Ciqcbr7 9 pr #2

bmastbergen · 2025-04-24T17:20:19Z

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jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> commit b18cba0 Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] ctrliq#8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] ctrliq#9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> (cherry picked from commit b18cba0) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> commit ad25f5c There's a locking issue with the per-netns list of calls in rxrpc. The pieces of code that add and remove a call from the list use write_lock() and the calls procfile uses read_lock() to access it. However, the timer callback function may trigger a removal by trying to queue a call for processing and finding that it's already queued - at which point it has a spare refcount that it has to do something with. Unfortunately, if it puts the call and this reduces the refcount to 0, the call will be removed from the list. Unfortunately, since the _bh variants of the locking functions aren't used, this can deadlock. ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 5.18.0-rc3-build4+ ctrliq#10 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. ksoftirqd/2/25 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: ffff888107ac4038 (&rxnet->call_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: rxrpc_put_call+0x103/0x14b {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: ... Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&rxnet->call_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&rxnet->call_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by ksoftirqd/2/25: #0: ffff8881008ffdb0 ((&call->timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x5/0x23d Changes ======= ver #2) - Changed to using list_next_rcu() rather than rcu_dereference() directly. Fixes: 17926a7 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit ad25f5c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> commit 75bfdbf Implement an in-kernel rxperf server to allow kernel-based rxrpc services to be tested directly, unlike with AFS where they're accessed by the fileserver when the latter decides it wants to. This is implemented as a module that, if loaded, opens UDP port 7009 (afs3-rmtsys) and listens on it for incoming calls. Calls can be generated using the rxperf command shipped with OpenAFS, for example. Changes ======= ver #2) - Use min_t() instead of min(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 75bfdbf) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> commit 5e6ef4f Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2/5e6ef4f1.failed Move the functions from the call->processor and local->processor work items into the domain of the I/O thread. The call event processor, now called from the I/O thread, then takes over the job of cranking the call state machine, processing incoming packets and transmitting DATA, ACK and ABORT packets. In a future patch, rxrpc_send_ACK() will transmit the ACK on the spot rather than queuing it for later transmission. The call event processor becomes purely received-skb driven. It only transmits things in response to events. We use "pokes" to queue a dummy skb to make it do things like start/resume transmitting data. Timer expiry also results in pokes. The connection event processor, becomes similar, though crypto events, such as dealing with CHALLENGE and RESPONSE packets is offloaded to a work item to avoid doing crypto in the I/O thread. The local event processor is removed and VERSION response packets are generated directly from the packet parser. Similarly, ABORTs generated in response to protocol errors will be transmitted immediately rather than being pushed onto a queue for later transmission. Changes: ======== ver #2) - Fix a couple of introduced lock context imbalances. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org (cherry picked from commit 5e6ef4f) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # include/trace/events/rxrpc.h # net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h # net/rxrpc/call_accept.c # net/rxrpc/call_event.c # net/rxrpc/call_object.c # net/rxrpc/conn_object.c # net/rxrpc/input.c # net/rxrpc/io_thread.c # net/rxrpc/local_event.c # net/rxrpc/local_object.c # net/rxrpc/output.c # net/rxrpc/peer_event.c # net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> commit 608aecd Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2/608aecd1.failed Now that rxrpc_put_local() may call kthread_stop(), it can't be called under spinlock as it might sleep. This can cause a problem in the peer keepalive code in rxrpc as it tries to avoid dropping the peer_hash_lock from the point it needs to re-add peer->keepalive_link to going round the loop again in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch(). Fix this by just dropping the lock when we don't need it and accepting that we'll have to take it again. This code is only called about every 20s for each peer, so not very often. This allows rxrpc_put_peer_unlocked() to be removed also. If triggered, this bug produces an oops like the following, as reproduced by a syzbot reproducer for a different oops[1]: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/sched/completion.c:101 ... RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 3 locks held by kworker/u9:0/50: #0: ffff88810e74a138 ((wq_completion)krxrpcd){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x294/0x636 #1: ffff8881013a7e20 ((work_completion)(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x294/0x636 #2: ffff88817d366390 (&rxnet->peer_hash_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch+0x2bd/0x35f ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x5f __might_resched+0x2cf/0x2f2 __wait_for_common+0x87/0x1e8 kthread_stop+0x14d/0x255 rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch+0x333/0x35f rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x2e9/0x449 process_one_work+0x3c1/0x636 worker_thread+0x25f/0x359 kthread+0x1a6/0x1b5 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: a275da6 ("rxrpc: Create a per-local endpoint receive queue and I/O thread") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000002b4a9f05ef2b616f@google.com/ [1] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 608aecd) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> # Conflicts: # net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h # net/rxrpc/peer_event.c # net/rxrpc/peer_object.c

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> commit 4e264be When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc ctrliq#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e ctrliq#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 ctrliq#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 ctrliq#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] ctrliq#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] ctrliq#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] ctrliq#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 ctrliq#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 ctrliq#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 ctrliq#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 ctrliq#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 ctrliq#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc ctrliq#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d ctrliq#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 ctrliq#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 4e264be) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> commit 6d65028 As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502125010.1319370-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au (cherry picked from commit 6d65028) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> commit de9df6c Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 ctrliq#8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 ctrliq#9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac ctrliq#10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 ctrliq#11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc ctrliq#12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] ctrliq#13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] ctrliq#14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] ctrliq#15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] ctrliq#16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] ctrliq#17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit de9df6c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> commit 5f4fa16 We do netif_napi_add() for all allocated q_vectors[], but potentially do netif_napi_del() for part of them, then kfree q_vectors and leave invalid pointers at dev->napi_list. Reproducer: [root@host ~]# cat repro.sh #!/bin/bash pf_dbsf="0000:41:00.0" vf0_dbsf="0000:41:02.0" g_pids=() function do_set_numvf() { echo 2 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs sleep $((RANDOM%3+1)) echo 0 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${pf_dbsf}/sriov_numvfs sleep $((RANDOM%3+1)) } function do_set_channel() { local nic=$(ls -1 --indicator-style=none /sys/bus/pci/devices/${vf0_dbsf}/net/) [ -z "$nic" ] && { sleep $((RANDOM%3)) ; return 1; } ifconfig $nic 192.168.18.5 netmask 255.255.255.0 ifconfig $nic up ethtool -L $nic combined 1 ethtool -L $nic combined 4 sleep $((RANDOM%3)) } function on_exit() { local pid for pid in "${g_pids[@]}"; do kill -0 "$pid" &>/dev/null && kill "$pid" &>/dev/null done g_pids=() } trap "on_exit; exit" EXIT while :; do do_set_numvf ; done & g_pids+=($!) while :; do do_set_channel ; done & g_pids+=($!) wait Result: [ 4093.900222] ================================================================== [ 4093.900230] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_netdev+0x308/0x390 [ 4093.900232] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88b4dc145640 by task repro.sh/6699 [ 4093.900233] [ 4093.900236] CPU: 10 PID: 6699 Comm: repro.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O --------- -t - 4.18.0 #1 [ 4093.900238] Hardware name: Powerleader PR2008AL/H12DSi-N6, BIOS 2.0 04/09/2021 [ 4093.900239] Call Trace: [ 4093.900244] dump_stack+0x71/0xab [ 4093.900249] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290 [ 4093.900251] ? free_netdev+0x308/0x390 [ 4093.900252] kasan_report+0x14a/0x2b0 [ 4093.900254] free_netdev+0x308/0x390 [ 4093.900261] iavf_remove+0x825/0xd20 [iavf] [ 4093.900265] pci_device_remove+0xa8/0x1f0 [ 4093.900268] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c6/0x460 [ 4093.900271] pci_stop_bus_device+0x101/0x150 [ 4093.900273] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20 [ 4093.900275] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x187/0x420 [ 4093.900277] ? pci_iov_add_virtfn+0xe10/0xe10 [ 4093.900278] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90 [ 4093.900280] sriov_disable+0xed/0x3e0 [ 4093.900282] ? bus_find_device+0x12d/0x1a0 [ 4093.900290] i40e_free_vfs+0x754/0x1210 [i40e] [ 4093.900298] ? i40e_reset_all_vfs+0x880/0x880 [i40e] [ 4093.900299] ? pci_get_device+0x7c/0x90 [ 4093.900300] ? pci_get_subsys+0x90/0x90 [ 4093.900306] ? pci_vfs_assigned.part.7+0x144/0x210 [ 4093.900309] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 4093.900315] i40e_pci_sriov_configure+0x1fa/0x2e0 [i40e] [ 4093.900318] sriov_numvfs_store+0x214/0x290 [ 4093.900320] ? sriov_totalvfs_show+0x30/0x30 [ 4093.900321] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 4093.900323] ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x350 [ 4093.900326] kernfs_fop_write+0x280/0x3f0 [ 4093.900329] vfs_write+0x145/0x440 [ 4093.900330] ksys_write+0xab/0x160 [ 4093.900332] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 [ 4093.900334] ? fput_many+0x1a/0x120 [ 4093.900335] ? filp_close+0xf0/0x130 [ 4093.900338] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x370 [ 4093.900339] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 4093.900341] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca [ 4093.900357] RIP: 0033:0x7f16ad4d22c0 [ 4093.900359] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d8 cb 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 89 24 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 fe dd 01 00 48 89 04 24 [ 4093.900360] RSP: 002b:00007ffd6491b7f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 4093.900362] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f16ad4d22c0 [ 4093.900363] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000001a41408 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 4093.900364] RBP: 0000000001a41408 R08: 00007f16ad7a1780 R09: 00007f16ae1f2700 [ 4093.900364] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 4093.900365] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f16ad7a0620 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 4093.900367] [ 4093.900368] Allocated by task 820: [ 4093.900371] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0 [ 4093.900373] __kmalloc+0xfb/0x200 [ 4093.900376] iavf_init_interrupt_scheme+0x63b/0x1320 [iavf] [ 4093.900380] iavf_watchdog_task+0x3d51/0x52c0 [iavf] [ 4093.900382] process_one_work+0x56a/0x11f0 [ 4093.900383] worker_thread+0x8f/0xf40 [ 4093.900384] kthread+0x2a0/0x390 [ 4093.900385] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [ 4093.900387] 0xffffffffffffffff [ 4093.900387] [ 4093.900388] Freed by task 6699: [ 4093.900390] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190 [ 4093.900391] kfree+0x8b/0x1b0 [ 4093.900394] iavf_free_q_vectors+0x11d/0x1a0 [iavf] [ 4093.900397] iavf_remove+0x35a/0xd20 [iavf] [ 4093.900399] pci_device_remove+0xa8/0x1f0 [ 4093.900400] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c6/0x460 [ 4093.900401] pci_stop_bus_device+0x101/0x150 [ 4093.900402] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20 [ 4093.900403] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x187/0x420 [ 4093.900404] sriov_disable+0xed/0x3e0 [ 4093.900409] i40e_free_vfs+0x754/0x1210 [i40e] [ 4093.900415] i40e_pci_sriov_configure+0x1fa/0x2e0 [i40e] [ 4093.900416] sriov_numvfs_store+0x214/0x290 [ 4093.900417] kernfs_fop_write+0x280/0x3f0 [ 4093.900418] vfs_write+0x145/0x440 [ 4093.900419] ksys_write+0xab/0x160 [ 4093.900420] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x370 [ 4093.900421] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca [ 4093.900422] 0xffffffffffffffff [ 4093.900422] [ 4093.900424] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88b4dc144200 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 [ 4093.900425] The buggy address is located 5184 bytes inside of 8192-byte region [ffff88b4dc144200, ffff88b4dc146200) [ 4093.900425] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 4093.900427] page:ffffea00d3705000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88bf04415c80 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 4093.900430] flags: 0x10000000008100(slab|head) [ 4093.900433] raw: 0010000000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88bf04415c80 [ 4093.900434] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000030003 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 4093.900434] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 4093.900435] [ 4093.900435] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 4093.900436] ffff88b4dc145500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 4093.900437] ffff88b4dc145580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 4093.900438] >ffff88b4dc145600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 4093.900438] ^ [ 4093.900439] ffff88b4dc145680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 4093.900440] ffff88b4dc145700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 4093.900440] ================================================================== Although the patch #2 (of 2) can avoid the issue triggered by this repro.sh, there still are other potential risks that if num_active_queues is changed to less than allocated q_vectors[] by unexpected, the mismatched netif_napi_add/del() can also cause UAF. Since we actually call netif_napi_add() for all allocated q_vectors unconditionally in iavf_alloc_q_vectors(), so we should fix it by letting netif_napi_del() match to netif_napi_add(). Fixes: 5eae00c ("i40evf: main driver core") Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Donglin Peng <pengdonglin@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Huang Cun <huangcun@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Reviewed-by: Madhu Chittim <madhu.chittim@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 5f4fa16) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

