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feat(server): ACP Captains propose a Crew without a native prompt - #304
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This repository does not receive automatic reviews because it has fewer than 10 stars. ⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Repository: Jacksondr5/j5code/.coderabbit.yaml Review profile: CHILL Plan: Advanced Run ID: Comment |
An ACP agent's t3-code MCP call reached the upstream permission policy as an unclassified tool, so interactive modes showed a native card before the roster gate and read-only personas were refused. codex-acp asked again through its MCP approval elicitation. A J5-owned matcher now allows a pre-approved J5 tool once, and only when the root session's recorded tool-call state proves a t3-code identity from structured fields the harness fills itself: codex-acp's tagged rawInput, qwen's serverId with an mcp::t3-code:: tool name, or claude-acp's claudeCode.toolName. Titles never match. The request can only veto, every identity field present must agree, edit/delete/move never match, execute only under the codex-acp tag, and only allow_once is selected. Every other ACP agent keeps today's verdict. Part of #233 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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FORK.md: this branch's ACP case is renumbered 46 → 48 after the sync took 40–45 and OpenCode and Pi took 46 and 47; the inventory count follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…al test The upstream sync made AcpAdapterV2Options.selfInvocation required; the J5 ACP approval test now resolves it the way upstream's adapter tests do. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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[Review panel: Opus 5.5 + Astra + Fable 5.1] FORK.md: Case 48 describes the edit, but the upstream-file table has no entry for Fix: add |
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[Review panel: Opus 5.5 + Astra + Fable 5.1] Live interaction tests, run by Astra on the stack tip (62d6dbd). No seats were launched: every roster was declined and every control was denied.
Protocol observations that matter for the
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Closing (Jackson, 2026-09-26). Per the ruling on #233, J5 pre-approves its tools only on Codex and Claude. Other harnesses may show their own MCP prompt once before the roster card, which is acceptable. ACP's permission request carries no trustworthy server identity, so any version has to infer identity per agent. That's hard, it's security-sensitive (see the panel's Antigravity finding), and it's upstream adapter territory. A general fix for T3's own MCP tools belongs upstream and is tracked in #276. Thanks for the careful work here: the review surfaced real upstream gaps, which are now recorded. |
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Reopened: closing it was my overreach, not Jackson's call. The decision above stands (per #233, J5 won't pre-approve its tools on this harness), so it won't merge. @bryantderosier, closing it is yours to do whenever you like. |
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@Jacksondr5 Closing this per your ruling on #233: J5 pre-approves its tools only on Codex and Claude, and a ACP Captain may show its own MCP prompt once before the roster card. The general fix for T3's own MCP tools is tracked upstream in #276. Thanks for the panel's review; the gaps it found are recorded there. I'm closing #267 as not planned for the same reason. |
…301) * refactor(server): share one J5 tool pre-approval list across harnesses Codex and Claude each kept their own copy of the J5 tools they pre-approve. Move the list, the interactive-mode coordination subset, and the approval-policy-never check into j5ToolPreapproval.ts so every adapter append spreads the same set. Codex and Claude produce the same config as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(crews): every shipped adapter can be a Captain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(crews): Codex and Claude are where the roster card is the only human step Per Jackson's ruling on #233, J5 pre-approves its tools on Codex and Claude only. crews.md AC5, the "Any harness can captain" bullet, its History line, and the Crews section of the personas guide now say that other harnesses may ask once with their own MCP prompt before the roster card, and a read-only persona there can't propose. The never-pre-approved testkit list is scoped to J5's own appends and names Claude's upstream mcp__t3-code__* wildcard as the exception. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(server): the shared pre-approval list is for Codex and Claude FORK.md, j5ToolPreapproval.ts, and the testkit still described every harness pre-approving the set, with later adapter appends to come. Under Jackson's ruling on #233 only Codex and Claude do, and #302–#304 are closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Important
This PR is part of the Captains stack. Merge top to bottom, one at a time; each PR is based on the one above it. The stack has no migrations and no ordering against the other Crews PRs.
