v1.0.0 -- Protocol crates on crates.io, auth enumeration, IANA registries, NFSv4 escape

The v1.0.0 release ships the eight protocol crates to crates.io as standalone libraries, adds comprehensive auth flavor enumeration, complete IANA RPC registries, 6 new analyzer findings, NFSv4 escape via LOOKUPP, and OS fingerprinting via EXCHANGE_ID.

Install

# From crates.io
cargo install nfswolf

# Prebuilt binaries (pick your platform below)

File	Link	FUSE	When to use
nfswolf-linux-x86_64	musl, static	no	Zero-dep binary, any Linux kernel
nfswolf-linux-x86_64-full	glibc, dynamic	yes	nfswolf mount (requires libfuse3)
nfswolf-linux-arm64 / -full	same split	same	ARM64 Linux
nfswolf-macos-universal	fat binary	macFUSE	macOS (Apple Silicon + Intel)
nfswolf-windows-x86_64-msvc.exe	MSVC	no	Windows x86_64

Highlights

Protocol crates published to crates.io

All 8 protocol crates are now standalone libraries on crates.io, usable independently of the nfswolf binary:

onc-xdr-derive -- onc-xdr -- onc-rpc-client -- onc-rpcbind -- nfs-mount -- nfs-v2 -- nfs-v3 -- nfs-v4

Auth flavor enumeration

• SECINFO GSS mechanism decoding (krb5/krb5i/krb5p from OID, not pseudo-flavors)
• Scanner v4 SECINFO + v3 MNT auth probing on every export
• AUTH_TOOWEAK oracle (F-1.8): detects Kerberos enforcement at the NFS layer
• AUTH_SHORT finding (F-3.9): replayable session credentials from wire captures

New analyzer checks

Finding	What it detects
F-1.8	Kerberos enforced via AUTH_TOOWEAK (MOUNT accepts AUTH_SYS, GETATTR rejects)
F-3.7	AUTH_DH advertised (cryptographically broken, RFC 5531)
F-3.8	RPC-with-TLS supported (RFC 9289 STARTTLS probe)
F-3.9	AUTH_SHORT session credentials (replayable without UID/GID)
F-4.6	Unrestricted chown via PATHCONF (ownership hijacking)
F-5.7	Case-insensitive filesystem (Windows NFS / NTFS fingerprint)
F-5.8	Export root attributes leaked via AUTH_NONE GETATTR

Complete IANA registries

• 1251 RPC program numbers (was 13) -- every assigned program in a portmapper DUMP decoded by name
• 19 auth flavor numbers (AUTH_NONE through AUTH_TLS, legacy flavors, krb5 pseudo-flavors)
• 19 auth status codes (AUTH_OK through RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE)

NFSv4 enhancements

• Escape via LOOKUPP -- pseudo-filesystem traversal to the real root without MOUNT
• OS fingerprinting via EXCHANGE_ID vendor/version strings
• SECINFO_NO_NAME fallback + WRONGSEC oracle for auth negotiation
• pNFS topology enumeration (GETDEVICEINFO/GETDEVICELIST)
• All 37 v4.0 operations + v4.1/v4.2 extensions wired
• Handle acquisition matrix: MOUNT v1/v3 cross-version with pad/trim variants

Crate restructuring

• Eight-crate rename from nfswolf-* to vendor-neutral names (onc-xdr, onc-rpc-client, nfs-v3, etc.)
• Portmapper/rpcbind extracted into onc-rpcbind; MOUNT extracted into nfs-mount
• NFSv2 on PooledTransport (pooling, circuit breaker, stealth, SOCKS5)

Other

• Scanner security notes for 15+ sideband RPC programs (NLM, NSM, NIS, RQUOTA, etc.)
• 543 tests across 8 workspace crates and the binary
• Trusted publishing CI for future crates.io releases

Verify

sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing

cosign verify-blob \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github\\.com/StrongWind1/NFSWolf/" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \
  SHA256SUMS

