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Security: PerryLink/dsh-defend

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:

https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-defend/security/advisories/new

That flow keeps the report confidential while we triage, and it is the channel we watch first.

Before you report

  • Redact sensitive data from any logs, session excerpts, or payload samples you attach: tokens, API keys, secrets, Authorization/request headers, personal paths, and account identifiers. Trimmed rule ids and severity facts are usually enough.
  • Include, when possible: the plugin version, the harness (dsh) version, Node and OS versions, and the minimal steps to reproduce.

What to expect

  • Acknowledgment: within 5 business days.
  • Triage: within 10 business days we confirm the issue and assess severity, or ask for more details.
  • Fix: security fixes are prepared in a private fork, released as a patch version, and announced in the release notes.

Disclosure and credit

  • We follow coordinated disclosure: a public advisory (and CVE request where appropriate) is published once a fix ships.
  • Reporters are credited in the advisory unless they ask to remain anonymous. There is no bug bounty program at this time.

Scope

This plugin is a detection and interception layer inside the harness. Its own guarantees:

  • Interceptions ride the official seams (tools/pre-execute, tools/post-execute, agent/pre-step, the approval service) — the plugin never re-implements or bypasses them, and every pass-through calls next().
  • Audit events are sanitized by construction: rule id, family, severity, and decision only; matched text never reaches the session log, and secret matches are type-only.
  • The plugin performs no network requests, stores no credentials, and executes no subprocesses.

Bypasses of this detector are detection gaps (false negatives), not vulnerabilities in the harness itself — but report them anyway so the rule library can improve. Vulnerabilities in the harness itself should be reported to the official harness maintainers instead.

There aren't any published security advisories