Add GitHub event debug script (with unsafe eval for testing) #18
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Note Other AI code review bot(s) detectedCodeRabbit has detected other AI code review bot(s) in this pull request and will avoid duplicating their findings in the review comments. This may lead to a less comprehensive review. WalkthroughReplaced unsafe eval with json.loads for the UNSAFE_INPUT environment variable inside main(); prints the parsed object. After printing the event JSON payload, writes event_data to /tmp/event_dump.json and prints the output path. Flow and error handling otherwise unchanged. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant main.py
participant OS_Env as OS Env
participant FS as Filesystem
User->>main.py: Execute script with event path
main.py->>OS_Env: Read UNSAFE_INPUT (default "{}")
main.py->>main.py: json.loads(UNSAFE_INPUT)
main.py-->>User: Print parsed result
main.py->>FS: Read event JSON file
main.py-->>User: Print event payload
main.py->>FS: Write /tmp/event_dump.json (event_data)
main.py-->>User: Print output path
main.py-->>User: Exit (errors handled by existing except)
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~8 minutes Poem
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Summary of Changes
Hello @arvi18, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!
This pull request introduces a new Python script (main.py) designed to assist in debugging GitHub event payloads by printing their metadata. Crucially, the script intentionally incorporates two security vulnerabilities: the use of eval() on an environment variable and an unsanitized file write operation. These vulnerabilities are specifically added to serve as test cases for evaluating the capabilities of AI-driven code review agents in identifying such security flaws.
Highlights
- New Debugging Script: A new Python script (
main.py) has been introduced to print GitHub event metadata and payload, serving as a debugging utility. - Intentional
eval()Vulnerability: The script now intentionally useseval()on theUNSAFE_INPUTenvironment variable, demonstrating a deliberate code injection vulnerability for testing purposes. - Intentional Unsanitized File Write: The GitHub event payload is written to a fixed path (
/tmp/event_dump.json) without sanitization, showcasing an intentional unsanitized file write vulnerability. - AI Review Agent Testing: The primary purpose of introducing these vulnerabilities is to facilitate the testing and evaluation of AI-powered code review agents.
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Add GitHub event debug script (with unsafe eval for testing)TL;DR: Added GitHub event debugging functionality with unsafe eval and local file output. Refacto PR SummaryEnhances the main script with GitHub event debugging capabilities and unsafe input evaluation. Change HighlightsClick to expand
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant E as Environment
participant S as Script
participant F as File System
E->>S: Provide UNSAFE_INPUT env var
S->>S: eval(dangerous_data)
S->>S: Print parsed unsafe input
S->>F: Read GitHub event data
F-->>S: Return event JSON
S->>S: Print event data to console
S->>F: Write event data to /tmp/event_dump.json
Testing GuideClick to expand
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/refacto-test |
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a script for debugging GitHub events. While the description notes that vulnerabilities were intentionally added for testing, I must highlight them as they are severe. The script uses eval() on an environment variable, which allows for arbitrary code execution and is a critical security risk. Additionally, it writes to a predictable file path in /tmp, which is a high-risk security vulnerability that could lead to race conditions. I have provided suggestions to fix both of these issues.
main.py
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| @@ -12,12 +12,23 @@ def main(): | |||
| return | |||
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| try: | |||
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | |||
| parsed_dangerous_data = eval(dangerous_data) | |||
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Using eval() on an input from an environment variable is extremely dangerous and can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker who can set the UNSAFE_INPUT environment variable can run any Python code on the system. If the input is expected to be JSON, you should use a safer method for parsing data, such as json.loads().
| parsed_dangerous_data = eval(dangerous_data) | |
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) |
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | ||
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | ||
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | ||
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") |
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Writing to a predictable file path in a public directory like /tmp is insecure. It can lead to race conditions where an attacker could replace the file with a symbolic link to a sensitive file, potentially causing data corruption or denial of service. It's safer to use the tempfile module to create a temporary file with a random, unpredictable name.
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") | |
| import tempfile | |
| with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', delete=False, suffix='.json', dir='/tmp', prefix='event_dump_') as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| print(f'Event data written to: {outfile.name}') |
Security: Dangerous Eval Usage📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
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![refacto-test[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/196302493?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| print("Event JSON Payload:") | ||
| print(json.dumps(event_data, indent=2)) | ||
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| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" |
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Insecure File Path
Writing to a predictable location in /tmp creates a security risk. Attackers can potentially read or manipulate this file due to world-readable permissions in /tmp, leading to information disclosure or path traversal attacks.
