🛡️ Database Sentinel

A Claude Skill that audits your database backends for security vulnerabilities.

Drop it into Claude Code, Cursor, or any Claude-powered environment. Say "audit my database" and get a comprehensive security report with exact fix code — in minutes, not days.

170+ Lovable apps were breached. 20.1M rows were exposed across YC startups. ~87,000 MongoDB instances were left vulnerable to MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847, CISA KEV). 1.8M Firebase passwords leaked in a single 2025 incident. 45% of AI-generated code introduces OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities. Database Sentinel tests whether your security configuration actually works — not just whether it's present.

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What it does

Database Sentinel performs a 7-step security audit on whichever backend(s) your project uses:

1. Detects which backends you're using (Supabase, Firebase, MongoDB, self-hosted Postgres / MySQL)
2. Scans your codebase for exposed credentials, hardcoded keys, secrets in git
3. Introspects each backend — schema, policies, rules, users, roles, configuration
4. Matches findings against backend-specific anti-pattern catalogs sourced from CVEs, breach reports, CIS benchmarks, and 2025–2026 vibe-coding research
5. Dynamically probes with safe primitives (tx=rollback, canary collections, opt-in MongoBleed detector)
6. Generates a scored security report with plain-English explanations and concrete attacker scenarios
7. Produces exact fix code — SQL DDL, rule files, config diffs, Terraform — copy, paste, done

Cross-backend reasoning catches issues that single-backend scanners miss (e.g., a Firebase Auth UID trusted by a Postgres API without JWT verification).

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Status

Phase	Backend	Status
1	Supabase	✅ shipped
2	MongoDB (self-hosted + Atlas)	✅ shipped
3	Firebase (Firestore / RTDB / Storage / Functions / Remote Config)	🚧 planned
4	PostgreSQL (self-hosted, including pgBouncer)	🚧 planned
5	MySQL (self-hosted)	🚧 planned
6	Cross-backend interaction analysis	🚧 planned
7	Distribution + polish	🚧 planned

Database Sentinel was previously Supabase Sentinel (single-backend). The rename happened during Phase 1 of the multi-backend expansion. A backwards-compat shim at compat/supabase-sentinel/ preserves the old skill name through at least the next minor release — existing users see no regression.

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Quick start

Option 1: Claude Code / Cursor

Clone the skill into your project's skills directory, or a central one:

git clone https://github.com/Farenhytee/database-sentinel.git ~/claude-skills/database-sentinel

Then ask Claude:

Audit my database

Database Sentinel will detect which backend(s) your project uses, run the relevant audits, and produce a unified report. If multiple backends are present (Firebase Auth + Postgres data, etc.), the report includes a cross-backend interactions section once Phase 6 lands.

Option 2: Single-backend invocation

If you only want to audit a specific backend, ask explicitly:

Audit my Supabase project
Audit my MongoDB instance

The dispatcher narrows the scope.

Option 3: Manual (any AI assistant)

Copy the contents of SKILL.md plus the relevant backends/<name>/workflow.md into your system prompt. Walk through the 7 steps with your credentials.

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What it catches

Supabase (Phase 1) — 27 patterns

Severity	Pattern	What
🔴 CRITICAL	SB-001 RLS_DISABLED	Tables without Row-Level Security — fully exposed to the internet
🔴 CRITICAL	SB-002 SERVICE_ROLE_EXPOSED	service_role key in frontend code — bypasses ALL security
🔴 CRITICAL	SB-003 POLICIES_BUT_NO_RLS	Policies written but RLS never enabled — false security
🔴 CRITICAL	SB-005 WRITE_USING_TRUE	INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE with USING(true) — anyone can modify
🟠 HIGH	SB-006 USING_TRUE_SELECT	All rows readable by anonymous users on sensitive tables
🟠 HIGH	SB-007 VIEW_NO_SECURITY_INVOKER	Views bypass RLS, run as superuser
🟠 HIGH	SB-008 SECURITY_DEFINER_EXPOSED	Functions in public schema bypass RLS, callable via API
🟠 HIGH	SB-009 USER_METADATA_IN_POLICY	Policies reference user-modifiable metadata — privilege escalation
🟠 HIGH	SB-010 UPDATE_NO_WITHCHECK	UPDATE policies without WITH CHECK — mass assignment risk
🟠 HIGH	SB-011 GHOST_AUTH	Unconfirmed email signups grant authenticated sessions
🟠 HIGH	SB-012 STORAGE_NO_RLS	Storage bucket missing access control policies
🟠 HIGH	SB-013 JWT_SECRET_EXPOSED	JWT signing secret leaked — can forge any user's token
🟡 MEDIUM	+ 15 more patterns	See backends/supabase/anti-patterns.md

