Fix Security Issues


 Action Items

### Immediate (P0)
- [ ] Add request size limits and timeouts
- [ ] Implement input validation for JSON parsing
- [ ] Fix HTTP parsing vulnerabilities
- [ ] Remove hardcoded credentials
- [ ] Add basic authentication mechanism

### High Priority (P1)
- [ ] Fix path traversal vulnerability
- [ ] Add security headers
- [ ] Implement rate limiting
- [ ] Add connection limits
- [ ] Fix CORS configuration


---

## 1. HTTP Server Security Analysis

### 1.1 CRITICAL: Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:390-428` (handle_client function)

**Issue:** The HTTP request parsing uses a fixed-size buffer with dynamic resizing, but several vulnerabilities exist:

```cpp
std::vector<char> buffer(65536);
int total_read = 0;
int valread;

while ((valread = read(client_socket, buffer.data() + total_read, buffer.size() - total_read - 1)) > 0) {
    total_read += valread;
    buffer[total_read] = '\0';
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Unbounded read loop:** An attacker can send unlimited data causing memory exhaustion
2. **Integer overflow:** `total_read` can overflow if attacker sends > INT_MAX bytes
3. **No timeout on read:** Slowloris-style attacks can exhaust server resources
4. **Buffer growth without limits:** `buffer.resize(buffer.size() * 2)` can grow indefinitely

**Impact:** 
- Denial of Service (DoS) through memory exhaustion
- Potential crashes from integer overflow
- Resource exhaustion from hanging connections

**Recommendation:**
1. Implement maximum request size limit (e.g., 10MB)
2. Add read timeout using `setsockopt(SO_RCVTIMEO)`
3. Add bounds checking on total_read before operations
4. Implement connection limits per client IP

**Example Fix:**
```cpp
const size_t MAX_REQUEST_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
const int READ_TIMEOUT_SEC = 30;

// Set socket timeout
struct timeval tv;
tv.tv_sec = READ_TIMEOUT_SEC;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
setsockopt(client_socket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv));

// Check size limits
if (total_read >= MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) {
    std::cerr << "Request too large" << std::endl;
    send_error_response(client_socket, 413, "Request Entity Too Large");
    close(client_socket);
    return;
}
```

---

### 1.2 CRITICAL: HTTP Request Parsing Vulnerabilities

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:57-87` (parse_http_request function)

**Issue:** Multiple vulnerabilities in HTTP header parsing:

```cpp
// Parse body based on Content-Length
if (req.headers.find("Content-Length") != req.headers.end()) {
    int content_length = std::stoi(req.headers["Content-Length"]);
    req.body.resize(content_length);
    stream.read(&req.body[0], content_length);
}
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **No validation of Content-Length value:** Accepts negative or extremely large values
2. **No exception handling:** `std::stoi` throws on invalid input, causing crash
3. **Direct trust of header:** No sanity checking before memory allocation
4. **Missing bounds checking:** Can allocate arbitrary amounts of memory

**Impact:**
- Application crash from invalid Content-Length headers
- Memory exhaustion from malicious Content-Length values
- DoS attacks

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
try {
    if (req.headers.find("Content-Length") != req.headers.end()) {
        long content_length = std::stol(req.headers["Content-Length"]);
        
        // Validate Content-Length
        if (content_length < 0 || content_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) {
            std::cerr << "Invalid Content-Length: " << content_length << std::endl;
            return req; // Return empty request
        }
        
        req.body.resize(static_cast<size_t>(content_length));
        stream.read(&req.body[0], content_length);
    }
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
    std::cerr << "Error parsing Content-Length: " << e.what() << std::endl;
    // Return request with empty body
}
```

---

### 1.3 HIGH: Path Traversal Vulnerability

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:126-165` (serve_static_file function)

**Issue:** Weak path traversal protection:

```cpp
// Security check - prevent directory traversal
if (file_path.find("..") != std::string::npos) {
    return build_http_response(403, "text/plain", "Forbidden");
}
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Bypassable with URL encoding:** `%2e%2e` bypasses the check
2. **Bypassable with alternate encodings:** `..%2f`, `%2e%2e/`, etc.
3. **No canonical path validation:** Doesn't resolve symlinks or normalize paths
4. **Missing null byte checks:** Can be exploited on some filesystems

