IEEE S&P 2026 Cycle 2 Submission #237
I-PIN is the first PIN authentication system that exploits structure-borne propagation acoustics to achieve robust resistance against visual eavesdropping, replay attacks, and environmental noise. This repository contains the implementation and demonstration materials for our revolutionary approach to mobile authentication.
- 🔬 Novel Biometric Approach: Structure-borne acoustic propagation for mobile authentication
- 🛡️ Comprehensive Security: Resistant to shoulder-surfing, replay attacks, and acoustic eavesdropping
- 📊 Outstanding Performance: 99.4% ASR with 0.9% FPR across 27 participants and 10 scenarios
We present I-PIN, the first PIN authentication system that exploits structure-borne propagation acoustics to achieve robust resistance against visual eavesdropping, replay attacks, and environmental noise. The core innovation lies in modeling each PIN tap as a Location-coupled Acoustic Fingerprint (LocAF) that jointly encodes the finger's anatomical traits and the keypad's structural attributes, with path-dependent frequency suppression during structural propagation naturally amplifying fine-grained biometric distinctions.
By exploiting propagation-enhanced acoustic biometrics and introducing a Log-Energy Scaling Ratio (LESR) to model frequency attenuation, we design a novel LESR–wavelet denoising method that preserves fine-grained identity features while resisting noise and replay attacks. A deep learning framework combining LESR-enhanced PANNs with contrastive learning further disentangles user identity from behavioral and environmental variations.
- LocAF Technology: Novel acoustic fingerprinting based on structure-borne sound propagation
- LESR Denoiser: Advanced noise reduction achieving 59.6 dB SNR improvement
- Multi-LocAF Fusion: Enhanced accuracy through multi-location acoustic analysis
- Robust Security: 100% resistance to shoulder-surfing and replay attacks
I-PIN illustration: I-PIN authenticates users via tap-induced acoustic biometrics, effectively preventing PIN leakage from shoulder-surfing and replay attacks.
I-PIN Application Demo: Demonstrating the acoustic biometric-based PIN authentication system in real-world usage scenarios
Experimental Results: Our system achieves 99.4% authentication success rate with 0.9% false positive rate across diverse environments (mall, office, subway, taxi) using 27 participants and 31,045 LocAF samples. The system demonstrates superior performance compared to existing acoustic and visual authentication methods.
This section demonstrates the core LocAF (Location-specific Acoustic Fingerprint) signals captured from real user interactions. We present data from 3 users tapping 2 different PIN digits (0, 2), with each digit repeated 2 times to show consistency and variability.
The following table presents the complete dataset of LocAF signals captured from our dual-microphone array system. Each row represents a specific user-PIN-attempt combination, with corresponding visualizations for time-domain analysis and frequency-domain CWT spectrograms.
Schematic of LocAF generation and propagation in a smartphone. A fingertip tap on each PIN keypad excites a LocAF signal that propagates through distinct structure-borne paths to the device's built-in top and bottom microphones.
| PIN | User | Attempt | Raw Audio | Time Domain | Top Mic CWT Spectrogram | Bottom Mic CWT Spectrogram |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | u1 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 0 | u1 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 0 | u2 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 0 | u2 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 0 | u3 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 0 | u3 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u1 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u1 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u2 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u2 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u3 | c1 | Audio | ![]() |
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| 2 | u3 | c2 | Audio | ![]() |
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Data Collection Details:
- Total Samples: 12 audio recordings (3 users × 2 PINs × 2 attempts)
- Audio Format: Dual-channel WAV files (8.0KB each)
- Sampling: Structure-borne acoustic propagation via dual-microphone array
Each data entry includes four key components:
- Raw Audio: Interactive HTML5 audio player for the original dual-channel WAV file recording
- Time Domain Analysis: Combined waveform visualization showing both top and bottom microphone signals
- Top Mic CWT Spectrogram: Frequency-time representation (0-16kHz, log scale) of top microphone signal
- Bottom Mic CWT Spectrogram: Frequency-time representation (0-16kHz, log scale) of bottom microphone signal
This section presents the Log-Energy Scaling Ratio (LESR) calculations for the LocAF data shown above, demonstrating how our novel LESR model extracts user-specific biometric features from the acoustic propagation patterns.
The LESR exploits asymmetric propagation paths between top and bottom microphones:
Where
The LESR model captures user-specific biometric signatures through path-dependent frequency attenuation. Key properties include:
- Position-dependent: Different tap locations exhibit distinct LESR patterns
- Behavior-resilient: Consistent across varying tap forces and angles
-
Noise-aware: Environmental noise results in
$\Delta LESR \approx 0$
Analysis shows LESR consistency across multiple taps of the same digit by the same user, demonstrating the reliability of our biometric approach. The stability is quantified through correlation coefficients and temporal variance measurements.
The following table presents the complete dataset of LESR analysis results for all LocAF signals. Each row represents a specific user-PIN-attempt combination, with corresponding visualizations showing the LESR heatmap (frequency-time analysis) and detailed LESR time series.
LESR Analysis Parameters: 5ms window, 1ms hop, 16 frequency bands, 32kHz sampling rate
| PIN | User | Attempt | LESR Heatmap (Frequency-Time Analysis) | LESR Time Series (Detailed View) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | u1 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 0 | u1 | c2 | ![]() |
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| 0 | u2 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 0 | u2 | c2 | ![]() |
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| 0 | u3 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 0 | u3 | c2 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u1 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u1 | c2 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u2 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u2 | c2 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u3 | c1 | ![]() |
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| 2 | u3 | c2 | ![]() |
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LESR Analysis Details:
- Total Samples: 12 LESR analysis results (3 users × 2 PINs × 2 attempts)
- Analysis Parameters: 5ms window, 1ms hop, 16 frequency bands, 32kHz sampling rate
LESR Visualization: Two types of analysis are shown: (1) LESR Heatmap provides frequency-time analysis showing LESR values across different frequency bands over time, and (2) LESR Time Series provides detailed temporal analysis with moving average.