Full Changelog: v0.8.0...v1.0.0

v0.8.0

What's New in v0.8.0

Cross-Version Parity

• NFSv2 identity change -- uid, gid, hostname, and impersonate now work in the v2 shell by reconnecting with new credentials. Previously v2 identity was fixed at connect time.
• NFSv2 fattr -- stat now shows correct rdev, fsid, and disk usage instead of zeros.
• NFSv2 escape guards -- export_is_fs_root check prevents false positives; BTRFS subvolume sweep now runs on v2 (previously v3-only).
• NFSv2 default export -- v2 shell defaults to / when no export specified, matching v3.
• NFSv4 local commands -- handle, lcd, lls, lpwd, lmkdir, history now work in the v4 shell.

Shell Aliases

All work across v2, v3, and v4 with tab completion:

Alias	Command
download / upload	get / put
ll	ls -a (full columns)
dir	ls
type	cat
del	rm
rename	mv
copy	cp
id	whoami
su	impersonate

Bug Fixes

• Analyzer proxy bypass -- per-export clients now inherit --proxy, --hostname, and --aux-gids. Previously silently bypassed the SOCKS5 proxy and hardcoded the hostname.
• cat vs get credential gap -- get now performs the same credential escalation as cat. Previously cat /etc/shadow could succeed while get /etc/shadow failed with NFS3ERR_ACCES.
• NFSv4 cat binary corruption -- raw byte output instead of lossy UTF-8 conversion.
• Pool blocking_lock panic -- try_lock instead of blocking_lock in pool checkin, which panicked inside the tokio runtime.
• Analyzer pagination -- check_nohide and check_symlink_preconditions now iterate all READDIRPLUS pages.
• Analyzer shared pool -- one pool shared across exports instead of fresh pool per export.

Protocol Crate Improvements

• Nfs2Error: is_permission_denied(), is_stale(), is_not_found() predicates
• Display for NfsStat (v2) and Nfs4Status (v4) with RFC error names
• Nfs2Client::into_transport(), tracing on v2 call failures
• Removed dead RpcbindTime and duplicate Opaque::from_vec()

Code Quality

• Consolidated 4 recursive walkers into generic walk_recursive() with filter closures
• Deduplicated rwx formatting into shared format_rwx()
• 480 tests, all passing across 3 feature matrices

Full Changelog

https://github.com/StrongWind1/NFSWolf/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#080---2026-07-28

v0.7.0 -- Six-crate workspace, NFSv2 shell, 469 tests

Complete workspace refactor and protocol expansion. Every code path live-tested against 6 NFS servers across ext4, XFS, BTRFS, NFSv2, NFSv3, and NFSv4.

Architecture

• Six-crate workspace: nfswolf-xdr, nfswolf-xdr-derive, nfswolf-rpc, nfswolf-nfs2, nfswolf-nfs3, nfswolf-nfs4. The RpcTransport trait is the single seam between wire protocol and connection policy.
• NFSv3 domain API: FileHandle, FileAttrs, Nfs3Error with oracle classification (is_handle_oracle_hit / is_handle_oracle_miss) and transient-error discrimination.
• Evidence-driven credential ladder: file owner first, then caller+owner-group, then root, then READDIRPLUS-harvested identities ranked by frequency, then service accounts. Mode-bit pruning skips rungs that provably can't succeed.

Protocol coverage

• NFSv2: all 18 procedures, MOUNT v1 (NULL/MNT/UMNT/EXPORT), shell with 44 commands including --handle MOUNT bypass and -c scripted mode.
• NFSv3: all 22 procedures, MOUNT v3 (all 6), FUSE mount with auto-UID ladder, connection pool, circuit breaker, stealth pacing.
• NFSv4: 9 COMPOUND operations (PUTROOTFH, PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, LOOKUP, GETATTR, GETFH, SECINFO, READDIR, READ), 22 named status codes, cookieverf pagination fix.
• RPC: AUTH_SYS with 16-GID cap, portmapper v2 (DUMP/GETPORT), rpcbind v3/v4 (GETTIME/GETSTAT/GETADDR), auth_stat values 8-14.

