-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 4
feat: simplified masternode list messages #50
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Conversation
WalkthroughThis pull request introduces new dependencies and expands several modules to enhance the blockchain system’s error handling, encoding, and messaging capabilities. It adds a new dev-dependency and incorporates random challenge generation for masternode authentication. Updates include new types and error variants for consensus encoding, additional hash types, and modularization of masternode list diff functionality. Network message variants and structures, along with associated encoding/decoding, are implemented across multiple modules to support the new masternode operations. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant Handshake
participant Rand as rand::random
participant VersionMsg as VersionMessage
Client->>Handshake: Call build_version_message()
Handshake->>Rand: Generate random challenge
Rand-->>Handshake: Return mn_auth_challenge
Handshake->>VersionMsg: Construct message with challenge
VersionMsg-->>Client: VersionMessage created
sequenceDiagram
participant NodeA
participant Network
participant SML
NodeA->>Network: Send GetMnListDiff message
Network->>SML: Process GetMnListDiff request
SML-->>Network: Return MnListDiff response
Network-->>NodeA: Deliver MnListDiff message
Suggested reviewers
Poem
Thank you for using CodeRabbit. We offer it for free to the OSS community and would appreciate your support in helping us grow. If you find it useful, would you consider giving us a shout-out on your favorite social media? 🪧 TipsChatThere are 3 ways to chat with CodeRabbit:
Note: Be mindful of the bot's finite context window. It's strongly recommended to break down tasks such as reading entire modules into smaller chunks. For a focused discussion, use review comments to chat about specific files and their changes, instead of using the PR comments. CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)
Other keywords and placeholders
CodeRabbit Configuration File (
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Nitpick comments (4)
dash/src/sml/address.rs (1)
9-18: Consider providing IPv6 support or a more robust fallback for non-IPv4 addresses.
Currently, calling.ip()returning anIpAddr::V6(_)will triggerunimplemented!("ipv6 not supported"). Although this may be acceptable for your immediate use case, IPv6 is increasingly common.dash/src/network/message_sml.rs (2)
74-79: Replace the TODO with a typed enum.
llmq_typeshould ideally be a strongly typed enum or well-documented constant set to avoid magic constants, improving readability and preventing invalid values.
83-105: Expand tests for comprehensive coverage.
The deserialization test checks a single.hexfile example. Add tests to verify edge cases (e.g., empty or all-zerobase_block_hash) and error handling for malformed data.dash/src/sml/entry.rs (1)
67-69: Address the TODO for multiple public keys.
Two distinct fields might cause confusion if they differ in usage or format. Consider clarifying or merging if only one is necessary, or rename them to better reflect each key’s role.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (13)
dash/Cargo.toml(1 hunks)dash/examples/handshake.rs(3 hunks)dash/src/consensus/encode.rs(6 hunks)dash/src/consensus/serde.rs(2 hunks)dash/src/hash_types.rs(3 hunks)dash/src/lib.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/network/message.rs(7 hunks)dash/src/network/message_network.rs(5 hunks)dash/src/network/message_sml.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/network/mod.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/address.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/entry.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/mod.rs(1 hunks)
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (1)
- dash/src/sml/mod.rs
👮 Files not reviewed due to content moderation or server errors (4)
- dash/src/hash_types.rs
- dash/src/consensus/serde.rs
- dash/src/network/message.rs
- dash/src/consensus/encode.rs
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 GitHub Actions: Continuous integration
dash/src/lib.rs
[warning] 48-48: unexpected cfg condition name: bench
[warning] 53-53: unexpected cfg condition name: fuzzing
[warning] 65-65: unexpected cfg condition name: bench
[warning] 79-79: unexpected cfg condition value: bls-signatures
[warning] 213-213: unexpected cfg condition name: bench
dash/src/network/message.rs
[error] 811-811: deserialize partial message: Io(Error { kind: UnexpectedEof, message: "failed to fill whole buffer" })
[error] 768-768: deserialize version message: Io(Error { kind: UnexpectedEof, message: "failed to fill whole buffer" })
dash/src/network/message_network.rs
[error] 190-190: deserialize message: Io(Error { kind: UnexpectedEof, message: "failed to fill whole buffer" })
🔇 Additional comments (13)
dash/src/sml/address.rs (1)
24-25: Double-check port byte swapping logic for compatibility.
