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[security] /override has no severity ceiling — can bypass a security CRITICAL with one log line #26
Description
Activity
Fixed.
commands/override.mdnow carries a dedicated "Security ceiling — heavier path for security-critical stops" section:- A security CRITICAL / irreversible-op stop is not bypassable by the single-confirm path.
- The heavier path requires acknowledgement of the specific finding (a generic "security override" is rejected), and writes a distinct
SECURITY-OVERRIDE-tagged audit line recording the finding + reason. - It runs
hooks/security-pass.py, which writes a boundsecurity-gate-passedmarker, so the bypass is gated rather than merely logged. - Under
/ca:sprint, a security-critical override is a hard-gate STOP that surfaces to the user; the orchestrator MUST route such stops through the Security ceiling path and MUST NOT auto-decide them.
The carve-out is documented in the "When NOT to use" area as requested. Closing as completed.
Generated by Claude Code
From the adversarial plugin review (gate reviewer). Verified.
Problem
commands/override.mdlets/override "reason"bypass any gate with a single audit line and a single confirm (:9"Single identity, single confirm"). The "When NOT to use" section (:35) lists only routine work that passes all gates — there is no carve-out preventing override of a security-critical stop.This contradicts the gate model's own premise:
ORCHESTRATOR.md§2 ranks "security & correctness of the audit trail" as the #1 conflict-hierarchy priority, andSPRINT.md:84-90treats security-controls / crypto / secrets / irreversible-ops as inviolable hard gates. YetSPRINT.md's hard-gate list names "/overrideterritory" as a stop that surfaces to the user — so a human can then/overridea security CRITICAL, andoverride.mdlogs one line and proceeds.Impact
The bypass is auditable but not bounded. The audit trail records that a security CRITICAL was overridden, but nothing prevents it. "Security stops are non-negotiable" is contradicted by a bypass with no severity ceiling.
Recommended direction
Add a severity ceiling to
/override: a security CRITICAL / irreversible-op stop either cannot be overridden, or requires a distinct, heavier confirmation path (explicit typed acknowledgement of the specific finding, separate from routine gate overrides). Document the carve-out inoverride.md's "When NOT to use."Related: the security-gate routing issue from the same review.