Escape and brute-handle

• escape: automatic filesystem detection (ext4 inode 2, XFS inode 128/64/32, BTRFS subvol 5/256+). Probe order: ext4 first, XFS second, BTRFS last. Automatic NFSv2 fallback for v2-only servers. Reads /etc/shadow via shadow GID on success.
• brute-handle: full cross-product (inode_start..=inode_end) x (gen_start..=gen_end) sweep. Reports ALL discovered handles, not just the root. BTRFS subvol sweep as fallback. Automatic NFSv2 fallback. STALE/BADHANDLE oracle for format validation.
• scan --auto-escape: works with NFSv2-only servers. Prints correct --nfs-version 2 rerun hints.

Security analysis

• F-1.7 mixed auth flavor downgrade detection (AUTH_SYS + Kerberos on same export).
• 21 findings detected by the analyzer, 14 exercised implicitly by protocol operations.
• WebNFS public handle probing with SNEGO-MCL flavor enumeration.
• Scanner wires EXPORT enumeration after UDP portmapper discovery.

Quality

• 469 tests (227 protocol crate unit tests, 106 integration tests, 22 proptest fuzz tests, 114 binary unit tests).
• Lint policy: pedantic clippy deny, 14 forbid-level compiler lints, wildcard_imports deny, use_self warn.
• Zero TODO/FIXME markers. Zero unannotated unwrap()/expect() in production code.
• RFC compliance review: 57 RFCs audited against the codebase.

Bug fixes since v0.6.0

• XDR Vec<u32>::unpack allocation amplification from forged wire lengths.
• NFSv2 DirOpRes::Pack wrong union encoding (wrote 100 extra bytes on error).
• NFSv2 missing NFSERR_WFLUSH=99.
• NFSv2 shell -c flag silently ignored.
• NFSv4 READDIR cookieverf=0 on continuation calls.
• Scanner EXPORT enumeration after UDP portmapper discovery.
• BTRFS compound UUID fingerprinting for export escape.
• convert --format console required -o (now prints to stdout).
• BTRFS identity check in escape (fileid vs handle bytes).

Upgrading

The binary is a drop-in replacement for v0.6.0. No configuration changes needed. New CLI flags:

• brute-handle: --inode-start, --inode-end, --gen-start, --gen-end (replace --fixed-inode and --fs-type).
• shell --nfs-version 2 --handle HEX: MOUNT bypass on NFSv2 servers.
• convert --format console without -o: prints to stdout.

Binaries

Binary	Platform	Notes
nfswolf-linux-x86_64	Linux x86_64 (musl static)	No FUSE (mount unavailable)
nfswolf-linux-x86_64-full	Linux x86_64 (glibc)	Full feature set including FUSE mount
nfswolf-linux-arm64	Linux aarch64 (musl static)	No FUSE
nfswolf-linux-arm64-full	Linux aarch64 (glibc)	Full including FUSE
nfswolf-macos-universal	macOS universal (x86_64 + arm64)
nfswolf-windows-x86_64-msvc.exe	Windows x86_64

SHA256SUMS is signed with the release signing key.

v0.6.0

Full Changelog: v0.5.0...v0.6.0

v0.5.0

Added

• scan --auto-escape: after discovery, automatically attempt an export escape (subtree_check bypass) against every discovered export path and print a ready-to-run shell --handle command for each filesystem root reached. Runs only on a complete scan, with bounded concurrency and a per-host timeout; honours --proxy and --delay/--jitter. The escape logic is shared with the escape subcommand via a single find_escape primitive.
• analyze --json [FILE]: optional file argument writes the JSON report to a file (matching scan --json <FILE>); with no value it still emits to stdout.
• NFSv4 shell honours --aux-gids (the shadow-GID trick now works in --nfs-version 4 mode, including across mid-session uid/gid/hostname reconnects).