**Impact:**
- Read arbitrary files on the server
- Information disclosure
- Potential access to sensitive configuration files

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
#include <filesystem>

std::string serve_static_file(const std::string& path) {
    namespace fs = std::filesystem;
    
    try {
        std::string file_path = path;
        if (file_path == "/") {
            file_path = "/index.html";
        }
        
        // Remove leading slash
        if (!file_path.empty() && file_path[0] == '/') {
            file_path = file_path.substr(1);
        }
        
        // Construct full path
        fs::path requested_path = fs::path("public") / file_path;
        fs::path base_path = fs::canonical("public");
        
        // Resolve to canonical path and validate it's within public/
        fs::path canonical_path = fs::canonical(requested_path);
        
        // Check if canonical path starts with base_path
        auto [base_end, path_end] = std::mismatch(
            base_path.begin(), base_path.end(),
            canonical_path.begin(), canonical_path.end()
        );
        
        if (base_end != base_path.end()) {
            return build_http_response(403, "text/plain", "Forbidden");
        }
        
        // ... rest of file serving logic
    } catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
        return build_http_response(404, "text/plain", "Not Found");
    }
}
```

---

### 1.4 HIGH: Missing HTTP Security Headers

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:36-47` (build_http_response function)

**Issue:** Critical security headers are missing:

```cpp
std::string build_http_response(int status_code, const std::string& content_type, const std::string& body) {
    std::ostringstream response;
    response << "HTTP/1.1 " << status_code << " OK\r\n";
    response << "Content-Type: " << content_type << "\r\n";
    response << "Content-Length: " << body.length() << "\r\n";
    response << "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\n";
    // Missing critical security headers
```

**Missing Headers:**
1. **X-Frame-Options:** Allows clickjacking attacks
2. **X-Content-Type-Options:** Allows MIME sniffing attacks
3. **Content-Security-Policy:** No CSP protection
4. **X-XSS-Protection:** No XSS protection header
5. **Strict-Transport-Security:** No HSTS (if served over HTTPS via nginx)

**Impact:**
- Clickjacking attacks
- Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities
- MIME sniffing attacks
- Mixed content issues

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
std::string build_http_response(int status_code, const std::string& content_type, const std::string& body) {
    std::ostringstream response;
    response << "HTTP/1.1 " << status_code << " OK\r\n";
    response << "Content-Type: " << content_type << "\r\n";
    response << "Content-Length: " << body.length() << "\r\n";
    
    // Security headers
    response << "X-Frame-Options: DENY\r\n";
    response << "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\r\n";
    response << "X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\r\n";
    response << "Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\r\n";
    response << "Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin\r\n";
    
    // CORS (keep restrictive or configure based on needs)
    response << "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\n";
    response << "Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS\r\n";
    response << "Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type\r\n";
    response << "\r\n";
    response << body;
    return response.str();
}
```

---

### 1.5 CRITICAL: Race Condition in Conversation History

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:96-101, 195-210, 293-308` (Conversation history management)

**Issue:** Potential race conditions in conversation history cleanup:

```cpp
std::map<std::string, ConversationHistory> conversations;
std::mutex conversations_mutex;

// Later in code:
{
    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(conversations_mutex);
    auto& conv = conversations[conversation_id];
    history = conv.messages;
    
    // Clean up old conversations (older than 1 hour)
    auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
    for (auto it = conversations.begin(); it != conversations.end(); ) {
        if (std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::hours>(now - it->second.last_activity).count() > 1) {
            it = conversations.erase(it);
        } else {
            ++it;
        }
    }
}
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Iterator invalidation during concurrent access:** If multiple threads iterate and erase
2. **Use-after-free risk:** History copied while cleanup may erase the same conversation
3. **Memory leak:** Unlimited conversations can accumulate before cleanup
4. **No maximum conversation limit:** Attackers can exhaust memory by creating many conversations

**Impact:**
- Application crash from iterator invalidation
- Memory exhaustion from conversation flooding
- Undefined behavior

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
// Add maximum conversation limit
const size_t MAX_CONVERSATIONS = 1000;

// Separate cleanup function
void cleanup_old_conversations() {
    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(conversations_mutex);
    auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
    
    for (auto it = conversations.begin(); it != conversations.end(); ) {
        if (std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::hours>(now - it->second.last_activity).count() > 1) {
            it = conversations.erase(it);
        } else {
            ++it;
        }
    }
    
    // Enforce maximum limit by removing oldest if needed
    while (conversations.size() > MAX_CONVERSATIONS) {
        auto oldest = std::min_element(conversations.begin(), conversations.end(),
            [](const auto& a, const auto& b) {
                return a.second.last_activity < b.second.last_activity;
            });
        conversations.erase(oldest);
    }
}

// Call cleanup in a separate thread or less frequently
```