The I-PIN system operates through a three-stage pipeline that transforms raw acoustic signals into reliable biometric authentication decisions.
System overview of I-PIN. The pipeline consists of three main components: (i) LESR-based Pre-processing, (ii) Identity Feature Extraction and Disentanglement, and (iii) Authentication with Multiple LocAF Samples.
Leverages on-device acoustic field to suppress noise and extract reliable LocAF segments:
- Dual-microphone signal acquisition and synchronization
- LESR calculation and frequency subband analysis
- LESR-wavelet denoising with adaptive thresholding
- Multi-resolution Stationary Wavelet Transform (SWT) processing
PANNs encoder extracts fine-grained physiological features, contrastive learning disentangles identity from behavioral variations:
- PANNs-based acoustic feature extraction (2048-dimensional)
- LESR structure-propagation biometric features
- Contrastive learning with triplet loss and binary cross-entropy
- Identity-behavioral variation disentanglement
Aggregates multiple LocAF samples during PIN entry for robust user authentication:
- Feature vector comparison with enrolled templates
- Multi-LocAF aggregation (N=5, M=3 parameters)
- Similarity scoring and threshold comparison
Each PIN tap generates unique LocAF signals encoding finger anatomical traits and keypad structural attributes.
LESR exploits asymmetric propagation paths with key properties: Position-dependent, behavior-resilient, and noise-aware (environmental noise →
Self-adaptive algorithm: Multi-resolution SWT analysis → Band alignment → Stability scoring (MAD) → Selective reconstruction. Achieves 59.6 dB SNR improvement vs. 33.3 dB best baseline.
Hybrid architecture combines PANNs fine-grained acoustic features (2048-dim) with LESR structure-propagation biometric features. Contrastive learning with triplet loss + binary cross-entropy disentangles identity from behavioral variations.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Authentication Success Rate | 99.4% |
| False Positive Rate | 0.9% |
| F1-Score | 99.3% |
| Equal Error Rate | 0.9% |
| Participants | 27 |
| LocAF Samples | 31,045 |
The following analysis demonstrates I-PIN's robust performance across various temporal conditions, environmental scenarios, user postures, and force levels.
| Environment | ASR (%) | FPR (%) | F1-Score (%) | EER (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mall | 100.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| Office | 100.0 | 1.0 | 99.5 | 0.5 |
| Subway | 99.8 | 1.4 | 99.2 | 1.3 |
| Taxi | 98.2 | 0.4 | 99.0 | 0.2 |
| Hard Tap | 99.8 | 0.4 | 99.7 | 0.2 |
| Light Tap | 99.4 | 0.8 | 99.3 | 0.7 |
| Component | Metric | I-PIN Value | Best Baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| LESR Denoiser | SNR Improvement | 59.6 dB | 33.3 dB |
| Feature Quality | Correlation | 99.99% | 99.98% |
| Multi-LocAF | ASR Improvement | 99.4% | 92.6% (single) |
I-PIN provides comprehensive defense against multiple attack vectors through its propagation-enhanced acoustic biometric approach:
| Attack Vector | Traditional PIN | I-PIN Defense Mechanism | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shoulder Surfing | ❌ Vulnerable | Visual-independent biometric authentication | 100% resistant |
| Zero-effort Attack | ❌ Vulnerable | User-specific LocAF signatures | FPR: 0.06% |
| Impersonation | ❌ Vulnerable | Anatomical trait encoding in LocAF | FPR: |
| Replay Attacks | ❌ Vulnerable | Structure-borne vs. airborne detection | FPR: 0% |
| Acoustic Eavesdropping | ❌ Vulnerable | On-device structure-borne signal isolation | 99.1% resistant |
| Environmental Noise | ❌ Affected | LESR-wavelet denoising (59.6 dB SNR) | Robust operation |
- Scale: 27 participants, 31,045 LocAF samples, IRB-approved study
- Devices: 7 smartphones (Vivo X100, Huawei Pura70Pro, Xiaomi 8, Redmi Note 13, Huawei P20, iPhone 13, Xiaomi 14)
- Environments: Mall, Office, Subway, Taxi + various postures (Tabletop, Palm, Grip) + force levels (Hard, Medium, Light)
- Data Collection: 44.1 kHz dual-microphone recording across diverse conditions
- Device Generalization: Stable performance across 7 different smartphones (ASR: 0.95-0.96, FPR: ~0.01-0.03)
- User Generalization: Average ASR > 0.98 across all participants with FPR < 0.02
- PIN Robustness: Consistent performance across all digits (0-9), most achieving perfect success (1.0) with zero false accepts
- Temporal Stability: 3-month evaluation shows sustained performance with minimal temporal drift
- LESR Denoiser Impact: Markedly improves discriminability under strict security budgets (ASR >0.97 at FPR=0.001)
- Full vs. Partial Components: Removing LESR features degrades performance (F1=0.62, ROC-AUC=0.95)
- Multi-LocAF Benefit: 92.6% → 99.4% ASR improvement with aggregation
- Parameter Optimization: K=16 subbands, L=8 SWT levels, (N=5, M=3) aggregation achieve optimal performance
@article{ipin2026,
title={Propagation-Enhanced Acoustic Biometrics: Noise-Resistant Mobile PIN Authentication against Shoulder-Surfing and Spoofing},
author={[Authors to be announced]},
journal={Proceedings of IEEE S&P},
year={2026},
publisher={IEEE}
}

































