MongoDB (Phase 2) — 20 patterns

Severity	Pattern	What
🔴 CRITICAL	MG-SH-001 MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847, CISA KEV)	Pre-auth heap memory disclosure via crafted compressed packet. ~87K instances exposed at disclosure.
🔴 CRITICAL	MG-SH-002 Auth disabled	mongod running with no authentication — Meow ransomware attack surface
🔴 CRITICAL	MG-SH-003 Internet-bound mongod	--bind_ip_all + 27017 reachable — paired with MG-SH-002 for total compromise
🔴 CRITICAL	MG-AT-001 Atlas allowlist 0.0.0.0/0	Atlas cluster reachable from anywhere on the internet
🟠 HIGH	MG-SH-004 localhost auth bypass + container exec	enableLocalhostAuthBypass true + docker exec access
🟠 HIGH	MG-SH-005 Server-side JS enabled	$where / $function / mapReduce reachable — NoSQL-RCE surface
🟠 HIGH	MG-SH-006 TLS not required	Plaintext traffic on the wire
🟠 HIGH	MG-SH-007 Privileged role on app user	App connects as root / dbAdminAnyDatabase etc.
🟠 HIGH	MG-SH-008 Self-modifiable role document	findByIdAndUpdate(id, req.body) + no validator + role field
🟠 HIGH	MG-AT-002 Atlas Function as DB pass-through	NoSQL injection over HTTPS — proliferated post-Data-API-deprecation
🟠 HIGH	MG-AT-003 Atlas Data API still in code	Deprecated Sept 30 2025; broken AND likely rotated to less-audited Functions
🟡 MEDIUM	MG-SH-009 Mongoose < 8.9.5	CVE-2024-53900 / CVE-2025-23061 — populate-match $where injection
🟡 MEDIUM	+ 8 more patterns	See backends/mongodb/anti-patterns.md

The MongoBleed network probe (backends/mongodb/mongobleed-probe.md) ships a single-packet detector that confirms exploitability at runtime — verified against mongo:7.0.20 (vulnerable) and mongo:7.0.28 (patched). It's read-only, gated behind two opt-in confirmations, and never extracts content.

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Example output

╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║                  SENTINEL SECURITY AUDIT               ║
╠════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║  Backends:   supabase, mongodb                         ║
║  Scanned:    2026-04-30 14:30 UTC                      ║
║  Score:      0/100 🔴                                  ║
║  Summary:    2 backends, 8 findings (3C / 4H / 1M)     ║
╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  Supabase                                       35/100 🔴
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

🔴 CRITICAL — public.users: RLS Disabled                  [SB-001]

  Risk:     Anyone on the internet can read your entire users table.
  Attack:   Open browser DevTools → copy anon key → curl the API → dump
            all emails, names, and metadata.
  Proof:    curl returns [{"id":"...","email":"user@real.com",...}]
  Source:   CVE-2025-48757 / Splinter 0013_rls_disabled_in_public

  Fix:
  ALTER TABLE public.users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

  CREATE POLICY "users_select_own"
    ON public.users FOR SELECT TO authenticated
    USING ((SELECT auth.uid()) = id);

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  MongoDB                                         0/100 🔴
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

🔴 CRITICAL — mongod 7.0.20: MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847)  [MG-SH-001]

  Risk:     A single TCP packet leaks fragments of MongoDB's memory —
            including credentials, queries, and document data — without
            requiring any login.
  Attack:   Public PoC available since Dec 26 2025; CISA KEV. Repeated
            requests progressively dump more of the working set.
  Proof:    buildInfo.version = "7.0.20" (vulnerable; patched in 7.0.28)
            zlib compression enabled (default): true
            Active probe returned: vulnerable (opCode=2012, 163 bytes)
  Source:   CVE-2025-14847 / CISA KEV / MongoDB Server Security Update Dec 2025

  Fix:
  Upgrade to 7.0.28+. Same-day mitigation if upgrade is blocked:
  net.compression.compressors = "snappy,zstd"  in mongod.conf

