[core] remove srv->entropy[]

unlikely to provide any real additional benefit as long as
PRNG has been appropriately initialized with random data

src/base.h

@@ -642,8 +642,6 @@ typedef struct server {
 	time_t last_generated_debug_ts;
 	time_t startup_ts;
 
-	char entropy[8]; /* from /dev/[u]random if possible, otherwise rand() */
-
 	buffer *ts_debug_str;
 	buffer *ts_date_str;
 

src/mod_auth.c

@@ -809,18 +809,11 @@ static handler_t mod_auth_send_401_unauthorized_digest(server *srv, connection *
 
 	/* generate nonce */
 
-	/* using unknown contents of srv->tmp_buf (modified elsewhere)
-	 * adds dubious amount of randomness.  Remove use of srv->tmp_buf in nonce? */
-
 	/* generate shared-secret */
 	li_MD5_Init(&Md5Ctx);
-	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, CONST_BUF_LEN(srv->tmp_buf)); /*(dubious randomness)*/
-	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, CONST_STR_LEN("+"));
 
-	/* we assume sizeof(time_t) == 4 here, but if not it ain't a problem at all */
 	li_itostrn(hh, sizeof(hh), srv->cur_ts);
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)hh, strlen(hh));
-	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)srv->entropy, sizeof(srv->entropy));
 	li_itostrn(hh, sizeof(hh), li_rand_pseudo_bytes());
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)hh, strlen(hh));
 

src/mod_usertrack.c

@@ -227,10 +227,8 @@ URIHANDLER_FUNC(mod_usertrack_uri_handler) {
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, CONST_BUF_LEN(con->uri.path));
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, CONST_STR_LEN("+"));
 
-	/* we assume sizeof(time_t) == 4 here, but if not it ain't a problem at all */
 	li_itostrn(hh, sizeof(hh), srv->cur_ts);
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)hh, strlen(hh));
-	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)srv->entropy, sizeof(srv->entropy));
 	li_itostrn(hh, sizeof(hh), li_rand_pseudo_bytes());
 	li_MD5_Update(&Md5Ctx, (unsigned char *)hh, strlen(hh));
 

src/server.c

@@ -244,7 +244,6 @@ static server *server_init(void) {
 	}
 
 	li_rand_reseed();
-	li_rand_bytes((unsigned char *)srv->entropy, (int)sizeof(srv->entropy));
 
 	srv->cur_ts = time(NULL);
 	srv->startup_ts = srv->cur_ts;