The legacy code swaps port bytes before encoding. Ensure that all other code handling this data similarly swaps port bytes so you avoid potential mismatches when connecting to external peers.dash/src/network/message_sml.rs (2)
9-21: Well-structured request fields.
TheGetMnListDiffstruct fields are consistent with the documentedgetmnlistdusage. The logic and naming convention look solid for the base and requested block hashes.
25-57: Ensure forward/backward compatibility for the version field.
Versioning can be tricky if older nodes expect different field placements. Double-check that external nodes correctly handle the new layout, especially if you plan multi-version network interactions.dash/src/sml/entry.rs (2)
13-20: Confirm performance implications for high-performance masternodes.
TheHighPerformancevariant captures different ports and keys. Ensure logic elsewhere properly distinguishesRegularvs.HighPerformancefor operational tasks.
110-114: Validate fallback toMasternodeType::Regularfor older versions.
Whenversion < 2, the entry automatically defaults toMasternodeType::Regular. Verify that this assumption aligns with your historical data, so you aren't misclassifying updated masternodes.dash/src/network/mod.rs (1)
48-49: LGTM!The new
message_smlmodule is correctly added with the appropriate feature gate, following the existing pattern of module declarations.dash/examples/handshake.rs (3)
7-7: LGTM!The import of
secp256k1::randis appropriate for cryptographic randomness generation.
111-113: LGTM!The masternode authentication challenge is correctly passed to the version message constructor.
100-102:✅ Verification successful
Verify the cryptographic randomness quality.
The
rand::random()function from secp256k1 is being used to generate the masternode authentication challenge. While this is generally secure, let's verify the randomness source.
🌐 Web query:
Is secp256k1::rand cryptographically secure for generating random challenges?💡 Result:
The cryptographic security of generating random challenges using
secp256k1::randdepends on how it is configured and implemented within the library:Key Points
Cryptographically Secure PRNG Usage
- The library’s
SecretKey::new()method uses rejection sampling with Rust’srand::Rngunder the hood[2][7]. This ensures valid secret keys within the secp256k1 curve order[2].- For context randomization (e.g., sidechannel resistance),
Secp256k1::randomize()requires 32 bytes of cryptographically secure entropy[4].Security Caveats
- Entropy Source: Security relies on using an OS-backed RNG (e.g.,
OsRng) or a trusted CSPRNG for seeding[3][6]. Weak entropy sources compromise security.- Implementation Risks: While rejection sampling mitigates invalid keys, improper use of non-CSPRNGs (e.g., simulation-focused PRNGs) can introduce vulnerabilities[3][6].
Example Secure Usage
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use secp256k1::rand::rngs::OsRng; let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let mut rng = OsRng; // Cryptographically secure OS-backed RNG let secret_key = SecretKey::new(&mut rng); // Secure key generationConclusion
When configured with features like
std,rand, and using an OS-backed entropy source (e.g.,OsRng), the library’s randomness generation meets cryptographic security standards. However, developers must explicitly avoid non-CSPRNG implementations for sensitive operations[3][7].Citations:
- 1: https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-secp256k1/blob/master/src/lib.rs
- 2: ZenGo-X/curv#62
- 3: https://rust-random.github.io/book/guide-rngs.html
- 4: https://docs.rs/secp256k1/latest/secp256k1/struct.Secp256k1.html
- 5: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5423882.0
- 6: https://bitcoindevkit.org/docs-rs/bdk/nightly/latest/bdk_chain/bitcoin/secp256k1/rand/rngs/index.html
- 7: https://docs.rs/secp256k1/latest/secp256k1/struct.SecretKey.html
- 8: https://docs.rs/secp256k1/
- 9: https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/learn-cryptography
- 10: https://rust.velas.com/solana_evm_loader_program/scope/evm/secp256k1/rand/rngs/index.html
Verified cryptographic randomness is secure under typical configurations.
