@vmware.com>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <aelder@sgi.com>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <alex.elder@linaro.org>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <alex.elder@linary.org>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@dreamhost.com>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@dreawmhost.com>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@ieee.org>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@inktank.com>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@linaro.org>
+Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> <elder@newdream.net>
 Alex Hung <alexhung@gmail.com> <alex.hung@canonical.com>
 Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> <alex.shi@intel.com>
 Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> <alex.shi@linaro.org>
@@ -98,6 +108,8 @@ Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org> <ben@bwidawsk.net>
 Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org> <ben.widawsky@intel.com>
 Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org> <benjamin.widawsky@intel.com>
 Benjamin Poirier <benjamin.poirier@gmail.com> <bpoirier@suse.de>
+Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> <benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com>
+Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
 Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org> <bjorn@kryo.se>
 Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org> <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
 Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org> <bjorn.andersson@sonymobile.com>
@@ -446,7 +458,8 @@ Mythri P K <mythripk@ti.com>
 Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> <namit@vmware.com>
 Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
 Nadia Yvette Chambers <nyc@holomorphy.com> William Lee Irwin III <wli@holomorphy.com>
-Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
+Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
+Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
 Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> <natechancellor@gmail.com>
 Neeraj Upadhyay <quic_neeraju@quicinc.com> <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
 Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
@@ -499,6 +512,7 @@ Praveen BP <praveenbp@ti.com>
 Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <quic_pradeepc@quicinc.com> <pradeepc@codeaurora.org>
 Prasad Sodagudi <quic_psodagud@quicinc.com> <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
 Punit Agrawal <punitagrawal@gmail.com> <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
+Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> <puranjay12@gmail.com>
 Qais Yousef <qyousef@layalina.io> <qais.yousef@imgtec.com>
 Qais Yousef <qyousef@layalina.io> <qais.yousef@arm.com>
 Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
@@ -524,6 +538,7 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <rdenis@simphalempin.com>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo@ribalda.com>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ribalda@kernel.org>
 Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org> <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com>
+Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@bootlin.com> <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
 Richard Leitner <richard.leitner@linux.dev> <dev@g0hl1n.net>
 Richard Leitner <richard.leitner@linux.dev> <me@g0hl1n.net>
 Richard Leitner <richard.leitner@linux.dev> <richard.leitner@skidata.com>

CREDITS

@@ -3146,6 +3146,10 @@ S: Triftstra=DFe 55
 S: 13353 Berlin
 S: Germany
 
+N: Gustavo Pimental
+E: gustavo.pimentel@synopsys.com
+D: PCI driver for Synopsys DesignWare
+
 N: Emanuel Pirker
 E: epirker@edu.uni-klu.ac.at
 D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
    On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
    injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
@@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3423,6 +3423,9 @@
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
+			Note, "mitigations" is supported if and only if the
+			kernel was built with CPU_MITIGATIONS=y.
+
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
@@ -3444,6 +3447,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6063,6 +6067,15 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
+	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
+			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+			clearing sequence.
+
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
 			The default operation protects the kernel from