jira LE-1907 cve CVE-2023-21102 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2 commit-author Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com> commit 0e68b55 Running a rt-kernel base on 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 on an Ampere Altra outputs the following: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/u320:0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 3 locks held by kworker/u320:0/9: #0: ffff3fff8c27d128 ((wq_completion)efi_rts_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41) #1: ffff80000861bdd0 ((work_completion)(&efi_rts_work.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41) #2: ffffdf7e1ed3e460 (efi_rt_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101) Preemption disabled at: efi_virtmap_load (./arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h:248) CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u320:0 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server System B81.03001.0005/Mt.Jade Motherboard, BIOS 1.08.20220218 (SCP: 1.08.20220218) 2022/02/18 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts Call trace: dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:158) show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:165) dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4)) dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:114) __might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10134) rt_spin_lock (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1769 (discriminator 4)) efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101) [...] This seems to come from commit ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack") which adds a spinlock. This spinlock is taken through: efi_call_rts() \-efi_call_virt() \-efi_call_virt_pointer() \-arch_efi_call_virt_setup() Make 'efi_rt_lock' a raw_spinlock to avoid being preempted. [ardb: The EFI runtime services are called with a different set of translation tables, and are permitted to use the SIMD registers. The context switch code preserves/restores neither, and so EFI calls must be made with preemption disabled, rather than only disabling migration.] Fixes: ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack") Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 0e68b55) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>

…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.15, round #2 - Single fix for broken usage of 'multi-MIDR' infrastructure in PI code, adding an open-coded erratum check for everyone's favorite pile of sand: Cavium ThunderX

[ Upstream commit a104042 ] The ieee80211 skb control block key (set when skb was queued) could have been removed before ieee80211_tx_dequeue() call. ieee80211_tx_dequeue() already called ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to get the current key, but the latter do not update the key in skb control block in case it is NULL. Because some drivers actually use this key in their TX callbacks (e.g. ath1{1,2}k_mac_op_tx()) this could lead to the use after free below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803083c248 by task kworker/u16:4/1440 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 6.13.0-ge128f627f404 #2 Hardware name: HW (DT) Workqueue: bat_events batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet Call trace: show_stack+0x14/0x1c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74 print_report+0x164/0x4c0 kasan_report+0xac/0xe8 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24 ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x12c/0x1c8 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xdcc/0x1b4c ieee80211_tx+0x1ec/0x2bc ieee80211_xmit+0x224/0x324 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x85c/0xcf8 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc0/0xec4 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x28c __dev_queue_xmit+0x6ac/0x318c batadv_send_skb_packet+0x38c/0x4b0 batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet+0x110/0x328 process_one_work+0x578/0xc10 worker_thread+0x4bc/0xc7c kthread+0x2f8/0x380 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 1906: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x4c __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1b4/0x380 ieee80211_key_alloc+0x3c/0xb64 ieee80211_add_key+0x1b4/0x71c nl80211_new_key+0x2b4/0x5d8 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x198/0x240 <...> Freed by task 1494: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x48/0x94 __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x60 kfree+0xc8/0x31c kfree_sensitive+0x70/0x80 ieee80211_key_free_common+0x10c/0x174 ieee80211_free_keys+0x188/0x46c ieee80211_stop_mesh+0x70/0x2cc ieee80211_leave_mesh+0x1c/0x60 cfg80211_leave_mesh+0xe0/0x280 cfg80211_leave+0x1e0/0x244 <...> Reset SKB control block key before calling ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to avoid that. Fixes: bb42f2d ("mac80211: Move reorder-sensitive TX handlers to after TXQ dequeue") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06aa507b853ca385ceded81c18b0a6dd0f081bc8.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 752e221 ] SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: syzbot+be6f4b383534d88989f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250407170332.26959-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit d54d610 upstream. Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250404082921.2767593-8-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410132850.3708703-2-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417202120.1002102-2-ardb+git@google.com # final submission Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit afcdf51 upstream. Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said "All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2". However, dml2_init()/dml21_init() are not protected from their callers, causing such errors: do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 239 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #2 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn pc ffff80000319de80 ra ffff80000319de5c tp 900000010575c000 sp 900000010575f840 a0 0000000000000000 a1 900000012f210130 a2 900000012f000000 a3 ffff80000357e268 a4 ffff80000357e260 a5 900000012ea52cf0 a6 0000000400000004 a7 0000012c00001388 t0 00001900000015e0 t1 ffff80000379d000 t2 0000000010624dd3 t3 0000006400000014 t4 00000000000003e8 t5 0000005000000018 t6 0000000000000020 t7 0000000f00000064 t8 000000000000002f u0 5f5e9200f8901912 s9 900000012d380010 s0 900000012ea51fd8 s1 900000012f000000 s2 9000000109296000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000001fd8 s5 0000000000000001 s6 ffff800003415000 s7 900000012d390000 s8 ffff800003211f80 ra: ffff80000319de5c dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x3c/0x960 [amdgpu] ERA: ffff80000319de80 dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0) PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S) Process kworker/0:5 (pid: 239, threadinfo=00000000927eadc6, task=000000008fd31682) Stack : 00040dc000003164 0000000000000001 900000012f210130 900000012eabeeb8 900000012f000000 ffff80000319fe48 900000012f210000 900000012f210130 900000012f000000 900000012eabeeb8 0000000000000001 ffff8000031a0064 900000010575f9f0 900000012f210130 900000012eac0000 900000012ea80000 900000012f000000 ffff8000031cefc4 900000010575f9f0 ffff8000035859c0 ffff800003414000 900000010575fa78 900000012f000000 ffff8000031b4c50 0000000000000000 9000000101c9d700 9000000109c40000 5f5e9200f8901912 900000012d3c4bd0 900000012d3c5000 ffff8000034aed18 900000012d380010 900000012d3c4bd0 ffff800003414000 900000012d380000 ffff800002ea49dc 0000000000000001 900000012d3c6000 00000000ffffe423 0000000000010000 ... Call Trace: [<ffff80000319de80>] dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu] [<ffff80000319fe44>] dml21_init+0xa4/0x280 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031a0060>] dml21_create+0x40/0x80 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031cefc0>] dc_state_create+0x100/0x160 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031b4c4c>] dc_create+0x44c/0x640 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002ea49d8>] amdgpu_dm_init+0x3f8/0x2060 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002ea6658>] dm_hw_init+0x18/0x60 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b16738>] amdgpu_device_init+0x1938/0x27e0 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b18e80>] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x20/0xa0 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b0c8f0>] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b0/0x580 [amdgpu] [<900000000448eae4>] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xc0 [<9000000003b02b18>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x18/0x40 [<9000000003b05da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300 [<9000000003b06718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440 [<9000000003b11b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220 [<9000000003ac1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4 Unfortunately, protecting dml2_init()/dml21_init() out of DML2 causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside. Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-74483 CVE: CVE-2024-54191 commit 7a17308 Author: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com> Date: Mon Dec 9 11:42:18 2024 +0200 Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_conn_big_sync This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released before calling a function that locks hdev. [ 561.670344] ====================================================== [ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ ctrliq#26 Not tainted [ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock: [ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670405] but task is already holding lock: [ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670450] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 561.670452] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 561.670453] -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth] [ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth] [ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610 [ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170 [ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0 [ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0 [ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670567] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth] [ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130 [ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190 [ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670632] -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0 [ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360 [ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0 [ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240 [ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470 [ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30 [ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250 [ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 [ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0 [ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670744] other info that might help us debug this: [ 561.670745] Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH [ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1 [ 561.670754] ---- ---- [ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 561.670767] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bastien Nocera <bnocera@redhat.com>