✅ PASSING — Supabase: orders, payments, invoices, subscriptions

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File structure

database-sentinel/
├── SKILL.md                                # Dispatcher — detects backends, routes audits (~2K tokens)
├── DECISIONS.md                            # Locked architecture decisions (D1-D4 + supersessions)
├── core/
│   ├── workflow.md                         # Universal 7-step audit workflow
│   ├── detection.md                        # Backend detection + JSON manifest
│   ├── scoring.md                          # Per-backend weights, min-aggregation
│   ├── reporting.md                        # Unified report format (text + JSON)
│   └── credentials.md                      # Public-vs-privileged key handling
├── backends/
│   ├── supabase/                           # Phase 1 — implemented
│   │   ├── workflow.md                     # 7-step audit specialized for Supabase
│   │   ├── audit-queries.md                # 20 SQL queries for schema introspection
│   │   ├── anti-patterns.md                # 27 patterns (SB-001..SB-027)
│   │   └── fix-templates.md                # SQL fix templates (7 RLS patterns + more)
│   └── mongodb/                            # Phase 2 — implemented
│       ├── workflow.md                     # 7-step audit specialized for MongoDB
│       ├── introspection.md                # mongosh + Atlas Admin API + IaC scan
│       ├── anti-patterns.md                # 20 patterns (MG-SH-001..014, MG-AT-001..006)
│       ├── mongobleed-probe.md             # Safe CVE-2025-14847 single-packet detector
│       ├── fix-templates.md                # Version matrix + mongod.conf + validators + Atlas TF
│       └── test-recipe.md                  # Document-only end-to-end test recipe
├── compat/
│   └── supabase-sentinel/                  # Backwards-compat shim (forces backend=supabase)
│       └── SKILL.md
├── references/
│   ├── vibe-coding-context.md              # CVE-2025-48757, breach studies — cross-backend
│   └── cve-feed.md                         # Cross-backend CVE list (MongoBleed seeded)
├── assets/
│   └── ci/
│       ├── github-action-supabase.yml      # 1 job — security audit
│       └── github-action-mongodb.yml       # 3 jobs — static IaC, live audit, MongoBleed probe
├── README.md                               # this file
├── LICENSE                                 # MIT
├── DECISIONS.md
└── sentinel-implementation-plan.md         # Multi-backend expansion roadmap

How progressive disclosure works: Claude loads only SKILL.md (~2K tokens) plus core/* initially. When detection identifies a backend, the matching backends/<name>/workflow.md and on-demand reference files load. A Supabase-only audit doesn't pay the cost of MongoDB content; future Firebase / Postgres / MySQL extensions follow the same pattern.

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Continuous monitoring (GitHub Actions)

Each implemented backend ships a CI workflow template:

Backend	Workflow	Job modes
Supabase	assets/ci/github-action-supabase.yml	Single job — security audit (introspection + dynamic probes)
MongoDB	assets/ci/github-action-mongodb.yml	Three jobs — static IaC scan (always runs, no secrets), live audit (gated on vars.AUDIT_LIVE == 'true'), MongoBleed probe (gated on vars.MONGOBLEED_PROBE == 'true' + ownership confirmation)

Workflows trigger on relevant file changes (migrations, rule files, IaC, dependency manifests), weekly cron (Monday 06:00 UTC), and manual dispatch. They post PR comments, upload report artifacts, and fail the build on critical findings.

Just ask: "Set up continuous security monitoring for this project."

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Research backing

Database Sentinel's anti-pattern database is sourced from:

Supabase / Firebase / vibe-coding ecosystem

• CVE-2025-48757 — 170+ Lovable apps exposed, CVSS 9.3 (Matt Palmer, May 2025)
• Escape.tech — 2,000+ vulnerabilities across 5,600 vibe-coded apps (October 2025)
• Veracode — 45% of AI-generated code introduces OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities (July 2025)
• Carnegie Mellon SusVibes — 82.8% of functionally correct AI code was insecure (December 2025)
• SupaExplorer — 11% of indie apps expose Supabase credentials (January 2026)
• ModernPentest — 20.1M rows exposed across 107 YC startups (March 2026)
• OpenFirebase / Icex0 (Sept 2025) — ~150 Firebase apps with unauthenticated read/write
• Zendata (May 2025) — 1.8M plaintext Firebase passwords leaked across 900+ apps
• GitGuardian — 19.8M Firebase secrets leaked in public GitHub
• Supabase Splinter — All 16 official security lints mapped and extended
• Wiz Research — Critical auth bypass in Base44 vibe-coding platform (July 2025)

MongoDB / Atlas

• CVE-2025-14847 "MongoBleed" (CVSS 8.7, CISA KEV) — pre-auth heap disclosure, ~87K exposed instances
• CVE-2024-53900 / CVE-2025-23061 — Mongoose populate-match $where injection
• CVE-2025-30706 — MongoDB Connector/J critical (Oracle CPU April 2025)
• MongoDB Atlas Data API deprecation (Sept 30 2025)
• Shadowserver / Meow ransomware tracking (continuing 2024–2025 sweeps)
• CIS MongoDB 7 Benchmark v1.2

See references/vibe-coding-context.md and references/cve-feed.md for the full citation set.