Changed

• Breaking -- scan: the "additional ports to probe" flag is renamed --nfs-port to --probe-port. --nfs-port now means the single-value port override consistently across every subcommand, and scan folds it into its probe set instead of ignoring it.
• Breaking -- convert: --format is long-only; the -f short flag is removed (-f is the targets-file flag in scan/analyze).
• shell: removed the local --uid/--gid that shadowed the global -u/-g; the session now uses the global identity flags consistently, so shell -u 0 works like every other subcommand.
• analyzer: dropped the unsound bind-mount (F-2.6) check and the tautological insecure-port (F-7.2) check (both produced false positives on well-configured servers); added a plaintext-transport check (F-3.1, Info); F-1.2 is now emitted when a forged non-root UID is honoured; F-4.1 (no_root_squash) and F-7.5 (all_squash+anonuid=0) are disambiguated; the world-writable/symlink check includes root-owned directories; duplicate F-1.3 findings are deduplicated.
• Circuit breaker: trips only on genuine transient transport outages (never on NFS3ERR_ACCES/PERM, nor on FragmentedReply), records connection-establishment failures so a dead host opens the breaker, and escalates the cooldown once per outage rather than per failure. Every RPC also carries a per-call timeout so a stalled server cannot pin a pool connection.
• NFSv2/NFSv4: NFSv2 raw RPC now uses a fresh AUTH_SYS stamp per call and feeds the circuit breaker; NFSv4 clients honour StealthConfig; both bound directory paging and XDR allocations against hostile servers; privileged source ports are used for raw NFSv2 RPC and MOUNT v1.
• FUSE: read loops on short reads (no more zero-filled gaps); readdir pages a directory to completion with a per-inode cache; forget bounds inode-map growth; device major/minor are encoded correctly in mknod.
• CLI: analyze resolves hostnames and IPv6 targets; --nfs-port and --hostname are threaded through the offensive subcommands; the connection pool re-stamps the requested credential (aux-gids/hostname) on checkout.

Fixed

• Addressed roughly one hundred correctness, robustness, and protocol findings from a two-cycle security review: short-read/short-write loops in the shell and NFSv2 read paths, unbounded directory listings and in-memory reads, escape-handle byte-layout and root-confirmation correctness (fsid_type=7 length, XFS-root candidates, identity check against the export's own inode), wildcard/netmask export-ACL detection, and numerous smaller fixes. See the commit history for the full list.

Security

• shell get -r now rejects server-controlled directory-entry names that contain a path separator or .. before writing locally, preventing a malicious NFS server from escaping the chosen download directory (a zip-slip-class arbitrary local file write -- remote code execution when run under sudo).
• Report renderers and the live analyze console neutralize untrusted server data: terminal control/escape sequences, Markdown/CSV/HTML injection, and Unicode bidirectional / zero-width "trojan source" characters (CVE-2021-42574 class).
• Bounded every directory-listing and XDR allocation driven by an attacker-supplied length or count (memory-exhaustion DoS), and added per-call/per-host timeouts so an unresponsive server cannot hang the client.
• UDP RPC binds to the target's address family and accepts replies only from the address it sent to (drops spoofed responses).

Full Changelog: v0.4.0...v0.5.0

v0.4.0

nfswolf 0.4.0

Added

• shell: tree [depth] — recursively map a directory (default depth 3), always traversing hidden dot-directories (.ssh, .aws, .bash_history are exactly what you want on a security tool).
• shell prompt now shows uid=<n> gid=<n> and tracks mid-session uid / gid / impersonate changes.
• brute-handle writability hint — reports a non-destructive read-write vs read-only signal per hit from advisory ACCESS bits (probed as uid=0 and the object's owner). It never writes to the server; a handle is not itself ro/rw — the export's flag and the credential decide.
• access::WRITE_BITS / access::grants_write() helpers in proto::nfs3::types.