[BUG] There is a bug report that a syzbot reproducer can lead to the following busy inode at unmount time: BTRFS info (device loop1): last unmount of filesystem 1680000e-3c1e-4c46-84b6-56bd3909af50 VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of loop1 (btrfs) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 48168 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00471-g119009db2674 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x2e9/0x390 fs/super.c:650 Call Trace: <TASK> kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1237 btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2099 deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473 deactivate_super fs/super.c:506 [inline] deactivate_super+0xe2/0x100 fs/super.c:502 cleanup_mnt+0x21f/0x440 fs/namespace.c:1435 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x269/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> [CAUSE] When btrfs_alloc_path() failed, btrfs_iget() directly returned without releasing the inode already allocated by btrfs_iget_locked(). This results the above busy inode and trigger the kernel BUG. [FIX] Fix it by calling iget_failed() if btrfs_alloc_path() failed. If we hit error inside btrfs_read_locked_inode(), it will properly call iget_failed(), so nothing to worry about. Although the iget_failed() cleanup inside btrfs_read_locked_inode() is a break of the normal error handling scheme, let's fix the obvious bug and backport first, then rework the error handling later. Reported-by: Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20250421102425.44431-1-superman.xpt@gmail.com/ Fixes: 7c855e1 ("btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

commit ab680dc upstream. Fix deadlock in job submission and abort handling. When a thread aborts currently executing jobs due to a fault, it first locks the global lock protecting submitted_jobs (#1). After the last job is destroyed, it proceeds to release the related context and locks file_priv (#2). Meanwhile, in the job submission thread, the file_priv lock (#2) is taken first, and then the submitted_jobs lock (#1) is obtained when a job is added to the submitted jobs list. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- (for example due to a fault) (jobs submissions keep coming) lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1 ivpu_jobs_abort_all() job_destroy() lock(&file_priv->lock) #2 lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1 file_priv_release() lock(&vdev->context_list_lock) lock(&file_priv->lock) #2 This order of locking causes a deadlock. To resolve this issue, change the order of locking in ivpu_job_submit(). Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <karol.wachowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250107173238.381120-12-maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com [ This backport required small adjustments to ivpu_job_submit(), which lacks support for explicit command queue creation added in 6.15. ] Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 93ae6e6 Author: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Date: Wed Mar 19 10:21:01 2025 +0800 iommu/vt-d: Fix possible circular locking dependency We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317035714.1041549-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 93ae6e6) Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Upstream-Status: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78704

…unload Kernel panic occurs when a devmem TCP socket is closed after NIC module is unloaded. This is Devmem TCP unregistration scenarios. number is an order. (a)netlink socket close (b)pp destroy (c)uninstall result 1 2 3 OK 1 3 2 (d)Impossible 2 1 3 OK 3 1 2 (e)Kernel panic 2 3 1 (d)Impossible 3 2 1 (d)Impossible (a) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() is called when devmem TCP socket is closed. (b) page_pool_destroy() is called when the interface is down. (c) mp_ops->uninstall() is called when an interface is unregistered. (d) There is no scenario in mp_ops->uninstall() is called before page_pool_destroy(). Because unregister_netdevice_many_notify() closes interfaces first and then calls mp_ops->uninstall(). (e) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() accesses struct net_device to acquire netdev_lock(). But if the interface module has already been removed, net_device pointer is invalid, so it causes kernel panic. In summary, there are only 3 possible scenarios. A. sk close -> pp destroy -> uninstall. B. pp destroy -> sk close -> uninstall. C. pp destroy -> uninstall -> sk close. Case C is a kernel panic scenario. In order to fix this problem, It makes mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall() set binding->dev to NULL. It indicates an bound net_device was unregistered. It makes netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() do not acquire netdev_lock() if binding->dev is NULL. A new binding->lock is added to protect a dev of a binding. So, lock ordering is like below. priv->lock netdev_lock(dev) binding->lock Tests: Scenario A: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 kill $pid ip link set $interface down modprobe -rv $module Scenario B: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 ip link set $interface down kill $pid modprobe -rv $module Scenario C: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 modprobe -rv $module sleep 5 kill $pid Splat looks like: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc001fffa9f7: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00000000fffd4fb8-0x00000000fffd4fbf] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: ncdevmem Tainted: G B W 6.15.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(undef) 0947ec89efa0fd68838b78e36aa1617e97ff5d7f Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock (./include/linux/sched.h:2244 kernel/locking/mutex.c:400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:443 kernel/locking/mutex.c:605 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746) Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 13 00 00 49 8b 1e 48 83 e3 f8 74 6a 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 34 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 f RSP: 0018:ffff88826f7ef730 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000fffd4f88 RCX: ffffffffaa9bc811 RDX: 000000001fffa9f7 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000fffd4fbc RBP: ffff88826f7ef8b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed103e6aa1a4 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff88826f7ef442 R12: fffffbfff669f65e R13: ffff88812a830040 R14: ffff8881f3550d20 R15: 00000000fffd4f88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888866c05000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000563bed0cb288 CR3: 00000001a7c98000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ... netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy (net/core/netdev-genl.c:953 (discriminator 3)) genl_release (net/netlink/genetlink.c:653 net/netlink/genetlink.c:694 net/netlink/genetlink.c:705) ... netlink_release (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:737) ... __sock_release (net/socket.c:647) sock_close (net/socket.c:1393) Fixes: 1d22d30 ("net: drop rtnl_lock for queue_mgmt operations") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514154028.1062909-1-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-84571 Upstream Status: net.git commit 443041d Conflicts: context mismatch as we don't have MPCapableSYNTXDrop _ upstream commit 6982826 ("mptcp: fallback to TCP after SYN+MPC drops") and MPCapableSYNTXDisabled _ upstream commit 27069e7 ("mptcp: disable active MPTCP in case of blackhole") commit 3d04139 Author: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Date: Mon Oct 14 16:06:00 2024 +0200 mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 but task is already holding lock: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-slock-AF_INET); lock(k-slock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113: #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240 R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300 </TASK> As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint. Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via such listener - its intended role. Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the incoming MPC request. Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-1-7faea8e6b6ae@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>