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What Database Sentinel catches that built-in tools miss

Backend	Built-in tool	What it misses	Database Sentinel covers
Supabase	Splinter (16 lints)	Whether policies actually prevent unauthorized access	Live tx=rollback testing of every CRUD path against every table
Supabase	Splinter	Ghost-auth (email-confirmation bypass)	Sign-up probe with .invalid TLD
Supabase	Splinter	Mass-assignment via UPDATE without WITH CHECK + sensitive columns	Cross-references column names with policy shape
Supabase	Splinter	Codebase scanning	Finds service_role keys in frontend code, hardcoded JWTs, committed .env files
MongoDB	Atlas Advisor	MongoBleed runtime confirmation	Single-packet protocol-level detector (verified against 7.0.20 + 7.0.28)
MongoDB	Atlas Advisor	Self-modifiable role documents	Source-pattern + collection-validator cross-check
MongoDB	Trivy / Aikido	Atlas-specific config (allowlists, IAM, CMK)	Direct Atlas Admin API audit
MongoDB	mongoaudit (abandoned 2018)	Active in 2025+	Maintained pattern catalog with 2025–2026 CVEs

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Safety

Database Sentinel is designed to be safe for production use:

• Default read-only. Introspection queries only read system catalogs (pg_tables, pg_policies, getCmdLineOpts, etc.). No DDL or DML by default.
• Write probes are opt-in. Per-backend strategy:
  • Supabase — Prefer: tx=rollback (PostgREST native; zero data modified)
  • Postgres self-hosted — BEGIN…ROLLBACK (transactional DDL)
  • MongoDB replica/sharded — session + abortTransaction()
  • MongoDB standalone — canary collection insert+delete (best-effort cleanup, framed as opt-in)
  • Firebase — canary collection at /_sentinel_probe/{random}
  • MySQL self-hosted — _sentinel_probe schema + DROP DATABASE (opt-in, destructive — explicit warning)
• Network probes (MongoBleed) are double-opt-in. Audit policy must enable network probes AND user must confirm host ownership separately. Some monitoring tools alert on the probe packet, even though it's a single 42-byte read-only test.
• Auth probes use .invalid TLD. Test emails use RFC 6761 reserved domains that cannot receive mail.
• Credentials never stored. Held in memory for the audit, discarded at end. Reports redact credential values.
• Open source. Audit the auditor — every query, probe, and pattern is in this repo.

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Contributing

Contributions are welcome. The most valuable contributions:

1. New anti-patterns — Found a security issue not in our database? Add it to the relevant backends/<name>/anti-patterns.md with severity, detection query, fix code, and real-world evidence (CVE / breach / Splinter / CIS).
2. Fix template improvements — Better policy patterns, edge cases, or performance optimizations in backends/<name>/fix-templates.md.
3. Live testing — Run Database Sentinel against your own backends and report false positives / negatives. Live testing is what caught three real bugs during Phase 2 (see backends/mongodb/mongobleed-probe.md "Empirically verified" annotations).
4. New backend extensions — Phases 3–5 are open. Follow the structure of backends/mongodb/ and backends/supabase/. The implementation plan (sentinel-implementation-plan.md) has the contract for each.
5. Vibe-coding pattern attribution — When you find a pattern that's plausibly AI-generated by Cursor / Bolt / Lovable / Claude Code, document it. This is the project's wedge.

How to contribute

1. Fork the repo
2. Branch (git checkout -b add-new-pattern)
3. Add your changes with clear documentation and citations
4. PR with a description of the pattern and evidence

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Roadmap

Shipping next

• Phase 3 — Firebase (Firestore + RTDB + Storage + Cloud Functions + Remote Config + App Check). The largest extension; sub-modules per Firebase product to manage token budget.
• Phase 4 — PostgreSQL self-hosted, including pgBouncer (CVE-2025-12819 detection)
• Phase 5 — MySQL self-hosted (Oracle CPU CVE coverage; mysql_native_password deprecation handling for 8.4+)
• Phase 6 — Cross-backend interaction analysis (Firebase Auth → Postgres trust paths, etc.)
• Phase 7 — README polish (this), BACKENDS.md quick reference, deprecation timeline for the supabase-sentinel shim

Future

• CLI tool — npx database-sentinel audit for non-Claude environments
• MCP server — programmatic access for CI/CD and dashboards
• VS Code extension — inline security warnings in the editor
• Premium dashboard — historical trending, multi-project views, Slack alerts

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Naming history

• Supabase Sentinel (v1) — single-backend Supabase auditor. Original release.
• Sentinel (working name during Phase 1 architectural refactor)
• DB Sentinel (v2, transitional working name during multi-backend rollout)
• Database Sentinel (v3, current) — multi-backend; full word "database" for explicit skill-discovery framing and to match the GitHub repo name

The supabase-sentinel skill name still works via the compat shim at compat/supabase-sentinel/. It forces the audit to Supabase only and produces output indistinguishable from v1. Sunset date: TBD; through at least the next minor release.

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License

MIT — use it however you want, commercially or otherwise.

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Built for the vibe-coding era.
Because "it works" and "it's secure" are two very different things.