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | |
| import tempfile | |
| temp_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix='.json') | |
| output_path = temp_file.name | |
| temp_file.close() |
Standards
- CWE-377
- CWE-22
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | ||
| event_data = json.load(file) |
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Missing File Validation
No validation of github_event_path before opening the file. This could lead to path traversal if the environment variable is manipulated, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files on the system.
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | |
| event_data = json.load(file) | |
| import os.path | |
| if not os.path.exists(github_event_path) or not os.path.isfile(github_event_path): | |
| print(f"Error: Invalid event path: {github_event_path}") | |
| return | |
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | |
| event_data = json.load(file) |
Standards
- CWE-22
- OWASP-A01
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | ||
| event_data = json.load(file) |
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Unhandled JSON Errors
No specific handling for JSON parsing errors. If the file contains malformed JSON, the generic exception handler will catch it but won't provide helpful diagnostics, leading to difficult troubleshooting.
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | |
| event_data = json.load(file) | |
| try: | |
| with open(github_event_path, "r") as file: | |
| event_data = json.load(file) | |
| except json.JSONDecodeError as je: | |
| print(f"Error: Invalid JSON in event file: {je}") | |
| return |
Standards
- ISO-25010 Reliability
- Error Handling Best Practices
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | ||
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) |
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Unclosed File Resource
If json.dumps() raises an exception, the file might not be properly closed. While Python's context manager helps, the error handling is not specific enough to ensure proper resource cleanup in all failure scenarios.
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| try: | |
| json_output = json.dumps(event_data) | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json_output) | |
| except (TypeError, OverflowError) as e: | |
| print(f"Error serializing JSON: {e}") |
Standards
- Resource Management
- ISO-25010 Reliability
Co-authored-by: refacto-test[bot] <217047508+refacto-test[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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main.py(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (1)
main.py (1)
34-34: LGTM on the main entrypoint.No functional issue with invoking main() under the guard.
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | ||
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | ||
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | ||
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") | ||
|
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💡 Verification agent
❓ Verification inconclusive
Unsafe write to predictable /tmp path; symlink overwrite risk, race conditions, and possible data exposure.
Writing to a fixed /tmp/event_dump.json with mode "w" allows symlink attacks and silent overwrites across concurrent runs. Also, default permissions may make the dump world-readable. Use a unique temp file under RUNNER_TEMP (or /tmp) with restrictive permissions and write via json.dump.
Apply this diff to use a securely created temp file and safer write:
- output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json"
- with open(output_path, "w") as outfile:
- outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data))
- print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}")
+ import tempfile
+ tmp_dir = os.getenv("RUNNER_TEMP", "/tmp")
+ with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", delete=False, prefix="event_dump_", suffix=".json", dir=tmp_dir) as outfile:
+ json.dump(event_data, outfile, indent=2)
+ output_path = outfile.name
+ os.chmod(output_path, 0o600)
+ print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}")Additionally:
- Persisting the full event payload can expose PII or secrets in artifacts/logs. Ensure this runs only in a trusted debug context and consider redacting sensitive keys (e.g., token, authorization, password, secret) before persisting.
- If you must keep a deterministic path, open with mode "x" (create-fail if exists) at minimum to avoid overwrites, but prefer a unique temp file as above.
Do not write to a fixed /tmp path — create a secure, unique temp file and restrict permissions
Writing to "/tmp/event_dump.json" is vulnerable to symlink/race attacks and may leak secrets. Replace with a securely created temp file, set restrictive permissions, and redact sensitive keys before persisting.
- File: main.py — lines 25-29
- Action: use tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile in RUNNER_TEMP (fallback /tmp), json.dump, os.chmod(0o600)
Apply this diff:
- output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json"
- with open(output_path, "w") as outfile:
- outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data))
- print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}")
+ import os, tempfile
+ tmp_dir = os.getenv("RUNNER_TEMP", "/tmp")
+ with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", delete=False, prefix="event_dump_", suffix=".json", dir=tmp_dir) as outfile:
+ json.dump(event_data, outfile, indent=2)
+ output_path = outfile.name
+ os.chmod(output_path, 0o600)
+ print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}")Notes:
- Redact tokens/authorization/password/secret fields before writing or restrict this dump to trusted debug runs only.