---

## 2. Authentication and Authorization

### 2.1 CRITICAL: No Authentication Mechanism

**Location:** All endpoints in `src/server.cpp`

**Issue:** The server has no authentication or authorization:
- `/query` endpoint is completely open
- `/status` endpoint is open
- Static file serving is open
- No API keys, tokens, or user authentication

**Impact:**
- Unrestricted access to LLM queries
- Resource exhaustion from abuse
- Potential for malicious queries
- No rate limiting or abuse prevention

**Recommendation:**
1. Implement API key authentication for `/query` endpoint
2. Add rate limiting per IP address
3. Consider implementing basic HTTP authentication for production
4. Add request throttling

**Example Implementation:**
```cpp
// Add to config.h
const std::string API_KEY_HEADER = "X-API-Key";
const size_t MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = 60;

// Add rate limiting map
std::map<std::string, std::pair<std::chrono::system_clock::time_point, int>> rate_limits;
std::mutex rate_limit_mutex;

bool check_rate_limit(const std::string& client_ip) {
    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(rate_limit_mutex);
    auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
    auto& [last_reset, count] = rate_limits[client_ip];
    
    // Reset counter every minute
    if (std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::minutes>(now - last_reset).count() >= 1) {
        last_reset = now;
        count = 0;
    }
    
    if (count >= MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE) {
        return false;
    }
    
    count++;
    return true;
}

// In handle_client, add authentication check:
if (request.method == "POST" && request.path == "/query") {
    // Check API key if configured
    const char* required_key = getenv("API_KEY");
    if (required_key && required_key[0] != '\0') {
        auto key_header = request.headers.find(API_KEY_HEADER);
        if (key_header == request.headers.end() || key_header->second != required_key) {
            response = build_http_response(401, "application/json", 
                "{\"error\":\"Unauthorized\"}");
            send(client_socket, response.c_str(), response.length(), 0);
            close(client_socket);
            return;
        }
    }
    
    // Check rate limit
    if (!check_rate_limit(client_ip)) {
        response = build_http_response(429, "application/json",
            "{\"error\":\"Too Many Requests\"}");
        send(client_socket, response.c_str(), response.length(), 0);
        close(client_socket);
        return;
    }
    
    response = handle_query(request.body);
}
```

---

### 2.2 HIGH: CORS Configuration Too Permissive

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:41`

**Issue:** 
```cpp
response << "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\n";
```

**Impact:**
- Any website can make requests to the server
- Potential for cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
- Data exfiltration from malicious sites

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
// Configure allowed origins from environment
std::string get_allowed_origin() {
    const char* origin = getenv("ALLOWED_ORIGIN");
    return origin ? origin : "http://localhost:8080";
}

// In build_http_response:
response << "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: " << get_allowed_origin() << "\r\n";
response << "Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\r\n";
```

---

## 3. Data Handling and Input Validation

### 3.1 HIGH: JSON Parsing Without Validation

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:168-189` (handle_query function)

**Issue:** Direct parsing of user JSON input without validation:

```cpp
auto request_json = json::parse(body);
std::string query = request_json["query"];
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **No exception handling for malformed JSON**
2. **No validation of query field existence**
3. **No validation of query length or content**
4. **Potential for JSON injection**

**Impact:**
- Application crash from malformed JSON
- DoS from extremely large queries
- Injection attacks

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
const size_t MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 10000;

std::string handle_query(const std::string& body) {
    try {
        // Validate body size
        if (body.length() > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH * 2) {
            json error;
            error["error"] = "Request body too large";
            return build_http_response(413, "application/json", error.dump());
        }
        
        auto request_json = json::parse(body);
        