- The use of
rand::random()implicitly calls Rust’s thread-local RNG, which is backed by a cryptographically secure, OS-based source when the library is built with default features.- The secp256k1 library also relies on secure operations (e.g., rejection sampling) provided an OS-backed RNG (such as
OsRng) is used.- For utmost clarity on the cryptographic security, consider explicitly using an OS-backed RNG (e.g., replacing with
OsRng) if the configuration might deviate from the secure defaults.dash/src/lib.rs (1)
125-125: LGTM!The new
smlmodule is correctly added to the library's public interface.dash/src/network/message_network.rs (2)
61-66: Documentation is clear and comprehensive.The documentation for the new fields clearly explains their purpose and usage.
97-110:✅ Verification successful
Verify consensus encoding order.
The order of fields in the consensus encoding implementation matches the order in the struct definition.
Let's verify that this encoding order matches the protocol specification:
🌐 Web query:
What is the correct order of fields in the Dash version message protocol?💡 Result:
The correct order of fields in Dash's
versionmessage protocol follows a standardized structure inherited from Bitcoin but with potential Dash-specific extensions. Based on network protocol documentation[5][8][10], here is the field sequence:
Protocol Version (4 bytes):
Specifies the P2P protocol version (e.g., 70235 in Dash Core 22.0)[10].Services (8 bytes):
Bitmask indicating supported network services (e.g.,NODE_NETWORK).Timestamp (8 bytes):
UNIX epoch time when the message was created.Receiver Address (26 bytes):
Network address of the receiving node (IP + port).Sender Address (26 bytes):
Network address of the sending node (IP + port).Nonce (8 bytes):
Random value to detect self-connections.User Agent (varies):
Client software identifier (e.g.,/DashCore:22.0/).Start Height (4 bytes):
Block height of the sending node’s blockchain tip.Relay Flag (1 byte):
Indicates whether transactions should be relayed (0or1).
Notes:
- This structure aligns with Bitcoin’s
versionmessage format[5][8][10], which Dash extends for features like masternodes or InstantSend.- For exact byte-level details or Dash-specific extensions beyond Bitcoin’s base fields (e.g., LLMQ parameters), refer to Dash Core’s
protocol.hsource code or developer documentation[10].Citations:
- 1: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620736.pdf
- 2: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~kubitron/courses/cs258-S02/handouts/papers/p148-lenoski.pdf
- 3: https://help.dash.app/en/articles/8969762-how-to-change-the-order-of-fields-in-dash
- 4: https://dash.plotly.com/advanced-callbacks
- 5: https://docs.dash.org/projects/core/en/19.0.0/docs/reference/p2p-network-message-headers.html
- 6: https://dashif.org/docs/EventTimedMetadataProcessing-v1.0.2.pdf
- 7: https://dashif.org/Ingest/
- 8: https://docs.dash.org/ar/latest/docs/core/reference/p2p-network-message-headers.html
- 9: https://docs.dash.org/projects/core/en/21.0.0/docs/reference/p2p-network-data-messages.html
- 10: https://docs.dash.org/projects/core/en/stable/docs/reference/p2p-network-protocol-versions.html
Consensus encoding order verified: The field sequence in the
VersionMessageimplementation matches the protocol specification. The first nine fields (i.e., version, services, timestamp, receiver, sender, nonce, user_agent, start_height, relay) align with Bitcoin’s standard format, and the additional fields (mn_auth_challenge,masternode_connection) are correctly appended as Dash-specific extensions. No adjustments are necessary.dash/Cargo.toml (1)
77-77:✅ Verification successful
Verify the version and status of assert_matches crate.
The addition of
assert_matchesfor testing is appropriate. Let's verify its version and status.
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check crate information for assert_matches # Get latest version and other metadata cargo search assert_matches --limit 1 # Check download stats and maintenance status curl -s 'https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/assert_matches' | jq '{ latest_version: .crate.max_version, downloads: .crate.downloads, recent_downloads: .crate.recent_downloads, created_at: .crate.created_at, updated_at: .crate.updated_at }'Length of output: 574
Dependency Version Confirmed for
assert_matchesAfter verifying the crate metadata from crates.io, the latest version of
assert_matchesis indeed "1.5.0". This version aligns with our expectations for a dev-dependency used in testing, and no security or maintenance issues have been flagged.