Problem
ACP registry agents run on
AcpAdapterV2, and a t3-code MCP call reachedacpPermissionDispositionas an ordinary unclassified tool (#267). That meant a native card in interactive modes and a refusal for read-only personas, so a persona Captain couldn't propose and a persona seat couldn't message its Captain or write its handoff. codex-acp asks a second time through anmcp_tool_call_approval_<toolCallId>elicitation.What I changed
apps/server/src/j5/a2a/mcp/acpToolApproval.ts(new):j5AcpT3ToolNameproves which t3-code tool a call invokes, or returns nothing.j5AcpPermissionResponsereturns a one-time allow for a proven, pre-approved call.j5AcpMcpElicitationDispositionhandles codex-acp's elicitation, linked by request id.AcpAdapterV2.ts(upstream, FORK.md case 48): one prefix at each call site. The permission handler returns the J5 response when it's defined, beforeacpPermissionDisposition. The elicitation handler triesj5AcpMcpElicitationDisposition(...) ??first.AcpClientPolicy.tsis untouched.docs/user/personas.md: the Codex, Qwen Code, and Claude Code agents from the ACP registry move to the harnesses that never add a step.Why this shape
ACP has no typed MCP call, and nothing at permission time proves a call came from T3's server: the bridge only sees a call after it's approved. So identity can come only from structured fields the harness fills from its own MCP dispatch. I dropped title matching entirely because some harnesses let the model write titles (pi-acp puts the shell command there; cline and Kimi append raw arguments).
Invariants
toolCallId. The permission request must repeat the recorded kind and can only veto._meta.is_mcp_tool_callwithrawInput.server/rawInput.tool;_meta.serverIdplus a_meta.toolNameofmcp::t3-code::<tool>(both required);_meta.claudeCode.toolNameofmcp__t3-code__<tool>.rawInputserver/tool still counts and vetoes on disagreement, as does goose's extension name.allow_onceoption is ever selected. With none offered, upstream's policy decides. The tool must be inj5PreapprovedToolsfor the thread's policy.Surfaces
packages/contracts)AcpAdapterV2.ts, recorded as FORK.md case 48.docs/user/personas.md.Out of scope
FORK.md numbering follows landing order: the formatter keeps the case list consecutive, so the Captains stack (feat(server): OpenCode Captains propose a Crew without a native prompt #302–feat(server): ACP Captains propose a Crew without a native prompt #304) and feat(crews): answer a Crew thread's provider approvals and questions from the Inbox #309 both start at case 46 on their branches. Whichever lands second renumbers its cases and file-table rows when it's brought up to date with
j5/main.Capture and match Grok MCP permission requests #268 (Grok) and Match Antigravity MCP permission requests by server #269 (Antigravity): their payloads carry no server-identifying field in the fixtures we have, and the tests assert they don't match.
droid, Gemini CLI, Amp, Kilo, opencode-acp, Copilot, Auggie, glm, and Kimi have no structured identity field, so they stay on the still-prompts list (Pre-approve J5 tools on ACP registry agents #267's final rule).
Accepted risk: a harness running a user-configured server named exactly
t3-codein place of T3's bridge would get that server's J5-named tools pre-approved. It's noted in the module doc comment.Upgrade and data
None.
Verification
acpToolApproval.test.ts: parity across the policy matrix plus the persona policy for each of the three forms, plus negatives:allow_always;acp-mcp-callfallback and bare names;serverIdwith a bare or unprefixed name.acpToolApproval.adapter.test.tsdrives both hooks throughAcpAdapterV2, including child-session reuse of a root call id.provider/acp, and the ACP, OpenCode, and Pi adapters.Review focus
claimsOfinacpToolApproval.ts: this is the security boundary. I changed two things from the earlier draft. An untaggedrawInputserver/tool now vetoes; the draft ignored it, so a request naming another tool there was allowed, and its own adapter test caught that. And qwen now grants only through the fullmcp::t3-code::name.executewithout the codex tag; those calls fall through to upstream's verdict.Closes #267
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