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ci: declare contents:read on build workflow - #970
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Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
AArnott
enabled auto-merge
May 20, 2026 18:23
AArnott
approved these changes
May 20, 2026
This was referenced Sep 14, 2026
This was referenced Sep 28, 2026
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permissions: contents: readat the top of.github/workflows/build.yml. The matrix build job clones withfetch-depth: 0(for nbgv versioning), installs the .NET prerequisites, builds and tests, then runs the localpublish-artifactscomposite action - which is just a series ofactions/upload-artifactcalls. Artifact upload writes to the run's own artifact scope and does not needcontents: write. Codecov is uploaded via a separately storedCODECOV_TOKENand bypassesGITHUB_TOKEN.The reason for being explicit even when the inherited default may already be read-only is the runtime supply-chain threat surfaced by CVE-2025-30066 (the March 2025
tj-actions/changed-filescompromise): a tampered third-party action exfiltratedGITHUB_TOKENfrom workflow logs and the leaked token retained whatever scope was issued. Per-workflow caps bound that authority irrespective of repo or org default, give drift protection if the default ever widens, and register with OpenSSF Scorecard's Token-Permissions check.YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.