Changed

• Grouped --help — the nine subcommands are organised into Recon / Connect / Advanced / Utilities sections (commands are still invoked flat, e.g. nfswolf scan ...).
• shell: escalation-aware get — get now follows the auto-UID escalation ladder like cat, so get /etc/shadow succeeds where it previously failed with NFS3ERR_ACCES; tree escalates credentials to descend into root-only hidden directories.
• brute-handle: optional seed — --seed-handle is now optional; a bare host:/export target derives the seed by mounting the export (MNTPROC_MNT), matching escape. --seed-handle HEX stays as an explicit override and a new -e/--export flag mirrors escape.
• brute-handle: parity with escape — candidate generation now fingerprints the seed (--fs-type auto) and tries the same known-root candidates as escape (ext4 inode 2 / compound-UUID, XFS 128/64/32, BTRFS subvolumes) before the generic inode sweep. A hit is accepted on NFS3_OK or NFS3ERR_ACCES/NFS3ERR_PERM, so it finds the same roots escape does (a root_squash'd root is a valid handle, no longer discarded).
• Docs — reconciled the finding count (39 findings, F-1.1 through F-7.6), RFC citation format (§), write-up severities, and CLI/command references across FINDINGS / ARCHITECTURE / README / CLAUDE; CONTRIBUTING MSRV is now 1.95.

Removed

• docs/scanning-module-plan.md (the completed scan-rewrite plan); stale NLM/NSM references in conn.rs.

---

Binaries below are checksummed (SHA256SUMS), cosign-signed (SHA256SUMS.sig), and carry SLSA build-provenance attestations. The mount (FUSE) subcommand is in the -full (glibc) builds only — it cannot be statically linked against musl.

Full changelog: v0.3.1...v0.4.0

v0.3.1

What's Changed

• feat: rewrite scan module with PROG_MISMATCH probing, SIGINT handling, and UDP portmapper support by @StrongWind1 in #4
• ci: bump github/codeql-action from 4.35.2 to 4.35.3 in the actions-minor-patch group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #3
• deps: bump tokio from 1.52.1 to 1.52.3 in the cargo-minor-patch group by @dependabot[bot] in #6
• ci: bump github/codeql-action from 4.35.3 to 4.35.4 in the actions-minor-patch group by @dependabot[bot] in #5

New Contributors

• @StrongWind1 made their first contribution in #4

Full Changelog: v0.3.0...v0.3.1

v0.3.0

[0.3.0] - 2026-04-29

This release adds three login-history readers to the interactive shell -- last, lastb, and lastlog -- so an operator who has reached an NFS-exported filesystem root (typically via escape-root) can decode /var/log/wtmp, /var/log/btmp, and /var/log/lastlog directly over NFS without staging them locally first. Parsing follows the canonical glibc struct utmpx (384 bytes) and struct lastlog (292 bytes) layouts and was cross-checked against util-linux 2.42 login-utils/last.c.

Added

• Shell: last [N] decodes /var/log/wtmp and prints paired login sessions with full timestamps and durations. The state machine mirrors util-linux 2.42 login-utils/last.c::process_wtmp_file() -- USER_PROCESS pairs with DEAD_PROCESS on ut_line, sysvinit pseudo-records (~/reboot, ~/shutdown, ~/runlevel) are reclassified, and unmatched sessions are closed as Crash (next boot) or Down (clean shutdown / runlevel 0/6) per the same rules. Always-on full-time format and numeric IPs.
• Shell: lastb [N] decodes /var/log/btmp and prints failed-login attempts. Same struct utmpx parser as last.
• Shell: lastlog decodes /var/log/lastlog (uid-indexed 292-byte slots), maps UIDs to usernames via /etc/passwd from the same export, and prints one row per user that has actually logged in. When the classic flat file is empty or absent the command also probes /var/lib/lastlog/lastlog2.db (util-linux 2.42 default) and prints a get hint -- the SQLite database is left to offline tooling because pure-Rust SQLite would violate the project's no-C-deps rule.
• New module src/util/utmp.rs: pure-Rust binary parser for struct utmpx, struct lastlog, and /etc/passwd. Bounds-checked, panic-free, with seven unit tests covering record sizes, BOOT_TIME / USER_PROCESS layouts, partial-trailing-record handling, UID-indexed lastlog slots, and IPv4 address rendering. Spec-cited to util-linux 2.42, glibc <bits/utmp.h>, and <bits/lastlog.h>. Safe on every architecture supported by the project: the on-disk record sizes are fixed by the Linux ABI regardless of native time_t width.
• New shell helper read_all_escalated(): returns the full contents of a file handle after running the standard auto-UID escalation ladder. Required by the binary log readers because wtmp/btmp are typically gid=43 (utmp); the helper transparently switches credentials on NFS3ERR_ACCES.