| impl Decodable for SocketAddr { | ||
| fn consensus_decode<R: io::Read + ?Sized>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, encode::Error> { | ||
| // Decode the 16-byte IP address. | ||
| let ip_address: [u8; 16] = Decodable::consensus_decode(reader)?; | ||
| // Decode the port (which was stored in swapped order). | ||
| let port: u16 = Decodable::consensus_decode(reader)?; | ||
| // Swap the port bytes back to native order. | ||
| let port = port.swap_bytes(); | ||
| // Extract the IPv4 octets from the last 4 bytes. | ||
| let ipv4_octets: [u8; 4] = ip_address[12..16] | ||
| .try_into() | ||
| .map_err(|_| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "Invalid IPv4 address"))?; | ||
|
|
||
| let ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(ipv4_octets)); | ||
|
|
||
| Ok(SocketAddr::new(ip, port)) | ||
| } | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Validate IPv4 assumption when decoding.
The code assumes the first 12 bytes of the 16-byte array are zero for IPv4 addresses. If future inputs don't follow that pattern, decoding might produce unexpected results. Consider explicit validation or erroring out if the leading bytes aren't all zeros.
| let message: VersionMessage = deserialize(&from_sat).expect("deserialize message"); | ||
|
|
||
| assert_eq!(message.version, 70002); | ||
| assert_eq!(message.services, ServiceFlags::NETWORK); | ||
| assert_eq!(message.timestamp, 1401217254); | ||
| // address decodes should be covered by Address tests | ||
| assert_eq!(real_decode.nonce, 16735069437859780935); | ||
| assert_eq!(real_decode.user_agent, "/Satoshi:0.9.99/".to_string()); | ||
| assert_eq!(real_decode.start_height, 302892); | ||
| assert!(real_decode.relay); | ||
| assert_eq!(message.nonce, 16735069437859780935); | ||
| assert_eq!(message.user_agent, "/Satoshi:0.9.99/".to_string()); | ||
| assert_eq!(message.start_height, 302892); | ||
| assert!(message.relay); | ||
|
|
||
| assert_eq!(serialize(&real_decode), from_sat); | ||
| assert_eq!(serialize(&message), from_sat); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Fix the version message test failure.
The test is failing with a deserialization error: "failed to fill whole buffer". This is likely because the test data from_sat doesn't include the new fields mn_auth_challenge and masternode_connection.
Update the test data to include the new fields:
let from_sat = hex!(
- "721101000100000000000000e6e0845300000000010000000000000000000000000000000000ffff0000000000000100000000000000fd87d87eeb4364f22cf54dca59412db7208d47d920cffce83ee8102f5361746f7368693a302e392e39392f2c9f040001"
+ "721101000100000000000000e6e0845300000000010000000000000000000000000000000000ffff0000000000000100000000000000fd87d87eeb4364f22cf54dca59412db7208d47d920cffce83ee8102f5361746f7368693a302e392e39392f2c9f040001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
);📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| let message: VersionMessage = deserialize(&from_sat).expect("deserialize message"); | |
| assert_eq!(message.version, 70002); | |
| assert_eq!(message.services, ServiceFlags::NETWORK); | |
| assert_eq!(message.timestamp, 1401217254); | |
| // address decodes should be covered by Address tests | |
| assert_eq!(real_decode.nonce, 16735069437859780935); | |
| assert_eq!(real_decode.user_agent, "/Satoshi:0.9.99/".to_string()); | |
| assert_eq!(real_decode.start_height, 302892); | |
| assert!(real_decode.relay); | |
| assert_eq!(message.nonce, 16735069437859780935); | |
| assert_eq!(message.user_agent, "/Satoshi:0.9.99/".to_string()); | |
| assert_eq!(message.start_height, 302892); | |
| assert!(message.relay); | |
| assert_eq!(serialize(&real_decode), from_sat); | |
| assert_eq!(serialize(&message), from_sat); | |
| let from_sat = hex!( | |
| - "721101000100000000000000e6e0845300000000010000000000000000000000000000000000ffff0000000000000100000000000000fd87d87eeb4364f22cf54dca59412db7208d47d920cffce83ee8102f5361746f7368693a302e392e39392f2c9f040001" | |
| + "721101000100000000000000e6e0845300000000010000000000000000000000000000000000ffff0000000000000100000000000000fd87d87eeb4364f22cf54dca59412db7208d47d920cffce83ee8102f5361746f7368693a302e392e39392f2c9f040001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" | |
| ); |
🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Actions: Continuous integration
[error] 190-190: deserialize message: Io(Error { kind: UnexpectedEof, message: "failed to fill whole buffer" })
