EdgeWasm-Runtime is pre-1.0. Security fixes land on main; there are no maintenance branches yet.

This runtime executes untrusted WASM modules and can be deployed to the public internet. The security boundary is documented in docs/OPERATIONS.md §Security and docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §12. In short:

• Untrusted code runs inside wasmtime's sandbox with hard memory/table/time caps; no host filesystem or network access by default.
• unsafe is forbidden workspace-wide (one audited AOT-deserialization site relaxes to deny).
• The gateway itself is the second boundary: API-key auth, per-key rate limiting, bounded bodies, and concurrency backpressure.
• Robustness fuzzing (tests/fuzz.rs, wasm-smith) feeds the sandbox random modules on every CI run.

Things deliberately out of scope (documented): TLS termination (the edge's job — Ingress/load balancer), and distributed rate limiting's Redis dependency (fail-closed by design).

Do not open a public issue for security problems. Report privately to the repository maintainers via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Repository → Settings → Security → Report a vulnerability), or open a security advisory.

Please include:

• The affected version/commit.
• A minimal repro (WAT/WASM module or HTTP request sequence).
• Impact and, if known, a suggested fix.

You should receive a response within 5 business days. We will keep you informed of progress and credit you (with your consent) in the fix.

1. Triage and confirm the report.
2. Fix on main with a regression test that fails before the fix.
3. Coordinate disclosure timing with the reporter; publish an advisory when warranted.