        // Validate required fields
        if (!request_json.contains("query") || !request_json["query"].is_string()) {
            json error;
            error["error"] = "Missing or invalid 'query' field";
            return build_http_response(400, "application/json", error.dump());
        }
        
        std::string query = request_json["query"];
        
        // Validate query length
        if (query.empty() || query.length() > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH) {
            json error;
            error["error"] = "Query too long or empty";
            return build_http_response(400, "application/json", error.dump());
        }
        
        // Sanitize query (remove control characters)
        query.erase(std::remove_if(query.begin(), query.end(),
            [](char c) { return c < 32 && c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != '\t'; }),
            query.end());
        
        // ... rest of processing
        
    } catch (const json::parse_error& e) {
        json error;
        error["error"] = "Invalid JSON format";
        return build_http_response(400, "application/json", error.dump());
    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        // ... existing error handling
    }
}
```

---

### 3.2 MEDIUM: Unsafe String Operations

**Location:** `src/text_utils.h:26-118` (extract_text_with_tika function)

**Issue:** Potential issues with file handling:

```cpp
std::stringstream buffer;
buffer << file.rdbuf();
std::string file_content = buffer.str();
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **No memory limits on file reading**
2. **Entire file loaded into memory**
3. **Can cause OOM with malicious files**

**Impact:**
- Memory exhaustion
- DoS attacks

**Recommendation:**
- Implement streaming for large files
- Add memory monitoring
- Implement file size limits (already present but can be improved)

---

### 3.3 MEDIUM: Command Injection via File Paths

**Location:** `src/text_utils.h:27-59, src/server.cpp:146-157`

**Issue:** File paths from user input used without sanitization

**Recommendation:**
- Validate all file paths against allowed characters
- Use allowlist of allowed file extensions
- Implement strict path validation

---

## 4. Memory Management

### 4.1 HIGH: Resource Leaks in Error Paths

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:528-535` (handle_client thread creation)

**Issue:**
```cpp
try {
    std::thread client_thread(handle_client, client_socket);
    client_thread.detach();
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
    std::cerr << "Error creating client thread: " << e.what() << std::endl;
    close(client_socket);
}
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Socket not closed on thread creation failure**
2. **Unlimited thread creation can exhaust resources**
3. **No thread pool or connection limits**

**Impact:**
- Resource exhaustion
- DoS attacks
- File descriptor leaks

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
const size_t MAX_CONCURRENT_CONNECTIONS = 100;
std::atomic<size_t> active_connections{0};

// In main loop:
if (active_connections >= MAX_CONCURRENT_CONNECTIONS) {
    std::cerr << "Too many concurrent connections" << std::endl;
    close(client_socket);
    continue;
}

active_connections++;

try {
    std::thread client_thread([client_socket]() {
        try {
            handle_client(client_socket);
        } catch (...) {
            close(client_socket);
        }
        active_connections--;
    });
    client_thread.detach();
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
    std::cerr << "Error creating client thread: " << e.what() << std::endl;
    close(client_socket);
    active_connections--;
}
```

---

### 4.2 MEDIUM: Memory Safety in LLM Context

**Location:** `src/llm.h:49-214` (LLMGenerator class)

**Issue:** Context recreation on every request can fail

```cpp
llama_free(ctx);
ctx = llama_init_from_model(model, ctx_params);
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **No rollback if context creation fails**
2. **Old context freed before new one created**
3. **Can leave generator in broken state**

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
// Create new context first, then swap
llama_context* new_ctx = llama_init_from_model(model, ctx_params);
if (!new_ctx) {
    std::cerr << "Failed to create new context, keeping old one" << std::endl;
    // Keep old context and return error
    return "Error: Failed to create LLM context";
}

// Swap contexts
llama_context* old_ctx = ctx;
ctx = new_ctx;
llama_free(old_ctx);
```

---

## 5. Configuration and Secrets Management

### 5.1 CRITICAL: Hardcoded Credentials

**Location:** `src/config.h:60-68` (PostgreSQL configuration)

**Issue:**
```cpp
inline std::string get_pg_password() {
    const char* p = getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD");
    return p ? p : "jic_password";
}
```

**Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Default password hardcoded in source**
2. **Credentials in plaintext**
3. **No secrets rotation capability**