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (4)
dash/src/sml/entry.rs (3)
41-59: Fix type mismatch in variant decoding.The variant is decoded as
u16but compared againstu8literals (0 and 1). While this works, it's inconsistent with the encoding which usesu8for variant tags.-let variant: u16 = Decodable::consensus_decode(reader)?; +let variant: u8 = Decodable::consensus_decode(reader)?;
70-80: Add documentation for the MasternodeListEntry struct.This is a core data structure representing a masternode entry. Consider adding documentation to explain:
- The purpose and usage of each field
- The version compatibility requirements
- The relationship between version and mn_type
124-136: Consider using type aliases for map types.The struct uses several
BTreeMaptypes with similar purposes. Consider introducing type aliases to improve readability and maintainability:+type OperatorKeyHistory = BTreeMap<u64, OperatorPublicKey>; +type EntryHashHistory = BTreeMap<u64, [u8; 32]>; +type ValidityHistory = BTreeMap<u64, bool>; #[cfg(feature = "bls")] #[derive(Clone, Eq, PartialEq)] pub struct MasternodeListEntryInfo { pub base_entry: MasternodeListEntry, pub loaded_operator_public_key: Option<PublicKey<Bls12381G2Impl>>, pub confirmed_hash_hashed_with_provider_registration_transaction_hash: ConfirmedHash, - pub previous_operator_public_keys: BTreeMap<u64, OperatorPublicKey>, - pub previous_entry_hashes: BTreeMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, - pub previous_validity: BTreeMap<u64, bool>, + pub previous_operator_public_keys: OperatorKeyHistory, + pub previous_entry_hashes: EntryHashHistory, + pub previous_validity: ValidityHistory, pub known_confirmed_at_height: Option<u32>, pub update_height: u32, pub entry_hash: Sha256dHash, }dash/src/network/message.rs (1)
240-243: Enhance documentation for new message types.While the documentation comments are present, they could be more descriptive to explain:
- The purpose of each message type
- When these messages are used in the protocol
- The relationship between
getmnlistdandmnlistdiffConsider expanding the documentation like this:
- /// `getmnlistd` + /// `getmnlistd` - Request a masternode list difference. + /// This message is used to request either a full masternode list or an update + /// to a previously requested list. GetMnListD(message_sml::GetMnListDiff), - /// `mnlistdiff` + /// `mnlistdiff` - Response to a getmnlistd message. + /// Contains the requested masternode list difference including additions, + /// modifications, and deletions since the base list. MnListDiff(message_sml::MnListDiff),
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (12)
dash/examples/handshake.rs(3 hunks)dash/src/consensus/encode.rs(5 hunks)dash/src/consensus/serde.rs(3 hunks)dash/src/crypto/sighash.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/lib.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/network/message.rs(7 hunks)dash/src/network/message_network.rs(4 hunks)dash/src/network/message_sml.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/psbt/map/global.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/address.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/entry.rs(1 hunks)dash/src/sml/mod.rs(1 hunks)
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (1)
- dash/src/crypto/sighash.rs
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (5)
- dash/src/sml/mod.rs
- dash/src/lib.rs
- dash/src/sml/address.rs
- dash/examples/handshake.rs
- dash/src/network/message_sml.rs
🔇 Additional comments (15)
dash/src/sml/entry.rs (3)
15-19: Well-designed enum for masternode types!The enum provides a clean representation of masternode types with proper fields for the HighPerformance variant.
21-39: Clean and efficient consensus encoding implementation!The encoding logic properly handles both variants with clear variant tags and efficient field serialization.
61-68: Address the TODO comment about public key usage.The comment indicates potential technical debt regarding the use of two different public keys. This should be clarified and addressed.
Could you provide more context about why two different public keys are being used? This might help in determining the best approach to resolve this TODO.
dash/src/psbt/map/global.rs (1)
201-203: Improved error handling readability!The changes enhance code clarity by using consistent block structure for error handling in both proprietary and unknown entries.