Changed

• Shell escape-root now also rebases the session's notion of / to the constructed filesystem root. Absolute path lookups (cat /etc/shadow, last, cd /) walk from the underlying filesystem root rather than the narrow export the session originally MOUNTed through. Without this fix the new log readers couldn't reach /var/log/wtmp after an escape because the path was still resolved against the original sub-export.
• Crate metadata: expanded description, added filesystem to categories, added [package.metadata.docs.rs] with all-features = true and --cfg docsrs so docs.rs rebuilds are deterministic, and switched the include list to absolute (/-prefixed) paths to match the convention used by most well-curated Rust crates.
• README: added crates.io and docs.rs badges, and pointed the security-disclosure paragraph at the GitHub private security advisory channel rather than a SECURITY.md file.

Full Changelog: v0.2.0...v0.3.0

v0.2.0

[0.2.0] - 2026-04-28

The headline change is a substantial CLI overhaul: the attack umbrella verb is gone, primitives that duplicated shell / mount were removed, and three offensive primitives (escape, brute-handle, uid-spray) have been promoted to top-level subcommands. The export subcommand was renamed to convert. Every subcommand now runs the full check matrix unconditionally — the per-check toggles are gone — and --help is grouped into seven sections on every subcommand. The scanner is faster and more resilient against half-open firewalls, and the FUSE driver is now feature-complete.

Added

• New top-level subcommands: nfswolf escape, nfswolf brute-handle, nfswolf uid-spray. Replaces nfswolf attack escape | brute-handle | uid-spray.
• New top-level subcommand nfswolf convert that renders a JSON dump produced by nfswolf analyze --json into HTML / Markdown / CSV / TXT / console. The pipeline is now analyze --json > results.json then convert -i results.json -f html -o report.html. convert is safe to re-run because it does not touch the server.
• Unified positional <TARGET> parser shared by every subcommand that touches a single export. Accepts host, host:/export, or bracketed IPv6 ([2001:db8::1]:/srv). --export and --handle still work as flags; the parser rejects ambiguous combinations with a clear error.
• --nfs-port and --mount-port are now global flags (previously duplicated on mount and shell).
• Successful subcommand runs print a # rerun: nfswolf … line on stderr that can be pasted back into the shell to reproduce the run. Suppressed by --quiet or --json.
• --help for every subcommand is now grouped into seven sections: Target / Identity / Permissions / Network / Stealth / Output / Behavior.
• Shell: get -r and put -r recursive directory transfer with indicatif per-directory spinners; get --verify <sha256> validates the downloaded file against an expected hash.
• Shell: hostname <name> command sets auth_unix.machinename mid-session to bypass hostname-restricted export ACLs (F-1.4 / F-3.3 precondition probe).
• Shell: SHA-256 of every downloaded file is printed for evidence chains.
• Shell: --proxy socks5://host:port tunnels every NFS connection through a SOCKS5 pivot. Inline CONNECT, no external crate.
• Global --transport-udp flag for single-shot UDP RPC probes (portmapper amplification measurement, NSM probes). Wiring into the scanner's portmapper queries is tracked as the next step in tasklist.md.
• FUSE: every Nfs3Client procedure is now wired through a Filesystem callback (lookup, getattr, setattr, access, readlink, mknod, mkdir, symlink, create, unlink, rmdir, rename, link, readdir, read, write, fsync, statfs). Auto-UID escalation runs on every callback and caches the resolved credential per inode.
• NFSv4 shell: nfswolf shell --nfs-version 4 drops into a minimal NFSv4 shell (ls / cd / pwd / cat / get) using Nfs4DirectClient — works against NFSv4-only servers where MOUNT and the portmapper are filtered.
• Scanner: nfs4_reachable: bool field in HostResult, set by a direct NFSv4 COMPOUND PUTROOTFH probe to confirm v4 even when portmapper is filtered (F-3.3).

