Remove intranet hostname check from ssl_policy now that CertVerifier …

…handles it

http://crrev.com/200704 implemented a better handle for intranet
hostnames, by only warning when it changes to a well-known/"public" CA.

Remove the existing logic, which only handled dotless domains, which
are presumably less common than their non-gTLD equivalents (eg:
example.corp > example)

BUG=119212

Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/20014003

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@213563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98

content/browser/ssl/ssl_policy.cc

@@ -24,17 +24,6 @@
 #include "webkit/common/resource_type.h"
 
 
-namespace {
-
-const char kDot = '.';
-
-bool IsIntranetHost(const std::string& host) {
-  const size_t dot = host.find(kDot);
-  return dot == std::string::npos || dot == host.length() - 1;
-}
-
-}  // namespace
-
 namespace content {
 
 SSLPolicy::SSLPolicy(SSLPolicyBackend* backend)
@@ -124,14 +113,6 @@ void SSLPolicy::UpdateEntry(NavigationEntryImpl* entry,
     return;
   }
 
-  if (!(entry->GetSSL().cert_status & net::CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID)) {
-    // CAs issue certificates for intranet hosts to everyone.  Therefore, we
-    // mark intranet hosts as being non-unique.
-    if (IsIntranetHost(entry->GetURL().host())) {
-      entry->GetSSL().cert_status |= net::CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
-    }
-  }
-
   if (net::IsCertStatusError(entry->GetSSL().cert_status)) {
     // Minor errors don't lower the security style to
     // SECURITY_STYLE_AUTHENTICATION_BROKEN.