Also applies to: 209-211
dash/src/consensus/serde.rs (1)
414-417: Well-structured error handling for invalid enum values!The implementation provides clear error messages with context about the maximum allowed value and the actual received value.
dash/src/consensus/encode.rs (1)
688-693: Good extension of consensus encoding support!The implementation properly adds consensus encoding support for new masternode-related types.
dash/src/network/message_network.rs (4)
61-66: LGTM! Well-documented fields for masternode authentication.The new fields are well-documented and their types are appropriate for their intended use:
mn_auth_challenge: 32-byte array for random challengemasternode_connection: boolean for quorum probe indication
79-93: LGTM! Constructor properly handles new fields.The constructor is correctly updated to:
- Accept the
mn_auth_challengeparameter- Initialize
masternode_connectionto false by default
97-113: LGTM! Proper encoding of all fields.The custom
Encodableimplementation correctly serializes all fields in the appropriate order with proper error handling.
229-249: LGTM! Comprehensive test coverage for new fields.The test has been properly updated to:
- Include new fields in the test data
- Verify the
mn_auth_challengevalue- Assert the default
masternode_connectionstatedash/src/network/message.rs (5)
33-33: LGTM!The import follows the established pattern for message-related modules.
297-298: LGTM!The command string mappings are consistent with the established pattern and correctly map to their respective message types.
382-383: LGTM!The serialization implementation follows the established pattern and correctly handles the new message types.
509-514: LGTM!The deserialization implementation follows the established pattern and correctly handles the new message types.
526-839:❓ Verification inconclusive
Verify test coverage for new message types.
While the existing test module is comprehensive, it would be beneficial to add specific test cases for the new masternode list difference messages to ensure proper serialization and deserialization.
Consider adding test cases similar to the existing ones in the
full_round_ser_der_raw_network_message_testfunction. Here's a script to check current test coverage:
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check test coverage for new message types # Test: Search for test cases involving the new message types rg -A 5 'GetMnListD|MnListDiff' 'tests/'Length of output: 87
Verify test coverage for new masternode list difference messages.
While the existing test module is comprehensive for many network messages, there doesn't appear to be any automated test cases covering the new masternode list difference messages. The initial script targeting a
tests/directory did not return any results—likely because such tests have not yet been implemented or are placed differently within the repository. Please manually verify that serialization and deserialization for these new messages are correctly handled (e.g., by adding tests similar to those infull_round_ser_der_raw_network_message_test) and ensure that all edge cases are covered.
| let mut mn_auth_challenge = [0u8; 32]; | ||
| if let Ok(_) = reader.read_exact(&mut mn_auth_challenge) { | ||
| // Successfully read challenge | ||
| } else { | ||
| mn_auth_challenge = [0; 32]; // Default value | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Improve error handling in mn_auth_challenge deserialization.
The current implementation silently ignores read errors and defaults to zero bytes. Consider propagating the error or logging it for better debugging:
- if let Ok(_) = reader.read_exact(&mut mn_auth_challenge) {
- // Successfully read challenge
- } else {
+ match reader.read_exact(&mut mn_auth_challenge) {
+ Ok(_) => {
+ // Successfully read challenge
+ }
+ Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => {
+ // Handle EOF specifically for backward compatibility
+ mn_auth_challenge = [0; 32];
+ }
+ Err(e) => {
+ // Log or handle other errors appropriately
+ return Err(encode::Error::Io(e));
+ }
+ }
- mn_auth_challenge = [0; 32]; // Default value
- }📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| let mut mn_auth_challenge = [0u8; 32]; | |
| if let Ok(_) = reader.read_exact(&mut mn_auth_challenge) { | |
| // Successfully read challenge | |
| } else { | |
| mn_auth_challenge = [0; 32]; // Default value | |
| } | |
| let mut mn_auth_challenge = [0u8; 32]; | |
| match reader.read_exact(&mut mn_auth_challenge) { | |
| Ok(_) => { | |
| // Successfully read challenge | |
| } | |
| Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => { | |
| // Handle EOF specifically for backward compatibility | |
| mn_auth_challenge = [0; 32]; | |
| } | |
| Err(e) => { | |
| // Log or handle other errors appropriately | |
| return Err(encode::Error::Io(e)); | |
| } | |
| } |
Add
getmnlistdandmnlistdiffp2p messagsSummary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Refactor