…_USERCOPY=y crash Borislav Petkov reported the following boot crash on x86-32, with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y: | usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'task_struct' (offset 2112, size 160)! | ... | kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! So the useroffset and usersize arguments are what control the allowed window of copying in/out of the "task_struct" kmem cache: /* create a slab on which task_structs can be allocated */ task_struct_whitelist(&useroffset, &usersize); task_struct_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("task_struct", arch_task_struct_size, align, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, useroffset, usersize, NULL); task_struct_whitelist() positions this window based on the location of the thread_struct within task_struct, and gets the arch-specific details via arch_thread_struct_whitelist(offset, size): static void __init task_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { /* Fetch thread_struct whitelist for the architecture. */ arch_thread_struct_whitelist(offset, size); /* * Handle zero-sized whitelist or empty thread_struct, otherwise * adjust offset to position of thread_struct in task_struct. */ if (unlikely(*size == 0)) *offset = 0; else *offset += offsetof(struct task_struct, thread); } Commit cb7ca40 ("x86/fpu: Make task_struct::thread constant size") removed the logic for the window, leaving: static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { *offset = 0; *size = 0; } So now there is no window that usercopy hardening will allow to be copied in/out of task_struct. But as reported above, there *is* a copy in copy_uabi_to_xstate(). (It seems there are several, actually.) int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct task_struct *tsk, const void __user *ubuf) { return copy_uabi_to_xstate(x86_task_fpu(tsk)->fpstate, NULL, ubuf, &tsk->thread.pkru); } This appears to be writing into x86_task_fpu(tsk)->fpstate. With or without CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU, this resolves to: ((struct fpu *)((void *)(task) + sizeof(*(task)))) i.e. the memory "after task_struct" is cast to "struct fpu", and the uses the "fpstate" pointer. How that pointer gets set looks to be variable, but I think the one we care about here is: fpu->fpstate = &fpu->__fpstate; And struct fpu::__fpstate says: struct fpstate __fpstate; /* * WARNING: '__fpstate' is dynamically-sized. Do not put * anything after it here. */ So we're still dealing with a dynamically sized thing, even if it's not within the literal struct task_struct -- it's still in the kmem cache, though. Looking at the kmem cache size, it has allocated "arch_task_struct_size" bytes, which is calculated in fpu__init_task_struct_size(): int task_size = sizeof(struct task_struct); task_size += sizeof(struct fpu); /* * Subtract off the static size of the register state. * It potentially has a bunch of padding. */ task_size -= sizeof(union fpregs_state); /* * Add back the dynamically-calculated register state * size. */ task_size += fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size; /* * We dynamically size 'struct fpu', so we require that * 'state' be at the end of 'it: */ CHECK_MEMBER_AT_END_OF(struct fpu, __fpstate); arch_task_struct_size = task_size; So, this is still copying out of the kmem cache for task_struct, and the window seems unchanged (still fpu regs). This is what the window was before: void fpu_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { *offset = offsetof(struct thread_struct, fpu.__fpstate.regs); *size = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size; } And the same commit I mentioned above removed it. I think the misunderstanding is here: | The fpu_thread_struct_whitelist() quirk to hardened usercopy can be removed, | now that the FPU structure is not embedded in the task struct anymore, which | reduces text footprint a bit. Yes, FPU is no longer in task_struct, but it IS in the kmem cache named "task_struct", since the fpstate is still being allocated there. Partially revert the earlier mentioned commit, along with a recalculation of the fpstate regs location. Fixes: cb7ca40 ("x86/fpu: Make task_struct::thread constant size") Reported-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250409211127.3544993-1-mingo@kernel.org/ # Discussion #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202505041418.F47130C4C8@keescook # Discussion #2

Move hctx debugfs/sysfs register out of freezing queue in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(), so that the following lockdep dependency can be killed: #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#16){++++}-{0:0}: #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: //debugfs And registering/un-registering hctx debugfs/sysfs does not require queue to be frozen: - hctx sysfs attributes show() are drained when removing kobject, and there isn't store() implementation for hctx sysfs attributes - debugfs entry read() is drained too when removing debugfs directory, and there isn't write() implementation for hctx debugfs too - so it is safe to register/unregister hctx sysfs/debugfs without freezing queue because the cod paths changes nothing, and we just need to keep hctx live Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-23-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