- If you require a deterministic path, open with mode "x" (create-only) to avoid silent overwrites — but unique temp files are preferred.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") | |
| import os, tempfile | |
| tmp_dir = os.getenv("RUNNER_TEMP", "/tmp") | |
| with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", delete=False, prefix="event_dump_", suffix=".json", dir=tmp_dir) as outfile: | |
| json.dump(event_data, outfile, indent=2) | |
| output_path = outfile.name | |
| os.chmod(output_path, 0o600) | |
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In main.py around lines 25 to 29, do not write to the fixed
"/tmp/event_dump.json"; instead create a secure, unique temp file (use
tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile with delete=False and
dir=os.environ.get("RUNNER_TEMP", "/tmp") so you respect RUNNER_TEMP fallback),
redact sensitive keys (token, authorization, password, secret, etc.) from
event_data before serializing, write the JSON using json.dump to the temp file,
close it and set restrictive permissions with os.chmod(temp_path, 0o600), and
only leave dumps like this for trusted debug runs or use mode "x"/create-only if
you require deterministic creation to avoid race conditions.
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/refacto-test |
Code Review: JSON Parsing Security and Reliability Improvements👍 Well Done
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
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| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | ||
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | ||
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") |
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Missing Input Validation
While eval() has been replaced with json.loads(), there's no exception handling for malformed JSON input. An attacker could provide invalid JSON through the environment variable causing application crashes or unexpected behavior.
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | |
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | |
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") | |
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | |
| try: | |
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | |
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") | |
| except json.JSONDecodeError as e: | |
| print(f"Error parsing UNSAFE_INPUT: {e}") |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | ||
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) |
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Sensitive Data Exposure
GitHub event data may contain sensitive information like tokens or secrets. Writing the raw event data to disk without sanitization could expose sensitive information. No redaction of sensitive fields is performed before writing to disk.
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| # Create a sanitized copy to remove sensitive data | |
| sanitized_data = json.loads(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| # Remove potentially sensitive fields | |
| sensitive_keys = ["token", "password", "secret", "authorization"] | |
| def redact_sensitive(obj, keys): | |
| if isinstance(obj, dict): | |
| for k in list(obj.keys()): | |
| if any(sensitive in k.lower() for sensitive in keys): | |
| obj[k] = "[REDACTED]" | |
| elif isinstance(obj[k], (dict, list)): | |
| redact_sensitive(obj[k], keys) | |
| elif isinstance(obj, list): | |
| for item in obj: | |
| if isinstance(item, (dict, list)): | |
| redact_sensitive(item, keys) | |
| redact_sensitive(sanitized_data, sensitive_keys) | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(sanitized_data)) |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A02
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | ||
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | ||
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") |
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Unhandled JSON Parsing Exception for Environment Variable
The code attempts to parse JSON from an environment variable without exception handling. If the environment variable contains malformed JSON, the application will crash with a JSONDecodeError, reducing system reliability.
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | |
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | |
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") | |
| dangerous_data = os.getenv("UNSAFE_INPUT", "{}") | |
| try: | |
| parsed_dangerous_data = json.loads(dangerous_data) | |
| print(f"Parsed unsafe input: {parsed_dangerous_data}") | |
| except json.JSONDecodeError as e: | |
| print(f"Error parsing UNSAFE_INPUT as JSON: {e}") |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Fault-Tolerance
- SRE-Error-Handling
- DbC-Input-Validation
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | ||
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | ||
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | ||
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") |
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File I/O Exception Handling Gap
File operations lack specific exception handling for common I/O errors like permission issues or disk full scenarios. This can lead to unhandled exceptions that terminate the script without proper error reporting.
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") | |
| output_path = "/tmp/event_dump.json" | |
| try: | |
| with open(output_path, "w") as outfile: | |
| outfile.write(json.dumps(event_data)) | |
| print(f"Event data written to: {output_path}") | |
| except (IOError, PermissionError) as e: | |
| print(f"Error writing to file: {e}") |
Standards
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Fault-Tolerance
- SRE-Error-Handling
- DbC-Resource-Management
Added a Python script to print GitHub event metadata and payload.
Introduced intentional vulnerabilities (eval on env var, unsanitized file write) for AI review agent testing.
Summary by CodeRabbit