Changed

• Scanner: per-host TCP probes for ports 111 and 2049 now run concurrently via tokio::join!. A half-open firewall on one port no longer serializes the other.
• Scanner: every portmap / mount RPC call inside scan_host (detect_nfs_versions, list_exports, mount, dump_clients, detect_nis) is wrapped in tokio::time::timeout(probe_timeout, …). A stateful firewall that completes the TCP handshake on 111 but drops RPC payload can no longer stall a worker for the underlying client default.
• Scanner: per-host workers are panic-isolated. A single misbehaving target can no longer sink a multi-thousand-host sweep.
• nfswolf mount(1) now detaches into a daemon so the FUSE handler outlives the shell.
• analyze: every analysis now runs the full check matrix unconditionally. The only per-run knobs are --test-read PATH, --test-read-uids, --test-read-gids, and --v4-depth. --test-read defaults to /etc/shadow when no paths are supplied.
• analyze: dropped per-check toggles (-A/--check-all, --skip-version-check, --no-exploit, --check-v4, --check-no-root-squash, --check-insecure-port, --check-nohide, --check-v2-downgrade, --check-portmap-amplification, --check-nis, --probe-squash).
• analyze: dropped --output FILE / --txt FILE. The global --json flag now makes analyze emit a JSON array on stdout — capture with shell redirection and feed to nfswolf convert.
• scan: dropped per-check toggles (--fast, --no-rpc-enum, --check-portmap-amplification, --check-v2-downgrade, --check-nis, --check-portmap-bypass). Every scan now runs the full check matrix unconditionally. The only knobs are concurrency, ports, and timeout.
• mount: dropped --auto-uid, --allow-root, --suid, --dev, --allow-other, --elevate-perms. The credential ladder, owner-bit elevation, suid/dev passthrough, and shared-mount visibility are always on — this is a security toolkit, the goal is unobstructed access. -e short for --export was added.
• shell: dropped --auto-uid. The credential ladder is always on; the shell falls through to escalated credentials on every NFS3ERR_ACCES.
• --export consistently has -e as its short form on every subcommand that accepts it.

Removed

• The attack parent verb is gone.
• Removed attack read, attack write, attack upload, attack harvest, and attack symlink-swap. shell (get, put, get -r, put -r, cat, find) and mount (regular filesystem tools) cover the same primitives with the same credential ladder.
• Removed attack lock-dos entirely. Lock-storm DoS was the only NLM-dependent feature; with it gone, the NLM and NSM clients (src/proto/nlm/, src/proto/nsm/), the F-6.1 NLM lock-attack analyzer check, and the portmapper helpers detect_nlm / detect_nsm are removed. F-6.2 / F-6.3 (grace-period DoS, SETCLIENTID state destruction) were never implemented and are documented as out of scope.
• Removed attack v4-grace (placeholder-only; no working implementation).
• Removed src/engine/fs_walker.rs (recursive walker used only by harvest) and the CredentialManager struct from src/engine/credential.rs (used only by removed attack modules). The escalation_list helper survives — it is shared by shell, mount, and the three offensive subcommands.
• Removed inline --escape flag from offensive subcommands. To cross the export boundary, run nfswolf escape first and feed the resulting handle into shell --handle HEX or mount --handle HEX. The escape module is now the single entry point for export breakout.

Fixed

• FUSE: --elevate-perms shift offset (now correctly copies owner bits to other; previously copied group bits, leaving 0700 unchanged). Behavior is now always-on.
• FUSE: --nfs-port being silently ignored when --export was used (was only honored with --handle).
• FUSE: --proxy not being passed to the connection pool, so --handle mounts now tunnel through SOCKS5.
• FUSE: server-side symlink resolution and the null-attr READDIRPLUS fix-up are always on (NetApp / nested-export workaround).
• Multiple small CLI bugs surfaced by live-server testing.

v0.1.0

First public release. Covers the full NFS attack path: recon → enumeration → analysis → exploitation → shell. For authorized security research only.