…xit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-26-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> says: This adds a test for fanotify mount ns notifications inside userns [1]. While working on the test I ended up making lots of cleanups to reduce build dependency on make headers_install. These patches got rid of the dependency for my kvm setup for the affected filesystems tests. Building with TOOLS_INCLUDES dir was recommended by John Hubbard [2]. NOTE #1: these patches are based on a merge of vfs-6.16.mount (changes wrappers.h) into v6.15-rc5 (changes mount-notify_test.c), so if this cleanup is acceptable, we should probably setup a selftests branch for 6.16, so that it can be used to test the fanotify patches. NOTE #2: some of the defines in wrappers.h are left for overlayfs and mount_setattr tests, which were not converted to use TOOLS_INCLUDES. I did not want to mess with those tests. * patches from https://lore.kernel.org/20250509133240.529330-1-amir73il@gmail.com: selftests/fs/mount-notify: add a test variant running inside userns selftests/filesystems: create setup_userns() helper selftests/filesystems: create get_unique_mnt_id() helper selftests/fs/mount-notify: build with tools include dir selftests/mount_settattr: remove duplicate syscall definitions selftests/pidfd: move syscall definitions into wrappers.h selftests/fs/statmount: build with tools include dir selftests/filesystems: move wrapper.h out of overlayfs subdir Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250509133240.529330-1-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a ctrliq#8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 ctrliq#9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 ctrliq#10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f ctrliq#11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf ctrliq#12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 ctrliq#13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 ctrliq#14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d ctrliq#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e ctrliq#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad ctrliq#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e ctrliq#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 ctrliq#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 ctrliq#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 ctrliq#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 ctrliq#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 ctrliq#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 ctrliq#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 ctrliq#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc ctrliq#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 ctrliq#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 ctrliq#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 ctrliq#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d ctrliq#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 ctrliq#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 ctrliq#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 ctrliq#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d ctrliq#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 ctrliq#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e ctrliq#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 ctrliq#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 ctrliq#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 ctrliq#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 ctrliq#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 ctrliq#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency [1] when cpu_hotplug_lock is acquired inside store_local_boost(), after policy->rwsem has already been taken by store(). However, the boost update is strictly per-policy and does not access shared state or iterate over all policies. Since policy->rwsem is already held, this is enough to serialize against concurrent topology changes for the current policy. Remove the cpus_read_lock() to resolve the lockdep warning and avoid unnecessary locking. [1] ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc6-debug-gb01fc4eca73c #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ power-profiles-/588 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffb3a7d910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: store_local_boost+0x56/0xd0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8b6e5a12c380 (&policy->rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: store+0x37/0x90 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&policy->rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_write+0x29/0xb0 cpufreq_online+0x7e8/0xa40 cpufreq_add_dev+0x82/0xa0 subsys_interface_register+0x148/0x160 cpufreq_register_driver+0x15d/0x260 amd_pstate_register_driver+0x36/0x90 amd_pstate_init+0x1e7/0x270 do_one_initcall+0x68/0x2b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x231/0x270 kernel_init+0x15/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #1 (subsys mutex#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xc2/0x930 subsys_interface_register+0x7f/0x160 cpufreq_register_driver+0x15d/0x260 amd_pstate_register_driver+0x36/0x90 amd_pstate_init+0x1e7/0x270 do_one_initcall+0x68/0x2b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x231/0x270 kernel_init+0x15/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ed/0x1850 lock_acquire.part.0+0x69/0x1b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 store_local_boost+0x56/0xd0 store+0x50/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x132/0x200 vfs_write+0x2b3/0x590 ksys_write+0x74/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x56/0x5e Signed-off-by: Seyediman Seyedarab <ImanDevel@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250513015726.1497-1-ImanDevel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-79791 CVE: CVE-2024-56607 commit 8fac326 Author: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com> Date: Mon Oct 7 19:59:27 2024 +0300 wifi: ath12k: fix atomic calls in ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask() When I try to manually set bitrates: iw wlan0 set bitrates legacy-2.4 1 I get sleeping from invalid context error, see below. Fix that by switching to use recently introduced ieee80211_iterate_stations_mtx(). Do note that WCN6855 firmware is still crashing, I'm not sure if that firmware even supports bitrate WMI commands and should we consider disabling ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask() for WCN6855? But that's for another patch. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/wmi.c:420 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 2236, name: iw preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 3 locks held by iw/2236: #0: ffffffffabc6f1d8 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x14/0x40 #1: ffff888138410810 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nl80211_pre_doit+0x54d/0x800 [cfg80211] #2: ffffffffab2cfaa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic+0x2f/0x200 [mac80211] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2236 Comm: iw Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-wt-ath+ #1772 Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa4/0xe0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __might_resched+0x363/0x5a0 ? __alloc_skb+0x165/0x340 __might_sleep+0xad/0x160 ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0xb1/0x3d0 [ath12k] ? ath12k_wmi_init_wcn7850+0xa40/0xa40 [ath12k] ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x45/0x7b0 ? __asan_memset+0x39/0x40 ? ath12k_wmi_alloc_skb+0xf0/0x150 [ath12k] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4d0/0x4d0 ath12k_wmi_set_peer_param+0x340/0x5b0 [ath12k] ath12k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate+0xa3/0x110 [ath12k] ? ath12k_mac_vdev_stop+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath12k] ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic+0xd4/0x200 [mac80211] ath12k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask+0x5d2/0x1080 [ath12k] ? ath12k_mac_vif_chan+0x320/0x320 [ath12k] drv_set_bitrate_mask+0x267/0x470 [mac80211] ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask+0x4cc/0x8a0 [mac80211] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 nl80211_set_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2bc/0x530 [cfg80211] ? nl80211_parse_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2320/0x2320 [cfg80211] ? trace_contention_end+0xef/0x140 ? rtnl_unlock+0x9/0x10 ? nl80211_pre_doit+0x557/0x800 [cfg80211] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f0/0x2e0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.0+0x250/0x250 ? ns_capable+0x57/0xd0 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x34c/0x600 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x310/0x310 ? __lock_acquire+0xc62/0x1de0 ? he_set_mcs_mask.isra.0+0x8d0/0x8d0 [cfg80211] ? nl80211_parse_tx_bitrate_mask+0x2320/0x2320 [cfg80211] ? cfg80211_external_auth_request+0x690/0x690 [cfg80211] genl_rcv_msg+0xa0/0x130 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14c/0x400 ? genl_family_rcv_msg+0x600/0x600 ? netlink_ack+0xd70/0xd70 ? rwsem_optimistic_spin+0x4f0/0x4f0 ? genl_rcv+0x14/0x40 ? down_read_killable+0x580/0x580 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x13e/0x350 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 genl_rcv+0x23/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x45e/0x790 ? netlink_attachskb+0x7f0/0x7f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x7eb/0xdb0 ? netlink_unicast+0x790/0x790 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x31/0x40 ? netlink_unicast+0x790/0x790 __sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x160 ____sys_sendmsg+0x620/0x990 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 ? __copy_msghdr+0x410/0x410 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? mark_lock+0xe6/0x1470 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x170 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x120/0x120 ? __lock_acquire+0xc62/0x1de0 ? do_fault_around+0x2c6/0x4e0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x8c1/0xde0 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x220/0x4d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x8c1/0xde0 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? __fdget+0x4e/0x1d0 ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x1a/0x170 __sys_sendmsg+0xd2/0x180 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4d0/0x4d0 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x72/0xb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 x64_sys_call+0x894/0x9f0 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f230fe04807 Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffe996a7ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000556f9f9c3390 RCX: 00007f230fe04807 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe996a7ee0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000556f9f9c88c0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000556f965ca190 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000556f9f9c8780 R13: 00007ffe996a7ee0 R14: 0000556f9f9c87d0 R15: 0000556f9f9c88c0 </TASK> Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241007165932.78081-2-kvalo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 570f945 ] Lockdep gives a splat [1] when ser_hdl_work item is executed. It is scheduled at mac80211 workqueue via ieee80211_queue_work() and takes a wiphy lock inside. However, this workqueue can be flushed when e.g. closing the interface and wiphy lock is already taken in that case. Choosing wiphy_work_queue() for SER is likely not suitable. Back on to the global workqueue. [1]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc2 ctrliq#17 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u32:1/61 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811bc00768 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] but task is already holding lock: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x7c6/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x8e/0x180 __flush_workqueue+0x129/0x10d0 ieee80211_stop_device+0xa8/0x110 ieee80211_do_stop+0x14ce/0x2880 ieee80211_stop+0x13a/0x2c0 __dev_close_many+0x18f/0x510 __dev_change_flags+0x25f/0x670 netif_change_flags+0x7b/0x160 do_setlink.isra.0+0x1640/0x35d0 rtnl_newlink+0xd8c/0x1d30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x700/0xb80 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x350 netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x7a0 netlink_sendmsg+0x759/0xc20 ____sys_sendmsg+0x812/0xa00 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x360 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &rdev->wiphy.mtx --> (wq_completion)phy0 --> (work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock((wq_completion)phy0); lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u32:1/61: #0: ffff888103835148 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xefa/0x1450 #1: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2 ctrliq#17 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS edk2-20250523-14.fc42 05/23/2025 Workqueue: phy0 rtw89_ser_hdl_work [rtw89_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x14c/0x170 __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: ebfc919 ("wifi: rtw89: add wiphy_lock() to work that isn't held wiphy_lock() yet") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250919210852.823912-5-pchelkin@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a. INVALID, memslot is encountered). To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting. Test memslot removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the success case. There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far) that are of interest: 1. Success 2. ENOENT due to no memslot 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather, easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory is trivial. But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios. The only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks. So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting. For the "no memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts prefaulting. Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so that the worker can recreate the memslot. Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250924174255.2141847-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 ctrliq#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 ctrliq#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 ctrliq#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 ctrliq#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 ctrliq#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 ctrliq#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 ctrliq#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 ctrliq#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 ctrliq#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 ctrliq#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com> Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 ctrliq#8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 ctrliq#9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 ctrliq#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 0dccbc7 ] When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range for the TPM TIS address space. The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC- mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things. Disabling the early call to hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET: [ 0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC. Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of accessing the device. In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an effective memtype. Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor) responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP. Not doing so cannot work, and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety of fatal #MCs. In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning. Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX guest. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8137d98e-8825-415b-9282-1d2a115bb51a@linux.intel.com Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jürgen Groß <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com> Cc: Jianxiong Gao <jxgao@google.com> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250828005249.39339-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit ffa1e7a Author: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue Mar 18 10:55:48 2025 +0100 block: Make request_queue lockdep splats show up earlier In recent kernels, there are lockdep splats around the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map, similar to [1], but they typically don't show up until reclaim with writeback happens. Having multiple kernel versions released with a known risc of kernel deadlock during reclaim writeback should IMHO be addressed and backported to -stable with the highest priority. In order to have these lockdep splats show up earlier, preferrably during system initialization, prime the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map as GFP_KERNEL reclaim- tainted. This will instead lead to lockdep splats looking similar to [2], but without the need for reclaim + writeback happening. [1]: [ 189.762244] ====================================================== [ 189.762432] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 189.762441] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 Tainted: G U [ 189.762450] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 189.762459] kswapd0/119 is trying to acquire lock: [ 189.762467] ffff888110ceb710 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26){++++}-{0:0}, at: __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762485] but task is already holding lock: [ 189.762494] ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.762507] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 189.762519] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 189.762529] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 189.762540] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 189.762548] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 189.762558] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 189.762566] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 189.762573] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 189.762582] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 189.762590] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 189.762597] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 189.762605] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 189.762613] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 189.762621] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 189.762630] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762647] -> #1 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 189.762659] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 189.762667] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 189.762676] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 189.762685] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 189.762709] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 189.762716] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 189.762725] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 189.762733] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 189.762756] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 189.762765] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 189.762773] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 189.762781] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 189.762790] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 189.762798] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 189.762807] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 189.762815] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762823] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762833] -> #0 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26){++++}-{0:0}: [ 189.762845] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.762854] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.762861] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.762870] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762878] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.762888] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.762896] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.762904] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.762912] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.762920] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.762929] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.762937] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.763261] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.763584] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.763946] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.764266] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.764586] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.764934] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.765249] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.765559] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.765889] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.766198] other info that might help us debug this: [ 189.767089] Chain exists of: &q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26 --> &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim [ 189.767971] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 189.768555] CPU0 CPU1 [ 189.768849] ---- ---- [ 189.769136] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.769421] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 189.769714] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.770016] rlock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#26); [ 189.770305] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 189.771167] 1 lock held by kswapd0/119: [ 189.771453] #0: ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.771770] stack backtrace: [ 189.772351] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 [ 189.772353] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 189.772354] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 189.772354] Call Trace: [ 189.772355] <TASK> [ 189.772356] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 189.772359] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 189.772360] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 189.772363] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 189.772365] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772368] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.772368] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772371] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.772372] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772375] ? lock_release+0xd5/0x2c0 [ 189.772376] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.772378] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772380] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772382] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772384] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772386] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772387] ? __might_sleep+0x58/0xa0 [ 189.772390] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.772391] ? count_memcg_events+0x68/0x90 [ 189.772393] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.772395] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.772396] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.772397] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.772401] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.772406] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.772409] ? isolate_folios+0xe80/0x16b0 [ 189.772410] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [ 189.772412] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.772414] ? evict_folios+0x34a/0xcd0 [ 189.772415] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 189.772417] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.772420] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.772421] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.772423] ? shrink_node+0xa08/0x1490 [ 189.772424] ? shrink_node+0xbd8/0x1490 [ 189.772425] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x366/0x480 [ 189.772427] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772428] ? balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772430] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772431] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xcb/0x330 [ 189.772433] ? __switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70 [ 189.772437] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.772438] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772440] ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772441] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.772443] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772444] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.772446] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772447] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772450] </TASK> [2]: [ 8.760253] ====================================================== [ 8.760254] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 8.760255] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 Tainted: G U [ 8.760256] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 8.760257] (udev-worker)/674 is trying to acquire lock: [ 8.760259] ffff888100e39148 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760265] but task is already holding lock: [ 8.760266] ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760272] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 8.760272] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 8.760273] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}: [ 8.760276] blk_alloc_queue+0x30a/0x350 [ 8.760279] blk_mq_alloc_queue+0x6b/0xe0 [ 8.760281] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x276/0x3c0 [ 8.760284] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x22a/0x440 [ 8.760286] __scsi_scan_target+0x109/0x230 [ 8.760288] scsi_scan_channel+0x65/0xc0 [ 8.760290] scsi_scan_host_selected+0xff/0x140 [ 8.760292] do_scsi_scan_host+0xa7/0xc0 [ 8.760293] do_scan_async+0x1c/0x160 [ 8.760295] async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x150 [ 8.760299] process_one_work+0x224/0x5f0 [ 8.760302] worker_thread+0x1d4/0x3e0 [ 8.760304] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 8.760306] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 8.760309] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.760312] -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 8.760315] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 8.760317] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 8.760319] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 8.760322] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 8.760323] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 8.760325] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 8.760327] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 8.760329] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 8.760332] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 8.760334] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 8.760336] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 8.760338] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760340] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760342] -> #0 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 8.760345] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760347] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760348] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760350] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760351] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760353] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760355] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760356] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760358] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760360] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760362] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760364] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760366] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760367] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760370] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760372] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760374] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760376] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760377] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760380] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8.760380] Chain exists of: &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> &q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27 [ 8.760384] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 8.760384] CPU0 CPU1 [ 8.760385] ---- ---- [ 8.760385] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27); [ 8.760387] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 8.760388] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27); [ 8.760390] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 8.760391] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 8.760391] 6 locks held by (udev-worker)/674: [ 8.760392] #0: ffff8881209ac420 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760398] #1: ffff88810c80f488 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x250 [ 8.760402] #2: ffff888125d1d330 (kn->active#101){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760406] #3: ffff888110dc7bb0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: queue_attr_store+0x148/0x1e0 [ 8.760411] #4: ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760416] #5: ffff888110dc76b8 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ctrliq#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760421] stack backtrace: [ 8.760422] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 674 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 [ 8.760424] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 8.760425] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 8.760426] Call Trace: [ 8.760427] <TASK> [ 8.760428] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 8.760431] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 8.760433] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 8.760437] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 8.760441] ? save_trace+0x54/0x360 [ 8.760445] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760446] ? irqentry_exit+0x3a/0xb0 [ 8.760448] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 8.760452] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760453] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760457] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760459] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760460] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760462] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760464] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760466] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760467] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760470] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760472] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760475] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760479] ? lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760480] ? kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760482] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 8.760485] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760487] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760489] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760494] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760497] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760499] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760502] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760504] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5d/0xe0 [ 8.760506] ? handle_softirqs+0x479/0x4d0 [ 8.760508] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x13f/0x280 [ 8.760511] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x8b/0x260 [ 8.760513] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760515] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760516] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760518] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760520] RIP: 0033:0x7aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760522] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 8.760523] RSP: 002b:00007ffc1e3697d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 8.760526] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760527] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc1e369ae0 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 8.760528] RBP: 00007ffc1e369800 R08: 00007aa3bf3f51c8 R09: 00007ffc1e3698b0 [ 8.760528] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 8.760529] R13: 00007ffc1e369ae0 R14: 0000613ccf21f2f0 R15: 00007aa3bf3f4e80 [ 8.760533] </TASK> v2: - Update a code comment to increase readability (Ming Lei). Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318095548.5187-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 9730763 Author: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed Mar 19 16:23:46 2025 +0530 block: correct locking order for protecting blk-wbt parameters The commit '245618f8e45f ("block: protect wbt_lat_usec using q-> elevator_lock")' introduced q->elevator_lock to protect updates to blk-wbt parameters when writing to the sysfs attribute wbt_ lat_usec and the cgroup attribute io.cost.qos. However, both these attributes also acquire q->rq_qos_mutex, leading to the following lockdep warning: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc5+ ctrliq#138 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/5902 is trying to acquire lock: c000000085d495a0 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: wbt_init+0x164/0x238 but task is already holding lock: c000000085d498c8 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: queue_wb_lat_store+0xb0/0x20c which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 ioc_qos_write+0x16c/0x85c cgroup_file_write+0xc4/0x32c kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c vfs_write+0x410/0x584 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec -> #0 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1b6c/0x2ae0 lock_acquire+0x140/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 wbt_init+0x164/0x238 queue_wb_lat_store+0x1dc/0x20c queue_attr_store+0x12c/0x164 sysfs_kf_write+0x6c/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c vfs_write+0x410/0x584 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->elevator_lock); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->elevator_lock); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by bash/5902: #0: c000000051122400 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x84/0x140 #1: c00000007383f088 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x174/0x29c #2: c000000008550428 (kn->active#182){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x180/0x29c #3: c000000085d493a8 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#5){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x28/0x40 #4: c000000085d493e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#5){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x28/0x40 #5: c000000085d498c8 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: queue_wb_lat_store+0xb0/0x20c stack backtrace: CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 5902 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ ctrliq#138 Hardware name: IBM,9043-MRX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_028) hv:phyp pSeries Call Trace: [c0000000721ef590] [c00000000118f8a8] dump_stack_lvl+0x108/0x18c (unreliable) [c0000000721ef5c0] [c00000000022563c] print_circular_bug+0x448/0x604 [c0000000721ef670] [c000000000225a44] check_noncircular+0x24c/0x26c [c0000000721ef740] [c00000000022bf28] __lock_acquire+0x1b6c/0x2ae0 [c0000000721ef870] [c000000000229240] lock_acquire+0x140/0x430 [c0000000721ef970] [c0000000011cfbec] __mutex_lock+0xf0/0xa58 [c0000000721efaa0] [c00000000096c46c] wbt_init+0x164/0x238 [c0000000721efaf0] [c0000000008f8cd8] queue_wb_lat_store+0x1dc/0x20c [c0000000721efb50] [c0000000008f8fa0] queue_attr_store+0x12c/0x164 [c0000000721efc60] [c0000000007c11cc] sysfs_kf_write+0x6c/0xb0 [c0000000721efca0] [c0000000007bfa4c] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b8/0x29c [c0000000721efcf0] [c0000000006a281c] vfs_write+0x410/0x584 [c0000000721efdc0] [c0000000006a2cc8] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [c0000000721efe10] [c000000000031b64] system_call_exception+0x134/0x360 [c0000000721efe50] [c00000000000cedc] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec >From the above log it's apparent that method which writes to sysfs attr wbt_lat_usec acquires q->elevator_lock first, and then acquires q->rq_ qos_mutex. However the another method which writes to io.cost.qos, acquires q->rq_qos_mutex first, and then acquires q->rq_qos_mutex. So this could potentially cause the deadlock. A closer look at ioc_qos_write shows that correcting the lock order is non-trivial because q->rq_qos_mutex is acquired in blkg_conf_open_bdev and released in blkg_conf_exit. The function blkg_conf_open_bdev is responsible for parsing user input and finding the corresponding block device (bdev) from the user provided major:minor number. Since we do not know the bdev until blkg_conf_open_bdev completes, we cannot simply move q->elevator_lock acquisition before blkg_conf_open_ bdev. So to address this, we intoduce new helpers blkg_conf_open_bdev_ frozen and blkg_conf_exit_frozen which are just wrappers around blkg_ conf_open_bdev and blkg_conf_exit respectively. The helper blkg_conf_ open_bdev_frozen is similar to blkg_conf_open_bdev, but additionally freezes the queue, acquires q->elevator_lock and ensures the correct locking order is followed between q->elevator_lock and q->rq_qos_mutex. Similarly another helper blkg_conf_exit_frozen in addition to unfreezing the queue ensures that we release the locks in correct order. By using these helpers, now we maintain the same locking order in all code paths where we update blk-wbt parameters. Fixes: 245618f ("block: protect wbt_lat_usec using q->elevator_lock") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202503171650.cc082b66-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319105518.468941-3-nilay@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 9dc7a88 Author: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Date: Mon May 5 22:18:00 2025 +0800 block: move hctx debugfs/sysfs registering out of freezing queue Move hctx debugfs/sysfs register out of freezing queue in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(), so that the following lockdep dependency can be killed: #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)ctrliq#16){++++}-{0:0}: #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: //debugfs And registering/un-registering hctx debugfs/sysfs does not require queue to be frozen: - hctx sysfs attributes show() are drained when removing kobject, and there isn't store() implementation for hctx sysfs attributes - debugfs entry read() is drained too when removing debugfs directory, and there isn't write() implementation for hctx debugfs too - so it is safe to register/unregister hctx sysfs/debugfs without freezing queue because the cod paths changes nothing, and we just need to keep hctx live Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-23-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