**Impact:**
- Unauthorized database access if defaults used
- Credentials in version control
- Compliance violations

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
inline std::string get_pg_password() {
    const char* p = getenv("POSTGRES_PASSWORD");
    if (!p || p[0] == '\0') {
        std::cerr << "ERROR: POSTGRES_PASSWORD environment variable must be set" << std::endl;
        std::cerr << "No default password available for security reasons" << std::endl;
        exit(1);
    }
    return p;
}
```

---

### 5.2 HIGH: Insecure Model Path Handling

**Location:** `src/config.h:14-41`

**Issue:** Model paths constructed from environment variables without validation

**Recommendation:**
- Validate model paths exist before use
- Restrict to specific directories
- Use absolute paths only

---

### 5.3 MEDIUM: Missing TLS/HTTPS Support

**Issue:** The C++ server doesn't support HTTPS natively, relies on nginx proxy

**Recommendation:**
- Document that TLS must be handled by nginx
- Add headers to indicate when behind reverse proxy
- Consider adding native TLS support using OpenSSL

---

## 6. Error Handling and Logging

### 6.1 MEDIUM: Information Disclosure in Error Messages

**Location:** Multiple locations with `std::cerr` logging

**Issue:** Detailed error messages logged to stderr can expose system information

**Recommendation:**
- Implement proper logging levels
- Don't expose internal paths or system info in production
- Use structured logging

---

### 6.2 LOW: No Request Logging for Security Auditing

**Issue:** No logging of requests for security monitoring

**Recommendation:**
```cpp
void log_request(const std::string& client_ip, const HttpRequest& req) {
    auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
    auto time = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now);
    
    std::cout << "[" << std::put_time(std::localtime(&time), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") << "] "
              << client_ip << " " 
              << req.method << " " 
              << req.path << std::endl;
}
```

---

## 7. Denial of Service Vulnerabilities

### 7.1 HIGH: No Connection Limits

**Issue:** Server accepts unlimited connections

**Impact:** DoS through connection exhaustion

**Recommendation:** Implement connection pooling and limits (see 4.1)

---

### 7.2 HIGH: No Query Complexity Limits

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:168-371` (handle_query)

**Issue:** 
- No limits on context size for LLM
- Can exhaust GPU/CPU resources
- No timeout on LLM generation

**Recommendation:**
- Implement query timeout
- Limit LLM generation time
- Add resource monitoring

---

### 7.3 MEDIUM: Vector Index Load Without Validation

**Location:** `src/server.cpp:104-123` (load_index function)

**Issue:** Index loaded without size or integrity validation

**Recommendation:**
- Validate index file size
- Check file integrity
- Implement corruption detection

---

## 8. Third-Party Dependencies

### 8.1 MEDIUM: Tika Service Communication

**Location:** `src/text_utils.h:27-118`

**Issue:** Communication with Tika service over HTTP without authentication

**Recommendation:**
- Use HTTPS for Tika communication
- Implement authentication between services
- Validate Tika responses

---

### 8.2 LOW: Dependency Version Management

**Issue:** No explicit version pinning for llama.cpp in Dockerfile

**Recommendation:**
- Pin specific commits or tags
- Implement dependency scanning
- Regular security updates

---

## 9. Summary of Findings

### Critical Issues (Immediate Action Required):
1. ✅ Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in HTTP parsing
2. ✅ HTTP request parsing without validation  
3. ✅ No authentication mechanism
4. ✅ Race condition in conversation history
5. ✅ Hardcoded database credentials
6. ✅ Missing input validation on JSON parsing
7. ✅ Path traversal vulnerability

### High Priority Issues:
1. ✅ Path traversal protection weaknesses
2. ✅ Missing HTTP security headers
3. ✅ CORS configuration too permissive
4. ✅ Resource leaks in error paths
5. ✅ No connection limits or rate limiting

### Medium Priority Issues:
1. ✅ Unsafe string operations
2. ✅ Memory safety in LLM context
3. ✅ Missing TLS/HTTPS support
4. ✅ Information disclosure in errors

---

## 10. Remediation Roadmap

### Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Week 1)
1. Implement request size limits
2. Add input validation for all user inputs
3. Fix HTTP parsing vulnerabilities
4. Add basic authentication
5. Remove hardcoded credentials

### Phase 2: High Priority (Week 2-3)
1. Implement proper path validation
2. Add security headers
3. Fix CORS configuration
4. Add rate limiting
5. Implement connection limits

### Phase 3: Hardening (Week 4+)
1. Add comprehensive logging
2. Implement resource monitoring
3. Add health checks
4. Security testing and penetration testing
5. Documentation updates

---

## 11. Secure Coding Practices Recommendations

### 11.1 Input Validation
- **Always validate and sanitize all inputs**
- Use allowlists rather than denylists
- Validate data types, lengths, and formats
- Implement proper error handling

### 11.2 Memory Safety
- Use RAII and smart pointers where possible
- Avoid raw pointers and manual memory management
- Implement bounds checking
- Use safe string operations

### 11.3 Error Handling
- Never trust user input
- Fail securely (deny by default)
- Don't expose internal details in errors
- Log security-relevant events

### 11.4 Authentication & Authorization
- Implement strong authentication
- Use API keys or tokens
- Rate limit all endpoints
- Implement proper session management

### 11.5 Network Security
- Use TLS for all communications
- Implement proper timeout handling
- Use secure defaults
- Validate all network inputs

---

## 12. nginx Configuration Recommendations

Since the application will be deployed behind nginx, add the following nginx configuration:

```nginx
# Rate limiting
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=jic:10m rate=10r/s;
limit_req zone=jic burst=20 nodelay;

# Connection limits
limit_conn_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=addr:10m;
limit_conn addr 10;

server {
    listen 443 ssl http2;
    server_name your-domain.com;
    
    # TLS configuration
    ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
    ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
    ssl_ciphers HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5;
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
    
    # Security headers
    add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
    add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
    add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
    add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'" always;
    
    # Request size limits
    client_max_body_size 10M;
    client_body_timeout 30s;
    client_header_timeout 30s;
    
    # Proxy settings
    location / {
        proxy_pass http://localhost:8080;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
        
        # Timeouts
        proxy_connect_timeout 30s;
        proxy_send_timeout 30s;
        proxy_read_timeout 90s;
    }
    
    # Block common attack patterns
    location ~ /\.(?!well-known) {
        deny all;
    }
}
```



Fix Security Issues #3

Description

Immediate (P0)

High Priority (P1)

1. HTTP Server Security Analysis

1.1 CRITICAL: Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities

1.2 CRITICAL: HTTP Request Parsing Vulnerabilities

1.3 HIGH: Path Traversal Vulnerability

1.4 HIGH: Missing HTTP Security Headers

1.5 CRITICAL: Race Condition in Conversation History

2. Authentication and Authorization

2.1 CRITICAL: No Authentication Mechanism

2.2 HIGH: CORS Configuration Too Permissive

3. Data Handling and Input Validation

3.1 HIGH: JSON Parsing Without Validation

3.2 MEDIUM: Unsafe String Operations

3.3 MEDIUM: Command Injection via File Paths

4. Memory Management

4.1 HIGH: Resource Leaks in Error Paths

4.2 MEDIUM: Memory Safety in LLM Context

5. Configuration and Secrets Management

5.1 CRITICAL: Hardcoded Credentials

5.2 HIGH: Insecure Model Path Handling

5.3 MEDIUM: Missing TLS/HTTPS Support

6. Error Handling and Logging

6.1 MEDIUM: Information Disclosure in Error Messages

6.2 LOW: No Request Logging for Security Auditing

7. Denial of Service Vulnerabilities

7.1 HIGH: No Connection Limits

7.2 HIGH: No Query Complexity Limits

7.3 MEDIUM: Vector Index Load Without Validation

8. Third-Party Dependencies

8.1 MEDIUM: Tika Service Communication

8.2 LOW: Dependency Version Management

9. Summary of Findings

Critical Issues (Immediate Action Required):

High Priority Issues:

Medium Priority Issues:

10. Remediation Roadmap

Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Week 1)

Phase 2: High Priority (Week 2-3)

Phase 3: Hardening (Week 4+)

11. Secure Coding Practices Recommendations

11.1 Input Validation

11.2 Memory Safety

11.3 Error Handling

11.4 Authentication & Authorization

11.5 Network Security

12. nginx Configuration Recommendations

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