-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 395
Description
Lines 407 to 416 in 4e023af
| if ((nPseudo == 0 && issuance_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && issuance_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid()) || | |
| (nPseudo == 1 && token_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && token_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid())) { | |
| num_blind_attempts++; | |
| num_issuance_blind_attempts++; | |
| CAssetIssuance& issuance = tx.vin[nIn].assetIssuance; | |
| // First iteration does issuance asset, second inflation keys | |
| CConfidentialValue& conf_value = nPseudo ? issuance.nInflationKeys : issuance.nAmount; | |
| if (conf_value.IsNull()) { | |
| continue; | |
| } |
If the issuance blinding key or token blinding key is specified for the input when calling BlindTransaction, but the transaction input itself have null value in issuance.nInflationKeys/issuance.nAmount, then num_blind_attempts will be incremented, while the size of value_blindptrs and asset_blindptrs will not be increased with another 32 bytes of random data.
(the same issue can happen with continue at
Lines 434 to 435 in 4e023af
| // Re-issuance only has one pseudo-input maximum | |
| continue; |
If num_blind_attempts is larger than the size *_blindptrs arrays, secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum that is called later can go over the size of the arrays, because there's no check that the sizes are equal to num_blind_attempts + num_known_input_blinds. This can cause crash. secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum will also write to the last blinder, and this can cause memory corruption.
Of course this is only possible by the calling C++ code being incorrect, supplying wrong transaction data, etc. But this raises the question - are these continue statements actually needed ? Wouldn't it be better to replace them with returning failure ? It seems that in both cases, either the transaction structure is wrong, or the arguments issuance_blinding_privkey/token_blinding_privkey are wrong.