feat: swap to using the git CLI directly #14
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,164 +1,172 @@ | ||
| package main | ||
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| import ( | ||
| "bufio" | ||
| "bytes" | ||
| "fmt" | ||
| "os/exec" | ||
| "strings" | ||
| ) | ||
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| type Repository struct { | ||
| path string | ||
| } | ||
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| // Returns a Change for each supplied commit | ||
| func (r *Repository) Changes(commits ...string) ([]Change, error) { | ||
| changes := make([]Change, len(commits)) | ||
| for i, h := range commits { | ||
| change, err := r.changed(h) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("get change %s: %w", h, err) | ||
| } | ||
| changes[i] = change | ||
| } | ||
| return changes, nil | ||
| } | ||
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| // Returns a Change for the specific commit | ||
| func (r *Repository) changed(commit string) (Change, error) { | ||
| // First, make sure the commit looks like a commit hash | ||
| // While technically all of our calls would work with references such as HEAD, | ||
| // refs/heads/branch, refs/tags/etc we're going to require callers provide things that look like | ||
| // commits. | ||
| if !hashRegex.MatchString(commit) { | ||
| return Change{}, fmt.Errorf("commit %q does not look like a commit, should be at least 4 hexadecimal digits.", commit) | ||
| } | ||
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| parents, author, message, err := r.catfile(commit) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return Change{}, err | ||
| } | ||
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| if len(parents) > 1 { | ||
| return Change{}, fmt.Errorf("range includes a merge commit (%s), not continuing", commit) | ||
| } | ||
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| headline, body, _ := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(message), "\n") | ||
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| if body != "" { | ||
| body += "\n\n" | ||
| } | ||
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| body = fmt.Sprintf("%sCo-authored-by: %s", body, author) | ||
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| change := Change{ | ||
| hash: commit, | ||
| Headline: headline, | ||
| Body: body, | ||
| Changes: map[string][]byte{}, | ||
| } | ||
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| change.Changes, err = r.changedFiles(commit) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return Change{}, err | ||
| } | ||
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| return change, nil | ||
| } | ||
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| func (r *Repository) catfile(commit string) ([]string, string, string, error) { | ||
| cmd := exec.Command("git", "cat-file", "commit", commit) | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🔴 High: Code VulnerabilityCheck command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `commit` may need to be validated (...read more)In Go, the Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data, or if you must, always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to How to remediate?Either remove the user-controlled data, filter the potential command with a list of allowed command or sanitize the command before execution.
Collaborator
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Commit hashes are validated in the calling function. |
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| cmd.Dir = r.path | ||
| out, err := cmd.Output() | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return nil, "", "", err | ||
| } | ||
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| parents := []string{} | ||
| author, message := "", "" | ||
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| scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out)) | ||
| for scanner.Scan() { | ||
| ln := scanner.Text() | ||
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| // End of headers, start of message | ||
| if ln == "" { | ||
| break | ||
| } | ||
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| key, value, _ := strings.Cut(ln, " ") | ||
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| switch key { | ||
| case "parent": | ||
| parents = append(parents, value) | ||
| case "author": | ||
| // author line is First Last <email@domain.com> timestamp timezone | ||
| // so we can just grab up to the last > | ||
| marker := strings.LastIndex(value, ">") | ||
| if marker == -1 { | ||
| // no author, or malformed, so make one up | ||
| log("Author is malformed, using a placeholder.\n") | ||
| log(" Malformed: %s\n", value) | ||
| author = "Commit Headless <commit-headless-bot@datadoghq.com>" | ||
| } else { | ||
| author = value[:marker+1] | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| mb := &strings.Builder{} | ||
| for scanner.Scan() { | ||
| mb.WriteString(scanner.Text()) | ||
| mb.WriteString("\n") | ||
| } | ||
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| message = strings.TrimSpace(mb.String()) | ||
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| if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { | ||
| return nil, "", "", err | ||
| } | ||
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| return parents, author, message, nil | ||
| } | ||
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| // Returns the files changed in the given commit, along with their contents | ||
| // Deleted files will have an empty value | ||
| func (r *Repository) changedFiles(commit string) (map[string][]byte, error) { | ||
| cmd := exec.Command("git", "diff-tree", "--no-commit-id", "--name-status", "-r", commit) | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🔴 High: Code VulnerabilityCheck command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `commit` may need to be validated (...read more)In Go, the Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data, or if you must, always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to How to remediate?Either remove the user-controlled data, filter the potential command with a list of allowed command or sanitize the command before execution.
Collaborator
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Commit hashes are validated in the calling function. There was a problem hiding this comment. 🔴 High: Code VulnerabilityCheck command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `commit` may need to be validated (...read more)In Go, the Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches. Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data, or if you must, always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to How to remediate?Either remove the user-controlled data, filter the potential command with a list of allowed command or sanitize the command before execution.
Collaborator
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Commit hashes are validated in the calling function. |
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| cmd.Dir = r.path | ||
| out, err := cmd.Output() | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return nil, err | ||
| } | ||
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| changes := map[string][]byte{} | ||
| scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out)) | ||
| for scanner.Scan() { | ||
| ln := scanner.Text() | ||
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| status, value, _ := strings.Cut(ln, "\t") | ||
| switch { | ||
| case status == "A" || status == "M": | ||
| contents, err := r.fileContent(commit, value) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("get content %s:%s: %w", commit, value, err) | ||
| } | ||
| changes[value] = contents | ||
| case strings.HasPrefix(status, "R"): // Renames may have a similarity score after the R | ||
| from, to, _ := strings.Cut(value, "\t") | ||
| changes[from] = []byte{} | ||
| contents, err := r.fileContent(commit, to) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| return nil, fmt.Errorf("get content %s:%s: %w", commit, to, err) | ||
| } | ||
| changes[to] = contents | ||
| case status == "D": | ||
| changes[value] = []byte{} | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { | ||
| return nil, err | ||
| } | ||
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| return changes, nil | ||
| } | ||
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| func (r *Repository) fileContent(commit, path string) ([]byte, error) { | ||
| cmd := exec.Command("git", "cat-file", "blob", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", commit, path)) | ||
| cmd.Dir = r.path | ||
| return cmd.Output() | ||
| } | ||
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🔴 High: Code Vulnerability
Check command call and ensure there is no unsanitized data used. The variable `commit` may need to be validated (...read more)
In Go, the
exec.Commandfunction is used to run external commands. Using this function carelessly can lead to command injection vulnerabilities. Carefully review the data flow that leads to a command execution and ensures no data can be injected by a third-party.Command injection occurs when untrusted input is passed directly to a system shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This can result in unauthorized access to the system, data leaks, or other security breaches.
Avoid executing commands constructed using user-provided data, or if you must, always validate and sanitize user inputs before passing them to
exec.Command.How to remediate?
Either remove the user-controlled data, filter the potential command with a list of allowed command or sanitize the command before execution.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Commit hashes are validated in the calling function.