…xit() JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 78c2713 Author: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Date: Mon May 5 22:18:03 2025 +0800 block: move wbt_enable_default() out of queue freezing from sched ->exit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-26-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit 8b428f4 Author: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Date: Wed Jul 9 19:17:44 2025 +0800 nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning nbd grabs device lock nbd->config_lock for updating nr_hw_queues, this ways cause the following lock dependency: -> #2 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __del_gendisk+0x132/0xac6 block/genhd.c:706 del_gendisk+0xf6/0x19a block/genhd.c:819 nbd_dev_remove+0x3c/0xf2 drivers/block/nbd.c:268 nbd_dev_remove_work+0x1c/0x26 drivers/block/nbd.c:284 process_one_work+0x96a/0x1f32 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3321 [inline] worker_thread+0x5ce/0xde8 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x39c/0x7d4 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork_kernel+0x2a/0xbb2 arch/riscv/kernel/process.c:214 ret_from_fork_kernel_asm+0x16/0x18 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:327 -> #1 (&set->update_nr_hwq_lock){++++}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 down_write+0x9c/0x19a kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1577 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x3e/0xb86 block/blk-mq.c:5041 nbd_start_device+0x140/0xb2c drivers/block/nbd.c:1476 nbd_genl_connect+0xae0/0x1b24 drivers/block/nbd.c:2201 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x206/0x2e6 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x514/0x78e net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x3be net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534 genl_rcv+0x36/0x4c net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4f0/0x82c net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 netlink_sendmsg+0x85e/0xdd6 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0x160 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x63e/0x79c net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x144/0x1e6 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmsg+0x188/0x246 net/socket.c:2652 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2655 [inline] __riscv_sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xa2 net/socket.c:2655 syscall_handler+0x94/0x118 arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h:112 do_trap_ecall_u+0x396/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:341 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 -> #0 (&nbd->config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_noncircular+0x132/0x146 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2178 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3168 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3287 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3911 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x12b2/0x24ea kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5240 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd8 lib/refcount.c:118 nbd_config_put+0x3a/0x610 drivers/block/nbd.c:1423 nbd_release+0x94/0x15c drivers/block/nbd.c:1735 blkdev_put_whole+0xac/0xee block/bdev.c:721 bdev_release+0x3fe/0x600 block/bdev.c:1144 blkdev_release+0x1a/0x26 block/fops.c:684 __fput+0x382/0xa8c fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x1c/0x26 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x16a/0x25e kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x118/0x134 kernel/entry/common.c:114 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:330 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:414 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:449 [inline] do_trap_ecall_u+0x3f0/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:355 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 Also it isn't necessary to require nbd->config_lock, because blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues() does grab tagset lock for sync everything. Fixes the issue by releasing ->config_lock & retry in case of concurrent updating nr_hw_queues. Fixes: 98e68f6 ("block: prevent adding/deleting disk during updating nr_hw_queues") Reported-by: syzbot+2bcecf3c38cb3e8fdc8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6855034f.a00a0220.137b3.0031.GAE@google.com Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Cc: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709111744.2353050-1-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-115630 Upstream Status: commit 17ce3e5 commit 17ce3e5 Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Date: Tue Jul 22 22:40:37 2025 +0000 bpf: Disable migration in nf_hook_run_bpf(). syzbot reported that the netfilter bpf prog can be called without migration disabled in xmit path. Then the assertion in __bpf_prog_run() fails, triggering the splat below. [0] Let's use bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() in nf_hook_run_bpf(). [0]: BUG: assuming non migratable context at ./include/linux/filter.h:703 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, migration_disabled() 0 pid: 5829, name: sshd-session 3 locks held by sshd-session/5829: #0: ffff88807b4e4218 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1667 [inline] #0: ffff88807b4e4218 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x20/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1395 #1: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 [inline] #1: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 [inline] #1: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x69/0x26c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #2: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e5c4e00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: nf_hook+0xb2/0x680 include/linux/netfilter.h:241 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5829 Comm: sshd-session Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-00002-g155a3c003e55 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __cant_migrate kernel/sched/core.c:8860 [inline] __cant_migrate+0x1c7/0x250 kernel/sched/core.c:8834 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:703 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline] nf_hook_run_bpf+0x83/0x1e0 net/netfilter/nf_bpf_link.c:20 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:157 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:623 nf_hook+0x370/0x680 include/linux/netfilter.h:272 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] ip_output+0x1bc/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x1d7d/0x26c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:527 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2686/0x3e90 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1479 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1497 [inline] tcp_write_xmit+0x1274/0x84e0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2838 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xaf/0x390 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3021 tcp_push+0x225/0x700 net/ipv4/tcp.c:759 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1870/0x42b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1359 tcp_sendmsg+0x2e/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1396 inet_sendmsg+0xb9/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x4aa/0x5b0 net/socket.c:1131 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x6c7/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fe7d365d407 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff RSP: Fixes: fd9c663 ("bpf: minimal support for programs hooked into netfilter framework") Reported-by: syzbot+40f772d37250b6d10efc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6879466d.a00a0220.3af5df.0022.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Tested-by: syzbot+40f772d37250b6d10efc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250722224041.112292-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>