Protocol support

• NFSv2, NFSv3, and NFSv4.0 over TCP with full XDR encoding
• AUTH_SYS credential injection with per-call stamp rotation to avoid duplicate-request-cache hits
• MOUNT, portmapper (DUMP / GETPORT), NLM4 lock procedures, and NSM stat/monitor
• NFSv4 COMPOUND operations: PUTROOTFH, GETFH, LOOKUP, GETATTR, READDIR, READ, SECINFO
• UDP transport for single-shot RPC probes (portmapper amplification measurement)
• SOCKS5 proxy support for all TCP connections
• Connection pool with per-(host, export, uid, gid) bucketing, LIFO reuse, and health eviction
• Circuit breaker with sliding-window failure tracking and exponential-backoff cooldown; permission denials do not trip the breaker during UID spraying

Subcommands

• scan — concurrent host and export enumeration across configurable CIDR ranges; detects NFSv2/v3/v4, supported auth flavors, and open portmapper/NLM/NSM services
• analyze — automated security analysis against all 36 findings (F-1.1 through F-7.6); produces a risk-scored report
• shell — interactive NFS shell with 35 commands, tab completion, and readline history; supports get/put with recursive (-r) directory transfer and SHA-256 verification; hostname spoofing to bypass hostname-restricted exports
• mount — FUSE filesystem mount with spoofed AUTH_SYS credentials; exposes the remote export as a local directory
• export — renders a prior analysis result in any of six output formats
• attack — nine targeted attack modules:
  • uid-spray — brute-force UID/GID pairs using the ACCESS oracle
  • escape — construct file-handle escape payloads for ext4, XFS, and BTRFS
  • read — read arbitrary files by inode using forged handles
  • write — write files as any UID without no_root_squash mitigation
  • harvest — recursive secret pattern matching across an export tree
  • brute-handle — inode-range handle brute-force with STALE/BADHANDLE oracle discrimination
  • lock-dos — NLM4 lock-storm denial-of-service
  • symlink-swap — TOCTOU symlink substitution attack
  • v4-grace — NFSv4 grace-period state disruption

Security analysis

• 36 findings across seven categories: credential spoofing (F-1.x), export escape (F-2.x), network (F-3.x), privilege escalation (F-4.x), enumeration (F-5.x), locking (F-6.x), and policy misconfiguration (F-7.x)
• Every finding references the authoritative RFC section and includes severity, detection method, and a detailed write-up
• Auto-UID resolution: nine-step strategy that tries NFSv2 (no root_squash negotiation), NFSv3 ACCESS oracle, and UID 0/65534/1000 before falling back to spray

File handle engine

• OS and filesystem fingerprinting from handle structure (Linux ext4, XFS, BTRFS, Windows, FreeBSD)
• Escape handle construction targeting inode 2 (ext4 root), XFS inode 128, and BTRFS subvolume UUID layouts
• BTRFS compound-UUID escape with subvolume enumeration
• Windows handle signing detection (HMAC presence / absence)
• Shannon entropy analysis for handle classification

Output and reporting

• Six report formats: ANSI-colored console, HTML (self-contained), JSON, CSV, Markdown, plain text
• Risk scoring: weighted sum across finding severities
• --output flag on export selects format; all formats accept the same AnalysisResult input

Releases

• Pre-built binaries for Linux x86_64 (musl static, glibc+FUSE), Linux arm64 (musl static, glibc+FUSE), Windows x86_64 (MSVC, GNU), Windows arm64 (MSVC), macOS arm64, macOS x86_64, and macOS universal
• SHA256SUMS file with cosign keyless signature (SHA256SUMS.sig) for every release
• SLSA build provenance attestations for every binary via actions/attest-build-provenance