The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a91c809 ] The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [ removed const qualifier from bin_attribute callback parameters ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-115639 Upstream Status: linux.git Conflicts: (context) Missing upstream commit 5cde39e ("vxlan: Rename FDB Txlookup function"): The vxlan_find_mac_tx() function is still called "vxlan_find_mac" in Centos Stream 10. commit 1f5d2fd Author: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Date: Mon Sep 1 09:50:34 2025 +0300 vxlan: Fix NPD in {arp,neigh}_reduce() when using nexthop objects When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::). The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4]. Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing it. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [2] #!/bin/bash ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3 [3] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77 [4] #!/bin/bash ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0 Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries") Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-105612 commit a9c83a0 Author: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Date: Mon Dec 30 14:15:17 2024 -0700 io_uring/timeout: flush timeouts outside of the timeout lock syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f ctrliq#29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f ctrliq#29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: syzbot+b1fc199a40b65d601b65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-119009 Upstream Status: kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit b1bf1a7 Author: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@xiaomi.com> Date: Thu Jul 10 14:48:55 2025 +0800 dm-bufio: fix sched in atomic context If "try_verify_in_tasklet" is set for dm-verity, DM_BUFIO_CLIENT_NO_SLEEP is enabled for dm-bufio. However, when bufio tries to evict buffers, there is a chance to trigger scheduling in spin_lock_bh, the following warning is hit: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2745 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 123, name: kworker/2:2 preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/2:2/123: #0: ffff88800a2d1548 ((wq_completion)dm_bufio_cache){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xe46/0x1970 #1: ffffc90000d97d20 ((work_completion)(&dm_bufio_replacement_work)){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x763/0x1970 #2: ffffffff8555b528 (dm_bufio_clients_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x1ce/0x710 #3: ffff88801d5820b8 (&c->spinlock){....}-{2:2}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x2a5/0x710 Preemption disabled at: [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 123 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-g90548c634bd0 ctrliq#305 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache do_global_cleanup Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 __might_resched+0x360/0x4e0 do_global_cleanup+0x2f5/0x710 process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970 worker_thread+0x518/0xea0 kthread+0x359/0x690 ret_from_fork+0xf3/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> That can be reproduced by: veritysetup format --data-block-size=4096 --hash-block-size=4096 /dev/vda /dev/vdb SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz /dev/vda) dmsetup create myverity -r --table "0 $SIZE verity 1 /dev/vda /dev/vdb 4096 4096 <data_blocks> 1 sha256 <root_hash> <salt> 1 try_verify_in_tasklet" mount /dev/dm-0 /mnt -o ro echo 102400 > /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes [read files in /mnt] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.4+ Fixes: 450e8de ("dm bufio: improve concurrent IO performance") Signed-off-by: Wang Shuai <wangshuai12@xiaomi.com> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@xiaomi.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>

Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch #1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch #3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch #4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch #5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 648ef1324add1c2e2b6041cdf0b28d31fbca5f13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <i@rong.moe> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit f19bbecd34e3c15eed7e5e593db2ac0fc7a0e6d8) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-116016 commit 387602d Author: Robert Hodaszi <robert.hodaszi@digi.com> Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 16:40:04 +0200 Don't set WDM_READ flag in wdm_in_callback() for ZLP-s, otherwise when userspace tries to poll for available data, it might - incorrectly - believe there is something available, and when it tries to non-blocking read it, it might get stuck in the read loop. For example this is what glib does for non-blocking read (briefly): 1. poll() 2. if poll returns with non-zero, starts a read data loop: a. loop on poll() (EINTR disabled) b. if revents was set, reads data I. if read returns with EINTR or EAGAIN, goto 2.a. II. otherwise return with data So if ZLP sets WDM_READ (#1), we expect data, and try to read it (#2). But as that was a ZLP, and we are doing non-blocking read, wdm_read() returns with EAGAIN (#2.b.I), so loop again, and try to read again (#2.a.). With glib, we might stuck in this loop forever, as EINTR is disabled (#2.a). Signed-off-by: Robert Hodaszi <robert.hodaszi@digi.com> Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250403144004.3889125-1-robert.hodaszi@digi.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <desnesn@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-116016 commit cf02334 Author: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 14:25:49 +0300 If the PHY driver uses another PHY internally (e.g. in case of eUSB2, repeaters are represented as PHYs), then it would trigger the following lockdep splat because all PHYs use a single static lockdep key and thus lockdep can not identify whether there is a dependency or not and reports a false positive. Make PHY subsystem use dynamic lockdep keys, assigning each driver a separate key. This way lockdep can correctly identify dependency graph between mutexes. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u51:0/78 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0008116554f0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c but task is already holding lock: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&phy->mutex); lock(&phy->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u51:0/78: #0: ffff000800010948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x5ec #1: ffff80008036bdb0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x5ec #2: ffff0008094ac8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x188 #3: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/u51:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm CRD, BIOS 6.0.240904.BOOT.MXF.2.4-00528.1-HAMOA-1 09/ 4/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x258/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1f84 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x338 __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x59c mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 phy_init+0x4c/0x12c snps_eusb2_hsphy_init+0x54/0x1a0 phy_init+0xe0/0x12c dwc3_core_init+0x450/0x10b4 dwc3_core_probe+0xce4/0x15fc dwc3_probe+0x64/0xb0 platform_probe+0x68/0xc4 really_probe+0xbc/0x298 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160 __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x138 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 __device_attach+0x9c/0x188 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xac/0xb0 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xc8 process_one_work+0x208/0x5ec worker_thread+0x1c0/0x368 kthread+0x14c/0x20c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 3584f63 ("phy: qcom: phy-qcom-snps-eusb2: Add support for eUSB2 repeater") Fixes: e246355 ("phy: amlogic: Add Amlogic AXG PCIE PHY Driver") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org> Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZnpoAVGJMG4Zu-Jw@hovoldconsulting.com/ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605-phy-subinit-v3-1-1e1e849e10cd@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <desnesn@redhat.com>

Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.18, take #2 - Fix check for local interrupts on riscv32 - Read HGEIP CSR on the correct cpu when checking for IMSIC interrupts - Remove automatic I/O mapping from kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region()

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm654 fixes for 6.18, take #2 * Core fixes - Fix trapping regression when no in-kernel irqchip is present (20251021094358.1963807-1-sascha.bischoff@arm.com) - Check host-provided, untrusted ranges and offsets in pKVM (20251016164541.3771235-1-vdonnefort@google.com) (20251017075710.2605118-1-sebastianene@google.com) - Fix regression restoring the ID_PFR1_EL1 register (20251030122707.2033690-1-maz@kernel.org - Fix vgic ITS locking issues when LPIs are not directly injected (20251107184847.1784820-1-oupton@kernel.org) * Test fixes - Correct target CPU programming in vgic_lpi_stress selftest (20251020145946.48288-1-mdittgen@amazon.de) - Fix exposure of SCTLR2_EL2 and ZCR_EL2 in get-reg-list selftest (20251023-b4-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-sctlr-el2-v1-1-088f88ff992a@kernel.org) (20251024-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-zcr-el2-v1-1-0cd0ff75e22f@kernel.org) * Misc - Update Oliver's email address (20251107012830.1708225-1-oupton@kernel.org)

…ostcopy JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-43214 commit de4da7b Author: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Date: Thu Aug 21 17:23:09 2025 +0200 KVM: s390: Fix access to unavailable adapter indicator pages during postcopy When you run a KVM guest with vhost-net and migrate that guest to another host, and you immediately enable postcopy after starting the migration, there is a big chance that the network connection of the guest won't work anymore on the destination side after the migration. With a debug kernel v6.16.0, there is also a call trace that looks like this: FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 881 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 549 Comm: kworker/6:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0 ctrliq#56 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 LA1 400 (LPAR) Workqueue: events irqfd_inject [kvm] Call Trace: [<00003173cbecc634>] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x168 [<00003173cca69588>] handle_userfault+0xde8/0x1310 [<00003173cc756f0c>] handle_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x760 [<00003173cc759212>] __handle_mm_fault+0x452/0xa00 [<00003173cc7599ba>] handle_mm_fault+0x1fa/0x6a0 [<00003173cc73409a>] __get_user_pages+0x4aa/0xba0 [<00003173cc7349e8>] get_user_pages_remote+0x258/0x770 [<000031734be6f052>] get_map_page+0xe2/0x190 [kvm] [<000031734be6f910>] adapter_indicators_set+0x50/0x4a0 [kvm] [<000031734be7f674>] set_adapter_int+0xc4/0x170 [kvm] [<000031734be2f268>] kvm_set_irq+0x228/0x3f0 [kvm] [<000031734be27000>] irqfd_inject+0xd0/0x150 [kvm] [<00003173cc00c9ec>] process_one_work+0x87c/0x1490 [<00003173cc00dda6>] worker_thread+0x7a6/0x1010 [<00003173cc02dc36>] kthread+0x3b6/0x710 [<00003173cbed2f0c>] __ret_from_fork+0xdc/0x7f0 [<00003173cdd737ca>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/549: #0: 00000000800bc958 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1490 #1: 000030f3d527fbd0 ((work_completion)(&irqfd->inject)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x81c/0x1490 #2: 00000000f99862b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_map_page+0xa8/0x190 [kvm] The "FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing" indicates that handle_userfaultfd() saw a page fault request without ALLOW_RETRY flag set, hence userfaultfd cannot remotely resolve it (because the caller was asking for an immediate resolution, aka, FAULT_FLAG_NOWAIT, while remote faults can take time). With that, get_map_page() failed and the irq was lost. We should not be strictly in an atomic environment here and the worker should be sleepable (the call is done during an ioctl from userspace), so we can allow adapter_indicators_set() to just sleep waiting for the remote fault instead. Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-42486 Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> [thuth: Assembled patch description and fixed some cosmetical issues] Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: f654706 ("KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages") [frankja: Added fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-99989 commit 752e221 Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Date: Mon Apr 7 10:03:17 2025 -0700 smc: Fix lockdep false-positive for IPPROTO_SMC. SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: syzbot+be6f4b383534d88989f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250407170332.26959-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mahanta Jambigi <mjambigi@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mete Durlu <mdurlu@redhat.com>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-110274 commit ee684de Author: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Date: Tue Apr 15 17:50:14 2025 +0200 libbpf: Fix buffer overflow in bpf_object__init_prog As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) ctrliq#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) ctrliq#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>

When freeing indexed arrays, the corresponding free function should be called for each entry of the indexed array. For example, for for 'struct tc_act_attrs' 'tc_act_attrs_free(...)' needs to be called for each entry. Previously, memory leaks were reported when enabling the ASAN analyzer. ================================================================= ==874==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 #1 0x55c98db048af in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 #2 0x55c98db048af in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:71 Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 #1 0x55c98db04a93 in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 #2 0x55c98db04a93 in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:74 Direct leak of 10 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 #1 0x55c98db0527d in tc_act_attrs_set_kind ../generated/tc-user.h:1622 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 58 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s). The following diff illustrates the changes introduced compared to the previous version of the code. void tc_flower_attrs_free(struct tc_flower_attrs *obj) { + unsigned int i; + free(obj->indev); + for (i = 0; i < obj->_count.act; i++) + tc_act_attrs_free(&obj->act[i]); free(obj->act); free(obj->key_eth_dst); free(obj->key_eth_dst_mask); Signed-off-by: Zahari Doychev <zahari.doychev@linux.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106151529.453026-3-zahari.doychev@linux.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ] Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ check/1334 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470 blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0 tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0 cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 wbt_init+0x17e/0x280 wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140 blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0 __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0 add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250 device_add_disk+0x18/0x30 virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800 virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610 really_probe+0x136/0x620 __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0 __driver_attach+0x158/0x250 bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130 driver_attach+0x26/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0 driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0 __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60 virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0 do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540 kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0 kernel_init+0x2b/0x270 ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940 lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690 del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod] device_remove+0x87/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230 device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220 device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0 __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0 scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60 sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100 dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->sysfs_lock); Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before rq_qos_mutex from other context. The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile, consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 6dd97ce upstream. When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <i@rong.moe> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit f19bbecd34e3c15eed7e5e593db2ac0fc7a0e6d8) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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bmastbergen commented Apr 24, 2025

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